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NINTH IRAQI BA'TH PARTY CONGRESS REPORT

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IRAQI BA'TH PARTY CONGRESS REPORT; PARTS I, II

JN281230 Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 26-27 Jan 83

[Text of the first installment of the central report of the Ninth Regional Congress of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party held 24-27 June 1982]

[26 Jan 83 pp 7-10]

[Text] Foreword

Between the Eighth Regional Congress held in January 1974 and the Ninth Regional Congress held in June 1982, the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party and its revolution in Iraq went through a long phase marked by major events and great achievements.

If the phase preceding the Eighth Congress was essentially distinguished by being the phase of entrenching the revolutionary authority, preserving national unity, waging the battles of steadfastness against imperialist and reactionary conspiracies and forging the difficult course of determining the identity of the revolution and the party after a long period of setbacks, divisions, deviations and distortions, the phase succeeding the Eighth Regional Congress, although it maintained the same features of the previous phase and fought some of its battles, was essentially distinguished by being the phase of the stability of the revolution and its continuation and prosperity in all fields.

The Eighth Regional Congress was indeed unique among all previous party congresses. One of its important characteristics was that it presented a comprehensive analysis of the phase preceding it and formulated a comprehensive program for the phase succeeding it. Above all, the congress sought to establish an interacting, conscious link between revolutionary principles and the tangible, objective reality and to make its analysis of the previous phase equitable and precise.

That might seem the natural thing to do, but it was not the case in the past. In the experience of the Arab revolution movement and the past experiences of this party, congresses and other party activities were not conducted in such a revolutionary, realistic, precise and equitable manner. Such qualities require extraordinary effort, true adherence to principles, a correct view of things, suitable conditions within the party and also suitable local conditions.

A comprehensive analysis of a previous phase is not an easy process because of two basic considerations: First, such a process is complicated by many ideological, political, economic, social and psychological factors, which are not easy to access or draw correct conclusions from which will be convincing to the masses and the party and constitute a basis for unifying ranks. Second, the great difficulty of balancing between the criticism of mistakes and negative points in a previous course without sometimes drifting into the negative, subversive and destructive tendency of serving personal ends and the drawing of positive and strong elements from that course which will maintain the flame of revolutionary action, preserve the spirit of optimism and open bright vistas for the future for the party strugglers and the masses of the people.

The Eighth Regional Congress has succeeded splendidly in all that.

The congress itself is to be credited for making the next phase most distinguished by its stability, unity and clarity in the life of the party and its ideological, political and organizational activities. The party came out from the congress with a comprehensive, precise, equitable and agreed upon comprehensive analysis of the previous phase. It also came out with a revolutionary, realistic and agreed upon comprehensive program for the next phase.

With the political report produced by the congress, the party and the masses possessed a central document specifying the work program in all fields. Thus, the party strugglers and the masses of the people were in a better position than in the previous phase to achieve the objectives of the revolution.

The citizen who believed in the principles of the party and the revolution and who saw in those principles a fulfillment of his ambitions and interests, was also in a better position to interact with the party and to participate in the revolutionary process led by the party.

This was a great achievement in revolutionary action. When the will and efforts of the revolutionary strugglers are united under the banner of one clear and convincing program, and when such a program is understood and backed by the masses, then it is possible to make great achievements. This was exactly what happened during the phase between the Eighth and Ninth Congresses.

The previous stage was characterized by a prominent historic event. It was Comrade Saddam Husayn's assumption of official and leading responsibility in the party and the state on 16 July 1979. It was well known to the party and the people right from the beginning that it was struggler Saddam Husayn who led the party and revolution, defining their principal trends, solving their complicated problems and facing the difficult and crucial dangers menacing us. This took place within the framework of a party and constitutional status abounding with hardships and complications. Therefore, the last period of the previous stage which began on the day struggler Saddam Husayn officially assumed leading responsibility and which continued until the convocation of this congress was characterized by clearer definition of aims and concepts, great capability to decide and confront dangers and plots and a strong dynamism in pushing the march ahead. We can objectively and sincerely say that during this period the real face of the party and its revolutionary experience in Iraq was made perfectly

clear on the largest possible scale. Moreover, the experience moved ahead according to its natural trend and acquired the greatest ability to confront the external and internal dangers.

The Ninth Regional Congress was held at a time when the party and the masses feel that the permanent slogan of the revolution as declared by struggler Saddam Husayn has been accomplished and turned into a fact in the party's life and in the life of the people in every walk of life and in every part of the society.

The general prevalent feeling is that of strength, determination, optimism and great confidence in the future. This is not because the current circumstances are not fraught with dangers and difficulties. On the contrary, it is because these circumstances in particular have witnessed the gravest dangers and difficulties, headed by the Iranian regime's aggression against the homeland and the escalation of the Zionist aggression until it reached a very delicate stage represented by the Zionist raid against the nuclear reactor on 7 June 1981 and the Zionist invasion of Lebanon in June 1982. This feeling stems from the deep and true conviction that the party and the revolution have become so strong that they can achieve their aims. The party strugglers and the people's masses are now required to work hard and fight bravely under the banner of the party and the revolution and under the leadership of struggler Saddam Husayn.

The party's strugglers and the people's masses consider the Ninth Regional Congress a new and strong starting point in the march of the party and revolution. The main task of this congress was to identify the landmarks of the previous stage and analyze them in a comprehensive, accurate and fair manner, draw up a revolutionary program that is realistic, comprehensive and absorbs both the current circumstances with all their dangers and complications and the forthcoming stage. Many aspects of the analysis made by the congress were neither new nor surprising because the period between the Eighth and Ninth Congresses was characterized by the prosperity of the party's ideological activity. It was particularly characterized by the prosperity of struggler Saddam Husayn's ideological activity and continuous work to analyze the basic phenomena, find solutions to problems, deal with standing difficulties, face all forms of dangers and develop the Ba'thist theory of action in the various fields of life. Accordingly, the congress did its best to identify and analyze the previous stage, crystallize it in the framework of a central party document and add to it new elements derived from life and experience. The program of the party and revolution in the coming stage will certainly be a continuation of their fixed programs that stem from principles. However, this program will interact with the new circumstances and the current and future dangers facing the homeland, the party and the revolution as well as with the newly discovered facts. This program will sincerely and scientifically try to interact with the ongoing movement of life.

The line on which this report is based is as follows:

1. Giving a general picture of the party's internal life and the particular circumstances of the revolution during the previous stage; describing the basic landmarks of the historic role played under the leadership of struggler Saddam Husayn in the party's construction process after the October setback

and the 17-30 July 1968 revolution; and highlighting this leadership's steadfastness and development until it reached this splendid level.

2. Reviewing the political, economic, social and other aims drawn up by the political report of the Eighth Regional Congress; specifying what has or has not been achieved of these aims; and pointing out the reasons and circumstances leading to this.

3. Reviewing the ideas and trends contained in the political report of the Eighth Congress in light of the experience acquired by the party during its past march and the theoretical and practical discoveries it made.

4. Specifying the ideas, trends and political aims of the coming stage in flight of the party's principles, circumstances and present capabilities, as well as in light of the present capabilities of the revolution and people, the party's rich experience in life, the discovered facts of life, the grave dangers facing the homeland, the party and the revolution and the current objective circumstances on the regional, Pan-Arab and international levels.

Preamble:

The Ninth Regional Congress was held in Baghdad from 24-27 June, 1982.

The congress was opened by Comrade Saddam Husayn, secretary general of the regional command.

Comrade Saddam Husayn delivered a guidance speech to the conferees in which he said: In this session, and in view of the special circumstances experienced by the revolution and great Iraq and of the special tests you have passed, you are rightly and generally considered the vanguard of the party. You are the cavaliers of our great people and its living conscience. You are its eyes which must not sleep and its voice in the forefront which must not remain silent when the truth must be spoken or must not be lowered when the situation calls for a loud, clear and strong voice.

The president then said: On the occasion of the convocation of this congress, I would like to extend my greetings to the comrade members of the congress and to say how pleased I am with the convocation of the congress. I would also like to extend my heartfelt congratulations to those comrades who won the confidence of their comrades in the lower party ranks and are representing the party conscience and ideology at this congress. I am hopeful and confident that you will be up to the great confidence of your comrades who entrusted you with this great historical responsibility which through the correct performance of your duties, will be in the proper framework and will open vistas for future hopes and responsibilities which inspire confidence and reassurance.

Discussing the choice of leaderships through elections, Comrade Leader Saddam Husayn said the choice should be made from among those who are known for their solid struggle and absolute faith in the principles and in the people. Leader Saddam Husayn specified to the congress the conditions which he considers essential in selecting a member of the regional command. They are:

1. Great and extraordinary courage in adversity. I mean that the most important criterion of courage is the ability to make brave decisions based absolute faith in the struggle of the party and the people, no matter how shaky and confused the picture may seem at times.

2. Absolute or semi-absolute abstinence from anything in excess of the needs for a balanced life and the legitimate future requirements of the Ba'thist struggler and his family.

3. Faith in and a desire for perseverance in applying the principles from his post in the party, government or society, Thus traditional supervision becomes essential only over party ranks below the higher leadership. The conduct of the members of the higher leadership must not be governed by the supervision of the regional secretary general of the party, but by their Ba'thist conscience and the honor and responsibility of leadership. They are the ones that should govern the conduct of the members of the regional command at all times and under all circumstances so the regional secretary general can devote himself to his supervisory, leadership and educational role and his other tasks.

4. Absolute faith in the importance and necessity for the independence of Iraq and the party so we can protect our revolutionary experiment from the interference and evils of outside foreign and Arab currents.

5. Faith and personality must not be shaken by anachronistic and international ideological currents. The party's ideology should be considered as the only ideology which can forge the course of life which the Ba'thist seeks for himself.

The comrade leader then addressed the conferees, saying:

Dear comrades: In a relatively short time your party and its revolution have given to the people, the homeland and the nation what no other party has given, and which I must warn you of, is that the enemies of the revolution and the party have succeeded during the previous phase in influencing some Iraqis, especially youths and workers who have been lavishly provided by the revolution, and they have joined their ranks. I am aware of the great international and regional forces working against the revolution. I am also aware of the reasons which make all these forces vie with one another over the revolution. I also know that if we change our attitude toward the reasons which made these forces work against the party and the revolution, we would be departing from our principled stands and ignoring the interests of our great people. But this will never occur to us in the least. Still, I believe that had we acted and considered matters as necessary at all party levels, we would have foiled the enemy plans, and our enemies would have won over a smaller number of deviate elements from circles which are considered supporters of the party and the revolution. The revolution and its party have given the people what the people themselves have never dreamed of achieving in such a comparative time. What is it that counterrevolutionary forces say to public circles to win them to their side, no matter how few are converted? Do they say: Come and work with us against the revolution, which has fed the hungry, clothed the naked and provided a life insurance for every person, a clear insurance for the bereaved family and salaries for orphans, widows, disabled, the retarded and old people?

The revolution and its leadership studied thoroughly the people's social and living conditions thoroughly and introduced advanced laws, such as the social security law, and put forward human visions of future conditions of workers, peasants and the military as well as the conditions of women and their social and legal status, family, maternity and childhood and adopted the necessary requirements for all that. The revolution established a strong and prosperous Iraq which is in a noble position on the Arab and international levels. Furthermore, the revolution has achieved great accomplishments, such as nationalization, autonomy, and the progressive front, and has made much progress culturally, educationally and in other fields.

If this is the case, and it is certainly to the point of astonishment, then the enemy's winning over of elements who are, technically and revolutionarily considered part of the people, indicates a fault to be borne by the party, in the place and at the level concerned. The most striking thing in this fault is a flaw in the ideological and principled strength of some party officials or their inability and incompetence to outline the party's principles in the right style and according to the program. It also indicates their failure to disclose the enemy's methods and nature or to outline what should be made available or stressed among the lower-level party circles.

Our enemies' style in this stage is to stir up the different anachronistic backward, social and religious concepts. They do this to feed the counter-revolution. The style is colored with cheating, charlatantry, lying and trickery, and varies according to the objectives of the psychological war. Hence, the starting point of our confrontation of the enemies is to stay in close contact with the masses, expose their styles, outline the information and make it available to the people, focus on it and, using the most influential method, whether direct or indirect, uncover the enemies' objectives. First we have to immunize our families, friends and acquaintances against the impact of countertrends. This must be one of the basic duties of struggle. If we do so, we will have not only isolated this immunized community from the negative influence of the counterpowers but also changed it into an acting community to warn and immunize the people, in the most effective possible way to block the enemies' propaganda and methods aimed against the revolution. What is wanted is a party organization--which now covers every part in Iraq--that really believes in the principles and expresses these principles through practice free from any weakness or reluctance. In order to guarantee this, we have to see that the basic measures by which we assess the sincerity of action and thinking are established on the fact that party members holding state posts must work with objectivity, competence and fairness, and must apply the programs, laws and instructions they are assigned to implement, seriously and carefully--provided that the hostile, unloyal and inactive elements disappear--in their reason of action and responsibility, the sincerity and competence in the community in which the party member are working must increase in time. If this task is not achieved, we have to consider those party members insincere or at least incompetent. This means that we give them other posts and replace them by more competent elements. If those elements are insincere, then we have to deal with them differently.

As for the party responsibilities, we have to assess the party members' sincerity and competence in the various governorates and district offices, taking into consideration the size of the revolution, the party's enemies and whether the number of negative elements among the people in each area has decreased. We must also assess the masses' enthusiasm for the revolution and whether the party has increased and the awareness, and ideological and moral immunity, which is based on the party's principles and measures in each stage, have been developed.

These concepts are based on the knowledge that the Iraqis have become socially and psychologically harmonious or to a large extent close to each other. Therefore, the responsibility for any differences between one area and another and the difference in loyalty to the party and the revolution's march between one city and another should be borne by the party's organization in that area or city.

These are the concepts that should guide our observance of the various phenomenon, our revolutionary duties in building the state, the party and the community, our confrontation of the enemies and our assessment of the party members, people and friends. I will deal with the comrades guided by these concepts according to their responsibilities.

Comrades, you may think that the difficulties facing the revolution are extraordinary. This is true and expected because the revolution the party is leading is extraordinary in the eyes of many. Accordingly, the men honored with posts of responsibility and leadership in this revolution are extraordinary. We have to compete among ourselves to meet this noble honor by sacrifice, persistent work and unexpired patience. The revolution that does not face serious difficulties cannot give birth to men capable of preserving its prosperity and defending it under all circumstances and in all stages.

Comrades: Had your revolution not encountered difficulties, it would have been hard for you to imagine your relations with the people, with yourselves and your principles. Your revolution would have certainly been transformed into a regime and you and the people would have become estranged from it. There would have been disappointment and frustration. Those who would believe in continuing the revolution within the framework of its original principles and concepts would be very few. The majority would have been corrupted by their stagnant life which would have been full of false appearances and social corruption. The revolution would transform into a regime. Some of the regime's men would preserve their revolution and reject any regime that might be taken as an alternative to it. Others would be very impotent and irreflective and would succumb to the alternative regime and become part of it. Thus, the revolution would lose its historical role and the masses their aspirations. Those who would like to continue the revolution would have to start the struggle from the beginning, either with our party or in any other way.

Had our party not encountered difficult circumstances in its early formation, it would not have been able to achieve a revolution like the July revolution. It would have been transformed into another party with no relation whatsoever to the party which we knew and to which we were affiliated.

Thus, dear comrades, the broad basis made from among the struggler Ba'thists and the people who meet the requirements of secret work became broader. Now the strugglers are in thousands and not in hundreds. The difficulties which faced the revolution, particularly the second al-Qadisiyah, have been solved. A conflict appeared between the desire to broaden the party basis and the fear that such an expansion would be a burden to the party and a means to infiltrate the party and kill it from within. These difficult circumstances played an educational role in building the party and the people, making them reliable and providing guarantees for the present and the future. The builders among the people who experienced such difficulties increased in number. They learned to increase their firmness and awareness and their ability to sacrifice. But for these reasons, the great bulk of the party, which was formed after the revolution, would have been battered or deviated from the correct path.

After the revolution, and particularly during the past few years, the party faced a serious situation. We either had to keep the size of the party small with limited increases from the people, thus isolating it from the people and leaving the masses an easy prey for hostile currents and committing suicide for the reasons just mentioned, or increasing the size of the party because of its increasing role in the government and society and the need for renewal. To open the party for the people in the absence of difficult circumstances that would test the revolutionary values and the sincerity to the revolution would create a malignant tumor and suicide. The war, which is one of the most difficult cases faced by the revolution, turned out to be in a sense the inescapable and necessary means not only to defend Iraq against the invaders but also to build a great Iraq in accordance with the principles of the party and the revolution, increase the number of the Ba'thist strugglers, increasing the people's awareness of their historical responsibilities and increasing their faith in the revolution after having sacrificed their blood to defend it. Our sacrifices, therefore, are very little compared with what we would have paid had we yielded to stagnation and surrender and had we not confronted the challenges.

Concluding, leader Saddam Husayn said: I believe that if man were convinced of his will and were confident of himself, he would be able to perform everything except the divine actions. Therefore, I am of the opinion that we will be able to realize our aims, God willing. Our enemies will fall one after the other and all the plots against Iraq and the revolution will be doomed. Our great people, under the leadership of our struggling party, will triumph in this battle and in all future battles to realize the new life, God willing.

In conclusion, I wish you success in your honorable task of struggle. You are playing a historical role in this congress. I hope that after this conference, every one of you will continue the struggle with firmness, determination and principled work. God grant you success. Peace be upon you.

The congress discussed in detail the central report presented to it by the Ba'th Party regional command. The congress commented on the report, made numerous observations and entrusted the regional command to prepare the report for publication in light of the congress' recommendations and observations, taking into consideration the developments which might take place during the period between the convening of the congress and the publication of the report.

It gives the regional command pleasure to present to the party strugglers and the masses of the nation the central report which was approved at the Ninth Regional Congress.

[Signed] The regional command, January 1983

Chapter I

Internal Life and the Particular Circumstances of the Party and Revolution

The party's internal life and the particular circumstances of the revolution constitute a primary element in defining its ability to construct and draft the features of its stage. It is not always possible to speak publicly about the internal life and the particular circumstances of the party and revolution. The leadership may be compelled sometimes to fold some pages down or to not disclose some aspects, even within the context of the internal work of the party and its leadership. This is not because this leadership wants to give itself the right to keep certain facts far from the party bases, but because raising any subject prematurely and disclosing any fact under inappropriate circumstances might produce harmful results to the march of the party and revolution. The enemies might unjustifiably benefit from these results.

This way of dealing with the internal life of the party and the particular circumstances of the revolution and the results this way of dealing might entail, such as patience which sometimes can reach the state of bitterness, emanates from the party's bitter experiences before the 17-30 July 1968 revolution. When strugglers and leaders in particular failed to deal properly with the facts of internal life and the facts of the particular circumstances of the revolution, feuds often emerged, contradictions exacerbated and disputes erupted without any objective justification. Hostile forces benefited from all this and dealt strikes at the entire party and entire revolution. This actually took place on 18 November 1963, and some of this also took place in February, 1966, in Syria.

If the experiment of the 17-30 July 1968 revolution which--out of all the party's previous experiments to assume power in Iraq and Syria, and out of several other experiments through which the Arab revolution in particular and the revolution's movement in the Third World in general had passed--were the revolutionary experiment which had successfully and distinguishly managed to forge ahead, reach maturity and advance, this would not mean that this experiment had not suffered bitter and difficult or rather serious circumstances. The experiment of the 17-30 July 1968 revolution actually suffered from all this, but despite this, it managed to continue, to reach maturity and to forge ahead.

Our special experiment in the party and other revolutionary experiments in the world have taught us over the past scores of years that such a remarkable experiment must have objective circumstances and components. This experiment cannot be attained by these circumstances and components only; the leaders themselves must play a crucial role, whether by complicating realities and circumstances and then erupting the conflict, or by bypassing the difficulties, enduring crises and dealing with the complex stages with wisdom, high level of morality and tremendous valor and effectiveness for the sake of safeguarding the march from explosion and stumbling and for the sake of supporting the march with all the ceaseless components of progress. This [is] what actually took place in the 17-30 July 1968 revolution experiment. Hence, the historical role of leader Saddam Husayn.

The objective loyalty toward the party and revolution, as well as toward the people and even toward the Arab revolution movement dictates that we, under this stage, handle this reality not by the motive of being fair to history only--and this in itself is essential--but also in order to grasp the essence of the previous march of the party and revolution, to solve the many puzzles that cropped up in our minds as strugglers and to understand the complexes which faced us. And what is more important is to pursue the sound road armed with more clarity, deeper convictions and more powerfully to realize the objectives of our party and revolution and serve our people and nation.

As strugglers we will recall those dark and critical days the party lived through following the 18 November 1963 plot and the state of confusion, loss and lack of confidence we experienced. Then we had our various and sometimes contradictory evaluations of the setback and its reasons. The party wrote much about that, and documents of basis value on the subject were issued. Despite that state of confusion and differences in judgment and evaluations, we as strugglers felt that among the most important reasons that led to the setback was the absence of a Ba'thist leader with integral qualities (principles, wisdom, courage, morals, patience, strategic mindedness and tactical ability) through which he could unify the Ba'thist strugglers, mobilize their huge potential, employ their great readiness for sacrifice and giving, solve their differences and end their contradictions, define priorities, outline the problems and face the enemies at the appropriate time and place.

That was something we agreed on at that time when, as strugglers, we felt in those critical circumstances the urgent, persistent and dire need for this requirement. Then in the middle of those bitter, difficult and complicated circumstance the indispensable leader emerged.

Comrade Saddam Husayn is neither the type of man who appears suddenly in a military coup nor one of those who assumes shape through a prolonged period of time and exists prior to his assumption of power, as in the case of parties and movements that operate publicly or partially publicly. Saddam Husayn emerged as a unique type and has developed under unique circumstances.

The party's work and organization were taking place then under strict secrecy because any form of working in the public then could have led to an oppressive and crushing blow to the party.

When the 18 November 1963 plot took place, it was accompanied and later followed by a split in the Ba'th party organization in Iraq. A few weeks later the split spread to the party's Pan-Arab organizations. Less than a year later, on 4 September 1964, a wide-scale blow was addressed to the party in Iraq where Comrade Saddam Husayn was arrested. In February 1966 there was a defection in the party in Syria.

In spite of those circumstances, the militant Ba'thists remained closely connected with international party life. They were aware of Comrade Saddam Husayn's role at that stage. They still recall that image of the valiant Ba'thist youth who abided by the party's orders and carried the gun to strike Dictator 'Abd al-Karim Qasim. The comrade Ba'thists still recall that image of Saddam Husayn

as a committed, brave and serious Ba'thist during the period of time he spent in exile in Egypt. They still remember him as a brilliant party member who bravely and clearly outlined the truth at the party's regional and Pan-Arab conferences during the 1963 Ramadan revolution, despite the critical circumstance and the terror which governed the party's internal life then. The comrade Ba'thists still remember how Saddam Husayn immediately after the setback bravely, persistently and with great faith, embarked on the reorganization of the party. They realize that it was he who played the basic role in preparing for the revolution and arranging to strike the 'Abd al-Salam 'Arif's regime in 1964. They all realize how Saddam Husayn valiantly faced the attempts to arrest him.

These were the signs of a new birth. Following his escape from prison in July 1966, the comrade Ba'thists felt that Saddam Husayn's presence among them would give them greater power and impetus to face the new split that developed after the February 1966 plot and would further help them to rebuild the party and enlarge its base.

Indeed, the party was protected against splits, reunited and had its organizational base extended. The party certainly became the first leader of the masses in Iraq and the first candidate to lead the anticipated revolutionary change.

The revolution process over the 'Arif regime and the party's assumption of political power were more complicated than the party's internal life and methods of struggle. The revolution and the assumption of power had different requirements and conditions then and witnessed various stages and difficulties that had to be conquered.

The Ninth Regional Congress Dealt with some aspects of the circumstances and the requirements which had accompanied that stage. The congress, however, did not deal with all of these aspects with adequate clarity, particularly the aspects pertaining to the party's internal life and the revolution's inherent circumstances.

When we speak about the revolution, more than 14 years after it was established, party, scientific and historical integrity dictate that we say that the 17 July revolution was a revolution in spirit and intentions, but that from a practical point of view it was a draft revolution and that the 30 July revolution was the real revolution, which we are now experiencing and whose course we are pursuing.

Had it not been completed by what took place on 30 July 1968, the changes on 17 July 1968 would have been a military coup with a rightwing reformation nature rather than a radical and comprehensive revolution. Nature rather than a radical and comprehensive revolution. Had the counterrevolution elements, such as 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Nayif, 'Abd al-Rahman al-Daud and others, succeeded in controlling the state of affairs, the 17 July changes would have really become a counterrevolution and the party, as well as all the people's aspirations for freedom, progress, independence and resurgence, would have been harmed.

Comrade Saddam Husayn masterminded the 17 July revolution. On the morning of 17 July, he was the first civilian struggler to drive the first tank which

stormed the presidential palace to proclaim the beginning of the revolution. But on 30 July, Saddam Husayn was the real leader of the revolution. He was the one who insisted on liquidating the counterrevolution forces as quickly as possible. He was the one who chose the time to carry out the revolution and to distribute the roles. He himself dealt the decisive blow, thus giving real birth to the revolution under whose canopy we are now living.

Through a long experience which has extended over many years, the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party, particularly in Iraq and Syria, has more than once demonstrated its capability to assume power. The Ba'th party has not experienced any difficulty in this respect, unlike some Arab parties which have aged without succeeding in assuming power. The party always had courageous civilian and military strugglers who were capable of striking this or that regime and assuming political power partially or completely. The party's principal and historical problem, however, had been how to maintain power, safeguard its Ba'thist identity and proceed forward on the road to fruition and enhancement of the Arab liberation movement.

Though Comrade Saddam Husayn played a leading and strategic role in the party's assumption of power from 17 to 30 July 1968, he is the first leader since 30 July 1968 to maintain power, elaborate its Ba'thist identity and proceed forward on the road to permanence, fruition and enlightenment.

The first and historical achievement that was scored thanks to his leadership and the maturity of the party and its basic cadres was his success, within the context of a revolutionary semi-peaceful, intelligent, intricate and patient operation; an operation which was at the same time a principled and firm one, to prevent the revolution from being depicted as a military coup, even after 30 July 1968, and to safeguard the identity of the revolution as being a revolution by the party.

Some ranking military officials in the party or those who joined the party because they had personal ambitions, did not have a party, popular and historical concept of the revolutionary operation and the role of the revolution, led by the party in one country, as being the basis for the Arab liberation movement because they lacked party and revolutionary maturity.

For them, the revolution was first of all in operation of vengeance against those who had usurped power from the party on 18 November 1963 and an operation from the top which resembled a superficial reformatory change which usually leads to a rightwing regime in the Arab countries and Third World countries and which fails to achieve the revolution's radical, democratic, social and cultural objectives and secure the necessary components for confronting imperialism, Zionism and reactionary forces.

Of course, this option was not possible with the party's continued participation in authority at any extent. The party rejected this option, and had it not been for the historic leadership that led the operation of safeguarding the authority's revolutionary Ba'th party identity a separation and explosion would have taken place, as we have said, between the party and those militarymen. The party would have been fragmented and become a group of conflicting and disputing trends and blocs, the majority of strugglers disappointed and desperate,

the entire experiment in all its elements would have failed and a black counterrevolution similar to the 18 November 1963 one would have occurred.

The second historic achievement which was realized thanks to the leadership of Comrade Saddam Husayn and the courage and alertness of the party's strugglers was the complete success in destroying all the conspiracies against the party plotted by the imperialist and reactionary forces, the adventurous factions, the rancorous political groups, the Syrian regime, the communist party shah regime in Iran and his local agents. All conspiratorial attempts within the party were also aborted.

This is never an ordinary achievement particularly under Iraq's complicated and difficult circumstances such as the political disruption that took place from 14 July 1958 and until the birth of the revolution, the rebellion in the north of the country, Iraq neighboring Iran, the control of monopolies of Iraq's basic resources, the escalation of covetous ambitions in Iraq and the multifaceted social and demographic situation in Iraq. This is a truly historic achievement, particularly since it was realized within the framework of the continuation of the revolutionary operation, its development and maturity as much as possible in accordance with the circumstances toward practicing democracy and developing the relationship with the masses.

We remember these days when struggler Saddam Husayn worked day and night effortlessly and with infinite patience. He worked behind the scenes within the framework of a company, whose name and status in the state, was known only by a few. He worked in the public relations office at the same time as he was officially regarded as the assistant secretary of the party's regional command, when he was actually the vice chairman of the revolution command council.

In those days, through very simple means and with the participation of a few of the courageous Ba'th strugglers, Comrade Saddam Husayn led the watch over the security of the revolution foiling one conspiracy after another, liquidating completely the nests of espionage and agency for Zionism, the United States, Britain, Iran, all the hostile forces that had covetous ambitions in Iraq, the Masonic networks and the group of adventurous officers within this state who lusted for power at any price. A great deal of this active, critical and dangerous work was undertaken secretly. The only information that was announced was that whose publication was deemed of interest for the revolution such as the destruction of the 1970 reactionary conspiracy and other attempts which were made public.

From the start, all the party's enemies and the hostile intelligences diagnosed the role of Comrade Saddam Husayn as the protector of the revolution. They were and still are taking into account the fact that no conspiracy can succeed unless it is aimed at leader Saddam Husayn. When all the external conspiracies against the party failed, the focus centered on conspiring from within the party and revolution. In this regard, Comrade Saddam Husayn, as always confronting this critical and dangerous form of conspiracy, was the prime target.

All of us remember those crucial hours of the July 1973 conspiracy which was perpetrated by several members of the leadership to take over control of the

party and revolution, to impose a strange ideological and moral course on them and to collude with imperialist hostile forces, the shah regime, the reactionaries and the Syrian regime.

At that time the party needed an iron fist to deal swift blows without any hesitation and a sharp chisel that could accurately separate the conspiratorial tendencies and tendencies of confusion entertained by some party members who were connected to the conspirators or may have sympathized with them but did not have their conspiratorial intentions.

At that time the party really needed a leader of unique caliber who could extirpate the cancer but keep the body strong and capable of development and offering. Comrade Saddam Husayn was the leader who did this successfully. Had it not been for this unique treatment the party would have been involved in an internal war of liquidation, would have adopted alien standards and its revolutionary experiment would have reached the brink of collapse and perhaps would have collapsed completely.

This was what took place in July 1979 when the treason and conspiracies of some members of the command were discovered along with participation of several members of the advanced cadre.

During these moments too, the party and its revolution found themselves facing a dangerous turning point. The intention at that time was to hamper Comrade Saddam Husayn's assumption of his legitimate responsibilities in the advanced command of the party and the revolution, and put the party and revolution in a state of confusion, loss and division so that the revolution and Iraq would become prey for the suspect regime of Hafiz al-Asad, the fanatical Iranian regime, foreign forces and the reactionary forces in the region, thus wiping out the party, the revolution and all the good and honest aspirations that the party strugglers and honest nationalists had been championing through the years for establishing a patriotic, revolutionary, strong and democratic experiment that would be completely independent and the basis of the Arab liberation movement and a center of enlightenment and support for this movement.

It is imperative that we discuss this vicious conspiracy which constituted one of the harshest blows that had been dealt to the party and the revolution in a series of conspiracies and vicious attempts against the revolution, Comrade Saddam Husayn and his historic role.

First of all, we must point out that after the 1973 conspiracy the sincere desire by the command not to prosecute some party members who had been connected to the conspirators in order to create a sound atmosphere and provide everyone with the opportunity to continue to serve the party and the revolution, regardless of the complexes and circumstances of the previous stage, was not a sufficient remedy for all as some of the party members continued to harbor hatred and to experience the effects of personal complexes which made them a fertile soil for the vicious conspiracy which was uncovered in 1979.

The 1979 conspiracy included several members of the command who had no right to lead the party and the revolution. All, without exception, had been given leading positions higher than their history and role in the party or personal qualifications qualified them for. Despite all this, they formed a gang which worked secretly within the party and used deception, maneuver and intrigue to harm the reputation of the strugglers and foment sedition within the command and the advanced cadre in preparation for assuming power in complete coordination with the agent regime in Syria and with several foreign parties which had agreed to strike the nationalist, Pan-Arab and independent Ba'thist trend; a trend which was democratic and against all forms of corruption.

Comrade Saddam Husayn was the firm and enlightened symbol of this trend. The conspirators were trying to bring about a situation similar to the one in Syria and in other regimes. In such regimes corruption prevails in the higher echelons of the state and foreign forces have many areas of influence. Such regimes are infested with hollow slogans that have no actual content or firm foundation upon which the country and the nation can base their confrontation of imperialism, Zionism and all the hostile forces that have covetous ambitions in Iraq and the Arab nation. The party succeeded in revealing and burying this malicious conspiracy and in punishing the conspirators for their crime, treachery and moral degeneration.

During these moments also, Comrade Saddam Husayn, with his unique equalities as leader and his noble ethics, was able to extract the cancer from the body and to maintain it alive and strong and at times stronger and more energetic. Despite bitterness over the conspiracy, the party was permeated by a sense of strength and optimism. Today we are living in this magnificent and unique stage not only in the history of our personal experiences but also in the history of revolutionary movement in the Arab homeland and the Third World.

Throughout the march of the revolution, at every turning point and in all the great achievements which were realized by the revolution, Comrade Saddam Husayn played the major role in taking the initiative, planning, confronting the difficulties and submitting solutions. Regarding the peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish issue, which we will discuss in detail in a special chapter, Comrade Saddam Husayn took the initiative in submitting the theoretical and political formulas. During contacts with the Brazani group at the time, and through his own initiative, a statement was issued on 10 March 1970 constituting the political and principled basis for a national settlement for the Kurdish issue. Since that day, and after the realization of the autonomous rule and the liquidation of the reactionary rebellion, Comrade Saddam Husayn masterminded all the theoretical, political, administrative, military, security, economic and psychological aspects of this complicated operation through his position in the leadership and his position as chairman of the higher committee for the affairs of the north.

Comrade Saddam Husayn also led the process of developing the national front--a process explained by the political report of the Eighth Regional Congress and particularly dealt with in this report. Comrade Saddam Husayn chaired the front's higher committee, led its principal activities and accurately diagnosed the difficulties facing it. We shall return to this in a special chapter on the front.

Comrade Saddam Husayn was a strategic and tactical leader of the oil nationalization process which is considered to be one of the biggest national, Pan-Arab and historical achievements. Through his special position in the leadership and his position in the presidency of the followup committee for oil affairs and the implementation of agreements, Comrade Saddam Husayn submitted a plan to entice the oil monopolies into negotiations. In the deadline period from 17 May 1972 to 1 June 1972 and on the day the historic nationalization decision was issued, he led the political and media campaigns and popular mobilization operation which prepared for this decision. He was the one who wisely and patiently dealt with the fears and hesitation that preceded the adoption of the decision. This remained a secret for many years known only to a few of the command members. He was also the one who led the long, arduous and complicated political, economic, psychological, media and even technical operation to make the nationalization process succeed and to tame the companies. He was also the one who concluded the agreement with France, which had a prominent role in rendering the nationalization process and the taming of monopolies a success. He was the one who laid down the firm and sound basis for the Iraqi oil policy which is today considered a marvelous example of sound and independent policy in this field. He was the one who watched over its implementation until it became a constant policy.

Comrade Saddam Husayn was the first to plan for comprehensive development in Iraq. This operation is nowadays considered the most successful development operation in the Arab homeland and in many Third World countries. Through this direct chairmanship of the planning council and his incessant work to formulate plans and implement them and through his unique qualities as leader, he has transformed the planning council and its commissions from technical bodies into political, economic and cultural restorums where theories and experiments are discussed and viewpoints and ideas are exchanged to achieve mature results.

Comrade Saddam Husayn formulated the strategy for nuclear research in Iraq. For many years he chaired the nuclear energy commission and formulated its strategic and tactical plans. He was also the one who signed major contracts with France and watched over this experiment, which is considered one of the most prominent achievements of the revolution.

Despite the fact that Comrade Saddam Husayn has kept away from direct supervision over the armed forces and the party's military organization for personal reasons, with the exception of the early stages of the revolution, he has continued through his position in the command, the state and through party means, which most of the time were difficult and complicated ones, to urge, encourage and sponsor the development of the armed forces, enhance their combat capabilities, and give chances to the loyal, brilliant and qualified commanders and officers. He has also worked to promote appreciation for the armed forces role in safeguard in the revolution, defending the sovereignty of the country and participating in the Pan-Arab battles within the framework of the mature and firm commitment to the revolution and to the party's firm command of the armed forces. He has also worked to promote respect for the values of party action and the need for them to conform to the sound army practices and values. He was the one who led the strategy for military industry and pursued its implementation.

In view of his position at the head of the higher committee in charge of the affairs of the north, Comrade Saddam Husayn--as shall be discussed in detail in Chapter V which deals with the Kurdish issue--used to supervise, sometimes directly and sometimes indirectly, the general course of the military operations against the reactionaries rebellion. This constituted an excellent opportunity for disseminating new ideas and methods among the Iraqi Army and in the battles it waged. These new ideas and methods constituted the general and important bases for building the Iraqi Armed Forces under the canopy of the revolution and have enabled the armed forces to become a strong and modern force, highly capable of performing excellent combat missions under very intricate political circumstances.

Comrade Saddam Husayn has been the leader and guide in the sphere of culture and information. He has transformed the office of culture and information which he chairs into an ideal school for the Ba'thists who are working in this field. The meetings of this office have been intellectual, political, cultural seminars as well as seminars of information of the first class. These meetings have been attended by a large number of the party's advanced cadres in addition to those who directly working in this field. Their presence at these meetings has shaped them, broadened their experience and opened new scores to them.

Under this formula, the organs of information and culture in the party have developed. Comrade Saddam Husayn has also encouraged brilliant poets, artists, authors and other outstanding potentials in this field who were inspired by his concept of the revolution and used their own means to express it.

Comrade Saddam Husayn, who played a prominent role in the organization of the party before the revolution, pursued this mission and role after the revolution. His many preoccupations in the revolutionary authority and the many tasks he had assumed, never distracted him from keeping up with organizing party affairs for safeguarding Ba'thist standards and values, securing the requirements for the party's ideological and practical development, protecting it from the erroneous and deviationist inclinations and trends, building relations with the masses on Ba'thist and democratic bases and widening its popular base.

Party strugglers and senior cadres know very well the great value of the hundreds of meetings and discussions held by Comrade Saddam Husayn in which he dealt with party organizational affairs, giving guidance and explaining and charting future courses and firmly warning, from a point of principle, against dangers, negative attitudes, bureaucracy and petrification.

Throughout the previous phase, with all its splendid achievements and successes as well as its hardships and bitter moments, the party strugglers have found in their Comrade Saddam Husayn the leader, the brother and the comrade who guided and protected them from harm, extricated them from difficult and complicated situations and opened before them the path of work, struggle and sacrifice.

From the outbreak of the revolution up to today, it has been Comrade Saddam Husayn who essentially charts the policy of the party and the revolution in

the Pan-Arab [qawmi] and international fields. He has also been the initiator of all the basic decisions which have been adopted in these fields.

He has carefully planned the method of conducting relations with the Arab countries and, at the same time, insured the right circumstances, within the means available, for promoting the activity of the party and revolutionary masses. In all major Pan-Arab [qawmiyah] crossroads, his opinion, analysis and proposals have first priority in the work of the leadership and turn into strategic and tactical plans for the party and the state.

In all major Pan-Arab events, the plans worked out by Comrade Saddam Husayn were in full harmony with the circumstances and requirements of the phase and they achieved their objectives. He led government delegations to most major conferences and important visits which set the bases for Iraq's Arab relations after the revolution.

Comrade Saddam Husayn was the one who formulated the strategy for Iraq's international relations. He was also the first to point out the need to diversify Iraq's international relations and to pay more attention to the upcoming centers of power in the world.

Comrade Saddam Husayn was the one who led high-level Iraqi delegations which visited foreign countries and set the bases for the relations with those countries. He was also the top negotiator with foreign leaders.

Comrade Saddam Husayn's role was not confined to the regional command field. Before assuming the top post of responsibility in the party and the government, Comrade Saddam Husayn did not officially occupy a leading post in the national command, but still his role as pointed out earlier, had an impact on the institutions of the national command. There, too, he was the initiator, planner and analyst.

Comrade Saddam Husayn played another role in history. For the first time in the history of the party, he formulated with precision and in a creative and rejuvenating manner the theory of Ba'thist action in the various fields. Before taking over power in the 17-30 July 1968 revolution, the party depended, in its struggle and activity, on general concepts and ideas which, no doubt, proved to be correct in the phases in which they were applied. But the party continued to lack an action theory for applying its principles when it assumed political power. This was one of the main causes of the party's setback in Iraq in 1963 and even in Syria.

Comrade Saddam Husayn managed to crystallize the Ba'thist theory of action which guided the party in its political, economic, social and organizational activities as well as in its relations with the masses and both Arab and international forces throughout the past stages. This crystallization of the Ba'thist theory of action was the outcome of persistent work and accurate profound observance of the progress of the revolutionary process, the difficulties and complications surrounding this process and the new facts emerging it. It was also the outcome of a lively contact with the party strugglers and the people's masses, a creative ideological work and a high preparedness for dialogue and interaction with opinions and facts. This theory is now the main guide for

the party's activities in all the above-mentioned fields. Comrade Saddam Husayn has thus achieved an important accomplishment in the history of the party and the revolution and in the march of the Arab revolution movement and the Third World revolution.

This top leading role in all fields was played by the man who was second in command in both the party and state from the official and protocol point of view. In most cases Comrade Saddam Husayn attributed this role and these accomplishments to the comrade who officially assumed the leadership or to the collective leadership, thereby showing selflessness out of good manners for the sake of protecting the march of the revolution from perils, crises and sensitivities, for years and years only those roles and accomplishments which were impossible to conceal surfaced. However, day after day the party and the people began to realize this fact.

This unique leading process was, in fact, one of the most difficult, complicated, accurate and sensitive processes and required unique qualities which could only be found in this distinguished leader. Had it not been for these qualities the party and revolution would have faced troubles, crises and even disasters. However, the march forged its way ahead despite all difficulties and perils--some of which were directly aimed against Comrade Saddam Husayn. Comrade Saddam Husayn and the other comrades in the leadership have preserved the high moral values, fulfilled the pledge and maintained the unity of the party. The march has thus continued to advance from one position to another.

As we have previously said all the enemies of the party, including the internal enemies, knew these facts. However, they tried to stir up seditions and plant mines. Comrade Saddam Husayn discovered all that and moved it away from the path of the party and revolution with patience that was not devoid of severe pain and with high and selfless morality. All this was done for the sake of the precious values and the basic interests of the party, the revolution and the country.

Thus, the significance of Saddam Husayn's assumption of the first post in the party and the revolution becomes amply clear. This assumption was completely legal from the viewpoint of the party and the constitution; it was carried out with a high level of moral values and behavior and was necessitated by the previous party march and the essential interests of the party, the revolution and the country.

Comrade Saddam Husayn's leadership of the party and the revolution was from the very beginning the historical necessity which was cherished by every honorable struggler in the party. This historical necessity was later transformed into a national necessity believed by all the honorable Iraqis who found in him the leader for whom they had been waiting for hundreds of years and who were convinced that he was leading them on the path of freedom, progress, dignity, pride and prosperity. To stress this fact in this congress, which is the highest legislative authority in the Iraqi Ba'th party and a historic occasion, does not stem from personal motives and is certainly far from what was termed in other experiments as the personality cult, this personality cult which is rejected by Comrade Saddam Husayn and other comrades and which is not

in tune with the Arab nation's traditions throughout history or with the Iraqi people's psychology, is qualitatively different from the term (the necessary leader) which has no resemblance to the personality cult. The necessary leader is the one in whom the party's and people hopes and interests are embodied during a certain historical period. Therefore, to promote the interests of the party and the people, this necessary leader must be preserved and must be adhered to genuinely and sincerely and within the democratic practices, the collective leadership and the sound national and party relationships. To abandon this necessity and deviate from its strategic line is not an individualistic line or an independent effort but an intentional and direct harm to the aspirations of the party and the people and their basic interests.

Under the leadership of Comrade Saddam Husayn, the party is filled with pride and optimism. It is more unified than ever before and is more capable of carrying out its duties and confronting dangers than at any other time in history. This also applies to the whole of Iraq.

Iraq, which has been suffering for centuries from foreign domination, humiliation, poverty, backwardness, tyranny and corruption, is not a newly-born Iraq; it is a free, dignified and strong Iraq; it is filled with hope in the future.

For the first time in many centuries, Iraqi nationalism has become the first bond for the people and the symbol for which the Iraqis are ready to die. For the first time also, this deep, strong and creative Iraqi nationalism is tied to the Pan-Arab, which is a tributary for its strength, forming a solid basis against the plots and machinations of the enemies. This is a great achievement by a great party for a great people led by the great leader Saddam Husayn.

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[Text] Chapter II: The National and Democratic Tasks.

The political report issued by the Eighth Regional Congress comprehensively, accurately and thoroughly dealt with the national and democratic tasks. It dealt with political independence and accurately defined the conditions that are needed to complete its components in Iraq and in Third World countries. It also dealt with issues of economic independence and stressed the importance of attaining it as a central pillar for safeguarding and strengthening political independence. The report also dealt with issues pertaining to the progressive front and the democratic process in the country in wake of the 17-30 July revolution. In all these vital fields, the Eighth Regional Congress had defined the objectives and tasks for the next stage.

What has been the nature of the course adopted by the revolution between the Eighth Congress and the present one in performing national and democratic tasks? What new developments have emerged in this field? Which objectives and tasks as defined by the Eighth Congress have been achieved? Which of these objectives and tasks have not been achieved and why?

1. Political Independence

After its establishment, the 17-30 July revolution waged a difficult and complicated battle to complete the tasks for political independence. It is true that Iraq was not colonized, had no foreign bases on its territory and there was no official or public foreign influence in it. National independence, however, was shaky and insecure. During the years that preceded the revolution, espionage networks spread throughout Iraq like a cancer allowing it to become an open arena for the activities of the intelligence services of Zionism, colonialism, Iran and other foreign countries. At that time, Iraq acutely lacked the crucial components for safeguarding its political independence such as a strong central authority, economic independence, balanced international relations and other factors which help to protect and consolidate independence.

As mentioned in the political report of the Eighth Regional Congress the party succeeded through its comprehensive national concept and its firm revolutionary will to remove all the circumstances which had threatened political independence in the country. The espionage networks were liquidated and no longer constituted a political threat. They became technical problems with which the competent authorities could easily deal with. A strong central national authority was also established and in 1974, the revolution waged a decisive battle against the forces of rebellion in the north and succeeded in wiping them out completely. In March 1975, and for the first time since 1961, the central authority imposed comprehensive control on that part of the homeland.

During the previous stage national maturity developed as well as the experience of the competent organs in safeguarding the components of the state and its secrets. These organs became more efficient and foiled all infiltration and penetration attempts. During the previous stage too emphasis was put on disseminating national, Pan-Arab and socialist culture whether in the sphere of education, information or culture. Despite the fact that noticeable progress has been achieved in this field, the party must pursue this course with increasing importance and concentration so that national, Pan-Arab and socialist culture will become the dominant and decisive factor in all walks of life for creating nationalist Pan-Arab and socialist citizens and protecting them from the negative aspects of foreign cultures while maintaining an inter reaction with useful foreign cultures and experiences.

The party's past experience of the national independence battle was deepened and it was realized that the issue is not specifically restricted to achievement of political independence but is closely related to the preservation of a free national will and the securing of political, economic, military and other requirements, particularly in confronting the large-scale, complicated national and Pan-Arab missions. Among these requirements are:

First: Establishment of evenhanded international relations with the various powers in the world, giving close consideration to national and Pan-Arab interests. Failing to do this will lead the country concerned into the orbit of a particular superpower or group of countries. In his speeches to Iraqi ambassadors in 1975, published in the book "Our Struggle and International Policy," Comrade Saddam Husayn underlined this problem and offered sound solutions to it. He confirmed the importance of diversifying Iraq's foreign

relations, particularly with world power centers and the developing centers, in order to bolster a free national will on the one hand and to provide better opportunities to secure national and Pan-Arab needs in all fields on the other.

Second: Diversification of weapons sources. This problem, which is significant in strengthening the political independence and free national will of all states, is very important and sensitive due to Iraq's special circumstances and the nature of its Pan-Arab missions.

For several years before and after the revolution, Iraq received its weapons from one source only, the Soviet Union, which generally cooperated well with Iraq in this regard. The revolution built up strong, well-prepared armed forces equipped with modern weapons.

From its strong concept of national independence and its experience, the revolution realized that dependence on only one source of weapons restricts the national will, particularly when the country has to fight large-scale military battles for various national or Pan-Arab reasons. In such circumstances, it is not possible to secure military requirements unless the source at least tacitly consents to supply the country with arms and ammunition.

Believing in this strategic vision, the leadership determined to follow a well-planned, firm policy to diversify arms sources. Accordingly, the revolution developed military relations with other socialist countries. Following this line, the revolution promoted relations with Yugoslavia and France in the field of armament and military equipment and made similar contacts with other states in Europe and elsewhere.

This policy yielded excellent results in the battle with the Iranian enemy. After we were forced to decisively and comprehensively confront the Iranian aggression, the Soviet Union completely halted all military supplies. The battle's requirements were abundantly and fortuitously secured, thanks to the sound policy of maintaining a large permanent reserve of military equipment, diversifying sources of weapons and adopting creative, daring methods to ensure our military needs. Despite this rupture [in Soviet military supplies], which lasted for a long time, our national armed forces remained very strong and were provided with most of their requirements. It may even be said that the armed forces' armament in certain spheres became better than it was before the battle.

The policy of diversifying weapon sources nowadays constitutes one of the main pillars of the policy of the revolution and is connected with the attempts to consolidate political independence and a free national will.

Third: The third aspect which is connected to the second aspect is the establishment of a national military industry.

The establishment of such an industry is necessary for strengthening national independence and a free national will. If it is not possible to produce all our armed forces' requirements, then it is possible and necessary to produce the major part of them through national production with emphasis on certain specific items in light of a clear conceptualization of the monopoly that some

sources of weapons impose on some specific kinds of weapons. This used to take place within the framework of specific calculations.

The command gave this issue special importance and great steps have been taken along this road. The circumstances of the war against the Iranian aggression have constituted a good incentive for development in this field.

Fourth: There is another issue which is closely linked to national independence. This issue of the Iranians who are residing in Iraq, some of whom have acquired Iraqi citizenship.

In view of the well-known historical circumstances through which Iraq has passed, its proximity to Iran, the Persian occupation to which it had been subjected during the dark ages in the wake of the downfall of the abbasid state, the presence of holy places in Iraq, the absence of a strong central authority during the Ottoman era, the weakness of the Iraqi authority which was established after 1920, the absence of explicit laws and regulations defining citizenship and the residence of foreigners, the anomalous circumstances which prevailed in Iraq in the wake of the July 1958 revolution and the control by many Shu'ubist elements over some sensitive state organs and in view of the weakness and corruption of the authority during ['Abd al-Salam] 'Arif's era, a large Iranian community was formed in Iraq over the years through illegal means. A large number of this community acquired Iraqi citizenship, sometimes legally and legitimately, but most times illegally and illegitimately.

The Iraqi people are known for their tolerance. In addition to its Arab and Islamic majority, ethnic and religious minorities also through the ages, came to live in Iraq. They lived in peace and brotherhood as long as circumstances were normal and sovereignty in Iraq remained an Iraqi or Arab sovereignty.

When the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party assumed power on 17-30 July 1968, these principles and practices became firmly established. The Ba'th Party is a national, Pan-Arab and humane party. Since its establishment, the Ba'th Party rejected all forms of Shu'ubist trends and practices and racism. It championed brotherhood among the nationalities and religions which existed on Arab land and believed in brotherhood among the nations and people in the world at large.

The bitter fact which emerged throughout the long historical experience, however, was that the majority of the Iranians who were residing in Iraq and who benefitted from its resources for hundreds of years and were treated as brothers, in addition to a large number of those Iranians who had acquired Iraqi citizenship and who enjoyed the same rights as all other Iraqis, continued to harbor feelings of racist rancor against Iraq and the Arab nation. They were not loyal to the country in which they lived or the homeland which granted them Iraqi citizenship. They remained loyal to Iran, serving its designs of conspiracy and expansion against Iraq and the Arab nation, irrespective of the nature of the regime which existed in Iran.

It is wrong to believe that this phenomenon arose after Khomeyni's assumption of power in Iran. It existed during the [Iranian] Qajar era when Iraq was ruled by the Ottomans and continued under the reign of Shah Reza Pahlavi and his son Mohammad Reza after Iraq gained its formal independence during the

[Iraqi] royal reign. This phenomenon also continued during the 'Abd al-Karim Qasim and 'Arif reigns.

When the revolution broke out on 17-30 July 1968, this phenomenon was still present. When in April 1969 the shah cancelled the 1937 agreement and started to threaten Iraq's sovereignty over the Shatt al-'Arab, to plot against the revolutionary regime in Iraq and to support the Barzani gang, the Iranians residing in Iraq, some holding Iraqi citizenship, formed a fifth column in Iraqi society. They were behind most of the rumors and confusion that prevailed in Iraqi society. They provided Iranian intelligence, and through it imperialist and Zionist intelligence, with information about the Iraqi economy, its strategic positions, its armed forces and all other information requested by Iranian and other collaborating intelligence organs.

Some of these elements even took part in the reactionary 1970 plot sponsored by the Iranian shah, as mentioned in the political report of the party's Eighth Regional Congress. They continued, particularly after the revolution, to act as allies of the Barzani clique inside Iraq.

When the differences with the Iranian shah intensified, this fifth column attempted to openly confront the revolution and increase its conspiratorial activity against the homeland. As a precaution, the revolution deported a few thousand Iranians residing in Iraq to Iran to save the country from their evil plotting and to punish those who betrayed the land that had given them shelter for many generations. This measure was carried out at the end of 1971 and afterward.

This deterred these elements somewhat. When they sensed that the revolution was determined to be firm with them, after they saw that all their attempts had failed to circumvent the measure or exert efforts--particularly the Communist Party--to weaken or defeat it, and when the revolution resolutely faced all the slanders of the shah regime and his friends inside and outside the region, the rest of the Iranian community and pro-Iranians holding Iraqi citizenship accepted the status quo.

Following the establishment of the Khomeyni regime, after it had blatantly disclosed its evil intentions toward Iraq and its plan to invade Iraq and impose Persian control, this problem [of the Iranianism Iraq] reappeared in a more dangerous form. It was seen that the Iranians residing in Iraq and some of those holding Iraqi citizenship who had supported the shah and served his designs had abruptly changed their allegiance in favor of Khomeyni and his regime, not necessarily because they agreed with his ideological and political line--for some of them might even disagree with him--but because they held a racial grudge against Iraq and the Arab nation.

They once more began to form an active fifth column in the service of the Khomeyni regime and to commit domestic sabotage. They created the widespread medium into which the agent al-Da'wah party was born. This provided the members of the party gang with shelter and money and facilitated their criminal acts of sabotage. Some Iranians who had recently received Iraqi citizenship even participated directly in acts of murder and demolitions aimed at citizens, party strugglers and public institutions.

It became necessary to take a firm stand on the issue of the Iranians presence in Iraq. This issue, at that stage and more than any time before, had become a very sensitive issue and was closely linked to national independence, national security and the vital interests of the country and the people. The organs of the revolution began to expel them from the homeland and punitive measures were taken against them for their conspiracies against and betrayal of Iraq. The positive results of these sound national measures appeared quickly.

Very soon, the phenomenon of tendentious rumors and the propagation of confusion which had been used against Iraq and in Iran's interest, abated to a large extent. Tehran radio and the Iranian intelligence service lost their sources of information and the situation in some Iraqi regions, where these people used to constitute a majority, stabilized. The situation on the markets also stabilized and market monopolies, the disappearance of consumer goods from the markets and the fluctuation in prices decreased to a great extent, because these people used to constitute an important part of the business sector in Iraq and had controlled key sectors in the sphere of trade.

These measures saved Iraq from the serious, poisonous cancer within it. By wiping out this phenomenon, a new and important factor was added to all the other factors which contribute to the consolidation of national independence and national will.

After this, it was no longer possible to exploit the Iranians' presence in Iraq to serve the Iranian schemes of expansion and conspiracy which are linked to the Zionist and colonialist schemes aimed at striking at Arab nationalism and the Arabs independent course and at fragmenting the Arab nation and imposing hegemony over its land and will. All those concerned with these schemes came to realize that it was no longer possible to exploit such a phenomenon or other similar manifestations in any way against Iraq, its sovereignty and unity.

The revolution, led by the party, remains deeply committed to the humanitarian principles in which it believes. The treasonous action of the Iranian community in Iraq and that of the Iranians who had acquired Iraqi citizenship has not and will not change this course.

All Iraqis, irrespective of their origin, have the opportunity of becoming sincere Iraqi citizens enjoying full rights in accordance with the laws in force. They shall receive all the care and love from Iraq and the revolutionary authority as long as they remain sincere to Iraq and loyal to their homeland, Iraq. However, let it be made clear that any person of non-Iraqi origin will be treated as those Iranian traitors if he disavows the homeland which granted him citizenship, care and wealth. The revolution will never allow the recurrence of the phenomenon of the Iranians who were residing in Iraq or the methods they had used to stab the Iraqi homeland and people in the back.

The Iraqi homeland is the homeland of all Iraqis. The Iraqi people are a solid and homogeneous unit, organically and eternally linked to Iraq.

The Iraqi citizenship is the official identity of all Iraqis. It is one of honor and pledge to serve Iraq, remain loyal to its soil and merge completely

with its history, fate and national and Pan-Arab aspirations. It is not a cover or means to strike at these principles and values.

2. Economic Independence

The experience that was gained by the 17-30 July revolution under the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party in the field of economic independence is considered a model and a vanguard in the Third World.

The party received all aspects linked to economic independence; complicated and delicate aspects which were dealt with by the Eighth Regional Congress and contained in the many documents issued by the party and the speeches made by Comrade Saddam Husayn, and the threats posed to the issue of economic independence and had clarified the ways to confront them so as to consolidate this independence and make it a reality.

The oil nationalization battle was the decisive battle between the revolution and the colonialist and monopolistic forces in this field.

Through this decisive and comprehensive success, the revolution led Iraq from the era of economic subservience to colonialist and monopolistic forces and the direct negative influence of these forces into the era of economic independence which has become, as previously mentioned, a solid and real economic independence thanks to the policies of the party and the revolution which preceded and followed the nationalization battle. When the Eighth Regional Congress convened, the revolution had accomplished only 85 percent of the process of oil nationalization. The shares held by the United Kingdom and France in the Basra Oil Company were not yet nationalized. In accordance with the goals that had been set by the Eighth Regional Congress to consolidate our complete control over our primary national resource, oil, from all aspects, the shares of these two countries were nationalized on 8 (November) 1975. This decision was preceded by the nationalization of the Netherlands share on 21 October 1973 and Portugal's share on 20 December 1973. Thus, Iraqi oil became completely nationalized and this nationalization covered all the branches and activities of the oil industry.

In accordance with the directives issued by the Eighth Regional Congress, oil projects of a strategic nature were executed such as the strategic line [as published] al-Bakr and al-'Amiq ports, the oil pipeline that passes through Turkey and other big projects which contribute to the consolidation of economic independence. These projects give Iraq freedom to dispose of its oil resources away from the blackmail and exploitation attempts whether by the Syrian regime, the other countries in the region or the colonialist and monopolistic forces. At an early stage and at Comrade Saddam Husayn's instructions, emphasis was put on the need to diversify Iraq's production in the field of oil and energy to foil any siege that international powers may impose on us whether with respect to the quantities to be marketed or determining oil prices. Iraq is also the largest marketer of oil on its national soil among OPEC countries.

Iraq's policy in the field of oil, whether in its dealing directly with the countries or through the OAPEC and OPEC, is an exemplary true national policy

which considers the national and Pan-Arab interests as its first and foremost priority. This policy fully understands the requirements of international cooperation on sound and equal bases. Over the past years and despite the hostile countries in the region, Iraq's responsible role in oil policy on the international level has been intensified.

As for foreign trade and Iraq's relations with issues of economic independence, which was discussed by the political report issued by the Eighth Regional Congress, the revolution pursued an even-handed policy. It has set up trade relations with the friendly states and with other states with whom the dealing would benefit us. Our trade ties were linked with the attitudes of these states toward our national and Pan-Arab issue and toward the issue of oil marketing. Hence, Iraq avoided any attempt to link its economies with any foreign bloc or alliance. Iraq acts with complete freedom in the field of trade, thus making its economic independence complete.

Iraq was guided by the same principles in implementing the comprehensive development plan. The implementation of this comprehensive, ambitious development plan called for asking for help from foreign companies, establishments and expertise. A need arose for foreign manpower. The leadership of the party and the revolution was careful to diversify its dealing with other states so that our free national will was unrestricted and our independence unharmed, taking into consideration quality, swift accomplishment and pricing in the implementation of projects. The leadership usually distributed opportunities among various foreign companies, establishments and states according to a political view toward protecting the national independence and will from any form of dalliance and influence and linked those opportunities to the states' stands on our national and Pan-Arab causes.

This policy achieved excellent results during the first stage of the war against the Iranian enemy. Iraq's complete economic independence, its flexible ability to deal economically with all world states and its sound policy of securing reserves for emergencies constituted one of the basic pillars of success in the battle with the Iranian enemy and earned the world's admiration for the Iraqi experience. Despite the war, the Iraqi economy maintained complete independence and remained prosperous. Furthermore, basic development continued according to the leadership's plan.

The march to strengthen economic independence must continue in the same spirit and according to the same methods which the revolution adopted in the past. The facts confirm that continued national development in all spheres, a successful development plan, the increased development in national industrial and agricultural production will bolster economic and political independence and promote Iraq's role in the Pan-Arab and international areas.

3. The Kurdish Issue

When the party's Eighth Regional Congress was held, the Mustafa Barzani gang's reactionary colonialist rebellion had not yet been launched. However, all indications are that this gang was determined to plot against the revolution and national unity and to trigger a rebellion. The Eighth Regional Congress dealt with the Kurdish issue in a magnificently principled and political manner. It

precisely outlined the stand of the party and the revolution on this issue, which occupies a very important place among the various national causes with which the revolution has dealt in a very accurate and principled spirit.

The congress asserted that the party and revolution's abidance by the 11 March up statement and its implementation of all its terms are a matter of firm, principled political commitment and that it would not be retracted under any circumstances.

The congress emphasized that this commitment does not at all mean a commitment to the leadership of the Kurdistan Democratic Party--the Barzani group, indicating that any cooperation with this group will be decided in light of its stand on the party and the revolution and on the 11 March 1970 statement, its fulfillment of the duties stipulated in the statement and its clear adherence to the national course and the national unity.

The congress stressed, "the commitment to the march statement and the attainment of a peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish issue does not at all indicate any leniency in dealing with the suspicious attempts encouraged by reactionary and colonialist circles through some agent and proxy figures in the Kurdish area--attempts which gave way at national unity, create and maintain an emergency in the autonomous region and entrench secessionist positions hostile to progressive democratic development in the country."

On 11 March 1974, 2 months after the conclusion of the work of the Eighth Regional Congress, on the date set for the application of autonomy in accordance with the March 1970 declaration, the revolution command council announced the autonomy law for the Kurdistan region. Under this law, the autonomy institutions--the executive council and the legislative council--were established to insure the Kurdish people's exercise of their legitimate rights within the framework of national unity.

But the clique of Mulla Mustafa Barzani did not cooperate with the revolution command council. That clique adopted hostile stands toward national unity and the revolution and declared open mutiny on a large-scale.

The declaration of mutiny against the revolution by the Barzani clique was not spontaneous. But a basic link in the Zionist-imperialist-reactionary plotting against the revolution, Zionism and U.S. imperialist had encouraged Mustafa Barzani to mutiny and pushed the shah of Iran to back him on a large-scale so as to tire out and weaken and revolution prior to overthrowing it or subjecting it to the U.S. imperialist plans, which the United States had begun to implement on a large-scale in the region, especially after the October [1973] war and the capitulatory settlement process, which in later years reached the Camp David phase.

The battle against the reactionary mutiny and the Zionist, imperialist and reactionary forces backing it was indeed a brave one worthy of being recorded with pride in the history of national struggle. Many of the facts about that battle were not published or known on the national, Pan-Arab and international levels. At the time the revolution chose not to publicize the battle against the mutiny, because the battle was an extremely sensitive issue and an internal problem, at least the visible part of it. The revolution tried as much as

possible to reduce the intervention of the imperialist forces, hostile elements in the country and forces hostile to the revolution in the region.

The decisive success which the revolution achieved in that brave battle, which lasted 12 full months, was founded on solid and correct bases.

The first principle which the revolution had followed in its battle against the mutiny was the precise and careful balance between the necessity to use all the legitimate means of struggle against the mutiny and the complete and principled abidance by the autonomy law and the guaranteeing of the legitimate rights of our Kurdish people exactly as stressed by the Eighth Regional Congress.

On page 26 of his booklet "One Trench or Two Trenches," published in August 1976, Comrade Saddam Husayn said in this respect: We said very early, even before 11 March 1970, that if the Kurdish question was tackled by purely military methods, we would be the losers even if the last trench of the opponent forces on the high mountain was destroyed. But if the question was tackled in a principled and political manner and within the correct framework, we would win the battle even if our opponents were larger in number. The prophecy materialized and the agent enclave was liquidated. This was not done by purely military methods, despite the brave role played by the Iraqi army. The Iraqi Army would not have been able to play any effective role in the fighting were it not for the fact that this army has stood and continues to stand in defense of the principles and political objectives formulated by the political leadership.

Mulla Barzani and his agent enclave were defeated by the principles, whose substance was that we should deal with the issues of our people in Kurdistan like we deal with our people in Basra and with ourselves.

The second principle is the principled and practical differentiation between the Kurdish masses on the one hand and the mutiny and its elements on the other. Under complex circumstances such as those in which the mutiny took place, it was expected that interaction would take place between the rebel reactionaries and the sectors of the Kurdish masses which were affected by the deceptive campaigns of the rebel reactionaries. The residential regions of these sectors were sometimes used as springboards for the rebel's activities.

The revolution was eager to deal with these sectors of Kurdish masses in their capacity as part of the Iraqi people and part of the revolution's masses. The revolution resorted to all means to gain the trust of these sectors. During the debates held by the higher committee in charge of the northern affairs--the debates which were attended by some comrades and members of the leadership--to review the combat operations, we put forth the following question: Where did our greatest victory take place?

Some comrades said: Our greatest victory was scored when we crossed the (Kuli 'Ali Bey) strait in accordance with the known plan. We answered: No. Our greatest victory was demonstrated in the fact that not a single soldier opened fire at a [Kurdish] element in the opposite trench when they ran out of ammunition and raised his rifle to surrender. Also, our greatest victory was thus seen in the fact that not a single woman was raped and not a single incident

of looting was reported during the combat operations. Moreover, our greatest victory was recorded because, despite the bloodshed, those gave themselves up when their ammunition ran short, they would then eat with the soldiers from the same dish as if nothing had happened.

The real victory means that Iraq's unity is still strong in the spirit of the Kurdish fighter in the opposite trench and in the spirit of the Kurd and the Arab who are together fighting along side the armed forces. As long as the mentality and spirit are those of unity, then this is our greatest victory.

The battle recorded tremendous pictures of patriotic relationship between the armed forces fighters and party strugglers on the one hand and the Kurdish masses on the other--the masses which abandoned the mutiny to join the revolution's ranks and whose areas were liberated by the revolution's forces from the reactionary rebels and their evil practices.

This principled patriotic stand served as a remarkable psychological atmosphere to heal the bloody wounds inflicted by the state of the wide-scale and protracted mutiny and before it by the exceptional circumstances in the area.

The Kurdish masses sensed the real experiment during the most critical and difficult circumstances. They felt that Iraq's leadership was truly patriotic, dealing with all its sons on equal bases and with love. These masses also sensed the difference between the party's patriotism, principles and ethics on the one hand and the agency, ethical degeneration and evil practices of the rebels' leadership on the other.

The battle against the mutiny of Mustafa Mulla Barzani and his clique was not merely a successful military campaign. It was rather an all-out, political, military, psychological and economic battle. This battle had its own local elements as well as elements that had connections with the situation in the area and the multi-faceted attitudes of its states. This battle had its own international dimensions.

Therefore, the strategy of waging the battle and defining its daily tactics were all a crucial factor in determining its success. Comrade Saddam Husayn, from his position as chairman of the higher committee in charge of the northern affairs, himself charted the strategy of the battle against the mutiny. He defined its tactics on the military, political, economic, psychological and social levels, and compiled a comprehensive report containing all the elements of this strategy. This report was approved by the regional command and was considered a guide line for the political action in this field.

Foremost of the fundamental aspects of this strategy was not to postpone the date for the implementation of the autonomous rule. The Barazani clique proposed extending the period for the march delegation from 4 to 5 years. This would have meant postponing the implementation of the autonomous rule experiment until March 1975. The Communist Party supported this proposal, which also received support from many circles. The leadership however, according to the report submitted by Comrade Saddam Husayn, rejected this proposal stressing the need for the revolution to fulfill its commitment of implementing the autonomous

rule on time on 11 March 1974. Thus, the plot which aimed at rendering the issue inactive, continuing to spread chaos in the north of the homeland and to link the rebellion scheme with attempts to explode the situation in the region at that time was foiled. One year later, the situation in Lebanon exploded and by that time the revolution had destroyed the rebellion and foiled the possibility of it joining with other preplanned conspiracies against the region.

The second fundamental aspect of this strategy, which was adopted by the leadership--the higher committee--was to avoid using traditional means to confront the rebellion in all fields, particularly militarily. The rebellion leaders had had much experience in facing the Iraqi armed forces. One of the miscalculations of these leaders was that they thought they could fight a protracted war against regular armed forces using traditional military tactics. This way they would have achieved the purpose of the rebellion in their war of attrition as part of the plot that aimed at toppling it or subjugating it to imperialist and foreign plots and influences. The leadership was aware of this fact, and through direct, and sometimes indirect, orders from Comrade Saddam Husayn it adopted new plans which were based on the principal course of successful military operations. Thus new fighting techniques were used which surprised and confused the rebels, inflicting heavy losses on them. Great efforts were exerted in this respect because it was not easy to change the fighting techniques which the army had used for many years.

The young Ba'th officers played a major role in the battle against the rebellion, gaining excellent fighting and command experience, particularly since in these battles they faced the most sophisticated U.S. weapons which the shah of Iran poured on the rebels. The Iraqi armed forces fought valiantly and efficiently and proved once again their ability to meet the responsibility of defending the country's sovereignty and unity. They gained experience and efficiency in the battles, which disrupted the proposed training programs aimed at enlarging and modernising the Iraqi Army.

The battle was difficult and arduous. The armed forces lost more than 16,000 martyred or wounded. The total civilian and military casualties of the battle almost numbered 60,000 martyred, dead or wounded. The people paid a heavy price with the blood of their sons to bury a massive mutiny which aimed at fragmenting, weakening and hampering Iraq's march toward complete liberation, might and progress. During the following years, great differences have emerged between the conditions which would have resulted from the rebellion, and the conditions created by the revolution led by the party. The unified, strong and prosperous Iraq, which has a prominent Arab and international role today, is the result of significant successes by the revolution. Foremost among these is the success in the decisive battle against the reactionary rebels backed by Zionism, imperialism and the reactionary forces.

Following the crushing of the reactionary mutiny, it was possible to apply the bases of the democratic solution to the Kurdish issue. The autonomy institutions were established and entrenched, stability and security prevailed in the northern part of the homeland and the development process began to spread throughout the autonomous region which, due to many years of privation, has remained behind the rest of Iraq.

The revolution allocated large sums of money for the reconstruction and development of the autonomous region. Industries were established, roads were opened, schools, clinics and hospitals were built and tourism flourished and prospered.

In recent years, the party's relationship with the Kurdish masses has strengthened. All attempts by the mutinous reactionary clique and the Communist Party to separate the Kurdish masses from the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party on the pretext that it is an Arab national party which cannot truly represent the interests of the Kurdish masses and express their aspirations have all failed. The Kurdish masses have tangibly felt, through profound experiences and tribulations, that the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party is the vanguard national party they must rally around to insure their interests and attain their legitimate aspirations. Thus the party spread widely in the ranks of the Kurdish masses.

At the 11th National Congress of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party, a very important theoretical document was approved defining the party's position on ethnic nationalities and minorities in the Arab homeland. This document, which was published on 19 April 1979, asserts: The Arab Socialist Ba'th Party is the vanguard party, which represents the masses, all the masses, in the Arab homeland, regardless of language and national characteristics. The party is the loyal defender of and solid struggler for their cause. It is the one leading them on the path of freedom and the united society in the Arab homeland.

We can definitely say that the task of comprehensive and firm national unity has been achieved. The democratic national solution to the Kurdish issue has also been achieved. But this historic achievement is still exposed to plotting. The imperialist forces, the Zionist entity, the Syrian regime, the Libyan regime, other forces accountable to the socialist bloc countries and the Iranian regime are all trying, whether collectively or individually, depending on each case, to back certain agent and traitorous forces to shake the situation in the northern part of the country. The activity of these forces has increased under the circumstances of the war against the Iranian enemy. The Syrian regime has a special role on this score, that suspicious regime which has grudges against the party and is deeply involved in divisionist sectarian plans in the region, had been involved in the mutiny in the northern part of the country right from the beginning. While it criticized the party and the revolution for issuing the March 1970 declaration, saying it undermined the Arabism of Iraq. That regime cooperated with the Barazani clique. Its intelligence organs provided the clique with weapons, especially in 1974 and 1975. Following the crushing of the mutiny, Syrian intelligence adopted the mutinous elements and it is still cooperating with them and coordinating with the communists, the al-Da'wah Party gang and the Iranian regime.

In recent years out of its grudges against the party and the revolution and true to its suspicious behavior, the Libyan regime also established relations with these agents and suspicious elements, which are trying to provoke the mutiny anew in the northern part of the country. The Libyan regime also adopted these elements and other agent elements which are plotting against the party, the revolution and national unity.

It is a definite fact that all of these attempts are only desperate tries which cannot harm the power of the party and revolution. All of these attempts which endeavor to incite instability in the northern region are only attempts isolated from the broad Kurdish masses which strongly denounce these tries and express their profound and vast rallying around the party, revolution and the leader. We are confident of wiping out these phenomena and abnormal cases and of forging ahead along the road which the revolution has charted--the road of national freedom, national prosperity and building the components of peace, stability and progress.

4. The Progressive National and Patriotic Front

The political report of the Eighth Regional Congress dealt with the progressive front's issues from the historical point of view. The report discussed the historical circumstances of the front during the prerevolution stages. The report also dealt with the way the relations between the party and the other parties were developed after the revolution up to the establishment of the front in July 1973 and the declaration of its charter and the formation of its bodies in August 1973.

The party considered the formation of the front as an important patriotic accomplishment and an outstanding step on the road of unifying the people's forces necessary to accomplish the national and patriotic tasks in a profound and comprehensive manner. The party considered the formation of the front as a model whose positive results could possibly enlighten the Arab revolution movement forces which had for long suffered from dismemberment and contradiction.

During the subsequent years following the formation of the front, the party exerted ideological and political efforts in order to make this experiment a success. Since the beginning, the party has viewed the front as an addition to its force and to that of the revolution to accomplish the national and Pan-Arab tasks and to be an open arena for interaction of opinions within the context of concrete commitment toward the leading role of the Ba'th Party. The party has frankly and clearly affirmed that it enjoys the historical and real right to lead the revolutionary march in the country because it ignited the revolution, achieved its basic accomplishments and owns the broadest popular base. Therefore, all parties which participate in the front should accept this objective fact and should deal with it in an objective and honorable manner. But the Iraqi Communist Party leadership, which agreed to join the front in accordance with bases that were made clear to it during the frank deliberations and declared stands as confirmed by the charter, failed to abide by the objectivity of these bases.

The Communist Party entertained the following interlinked characteristics and the results of these characteristics are interlinked:

1. The Communist Party in Iraq, throughout its history and despite all the changes that were introduced to the world communist movement and despite all the changes in the world revolutionary movement, remained a party lacking selfwill and has never had a policy, stands, or independent initiatives, not even partially.

2. In view of this feature on the one hand and of the backward leaders of the Communist Party on the other, this party has never had noble and creative participation in realizing and analyzing Iraq's realities and characteristics and those of the Arab homeland. Therefore, all the Communist Party's analyses of the situation in Iraq and of that in the Arab homeland as well as of all the national and Pan-Arab issues and problems were a literal translation of the Soviet stands and a meager imitation of the traditional Marxist literature, despite the concrete differences in the circumstances and conditions.

This characteristic has rendered the Communist Party completely incapable of understanding the nature of the Arab revolution movement and in Iraq on the one hand, and of the significance of the revolutionary development it is leading in the country on the other. All progress made by the Ba'th Party in revolutionizing the society and achieving national and democratic tasks used to further confuse the Communist Party to the point where it could no longer make correct analyses and assessments.

And, instead of making a genuine and open-minded intellectual effort to understand the living reality in the country and to interact with it positively and sincerely, the Communist Party leadership interacted with this reality with a completely different and unobjective attitude; that of harboring hatred and complex feelings against the Ba'th Party. The Communist Party leadership went about wagering on imagined situations and developments within the Ba'th Party. But this only led it to more mistakes in its dealings with the party and the revolution and more complications in its relationship with them.

Of course, like any other revolutionary party going through the formative stage of ideological, political and organizational maturity and the complicated and unique experience of building a revolutionary authority, the Ba'th Party used to suffer from internal problems. As a matter of fact, it suffered from evil internal plots, the last of which was the plot by a traitorous group from among the members of the leadership which was exposed in July 1979.

Furthermore, the constitutional situation prior to Comrade Saddam Husayn's assumption of top official responsibility in the leadership of the party and the revolution in July 1979 and during--a situation in which the question of leadership had not been very clearly determined--was full of difficulties, complications and loopholes. The Communist Party leadership thought it could exploit those circumstances. It wagered on imagined situations. Because the truth was that, despite all the complicated internal situations the mean plots by the traitorous clique from among the members of the leadership and the complications of the previous constitutional situation, the party was strong enough to face all tricks and plots. Nobody could have been able to change the revolution's basic course, which stemmed from the party's belief and basic trends.

3. Due to the two abovementioned reasons on the one hand and the historical structure of the Iraqi Communist Party, which from the start has concentrated on spreading within the ranks of religious and ethnic minorities in Iraq for special divisive reasons and has, therefore, been affected by the negative atmosphere that pervaded these minorities in past areas on the other, the

Communist Party's attitudes toward Arab nationalism, Arab unity and the Palestine question have also been negative. Although some of these attitudes are attributed to the fact that the Communist Party leadership views the Arab national cause from the stand point of proletariat maxism, still, the party's historical structure has been the main influence that has made it go too far in its negative attitude toward the Arab national cause to the point where it can rightly be described as anti-Arab [Shu'ubi].

As for the Communist Party leadership's position on the Palestine question, it has always been detached from the Pan-Arab stands, and very often different from them. As a matter of fact, the Communist Party leadership has at times adopted very bad stands, which complicated relations between the party rank and file and this leadership, which has not exerted any sincere and earnest effort to improve its position on Pan-Arab issues and the Palestine question. Thus, the Communist Party leadership's position was incompatible with the concepts and basic trends of the front's charter on this subject.

Unity and the Palestinian question are not merely political issues as far as the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party is concerned. They are the two central issues in the party's ideology, strategy and daily political, cultural and media struggle. Thus, any contradiction or differences between the party on the one hand and the leadership of the Communist Party, on the other, regarding political positions and practices on these issues following the formation of the front always created problems. This also complicates relations not only at the leadership and international levels but also regarding the principles of the parties.

The Communist Party, for example, would defy the feelings of the masses and the party by establishing open relations with the so-called Israeli Communist Party. It even used to publish cables to that party in its open press in Iraq, although the framework of the progressive front was more developed and open than its counterparts in the region's states, and although the Communist Party enjoyed total freedom in the political, organizational and external relations activities and its press was independent and was not subject to any censorship, we did not deal with the Communist Party leadership within this framework. Because it is the result of the front's position--the democratic and sound position of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party and its sincere desire to establish a distinguished democratic front. The Communist party, however, used it in an opportunist exploitation contrary to the front's concepts and relations.

The activities of the Communist Party among the masses, and the course of its press, did not pay any attention to the defense of the revolutionary regime and the protection of its great achievements. It was a rare event to see the communists positively value the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party and the 17-30 July revolution. Its achievements and leadership in manner commensurate with the objective truth. On the contrary, the activities of the Communist Party and the course of its press used to focus on some of the negative aspects and mistakes which are a natural phenomenon in massive revolutionary march. This was not aimed at correcting it but at achieving cheap gains at the expense of the party and the revolution.

Over many years, the party leadership warned the Communist Party leadership against this course which contradicted with the concepts of the front's activities and the mutual commitments within it. It is not logical for the Communist Party, which participated in the front and government, and hence enjoyed all the rights and privileges of the legitimate party, which is also participant in the front and government, to behave from this position as if an opposition party lying in wait for the negative aspects and mistakes. The party was determined to draw the attention of the Communist Party to this morally and ethically in order to maintain relations and traditions within the front and to make the experiment succeed.

Comrade Saddam Husayn spoke about this issue accurately, clearly and frankly at an extended meeting of the front's committees in the country in August 1976. His speech, which later published in a booklet entitled "One Trench or Two Trenches" is regarded a historic document on the development of relations between the party and the revolution on the one hand, and the party and the Iraqi Communist Party on the other.

Comrade Saddam Husayn said: We are aware that some of our brothers, particularly from the Communist Party, are embarrassed when they are asked: Are you with the regime or not? Are you with the revolution or not? Is it disgraceful or embarrassing for one to be with the great revolution and its regime? The revolution is the pride of every honest nationalist. Its great achievements are obvious to every one, and if there is any waging on the revolution and affiliation to it, then that must be made on the resultant and not on the details which can be criticized democratically and objectively.

Each of us should criticize any mistake in the details. But this mistake should not turn us against the revolution and its regime. At the same time, the administrative organs' mistakes should not be justification for party gains. The basic justification for that should be our ideology as we present it and interact with the masses by it.

The communists uphold a line independent of the Ba'th Party's ideology. The same thing can also be said about the members of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan and others. Therefore, they should make gains through this course, not any other course. This is because any other course is bound to lead to contradiction between the national forces. It could also lead to deviation if it turns into a conflict with the revolutionary march. Suppose we reversed the situation, and we in the Ba'th Party began defaming the communists in our speeches and news media, because some communists defame us, our regime and principles--and we discovered that they are doing this because of what they consider errors in the administrative organs and they are also using this as a means for party gains--what would the situation be like? Is it conceivable to achieve gains for our party by destroying others? If this is acceptable, then try to imagine how much you would lose if the Ba'th Party leaders spoke to the masses about the negative attitudes of the Communist Party. (We are not saying this out of conceit, but out of the belief that our relationship with the masses is based on positive interaction and mutual trust, and therefore, the masses are bound to listen to what we say). But if we stand up and speak positively about the front and about your role in it as well as the role of other national forces, that will be a big gain for you.

This principled and practical talk, which is characterized by a deep desire to build strong relations within the front and to lead the country on the path of interaction within the front, could have been an excellent program for relations between the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party and the Iraqi Communist Party on the path of accomplishing national and Pan-Arab talks had the Communist Party leadership been sincere in its relations under the banner of the revolution and for the sake of carrying out the tasks set out in the national action charter.

But the leadership of the Communist Party has behaved contrary to [word indistinct] set forth by Comrade Sad[dam Husayn].

The Communist Party continued its method of defaming, casting doubts on and sabotaging the revolution's march by every available means, including its overt press. It continued to operate under emergency formulas. Even its central conferences were held clandestinely, which confirms its ill intentions against the party and the revolution.

The Communist Party leadership's subversive trends were clearly evident in that leadership's behavior toward the Kurdish issue. When the Barzani clique was crushed and a real opportunity emerged for consolidating the peaceful, democratic solution to the Kurdish issue, strengthening security and stability in the region and enhancing national unity, the Communist Party press and organizations in the northern part of the country began fomenting secessionism, sowing discord between Arab nationalism and Kurdish nationalism and rekindling all chauvinistic tendencies in Kurdish circles. If we went back to the Communist Party's literature of the time and removed the word communist from it, we will not find any difference between it and the literature of the Barzani clique. As Comrade Saddam Husayn said in the speech we referred to earlier, this attitude by the Communist Party leadership entailed contradictions on the one hand and a negative stand toward the party, the revolution and national unity on the other.

The contradictory attitude of the Communist Party is demonstrated by the fact that it follows a proletarian and antinational policy in handling Pan-Arab affairs and in revoking their special character. This party is so chauvinist that it has incited national sedition to the greatest extent possible in the affairs of the Kurdish nationality and other ethnic minorities in Iraq by inciting contradictions, disputes and divisions.

It has become clear that the Communist Party leadership, which found out that the Ba'th Party had become the leading popular force among the Arab masses in Iraq, has acted as the substitute for the Barzani leadership in the northern region. This leadership sometimes through insinuation and sometimes through statements, attempted to conclude a deal with the leadership of the party and the revolution according to which the Arab part of Iraq would be under the control of the Ba'th Party and the Kurdish part would be under its own control and influence. That was a clear partition of Iraq. It is very strange that the Communist Party leadership has completely forgotten that the Barzani leadership pursued the same course and tried every means to conclude such a deal with the leadership of the party and revolution under the difficult circumstances through which the revolution passed in the first years. The Communist

Party leadership also forgot that the leadership of the party and revolution had turned down this divisive and unpatriotic course. Even under most difficult and complex circumstances during which the party's power was threatened. The leadership of the party and revolution raised the slogan that Iraq is united under a single national leadership pursuing one national policy. The leadership waged a ferocious political and military battle against this suspect divisive trend during which it offered the most precious sacrifices for the sake of entrenching national unity and preventing any form of secession.

Proceeding from this principle and based on a narrow-minded chauvinism, the Communist Party actively moved against the spread of the Ba'th Party among the Kurdish people. We discussed this point when we dealt with the Kurdish question.

The matter did not stop here. The Communist Party started to establish ties and erect bridges with the new suspect sabotage clique which was formed outside and inside Iraq following the collapse of the Barzani clique.

It was obvious from this behavior that the objective of the Communist Party leadership was not to find a peaceful and democratic solution to the Kurdish problem, but instead to exacerbate it. This is not only a negative, erroneous political attitude, it seriously threatens national unity and independence.

The matter was not confined to this threat. The press of the Communist Party unjustifiably launched organized campaigns against the non-communist states with which the revolution was trying to establish relations of friendship and cooperation in the service of national and Pan-Arab interests. During the official visits exchanged between Iraqi officials and officials in these states, the Communist Party press launched campaigns against these states to distort the objective of the revolution's policy on the one hand and to sabotage its relations with these states on the other. When a leader of the revolution visited France, for example, the Communist Party press attacked the French Government--unjustifiably from the national and Pan-Arab aspect--on domestic or foreign policy.

Among the fundamental points which were agreed upon with the Iraqi Communist Party when the front was formed was the banning of any form of political organization or activity within the army and armed forces by any political party or movement other than the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party. Before the establishment of the front in July 1973 a law was passed, which has been valid and in force since that time, and which unambiguously explained this issue.

The Iraqi Communist Party however, tried with all means to circumvent this agreement following the establishment of the front, and continued with organizational activities in the armed forces. When such activities were discovered by the competent organs, the leadership of the Communist Party tried to present justifications to save the perpetrators from punishment or to lessen the punishment. Although the leadership of the party and revolution was firm in implementing this law, some complications in the implementation process occurred because the party wanted relations within the front to continue. Thus no punishment was given in circumstances which were not definitely confirmed as intending to cause harm.

However, all indications pointed to the fact that the leadership of the Communist Party was trying with these methods to moderate the leadership of the party and revolution to accept a fait accompli and finally to allow communist activity in one form or another within the armed forces. Due to a mistake by one of the competent organs, the execution of communists convicted of carrying out activities within the armed forces was postponed for a short time allowing the number of criminals to reach 31. The leadership realized this and ordered the execution of several of them. The Communist Party leadership tried every conceivable way to halt the execution of the remaining criminals and called upon leaders of several communist countries to send messages to the leadership requesting the suspension of execution of those criminals.

Thus, the leadership of the Communist Party revealed its entire plan. It also revealed its alliance with foreign countries, with which Iraq was determined to maintain relations of friendship and cooperation, to consolidate a fait accompli in Iraq's internal situation which was contrary to its sovereignty, primary interests and the foundations upon which the front was formed.

The party leadership's reply was clear and decisive. The leaders of the countries who sent messages were forwarded reply messages clearly and firmly rejecting any form of interference in the country's internal affairs and affirming that the revolution was determined to apply the law to all those who violate it.

The failure of all the policies and maneuvers of the leadership of the Iraqi Communist Party, the diminishing influence of the Communist Party among the masses, the expanding and deepening influence of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party and the consolidation of its social, progressive and democratic achievements placed the leadership of the Communist Party at a crossroad: Either to join the ranks of the revolution, adhere to the front's progressive principles and serve the national and Pan-Arab interests, or adopt a different course to the revolution and enter a desperate adventure against it. The leadership of the Communist Party adopted the second course.

The Iraqi Communist Party's ideological and political backwardness, the failure of its policies and maneuvers, the ebb in its influence among the masses and its blind allegiance led this leadership to an impasse. The Iraqi Communist Party leaders left the country for Moscow and other communist capitals without being pursued. They formed Iraqi communist communities abroad and embarked on propaganda campaigns against the party and the revolution in cooperation with all our enemies despite their contradictory ideological concepts and political trends.

Despite all the Communist Party's practices against the revolution, national unity and the country's basic interests, the Ba'th Party leadership--out of concern for the [national and progressive patriotic] front--called on the Communist Party leadership for a dialogue on the basic issues pertaining to the relationship between the two parties. This call was made in 1978, Comrade Saddam Husayn himself communicated it to the Iraqi Communist Party's representative in the government. However, the Communist Party leadership whose assessments have always been erroneous and short-sighted, imagined that this sincere national invitation was made because the situation in the party and

revolution was critical. Therefore, it made a condition which may fairly and objectively be called silly. It stipulated that any dialogue with the Ba'th Party leadership should be held abroad. The communist representative was then told that anyone making such a condition shows that he does not want to return to the front and the country. Accordingly, relations with the Communist Party leadership were severed and its two representatives were relieved of office.

The Communist Party's stand against the homeland and the people was emphasized during the battle with the Iranian enemy. The Communist Party leadership disavowed the simplest national considerations, which call for sidestepping differences and internal political conflicts, by siding with the Iranian enemy--which is the enemy of the country, people and armed forces--and by allying itself with this enemy and its local agents. It thus deserves comprehensive national condemnation.

The march of the national front, which is based on loyalty to the homeland and the revolution, did not stop with the departure of the Communist Party. The march continued in its natural course, carrying out its duty to mobilize all sincere citizens within the context of unified work for the country and consolidation of the revolution.

5. The Democratic Changes

The political report of the Eighth Regional Congress summed up the activities of the party and revolution in the field of democratic changes during the previous period as laying down the bases of popular democracy and using formulas of democracy that are proportionate with the objective circumstances of the party and revolution, it also defined a central task for the forthcoming stage: Completing the components and institutions of popular democracy. For this purpose the report specified the following objectives:

1. The appointment of the National Assembly through a short-term formula.
2. The completion of the theoretical, political and legislative requirements of the people's councils and the provision of experienced cadres to lead them. Due attention and care should be given to these councils, which are a new institution of the revolutionary society and a pillar in the democratic popular experiment.
3. The expansion of opportunities given to the party, official and popular organizations' press to exercise criticism and hold discussions and dialogue on basic issues and those concerning citizens. All available means should be used to expand the base of participation in discussing these issues and finding solutions to them.
4. Within the context of the forthcoming stage, and after the appropriate conditions ripen, efforts must be exerted to complete the fundamentals of the popular democratic experience by drawing up a permanent constitution for the country, holding general elections for the National Assembly and electing people's councils.

The report also emphasized that the forthcoming stage requires a large-scale development of the ideological activities in order to find formulas and solutions to the questions raised by the issue of completing the bases of popular democracy. Accordingly, what have the party and revolution accomplished in the field of democratic changes in the period between the Eighth Regional Congress and this congress? The question of democracy is one of the most complicated questions in the Third World--a world which had no opportunity to constantly and continuously develop and grow over the centuries and which suffered throughout these centuries from the evils of colonialist hegemony and monopoly.

Iraq is part of the Third World and the question of democracy cannot be dealt with isolated from this fact. The political report of the Eighth Congress soundly indicated an important fact which distinguished Iraq from the rest of the Arab countries when it said: Iraq was one of the poorest Arab countries in its democratic traditions and practices regardless of the social content. Iraq has moved from one despotic regime to another since the Ottoman domination and up to the 17 July 1968 revolution. The Iraqi people and their enlightened forces enjoyed only brief periods of freedom of opinion, press, parties, trade unions and parliamentary participation. Accordingly, we cannot compare what the revolution has achieved in this field with the progress it has achieved in some other fields where the revolutionary will can achieve results more rapidly.

During the past stage the revolution has definitely managed to develop the practice of democracy in the revolutionary society. However, it did not achieve the quick progress that was proportionate with the aspirations and objectives defined by the Eighth Congress. Moreover, some of the objectives defined by that congress were not accomplished for reasons that will be given later. Meanwhile, the main objective of holding general elections to choose a national assembly was achieved in June 1980 for objective and internal reasons.

When the Eighth Regional Congress convened the rebellion staged by the Barzani clique had not yet begun and the progressive national and patriotic front was still growing. Among the most important objective factors which were reflected on the development of the democratic changes, particularly in the field of establishing the democratic institutions headed by the National Assembly, were the following three factors: The conditions in the northern region during and after the rebellion; relations with the Communist Party; and the Arab developments after al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and the Camp David accords.

The party's principled stand throughout the march of the 17-30 July 1968 revolution and until today was that of giving any form of popular democratic practice a real change to develop. The party rejected the employment of false and superficial methods which could make it pretend to have democratic institutions and practices. The basic issue in the party's opinion is getting the people's confidence in and respect of the institutions and concepts of the party and revolution and their belief in the originality of the leadership's measures and decisions. When the party discovers that circumstances do not allow for this or that formula of democratic practice it will say frankly that it will not adopt it. It will not substitute this with formulas obtained by force or forgery.

It is necessary here to point to an important matter related to the party's ideology during the period between the Eighth Congress and the decision to hold general elections to the National Assembly. In the past, a formula on establishing a national assembly by appointments was adopted and was included in the provisional constitution. This incremental formula was also incorporated in the objectives that were set by the Eighth Congress for the next stage with respect to the democratic changes. The command, however, hesitated in implementing this formula, not because it was incapable of implementing it--such a formula could be implemented easily--but because the command believed that it would not really affect the process of democratic development in the revolutionary society and because the people would view it as being an artificial state that lacks all the components of genuine life. That's why the command preferred not to resort to it and to wait for suitable circumstances to establish a national assembly through elections that would acquire all the components of a genuine life and possess the capability to promote democratic practices in the revolutionary society.

How did the above three factors influence the manner of democratic transformations?

1. The Situation in the Northern Region

It goes without saying that any institution that is established with the purpose of developing democratic practices in the country, particularly the institution of the National Assembly, must be of a comprehensive national nature. Any anomalous situation in an important part of the country will inevitably reflect on the overall situation in the country.

During the rebellion, which began several weeks after the Eighth Congress completed its meetings, it was impossible to hold real democratic elections in the northern region of the country. After wiping out the rebellion, the revolution had to exert great efforts and time to deal with the serious and complicated consequences which had emerged from the rebellion and the general anomalous situation which took place in many parts of northern Iraq during the past years. There was an incessant need to confront and deal with the wounds, pains, complexes and misunderstandings that were caused by this anomalous situation. There was also the need to create a sound, healthy and national atmosphere in that region. The revolution also had to achieve big development projects in that region to establish some kind of harmony between the benefits obtained by the citizens in that region from the revolution's economic, social and cultural achievements and the benefits that the majority of the citizens in the other Iraqi regions had obtained.

2. Relations with the Iraqi Communist Party

The revolution's trend in establishing the democratic institutions, the necessity of which it believes, cannot be altered by the stand of this or that party on the revolution or toward the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party. The nature of the party's relations with other parties, however, will inevitably influence the manner of the establishment of these institutions. When these relations are normal ones, and when there is a conviction as to the need of establishing any institution. The establishment of such an institution will be an easy thing to accomplish but when relations become tense, a different state will inevitably emerge.

As outlined in the previous chapter, relations with the Communist Party's command were tense, thus making it impossible to establish democratic institutions within the framework of these tense relations as the role of each of these parties participating in that institution would be difficult to define, not to mention the objectives of such an institution.

One of the reasons which delayed the establishment of the National Assembly was not giving the Communist Party's command a new rostrum, which it would use under the cover of the front, to attack the party and the revolution and to implement foreign strategies.

3. Arab Situation

The period between the Eighth and Ninth Congresses witnessed serious and delicate events on the Arab level. The leadership of the party and revolution attached great importance to these events, more than they had shown toward the other democratic transformations on the regional level.

The year that immediately followed the Eighth Congress witnessed the eruption of the situation in Lebanon--the situation which greatly preoccupied the leadership. In 1977, al-Sadat made his ill-fated visit to Jerusalem. Ever since then, and particularly [word indistinct] couple of years, the leadership has been completely preoccupied with the Arab events. The few months that followed al-Sadat's Jerusalem visit witnessed acrimonious debates and extensive contacts with regard to the best possible formula for confrontation.

After the signing of the Camp David accords, the leadership called for holding the Arab summit conference in Baghdad. This was followed by the conclusion of the national action charter with the Syrian regime. The leadership had exerted strenuous efforts in the field of national action. The relations with Syria after the charter occupied a large part of the leadership's political, practical and theoretical action.

The Arab events should not have justified postponing the completion of the democratic institutions as the whole matter should have been viewed with realistic perspective. When the leadership of the party and revolution and all the leadership institutions are preoccupied with many complex national problems, there is no time left for charting new formulas that are necessary for democratic practice as these certainly require huge practical, political and theoretical efforts.

Inasmuch as the objective or external factors were important in delaying the completion of the democratic and popular components and institutions during the past stage, the internal and inherent factors were also equal in importance.

What are the inherent factors and how much did they reflect on the march of the democratic transformations in the revolutionary society?

Since the beginning, the party followed the popular democratic principles as a road for practicing democracy. In other words, the party had rejected the liberal course which emerged from the capitalist experiences in Western Europe

and America. The party has also rejected the communist course, the so-called dictatorship of the proletariat. But faith in the popular democracy as a special course dictated that the party draft its experience and perspective in the field as was the case in the other socialist transformation. It was impossible to expand the democratic practices and formulas unless these were accompanied by inherent or internal circumstances suitable for the party and the revolution.

The party confronted a crucial matter in entrenching the revolutionary authority and in placing this task above any other considerations. The stage that preceded the Eighth Congress was one in which the leadership worked hard to consolidate the revolutionary authority and wipe out every possible conspiracy and apostasy. But this task was not completed with the completion of this congress. Although the revolutionary authority has become solid, it was seriously and gravely threatened. The situation in the north and the hostile Communist Party stands had developed to the extent of hostility. Also, the emergence of the political-religious phenomena with its hostile and conspiratorial shape constituted challenges that could not be discounted by the party and the revolution.

The political report which was issued by the Eighth Congress (page 217) stressed the need for reinstating balance between centralization and democracy in the field of work and action whether on the level of the party or government or popular organizations. The report also said "as far as all fields are concerned it should be taken into account that the formulas of need and emergency, parts of which could be dropped under certain circumstances, could become very important sometimes for confronting a certain state of affairs."

In light of this appreciation and the subjective circumstances around the party and the revolution and because of certain internal reasons within the party, including the former constitutional formula, the leadership did not have enough enthusiasm to appropriately balance between centralism and democracy to expand and promote the democratic practices and establish the necessary institutions for this purpose. Actually there was a fear that the expansion of the democratic institutions might be used to harm and weaken the party and the revolution.

During this stage, Comrade Saddam Husayn exerted intensive efforts in order to develop the democratic understanding and practices in the leadership, on the level of the party cadres as well as on the level of the party, the state and the popular organizations.

Comrade Saddam Husayn criticized the trends that unjustifiably employed oppressive centralist formulas in administering the affairs of the party, the state and the popular organizations and in dealing with the masses. He called for being open in dealing with the masses and for providing more opportunities for the selection of leaders among the popular and vocational organizations.

As for the people's assemblies and the related formulas and missions defined by the Eighth Congress, it is essential to say that none of these formulas were promoted and, furthermore, the leadership itself did not pay enough attention to promote them.

The people's assembly formula appeared at a time when the revolution was passing through exceptional circumstances mentioned in the political report of the Eighth Congress. The people's assemblies were established by means of appointment. Although the presence of these assemblies in this form remains an achievement, practical experience confirmed that those formulas could not be developed unless they were genuinely derived from among the masses.

It was not either practically or principally possible to establish the people's assemblies through elections even prior to the establishment of the National Assembly.

In 1978, the leadership asked for the preparation of a study on the establishment of the National Assembly, the people's assemblies and the state's democratic administration. The study, which was supervised by one of the plotters in the leadership, was deliberately delayed for a long time and was finally forwarded to the leadership which found it complicated and full of errors. The leadership decided to reconsider the whole study again.

After Comrade Saddam Husayn's assumption of the direct leadership responsibilities in the party and state, the leadership decided to hold elections for the National Assembly and agreed to study the formula of the people's assemblies following the establishment of the National Assembly.

The coming stage demands a reconsideration of the people's assemblies formula and a definition of their future and role in the democratic practices in the country.

As for the popular and vocational organizations, it was noticed that their role in the society was strengthened as a result of the progress in the revolution's march and the economic, social and cultural changes. These organizations became well-established social institutions bearing a big moral and material influence on the political and social life in the country. Millions of workers, peasants, women, craftsmen, students and youth are working within the framework of these organizations and are practicing their democratic rights in elections and are effectively participating in building up and developing the new society. Even after the establishment of the National Assembly as one of the central democratic popular institutions, one should not at all belittle the role of the popular and vocational organizations in the democratic process in the revolutionary society. These organizations should continue to play an influential role in the democratic process, in the development march, in the socialist changes and in all other revolutionary changes in the various fields.

The role of the official, party and organizations press media also developed during the previous stage in its criticism of the erroneous practices of the organs, expression of the needs of the masses and participation in the dialogue on fundamental national issues in the stage that preceded the Eighth Congress, whose political report praised that dialogue.

The bureaucratic trends which were criticized by the political report of the Eighth Congress and which sought to undermine the role of the press media in the democratic process did not end in the stage that followed the congress.

However, the role of the press media has become more entrenched than before and became legalized by the regional congress resolution. This role also received the attention of the leadership, particularly Comrade Saddam Husayn's direct interest in it and in its development as well as his personal participation at times in criticism campaigns against bureaucratic practices and their subsequent setbacks.

The leadership adopted an important step in the democratic field and in building the modern state when it decided to involve the concerned parties from popular circles and professional organizations in the discussion of draft laws and new rules before they are submitted to the revolution command council. Among the important initiatives which were adopted by the leadership was to call upon those who are concerned with new laws and legislations to attend the National Assembly meetings during the discussion of these laws and legislations. Other important initiatives by the leadership were the adoption of a style of working paper for studying important issues and the involvement of a large number of the concerned parties in the discussions.

National Assembly

The establishment of the National Assembly was one of the revolution's political achievements in the field of democratic transformations. The National Assembly experience was innovative and original. In accordance with what was previously explained about the course of the revolution in dealing truthfully with the people and in fulfilling its commitments, the National Assembly was not built on traditional or artificial bases.

The party, with the help of massive popular support and effective organs in authority, popular organizations and media departments, could have fought traditional parliamentary elections and easily won a great majority in the National Assembly. The party, however, chose another course, the truthful and noble course.

The party provided candidates from the party and from the independent citizens who are loyal to the march of the revolution. The number of these candidates in every department exceeded the allocated number of seats in the National Assembly. Any citizen who so desired was permitted to be nominated to the assembly.

Members of the Communist Party were not allowed to be nominated because of their betrayal of the homeland, the people and the revolution as we have previously explained. Those who were affiliated with agent political groups which were hostile to the revolution were also banned as well as any one who was a parliamentarian during the reactionary monarchy era. Those convicted of treason, espionage, agentry and ordinary indecent crimes were also banned.

These restrictions which were necessary for safeguarding the first experiment in electing a parliamentary National Assembly in the country's history since the birth of the revolution in July 1958, did not diminish competition, on the contrary competition was extensive. Out of 840 candidates 250 seats in the National Assembly were filled. All candidates were given completely equal

opportunities in the propaganda campaigns and the state paid for the expenses. The leadership did not give any party candidate, or even members of the leadership who were nominated to the National Assembly, preference over non-Ba'thist candidates. The party and popular organizations were not allowed to carry out activity in favor of any candidate. The state departments were absolutely banned from interfering in the elections processes, except in performing their duties as dictated by the National Assembly law.

The people's participation in the process of elections was broad and magnificent. Though this was the first electoral experience for over 20 years and the first real experience, not to mention that it took place in the heat of summer and amid threats by some agent forces to attack election centers in the autonomous rule region, the number of those who participated in the elections was very high.

The results of the elections came to confirm the soundness of the course that had been adopted by the command in the organization of the elections to the National Assembly.

The faithful and loyal dealings with the people and the consideration of any candidate as the revolution's candidate as long as he remains committed to the revolution's basic trends and safeguards its gains, irrespective of his party affiliation, have bolstered the masses confidence in the party and increased their support for it. The vast majority of the candidates were chosen from among party candidates and the nonparty candidates who had to their credit a long history of struggle.

The June 1980 elections to the National Assembly were a real popular referendum through which the masses in Iraq expressed their genuine and solid rallying around the party, revolution and leader Saddam Husayn. Naturally, the elections included some negative aspects and erroneous practices. At the opening session of the National Assembly on 30 June 1980 Comrade Saddam Husayn spoke frankly about them and he diagnosed all the negative aspects and the mistakes and called for correcting them and for their nonrepetition.

These mistakes and negative aspects, however, did not impair the democratic value of this experience or the excellent results with respect to the relationship between the party and the revolution and the people.

During the past period, the National Assembly proceeded with its tasks in accordance with what the law had set for it.

Despite the fact that the experience of the National Assembly was a recent one, the fact that it lacked traditions and the fact that its work coincided with the beginning of the war between us and Iran, the National Assembly's activities have been serious ones seeking to practice democracy in a manner that would bolster the democratic and popular trend in the revolutionary society.

With the complete support of the party command and the comrade president of the republic, the National Assembly members must broaden and intensify their activities in the democratic process and promote their effective participation

in the process of revolutionary construction in accordance with the tasks and prerogatives that the law has assigned to the National Assembly.

On 19 September 1980, and in spite of the circumstances of the war with Iran, the revolution fulfilled its commitment by establishing the legislative council for the autonomous rule region through elections. The first legislative council was elected in this manner after that. It had been formed by appointment since the issuance of the autonomous rule law on 11 March 1974.

The elections to the legislative council in the autonomous rule region were similar to the elections to the National Assembly in that they were held in the same democratic and free manner, provided equal opportunities to all the candidates and were also characterized by broad popular participation. The results of the elections also constituted another referendum showing the close relationship which exists between the masses in this region with the party, revolution and leader Saddam Husayn. It also constituted a popular referendum in support of the revolution's course in settling the Kurdiah issue in a sound national and democratic manner.

It is essential, while discussing the democratic experiment in the country, to allude to the special role played by struggler Saddam Husayn in this process, especially after assuming his leading, official tasks in the leadership of the party and revolution. This is in addition to his role and responsibilities at the head of the party's institutions in developing the democratic practices in the country. Comrade Saddam Husayn has himself established a direct, profound and solid relationship with the sons of the people. Comrade Saddam Husayn gives every citizen the chance to contact him by telephone. Every week he receives dozens of citizens to become acquainted with their problems. Also, he visits every part of Iraq to acquaint himself with the living conditions of the citizens, to enquire about their problems, to discuss their views on public issues and to get precise information about the work of the institutions of the party and revolution as well as those of the popular organizations.

These direct contacts with the people do not fall within the framework of any modern methods in democratic practices. This method has been created by struggler Saddam Husayn and has been linked with his personality and his strong link with the people. Some aspects of this method are very similar to the method followed by the early Arab and Muslim leaders in terms of their communication with the people and of getting acquainted with their problems. The only difference is the size of the society, which is quite complicated in this age.

Struggler Saddam Husayn's way of dealing with the citizens and of handling and solving their problems and conditions adds a deep and humanitarian dimension to the democratic practices in the society, which is being built by the party in Iraq. Furthermore, this method enables the leader and, consequently the leadership to have first hand information about the problems and conditions in the face of which the party, official and popular institutions might possibly feel impotent to cure. Thanks to this method, the leadership managed to introduce new administrative, social, and economic order; and to draft, modify and develop many laws and measures which are of social, economic and administrative

nature and which are closely connected with the life of the masses and with their living and social conditions. The distinguished method of leader Saddam Hysayn sets an example to every official in the party and revolution how to deal directly with the people.

This method includes an objective guarantee against the freezing of the party and official institutions, and even the popular institutions, this method protects these institutions against narrowmindedness, bureaucracy and wrong openness. This method always injects these institutions with blood and spirit to make them fully understand the conditions of the people and render to them the best possible services.

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FURTHER REPORTAGE ON REPORT OF NINTH CENTRAL CONGRESS

Development, Socialist Issues

Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 28 Jan 83 pp 3-11

[Text] "One Arab nation with one everlasting mission: the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party of Iraq

Chapter Three: Issues of Development and Building Socialism

In the preface to the chapter on the functions of social change the "Political Report of the Eighth Regional Congress" stated, "The Arab Socialist Ba'th Party is a revolutionary, socialist party that considers socialism a vital necessity for achieving liberation and unity and bringing about the modern awakening of the Arab nation. Therefore, chief among its functions of struggle are those of disseminating socialist ideas and values, giving those socialist ideas and values concrete form in all areas of the struggle, trying to put those ideas and values into application in accordance with the requirements of each stage wherever that is possible anywhere in the Arab homeland and doing that in the context of a unifying outlook."

Ever since the beginning the party has had its own understanding of socialism, and it has emphasized the Arab nation's own way for achieving socialism.

The Arab nation's own way for achieving socialism does not refer to a theory of work and to a way for realizing ideological socialist objectives and premises. [The Arab nation] shares with other socialist ideologies the ideological premises and the background of the socialist doctrine. [What is intended here] is a special way of [formulating] ideological premises and conceptualizing a socialist ideology just as [what is intended] is a special way of setting up a socialist structure (a theory of work). [The Arab nation's] participation in the process of building bridges among nations would take place through a value which affirms that each nationalistic theory of life has viewpoints, frames of reference and bridges that it shares with earlier humanitarian theories in the world.

The party did not adapt its socialist principles from the Marxist theory or from any other socialist theory. Nor did the party try to emulate any of the socialist experiments that exist in the world. At the same time, however, the party did advocate a study of all socialist theories and experiments in the world and called for an active and creative interaction with them.

It may be said that socialism was not a [mere] theory for the party before it took over political power in Iraq on 17-30 July 1968. To the party socialism was rather a set of basic principles. After the revolution the party had to define its own way for building socialism. It had to formulate its own socialist theory, a theory that stems from the nation's heritage and from the needs and objective conditions that exist in Iraq and in the Arab homeland.

Despite the fact that the theoretical and applied questions of socialism are precarious, difficult and overlapping, the party was able to formulate a socialist theory with relative ease and with minimal losses. The party was also able to deal even-handedly with principles and with objective circumstances. Two factors were helpful in this regard.

First, as we mentioned, the party had chosen from the beginning its own route to socialism. It was not bound by any formula or previous theoretical or practical restrictions.

Second, the party was able to rid itself of deviant and short-sighted tendencies and movements that had emerged in its ranks in the sixties during its experience in government in 1963 in Iraq and afterwards in Syria. (Some effects of that experience lingered after the 17 July 1968 Revolution). These tendencies and movements had been superficially influenced by Marxism and had tried to force on the party a dogma that was alien to its principles and its nature.

The Eighth Regional Congress dealt with theoretical and applied questions of socialism as principal questions on its agenda.

The Congress dealt with these questions from the standpoint of the party's principles and its over-all view [of these matters]. The Congress was able to provide a profound and a comprehensive analysis of economic and social conditions that surround problems of socialist change. It provided a circumspect diagnosis of the basic facts of Iraq's political, economic and social development, and it defined for a subsequent stage tasks of a comprehensive nature that are vitally related to the requirements of the national and pan-Arab struggle as well as to the interests of the public in Iraq.

It is important to affirm here that while the Eighth Regional Congress defined specific objectives to be achieved through socialist change and subsequent development, it did not deal with these objectives in a rigid, dogmatic manner. Instead, the Congress emphasized the importance of finding out about this concrete reality, interacting with new facts, balancing principles against objective circumstances and being extremely careful of steering the final outcome of the quest for socialism in the direction of strengthening and developing the socialist method and ensuring its decisive victory.

Achievements of the Past Stage

What are the basic objectives and tasks for socialist change and development that were defined by the Eighth Regional Congress? What objectives and tasks have been achieved?

Before answering this question, reference must be made to the fact that in the period of time between the two congresses there were three fundamental changes in

the area of building socialism and development. We make this reference so we can come to an objective and a precise understanding of this matter.

1. The party's experience in the various areas of socialist application and development was enriched, and many new facts were discovered during complex application processes. This was a natural development, but the party dealt with it creatively.

2. National resources grew at rates higher than expected during the Eighth Regional Congress. This was due to the fact that the fruits of the nationalization of oil, of increased production and increased prices were being reaped. This had a direct effect on the course of development and socialist change.

3. The fighter Saddam Husayn stepped up his activities in making observations and analyses of the basic aspects of the course of development and socialist change. Revolutionary and practical solutions to complex problems created by the course were discovered, and a framework for a Ba'th theory of work in terms of socialist application was laid down.

More than 8 years after the Eighth Regional Congress and 14 years after the Revolution we can say most emphatically and with considerable pride that the 17-30 July 1968 Revolution that was led by the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party in Iraq has made advanced strides in building a socialist society in Iraq.

During these 14 years Iraq underwent a decisive change. It changed from a country whose resources and basic materials were controlled by colonial, monopolistic countries and a society where feudalism exploitation, poverty, unemployment and backwardness prevailed and became a completely different society.

Iraq has been totally liberated from any form of foreign exploitation and control that was exercised over its resources and its wealth. Today we are proud to declare that Iraqi society has become a society free of feudalism and capitalist exploitation. It is a society that ensures equal opportunity to its citizens. It is a society where standards of living are rising at high rates and where all areas and facilities of life are developing and flourishing.

The elimination of the remnants of feudalism and feudalism relations and the establishment of the state's firm control over foreign and domestic trade have done away with conditions that are conducive to exploitation. Today, Iraqis are living in a society that guarantees them protection from exploitation regarding the capacity for work or the profit realized from commercial agencies. The state has guaranteed all citizens opportunities for work. Any citizen can [now] find himself a place where he can work in the state's sectors. No one in Iraq is compelled to undersell his ability to work or to engage in any economic activity where the obligations and rights of both parties are not co-equal.

1. The following passage may be found on page 230 of the "Political Report of the Eighth Regional Congress:"

"The principal objective of socialism is the elimination of exploitation. [Another is] the achievement of justice in society. Prosperity for people in all areas of life is to be secured in a manner that is balanced with conditions of the stage, with the country's economic capabilities and with national and pan-Arab interests.

The Revolution enacted the Comprehensive Social Security Act which guarantees families with no income, families with a fixed income and families with low income an additional monthly income that would ensure for them a decent life.

The Revolution also enacted a law that provided social security [benefits] to the handicapped above and beyond what was provided to them under the forementioned act. This law stipulated that a handicapped person who can work and who has no steady source of income is to be appointed to a position in state and socialist sector agencies according to his ability and his inclinations. [According to this law] a handicapped person is to be exempted from the provisions of the Labor Law and the laws and regulations of service. If he is not appointed to such a position, a fixed income is to be designated for him.

There is now no unemployment in Iraqi society. Also these two new social security laws are finally putting an end to all signs of begging and homelessness and cases of poverty and want.

In addition to the foregoing the state now provides citizens with basic goods, whether these goods are imported or produced locally. The state provides these goods at prices it sets with an eye to the public interest and the interests of citizens and not to exploitation.

The state did not stop at just providing basic goods. The state's agencies expanded [their service] to ensure the availability of many goods and commodities for a variety of uses. The state even provided goods that are described as luxury goods, and they did so at suitable prices.

As national revenues continued to grow, the Revolution tried to raise citizens' standards of living indirectly by changing social security [laws], public services and by producing consumer goods and selling them for prices that were commensurate with the people's national income. The Revolution tried to raise standards of living directly by increasing salaries and wages for all sectors of workers in the state. Salaries in the armed forces were increased numerous times, and there were some salary increases for workers in 1974 on the 11th anniversary of the February Revolution. The Revolutionary Command Council had issued several decrees increasing salaries in the armed forces and salaries for civil servants and workers between 9 and 19 dinars; lowering interest rates on loans from the real estate bank; raising the maximum legal allowance for income taxes; and reducing the prices of a large number of goods and services that are offered by the state to citizens, such as gas, oil, shortening, water and electricity. Rural areas were to enjoy greater reductions.

"Also the considerable increase that was realized in national revenues under the auspices of the 17 July Revolution and its libertarian, progressive and development policies--and particularly our victories over monopolies in the glorious battle of nationalization--requires today that a major leap in the people's standard of living be brought about. This may be realized by increasing salaries and wages and reducing the costs of basic services such as electricity and water. Education that is absolutely free is to be realized; health services are to be developed; and housing is to be provided. The prices of basic goods that pertain to the lives of the vast majority of citizens are to be stabilized, and the prices of other goods are to be regulated."

Other decrees were issued in 1979 on the 11th anniversary of the 17-30 July 1968 Revolution. These decrees increased the salaries of military men, of persons in the internal security forces and of civil servants and workers. The raises were between 10 and 17.5 dinars. Retired people were also covered by those raises. The most recent of [these] decrees which increased citizens' purchasing power was one issued in 1980 on the 12th anniversary of the 17-30 July Revolution. According to that decree all civilian, military and retired employees of state agencies were given a raise of between 20 and 25 dinars. Thus the total increase in purchasing power was between 40 dinars and 61.5 dinars during the period between the two congresses. This was more than the salaries earned by large groups of citizens in the first years of the revolution. [This increase in purchasing power] does not take into account a law that was enacted increasing children's allowances and establishing equal allowances for the children of Iraqi workers, civil servants and military men.

Average per capita income in Iraq rose from 91.1 dinars in 1968 to 269.4 dinars in 1974 and to 666.1 dinars in 1981.¹ The average increase in per capita income was 19.8 dinars in the period between 1968 and 1974 and 13.09 dinars in the period between 1975 and 1981.²

The increase in Iraqis' average per capita income was associated with raising average wages and salaries for workers in the state's agencies and institutions. The average annual salary rose from 492 dinars in 1968 to 609.2 dinars in 1974 and to 1,517 dinars in 1981. Average wages rose from 228 dinars, to 675.4 dinars and to 1,617 dinars, respectively. Thus, the median figure for the change in salaries and wages rose from 100 to 187 and to 474 dinars for the same periods.

These increases in per capita income created a concrete and an over-all state of progress in the standard of living and in [the people's] prosperity. The Revolution had inherited a society that was characterized by poverty and want. That society has now become one that is acquiring every day the features of a decent life and growing prosperity. The number of families that spend 50 dinars or less per month dwindled during the period from 1976 to 1979 from 11.7 percent of all families to only 2.8 percent of all families in urban areas. In rural areas the number of these families declined from 37.5 percent to 12.9 percent. This change in the spending makeup of families is countered by an increase in the percentage of families whose spending exceeds 150 dinars per month. In urban areas families that spend more than 150 dinars per month increased from 12.2 percent to 45.4 percent; in rural areas those families increased from 7.3 percent to 8 percent. The number of families in urban areas that spend between 51 and 150 dinars [per month] declined from 66.9 percent to 51.7 percent in favor of the group that spends more than 150 dinars per month; and in rural areas the percentage of

1. In 1980 average per capita income was 998 dinars, but in 1981 it dropped because oil production declined due to the war with Khomeyni's regime.

2. The average growth in per capita income was 25.6 dinars for the period between 1975 and 1980.

3. The most recent study on family budgets that is available is the one covering the period between 1976 and 1979. A study covering subsequent years is being prepared.

families that spend between 51 and 150 dinars per month rose from 55.2 percent to 69.1 percent.

General consumer spending for families in urban areas rose from 114.1 dinars a month in 1976 to 166.9 dinars in 1979. In rural areas consumer spending for families rose from 74.8 dinars to 109 dinars. The rate of increase for both urban and rural areas amounted to 46 percent and 46 percent, respectively. This was countered by a 26 percent increase in prices. It is also to be noted that during the same period the number of families that have electricity [in their homes] rose from 94 percent to 96.6 percent in urban areas and from 25 percent to 43.3 percent in rural areas. The number of families that own private automobiles--not including cars used for production and taxicabs--rose from 10.6 percent to 12.2 percent in urban areas and from 0.3 percent to 3.2 percent in rural areas.

The number of families in urban areas that use gas as their principal fuel rose from 54.5 percent to 71.2 percent and from 10.1 percent to 17.8 percent in rural areas. This is countered by a decrease in the number of families that use firewood for fuel: from 55.1 percent to 31.2 percent of the total number of families.

The Revolution dealt with the problem of taxes in a socialist manner, and it took into account the financial capabilities of the state in every stage of development.

With regard to the income tax, a wife's income was set apart from that of her husband, and each one was considered responsible for himself [and for his own taxes], but a wife was granted the right to add her income to that of her husband if that was advantageous to both of them.

The income tax for those employed by the state and by the socialist and mixed sectors was also abolished. These two measures are considered a major gain in terms of socialist accomplishments. Besides, the legal exemption for taxpayers themselves or for their dependent children was increased without restricting the exemption to a certain number of children as was the case in the past. Income tax on the income of retired people and on bonuses payable to retired military men and civilians was also abolished. Profits realized from the sale of one's residence have also been exempted from taxes if the owner of the residence or the owner, his wife and dependent children do not own another residence at the time of sale. The same conditions for this exemption also apply to land [zoned] for residential use. This is a humanitarian measure whose purpose is to enable a citizen who has to sell his home for any reason to acquire another suitable home. Hatcheries and poultry farms have also been exempted from taxes to encourage this kind of production that would serve the national economy and reduce reliance on chickens and eggs obtained from foreign sources.

Leaders of the party and the Revolution were also humane in the special consideration they gave our brave martyrs, the heroes of Saddam's glorious Qadisiyah. They were exempted from inheritance tax, and their heirs were exempted from income tax on transactions in which they deeded inherited property to each other.

Regarding the inheritance tax, leaders of the party and the Revolution exempted

the domicile of a deceased [hero] from inheritance tax regardless of its value. This stemmed from a knowledgeable and a humanitarian view that takes into account the conditions of a family and the difficulties families would face in obtaining an appropriate residence.

From a humanitarian standpoint leaders of the party and the revolution issued a law releasing the heirs [of a hero] from any liability their benefactor may have incurred to the state, if he was indebted to the state. That liability would be limited to the deceased person's property, and it would not include the shares of his dependent heirs and the family residence.

Regarding real estate taxes, property occupied by its owners is exempt from real estate tax. The tax on farm land was abolished for 5 years, and funds that would have been collected accordingly have been deleted [from the budget].

Customs fees or the interest paid on a number of essential food substances was reduced. In particular customs fees on imported formula for infants were abolished so that the price of baby formula can be reduced because it provides essential nourishment for infants of all classes.

The Development of Public Services

Under the auspices of the 17-30 July Revolution and in the period between the Eighth Congress in 1974 and the Ninth Congress in 1982 the Revolution focused on two closely connected trends in the area of public services. The first was that of developing the quantity and quality of basic public services. The second was that of affirming a social and a socialist notion of public services. Thus two major objectives would be realized simultaneously: developing the country and improving the standard of living of all the masses in all areas. This development and the attendant improvement in the standard of living would be linked to a socialist course that would protect citizens from exploitation.

Education

Since 1974 all stages of education have been available absolutely free. The state provides students with all the requirements for education from kindergarten until graduate school. The state also provides free food for kindergarten and elementary school students. On the other hand this sector has undergone considerable expansion that is consistent with the requirements of creating the revolutionary individual.

The standard of development of public services in any country is closely related to the standard of living of its citizens. Also the way in which the state treats public services reflects to a large degree the state's social concept.

The number of children attending kindergartens rose from 14,500 children in 1968-1969 to 35,300 children in 1974-1975 and to 76,500 children in 1980-1981. During the same periods the number of kindergartens rose from 135 to 203 and to 387. The number of students in elementary schools rose from 1.01 million students in 1968 to 1.7 million in 1975 and to 2.6 million in 1981.

The number of students in secondary schools rose from 285,700 students in 1968 to 487,800 in 1975 and to 1.01 million in 1981.

The development of vocational education in the country was evident. Its purpose was to meet the country's growing needs for mid-level cadres required by the development process and the expansion needs of different projects. The number of vocational schools rose from 36 schools in 1968 to 75 schools in 1975 and to 148 in 1981. This was countered by an increase in the number of students at those schools: from 8,600 students to 23,300 and 53,200 students for the same periods. In addition, the number of students at technical institutes affiliated with the Organization of Technical Institutes [also increased]. The number of students at these institutes amounted to 23,000 in 1980-1981.

The number of students at teachers' institutes rose from 10,800 male and female students in 1968 to 14,700 students in 1975 and to 29,200 in 1981. In 1981 the number of [teachers'] institutes was 42.

University education too underwent considerable development. The number of university students rose from 28,600 students in 1968 to 75,500 students in 1975 and to 112,400 in 1981. These students were divided among six universities.

Health Services

Health services were also expanded in the period between the Eighth Regional Congress and this one. This was consistent with the concern leaders of the party and the Revolution had with ensuring good health care for citizens and providing the suitable climate for building the sound and strong character of citizens. In this context the number of hospitals rose from 149 in 1968 to 167 in 1975 and to 203 in 1981. The number of hospital beds thus rose from 16,300 beds to 22,100 and to 25,300 beds for the same periods. Health institutions also underwent considerable growth and evident development. The number of health institutions rose from 933 to 1,505 and to 1,745 for the same periods. People's health clinics were established for the first time in the country. In 1975 the number of these clinics was 55; in 1981 that number rose to 124. This growth in health institutions and hospitals was accompanied by a similar growth in medical staff. The number of physicians rose from 1,759 male and female physicians in 1968 to 4,478 physicians in 1975 and to 5,518 in 1981.

The state's health organizations guarantee free health services for citizens. In some cases these organizations charge nominal fees to cover organizational and administrative [costs]. These organizations also offer most of the medication that is needed free of charge. The state provides citizens with medicines at prices that are much lower than they are in all countries of the region. The state also provides large numbers of citizens with opportunities to receive therapy abroad at its own expense at the best foreign health organizations. This is provided for cases that cannot be treated inside the country.

The Problem of Housing

The housing shortage is the biggest crisis the country is facing in terms of the standard of living and services. The crisis was brought about by the change in citizens' standard of living, by changes in life style and in social relations, by the break-up of the family which is caused by these changes, by the continued growth of the population and by the growing number of Arabs and foreigners in the country. Besides, there is a shortage of construction materials in relation with growing needs in this sector and in all development facilities.

Studies that were conducted to determine the magnitude of the housing shortage and to treat it indicated that in 1975 the shortage in housing units in Iraq amounted to 300,000 units; 220,000 of these units were in urban areas. If one were to add to this figure the housing units that are substandard, the cumulative need for housing would amount to 566,000 units at the end of 1980; 440,000 of these units are [needed] in urban areas.

In the years that followed the Eighth Regional Congress authorized agencies of the state committed a grievous error--there were special conditions and reasons for that--when they failed to effect an expansion in plants for construction materials such as cement, bricks and other construction materials. This created an annual shortage that was not less than 25 percent in the production of these materials. Also the resources that were put to work during those years in the services sector in general and in the housing sector, as part of that sector, were relatively small compared with the country's growing needs in this sector. Although the construction sector has undergone considerable development since the time of the revolution, the value of production in that sector rose from 98.5 million in 1968 to 426.1 million in 1974 and to 3,030,700,000 in 1981. This is a growth rate of 27.6 [percent] for the period between 1968 and 1974 and 29.22 [percent] for the period between 1975 and 1981. The national product [in this sector] rose from 36.8 million to 155.5 million and to 1,645,400,000 for the same periods. The rates of growth in the national product amounted to 27.1 [percent] for the period between 1968 and 1974 and 29.06 [percent] for the period between 1975 and 1981. However this growth was not enough to meet all the country's service and production needs. This was recorded as a deficiency in the previous plan. Fellow fighter Saddam Husayn and the leaders of the party and the Revolution emphasized the necessity of correcting this deficiency. In the last years of the plan this deficiency was avoided in part, and larger investments were allocated to services and to the housing sector. Establishment of new plants for construction materials was begun, and authorized agencies were instructed to import whatever construction materials could be imported. Citizens were given broad easy terms in [acquiring] land and [applying for] loans to encourage construction, and measures were taken to deal with the problem of housing for foreigners employed by companies that are carrying out major development projects in the country. Nevertheless, the housing shortage still exists, and major efforts must be made to confront it during the coming period.

In previous years much was accomplished in this area even though the urgent need for housing still exists. Numerous organizations, such as the General Housing Organization, have energetically taken part in completing housing units. In addition, other state agencies and departments have been actively involved in projects such as the industrial housing projects, rural housing projects, military housing and projects of the Ministry of Local Government.

It is worth noting here that the Revolution has so far built tens of thousands of modern housing units in the northern district of the country. This followed implementation of the decision to have the Ministry of Local Government evacuate the scattered and backward villages on the border strip. New housing units were thus provided for tens of thousands of citizens who now live in modern villages where basic services are available. Citizens had been deprived of these basic services in their [previous] remote places of residence.

The total number of housing units completed by agencies of the socialist sector in the period between 1968 and 1974 was 11,561 units. In the period between 1975 and 1981 this figure rose to 96,878 units.

In general the number of housing units completed by the various organizations and agencies of the socialist and private sectors between 1978 and 1981 only amounted to 172,600 units and about 12,000 apartments. It is known that these units include those that were completed in cities and municipalities and those that were built with bricks, stone and cement. It is worth noting that according to the 1977 census the total cumulative number of housing units in the country (in urban and rural areas) amounted to 798,700 units and about 17,000 apartments.

Easy terms offered by the state have also helped solve part of the housing shortage. The most recent of these terms was that of abolishing interest, effecting a substantial increase in the money available for loans from the real estate bank and encouraging the construction of apartment buildings.

If the sums of money disbursed by the real estate bank were an indicator of the extent of the state's involvement in facilitating the construction of housing for citizens, we would find that the loans which were actually disbursed in 74,400 transactions between 1968 and 1974 amounted to 98.1 million dinars. Between 1975 and 1981 the loans that were disbursed rose to 1.729 billion dinars in 459,500 transactions.

Roads

The state has worked energetically to have new roads built in all parts of Iraq and particularly in the northern region which has not received its adequate share of development in this and in other services because of the conditions of the reactionary rebellion there. In this context 2,661 kilometers of roads were completed in the country between 1968 and 1974; and 15,611 kilometers were completed between 1975 and 1981. There are 1,242 kilometers of super highways and 12,711 kilometers of other roads under construction. A total of 30 small and large bridges with a total length of 3,952 kilometers were [completed] between 1968 and 1974. The number of bridges rose to 241, measuring a total of 23,588 kilometers. This is in addition to 57 bridges, measuring a total of 12,990 kilometers.

Electricity and Water

During the past period there was an appreciable change in the rise of electrical energy in the country, and villages and rural areas that did not have it were provided with electricity. Many power generating stations were built in different parts of the country, and power transmission lines were connected to most parts of the country. Thus, total electricity generated rose from 2,571,800,000 kilowatts per hour in 1968 to 3,934,100,000 kilowatts per hour in 1975 and to 11,665,300,000 kilowatts per hour in 1981. Thus, the rate of increase in power generation from 1974 to 1981 amounted to 258.4 percent.

There was a similar development in the establishment of fresh water projects in the country. During the forementioned period a large number of these

projects was completed, and the quantity of fresh water produced thus rose from 396 million cubic meters in 1968 to 412.03 million cubic meters in 1975 and to 689.9 million cubic meters in 1981. This utility thus produced 87.9 percent more fresh water in 1981 than it did in 1974.

Public Transportation

Public transportation services, including transportation of commuters, passengers, goods, air transportation and rail transportation, were developed during the past period. More trucks, passenger vehicles and rail cars were purchased, and air transportation routes were increased. In addition, installations, workshops and airports necessary for this were built.

This expansion was reflected in the [increased] capacity of all kinds of transportation. Between 1968 and 1974 the number of passengers on Iraqi Airways was 1.3 million passengers. Between 1975 and 1981 that figure rose to 4.1 million passengers. Goods shipped on airlines rose from 8.3 million tons to 73.8 million tons during the same periods.

In land transportation the Land Transportation Organization was established. Between 1975 and 1981 the organization shipped 29.1 million tons of goods, and its vehicles served 9.5 million passengers.

Transportation services for commuters were developed significantly. Routes in cities as well as the number of vehicles were increased. It is sufficient to note that between 1968 and 1974 the number of commuters in the city of Baghdad was 1.1 billion and that that figure rose to 1.854 billion between 1975 and 1981.

Between 1968 and 1974 the number of passengers who traveled on trains was 19.6 million. That figure rose to 23.6 million passengers between 1975 and 1981. Goods shipped on trains rose from 28.3 million tons to 37.7 million tons.

It is worth noting that the development realized in the transportation and communications sector in past years has been evident and appreciable. The value of production in this sector rose from 110.8 million dinars in 1968 to 208.4 million in 1974 and to 1,110,600,000 dinars in 1981. This is an 11.1 percent rate of growth for the period between 1968 and 1974, and a 26.4 percent rate of growth for the period between 1975 and 1981.

Despite the development realized in public transportation services, its general outcome in relation with the standards of general development in the country remains slow. Land transportation means continued to be much less than what is needed, and transportation services in cities, including Baghdad, have not been provided at the required level. Railroads have not been developed sufficiently developed to ensure transportation requirements for citizens or for goods.

Authorized state agencies will have to spend a great deal of effort to confront this problem and overcome the congestion caused by this problem in production and services.

Telecommunications

In the past period developments in telecommunications in Iraq have been appreciable. The most modern and the fastest telephone communications system between principal cities has been provided by means of a microwave system. Excellent means of communication between Iraq and the outside world have also been provided through the use of satellites and telex devices. Many factors of weakness and backwardness that had been prevalent in this area before the Revolution were thus overcome.

Leaders of the party and the Revolution devoted obvious attention to this utility and allocated to it the funds that were necessary to develop its means and its establishments. Investment spending for telecommunications rose from 13.5 million in the period between 1968 and 1974 to 180.9 million in the period between 1975 and 1981. This increase in investment spending was accompanied by growth in all kinds of telecommunications services. The number of automatic telephone exchanges rose from 22 in 1968 to 30 in 1974 and to 50 in 1981. The capacity of these exchanges grew from 76,000 lines to 130,000 and to 350,000 lines for the same years. The density of telephone communications (1 telephone per 100 persons) thus rose from 0.7 [percent] in 1968 to 1.1 [percent] in 1974 and to 3.0 [percent] in 1981.

Postal services also underwent development: there were 110 million pieces of mail in 1968, 140 million pieces in 1974 and 200 million pieces in 1981. Telegraph services rose from 1.8 million telegrams to 3.0 telegrams. The number of individuals using the savings services of the Post Office rose from 140,000 to 160,000 and to 270,000 for the same years.

In addition, during the period that followed the Eighth Regional Congress the Revolution completed a number of vital projects that played a part in the development of the telecommunications sector. Among these were three projects [for installing] coaxial cables. The first was the eastern cable with a capacity for 960 channels; it would link the exchanges of the southern governorates with the [other] exchanges in the country. The second was the southern cable with a capacity for 1,260 channels; it would link the exchanges of the southern governorates with the [other] exchanges in the country. And the third was the northern cable with a capacity for 960 channels; it would link the exchanges of the northern governorates with the [other] exchanges of the country. Ten automatic exchanges with a capacity for 60,000 lines were completed along with their supplementary requirements in Baghdad and a number of governorates. Regarding developing the country's communications with the outside world, the land station project and the international exchange, which has a capacity for 204 channels, were completed so that Iraq can communicate by telephone with a large number of countries of the world. The electronic telex exchange with a capacity for 1,462 lines was completed; the Iraq-Syria and the Iraq-Kuwait (120 channels) microwave project was completed; and the capability for transmitting television broadcasts to the outside world by means of satellites became available.

Means of communication pertaining to radio and television broadcasting underwent significant development commensurate with the growing need for this kind of communications. The details of that are in Chapter Four, "Culture and the Media."

Although what has been realized in this area in relation with conditions prior to

the Revolution has been significant, there are still obvious bottlenecks in this facility which still falls short of meeting citizens' needs for service, particularly telephone services.

Building Socialism and a Theory of Work

The Eighth Regional Congress defined [the following] central tasks in emphasizing that the preliminaries to the shift to socialism were to be realized and that a shift to the socialist mode was to be begun in all areas where the objective conditions for the shift can come to maturity as allowed by the conditions of the stage.

1. Public sector farming--that is, state farms, collective farms and cooperatives--are to be expanded and developed so that the public sector can prevail and become a leader in farming. During the coming period an effort is to be made to reduce forms of agricultural production undertaken by individuals so as to guarantee increased production, to realize prosperity in the life of farmers and to expedite the mode of socialist changes.

2. The state is to control all foreign trade, and it is to exercise central control over domestic trade. The public sector is to assume a position of leadership in foreign trade. Urgent needs for completing the development plan and special measures that are required in this regard are to be taken into account.

3. The leadership position of the public sector in industry is to be strengthened, and an enthusiastic and a conscientious effort is to be made in accordance with the indicators that have already been discussed to effect a shift in this sector from the modes of a capitalist state to socialist, democratic modes. An effort is to be made to coordinate the conditions of the private sector and strengthen the state's leadership of it so that it would play a positive role in the development plan.

4. Public services are to be guided in accordance with the objectives and requirements of development and socialist change.

To that the Eighth Regional Congress immediately added the following:

"With regard to all areas of socialist change and all pertinent questions, the problem of economic struggle in the region must be taken into account and given a great deal of attention. Iraq is surrounded by several rich countries that follow a capitalist mode and have close ties with imperialism. Due to the wealth of these countries and because of the U.S. imperialist plan, which seeks to undermine the socialist trend and eliminate it altogether from the countries of the region, these countries are trying to set up models of economies, particularly where large human and economic resources are available, that are subordinate to imperialism and to the capitalist mode. They are using false evidence and misleading propaganda to portray these economies as advanced models. Therefore, the region whose countries are influenced by each other will see a struggle during the coming period. This will be a struggle between the mode that is based on national independence and socialist planning and that mode which is based on subordination to imperialism and capitalist methods. Imperialist forces, reactionaries in the region and right wing forces in the country will try to exploit the mistakes that are made and the difficulties that arise in the course of

bringing about socialist change. They will try to exploit these mistakes and difficulties on a broad scale to undermine confidence in the socialist mode. The matter of citizens' standard of living, providing the essential needs of consumers and the varieties of those needs will play a principal role in the battle between these conflicting modes.

"Therefore, it is essential that steps for socialist change be carefully calculated so as to take into account the conditions of the forementioned battle. This is to be accompanied by a firm ideological determination to pursue a socialist course, to develop with the utmost urgency ideological efforts geared to socialism, to universalize and further socialist education among the masses and to expose the propaganda of imperialist circles and right-wing reactionaries. It is also essential that a flexible course be adopted in confronting emergency cases and difficult conditions. Extreme care should be exercised in steering the final outcome of the course in the direction of strengthening and developing the socialist course and ensuring its decisive victory."

What are the problems and basic issues we faced in the past in the course of building socialism and in [the course of our] attempt to select our own theory of work?

The period that preceded and followed the Eighth Regional Congress was characterized by a tireless effort to expand the domain of the socialist sector in the various branches of the economy: in industry, agriculture, trade and services.

The general framework of this method was correct and necessary. The Revolution had inherited a society in which feudalist and capitalist relations prevailed, and exploitation and corruption were widespread. In order to alter the course of development and life in the country from its former feudalist and capitalist course to a socialist one, it was necessary to embark on a tenacious socialist struggle in education and application. It was necessary to give the socialist mode in every area of the economy and in every field of life a very strong thrust inasmuch as extrinsic conditions surrounding the Revolution would allow. Reference to these conditions was made in the political report that was issued by the Eighth Regional Congress, even though this course included some errors and shortcomings.

The party had to transform Iraq decisively and totally into a socialist society. This is what certainly happened during the past 14 years. In the past years, however, that close adherence to all the objectives that were defined by the Eighth Regional Congress was not necessarily there. The party dealt with these objectives as though they were a guide for action and a general agenda. It did not deal with them as though they were firm precepts that were not to be infringed upon. In fact, after the Eighth Regional Congress itself had defined the objectives it had achieved from the party's experience at that time, it placed primary emphasis on the fundamental aims that were being sought from these objectives. In the process of building socialism we have to set our eyes primarily on these aims: to do away with exploitation and to ensure prosperity, happiness and freedom for individuals and society. We are not to focus on precepts that we may attain at some point because each precept is the product of its own stage and its own conditions. These stages and conditions are not constant; therefore, precepts are subject to changes, alterations and adjustments.

The past period was characterized by the fact that a large percentage of the objectives that were defined by the Eighth Regional Congress were accomplished according to the rules and measures that had been approved by the Eighth Regional Congress. Reference to these objectives was made previously. The changes and developments that were made in some of the rules were the result of the three fundamental changes that we previously referred to.

Practical experience and the concrete results of some applications dictated a reconsideration [of conditions] to correct shortcomings and relieve the congestion that had surfaced and created results harmful to the Revolution. These shortcomings were used by hostile forces to disparage the Revolution and the socialist method.

The intellectual activities of the fighter Saddam Husayn during that period offered the party revolutionary and profound practical solutions to problems that in the past were merely ideas and general principles.

At the same time the growth of the country's public wealth enabled leaders to take measures that had not previously been taken into account to ensure prosperity for the people. This required that adjustments be made to previous rules, particularly in the area of trade.

Tasks of the Socialist Sector and Tasks of the Private Sector

The expansion and consolidation of the socialist sector in the fields of industry, agriculture, trade and services were splendid achievements. Tremendous efforts had been made by party leaders and by party and national cadres in the state, who believe in the Revolution and in socialism and who work in this field, to bring about these achievements. As we mentioned, these achievements firmly established the socialist agenda in the country and transformed the old society, which the Revolution had inherited, into a socialist society.

These positive characteristics, however, were not free from shortcomings which produced results that harmed the Revolution and its relations to the masses and to the socialist agenda itself.

On the basis of the its objective, revolutionary outlook the party is constantly concerned with stabilizing positive and splendid accomplishments and noting shortcomings and mistakes so these can be overcome and so that new energies can be ensured for launching the revolutionary quest anew. It is therefore essential that reference be made to the snags that occurred in this regard so they can be analyzed and revolutionary and practical solutions for them found.

The party and its revolution in Iraq endorsed in principle and in constitutional and political documents issued by the Revolution [the notion] that private ownership is legitimate and that private business is also legitimate in the context of socialist principles and laws and the supreme interests of the state and society. The Revolution has adhered to these principles. However, authorized agencies in various branches of the economy and services had failed in the past to define accurately the boundaries separating the activities of the socialist sector from those of the private sector. They had also failed to define the functions of both sectors in the process of development, production and services.

Business in the socialist and private sectors overlapped and was interconnected in all areas [of activity]. Both sectors were hurt by this: it upset relations between both sectors and caused them to lose confidence in each other.

In industry the state built factories that the private sector could have taken over with greater efficiency, sparing the state much effort and saving it a great deal of money. The state became involved in farming, and it almost controlled every field of production. Individual initiative dwindled, and there were severe shortages in agricultural and animal production.

In trade, state agencies became involved in all kinds of merchandise. According to an accurate diagnosis by our compatriot Saddam Husayn, the state was almost turned into "a state of shopkeepers." In tourism, despite assistance from the state to the private sector, authorized agencies were establishing and managing small restaurants at the same time that they were establishing and managing large tourist complexes.

This interconnection and overlapping in the activities of the socialist and private sectors, the failure of authorized state agencies to distinguish between principal and secondary branches of the economy and also between principal and secondary consumer needs or development needs, and the unscientific propensity to expand the domain of the socialist sector were all mistakes which demonstrated that the rules of application for the process of expanding the socialist sector horizontally were out of balance. All this impaired the process of development in the country, not to mention the negative consequences that developed therefrom such as production shortages in some areas, products of poor quality, and the bottlenecks which occurred particularly in the field of trade.

These conditions were among the most prominent factors that led to the creation of an imbalance in the growth of the socialist sector. They prevented the private sector from carrying out its set and required role in the process of production, development and public services.

Private business in the industrial sector did not develop as much as was required to satisfy some consumer needs which experience had shown state institutions had failed to provide in the desired quantity and quality. For numerous reasons, however, private business did realize profits in the construction sector and in the contracting sector in general. Among these reasons is the fact that people who own private property were fearful of nationalization because of the experience they had had in the years preceding and following the Revolution. In addition, theoretically the historical range for the role of the private sector was not clear. And all this weakened private sector initiatives in the field of industry and in the industrial-agricultural field as well.

In agriculture conditions for private business became unsettled because the state became involved in numerous enterprises and fields which the private sector could have carried out more efficiently. Besides, state agencies imposed severe controls over those engaged in private business in this field.

In trade the country experienced successive cases of shortages and bottlenecks that lasted for several years and inflicted psychological and political damage on the Revolution and hurt its relations with the public. These conditions were caused by the growing control experienced by the state on marketing thousands of

basic and secondary goods, by the inability of state agencies to assume those complex burdens and primarily by the lack of proper central control on the branches of production, import and distribution due to the presence of multiple certification centers. Elements and forces hostile to the Revolution utilized these conditions to their advantage.

Although the nationalization of education and establishment of the state's control over the health sector were quite correct, the unlimited expansion of state agencies in other areas of the services sector and the fact that no attention was paid to the role of private business, which could fill many needs, led to the deficient growth of that sector at a time when the need for all branches of services in that sector was growing significantly every year.

The private sector itself is responsible for its own backwardness. For many years segments of the bourgeoisie and exploiting groups adopted an attitude that was hostile to the Revolution and its socialist agenda. They tried everything to foil the socialist experiment. They were hoping that the Revolution would suffer a setback, and the capitalist system would be restored in the country. The private sector is also a backward, selfish and short-sighted sector where people look for fast profits that are guaranteed 100 percent. People in the private sector devise all kinds of schemes to accumulate profits, to manipulate prices and to create shortages in the supply of goods and materials, particularly in trade and in the business of craftsmen. This is the case in the contracting and industrial sectors where the private sector benefits from subsidies and easy terms offered by the state to enable it to contribute to the country's development. People engaged in these businesses make quick profits without making the sincere efforts to improve the standard of services they perform and the products they produce or to maintain balanced prices. In all this it is the citizens, and particularly those who have fixed incomes, who are unjustifiably hurt. The private sector is proving that it is not prepared to make extraordinary efforts to develop the country and obtain long-term benefits.

These shortcomings of the private sector were augmented by the formentioned mistakes of state agencies.

Among the salient facts in this regard is the fact that the private sector in Iraq no longer has political institutions that represent its interests and its positions. At the same time those professional organizations to which people in the private sector belong do not have power and influence. Some of these organizations, like the Association of Industries, are led by the state into general directions whereby conflict between the activities and the outlook of these organizations and the activities of the socialist sector can be avoided. Nevertheless, the relationship between this sector and the authorized agencies of the state has not been regulated on a clear, continuous and scientific basis.

If these facts had positive benefits from a political standpoint, particularly in the early stages of socialist change and construction, it is that they kept the bourgeoisie from acquiring power centers that could play a political role in opposition to the Revolution and its socialist agenda. In practice, however, these facts left the relationship between state agencies and the private sector subject to the whims, assessments and partial information of individuals and to chance.

The other reason for the snags that occurred in expanding the domain of the socialist sector without scientific controls is that some state agencies did not understand the socialist principles of the Revolution correctly. They thought that by pursuing the course they were pursuing they were serving socialist development. Others were drawn into that trend more by a propensity to exercise bureaucratic control than by [their devotion to] socialist principles.

Bureaucrats are by nature feudalist and domineering. When bureaucrats enter into an area of life, they try everything to impose their control over that area.

The mistakes that were made in expanding the domain of the socialist sector to all areas without making distinctions between what is primary and what is secondary did not only lead to bottlenecks, shortages and weaknesses in some branches of the economy, but it also had negative effects on the process of development and on the Revolution's principal national and pan-Arab objectives.

The revolution that the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party is leading in Iraq is not merely a socialist revolution that is taking place in Iraq. If it had been that, it would have had fewer and smaller tasks, and it would have had fewer problems. It would have been possible for us to deal with economic issues from a different perspective, not with regard to [their] substance, but with regard to prospects, magnitude and means.

The national nature of the Revolution and its efforts to build a foundation for supporting and sending forth the Arab Revolutionary Movement involves the Revolution in tremendous responsibilities and commitments. These require the Revolution to deal with all the questions it is facing. Among these questions are questions of the economy from this perspective.

When it becomes the duty of the Revolution to build a large and a strong army that would defend the country and play an active part in national functions and when the Revolution has to build a base for military industries and heavy industries to strengthen national independence and provide the requirements for national liberation battles, it would be a mistake for the state to become preoccupied or inundated with problems of producing refreshments, pastries, and eggs and establishing small restaurants, if private business is capable of carrying out any of these tasks.

It is true that each one of these activities has its own agencies, but all these agencies are part of the state [machinery], and the state's ability to organize and manage is limited. The state's cadres are also limited. These agencies' work formulas remain restricted to certain frameworks and ranges. Thus when the state becomes involved in managing the affairs of both principal and secondary activities, it does so at the expense of principal activities and does not realize any distinguished success in secondary activities. In addition, Iraq's population of 14 million persons must be reckoned with in dealing with the magnitude, methods and priorities of socialist activity.

At the present stage we can do without many secondary economic activities in industry, agriculture, trade and services so we can save the necessary capabilities for the principal branches of the economy and for basic national and pan-Arab missions. These secondary activities can be carried out by the private sector which can develop them better than the state can.

Now and for many years to come Iraq will have large economic capabilities that are provided for it by its oil resources. Therefore, we have to invest these capabilities in meeting the public's secondary and consumer needs by assigning those tasks to the private sector or by providing these needs through imports until we finish building the structures that support the national economy and the general development of the party. These supporting structures cannot be charged to the private sector for ideological or practical reasons or both. The task [of meeting those needs] may not be charged to the private sector, and these needs cannot and may not be provided by imports because they constitute the principal foundation of national independence; of proper development in scientific, economic and technical areas; and of the availability of the principal capability for carrying out national and pan-Arab missions.

Socialism and Private Ownership

The socialist principles of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party acknowledged from the outset that private ownership and private business carried out in the context of socialist principles and laws and the supreme interests of the state and society are legitimate, provided that the state exercise firm control on all the principal means of production and on the principal activities of the economy that are related to the crucial interests of the people. The state is to guarantee preventing the formation of a bourgeois class on the basis of exploiting the masses. This is with respect to principle.

In the material world achieving this balance was and still is an extremely difficult and complex matter. The party has to deal with the problems and conflicts that are produced by this matter at each stage.

This problem emerged in theory and in practice in the process of socialist application during the past period. Primary credit for focusing the limelight on this problem and finding ideological and practical solutions for it goes to the creative intellectual activity of the fighter Saddam Husayn.

The first side of the problem is the practical side, which has to do with the quality of production and services and the extent to which they meet the growing and diverse needs of the public in a highly complex age. In the context of the race between the capitalist and socialist worlds and in light of the vast existing gap between advanced countries and backward or developing countries--and Iraq and the Arab homeland are part of [the latter]--is it correct for the state to go in and control all branches of the economy and services? Will this method cause production to grow and to develop, and will it ensure the needs of the masses?

Experiments that were done in this vein have suffered and are still suffering from failures, economic crises and slow development in most areas of the economy and services. Enlightened communist leaders in more than one communist country tried to alleviate this tendency by stimulating the role of the private sector in some secondary branches of the economy and services to confront shortages and bottlenecks and realize better rates of growth and development.

Nevertheless, such attempts are makeshift attempts to remedy economic and social bottlenecks and to patch up some theoretical notions that have become backward in contemporary life and in its fast development of needs and capabilities.

If this is the reality of the situation in communist experiments that stem from a doctrine which denies the legitimacy of individual ownership and private business and turns theoretically to building a communist society that is based on the theory of "Each according to his work and each according to his need," it would be natural for us, who start out with a doctrine that professes the legitimacy of private ownership and private business in the context of socialist principles and laws and the supreme interests of the state and society, not to make the mistake of expanding the domain of the state's activities and making that domain include every field, every principal and secondary branch of activity and all the minute specifics in the fields and branches of the economy and services.

The experience [we've had] in past years in building the new socialist society has affirmed this matter, as we indicated previously; it has indicated to us the necessity of avoiding this error.

The second side of the problem is the ideological and theoretical one; it has to do with the problem of exploitation. How can we effect a balance in a private sector that does not depend on individual effort or the effort of a family only? How can we effect a balance in a private sector that needs the contribution of workers, and yet prevent the exploitation of other human beings?

The answer to this question is complex, and it may be said that there is no decisive answer to it. The matter cannot be dealt with from a theoretical perspective or in a mathematical style. In fact, we have to deal with it realistically and to link it with a person's freedom and happiness and with the extrinsic conditions that surround every experience.

Before the Revolution a large number of farmers and workers had to sell their labor to feudalists and to capitalists in a relationship that was not equal. They were thus subject to exploitation. However, after 14 years of a socialist regime in Iraq the situation is completely different.

The Revolution has provided work opportunities for every Iraqi citizen who wants to work in the various sectors of the state. Unemployment has finally been eliminated. Therefore, an individual who does not wish to work for the state and who wants to become involved in his own business and rely on his own effort would not be considered an exploited or an exploiting individual. But if an individual voluntarily wishes to work for someone who has his own private business, that would be up to him even if his employer were to benefit from the surplus value of his labor.

This situation cannot exist under any circumstances in all societies. But it does exist in Iraq's revolutionary and socialist society because economic capabilities produced by oil resources are available. It would be a mistake not to benefit from this situation by doing away with exploitation on the one hand and ensuring freedom for people on the other. At the same time we are to obtain better opportunities to develop some branches of the economy and services and ensure that the needs of the masses for these services are being met in a better way.

It is important to affirm here that individuals who work voluntarily for private entrepreneurs are not preyed upon and cannot be exploited indefinitely by those people.

The state regulates business affairs in the country to ensure the basic rights of every individual whether he works in the socialist sector or the private sector. The law sets the minimum wage, the hours of work, regular leave and sick leave, and it also guarantees that an employee is not fired from work unless his dismissal is carried out according to specific controls. Private sector employees are also covered by [social] security laws. As citizens they enjoy having all the free services that are offered by the state in education, health and other areas.

If we were to exclude wages in the socialist sector, which are not subject to the rapidly changing factors of supply and demand that set workers' wages in the private sector, [we would conclude that] workers in the socialist sector have better benefits than their counterparts in the private sector. This is an additional incentive for workers to work in the socialist sector.

One of the important matters that deserve attention here is the fact that the pool of workers in the private sector, such as industry, farming and services, is shrinking among Iraqi workers. The vast majority of Iraqi workers prefer working in the socialist sector. A significant part of the employment needs of the private sector are now being provided by workers coming from abroad.

[Our] compatriot Saddam Husayn dealt with the problem of private ownership and private business in the context of the party's socialist principles and the Revolution's applications of socialism. He dealt with this problem in an all inclusive, profound and creative manner in his address to some civilian and military party organizations at an educational meeting that was organized by the party's Culture and Media Office on 16 February 1978. This address which was published in a pamphlet under the title "Private Ownership and the Responsibility of the State" is considered splendid evidence of action for treating these matters at the present time and in the future. It is essential to establish that fact in the course of this report since it is a principal part of it. The text of the passages that dealt with this subject follow:

"Capitulation, loss of momentum and hence setbacks would be the result of maintaining a slow pace in applying socialism and not dealing with private ownership and private business with a revolutionary mentality and spirit and confronting their functions on that basis. Likewise, unlimited problems and bottlenecks in [the process of] socialist application would be the result of building socialism quickly without careful consideration, of expanding socialist fields hastily and of assuming an unobjective and an unscientific attitude towards non-exploitive private ownership. Among these problems is that many people whose loss could be avoided would be lost to the system. In addition, these measures provide in another way a cover and conditions for a setback.

"Therefore, the problems that our party faces in building socialism are numerous and complex and require constant and continuous vigilance in conceiving and formulating solutions. These problems require us to have a constant faith in the importance of staying away from rigid models of seeing and treating problems. They require us to make a special effort to curb private ownership and private business and to abolish any kind of conflict between permissible private business and private ownership and the socialist sector and the socialist course in general. In making this effort we are to take into account not only the material requirements for socialist application, but also the humanitarian conditions for

such application. This is because to our party socialism is an integrated philosophy of life with all the principal and secondary ingredients of a philosophy of life. Our party does not view socialism as merely [a set of] economic remedies and solutions. [In making this effort], we would avoid losing people, and this is the objective of socialist application.

"We are not the only ones who are constantly facing the difficulties of putting socialism into practice. The difficulties we are facing remain much smaller than all the difficulties of other previous experiments in the application of socialism. In their applications of socialism some socialist experiments acquired total and rapid control of all the means of production and effected an absolute prohibition of private ownership and private business without trying to balance that step with the objective and practical requirements of the conditions for developing life, the requirements of social maturity, cultural and psychological readiness and the serious ability to deal with the socialist structure and the conditions of its development. This created for these experiments obstacles that were extremely costly with regard to development and loss in human terms. In addition to other factors sacrifices made on this route under Stalin, for example, amounted to 13 million persons and one third of the Soviet Union's animal resources. Besides, there were other moral and material effects. This matter sheds some light on the fact that the Soviet Union is retracting its view of non-exploitative individual ownership and also on the fact that [private] ownership has not been absolutely relinquished in some countries of eastern Europe like Poland, Yugoslavia and Hungary.

"It would be considered easy to follow the path of prohibiting private business and private, non-exploitative ownership; to [establish] total state control over the means of production and all economic activity; and to have the state and its agencies manage all that. That would be considered easy when the matter is looked at in its immediate material context without taking into account the social and psychological effects of that path and its effects on development and on the degree of development.

"I am saying that such a measure would be considered easier for the state if it is looked at from an immediate material perspective, compared with our way of building socialism. However, this method would certainly cause grave damage.

The most important requirements for building socialism are those of establishing control over the means of production and making the means of production publicly owned so that all the requirements for preparing the material foundation for building socialism are met. The required balance between this and what is required regarding the role and activities of private ownership is to be preserved. Private business is to serve socialism and the socialist comprehensive view of life according to the conditions and the developing and successive stages of socialism.

"Therefore, this view does not assume that the means of production and all economic activity have to be publicly owned. However, this view does stipulate that private ownership serve public trends and the laws of society by building socialism and socialist relations. The volume and directions of private business are to be determined by the conditions of change. Nevertheless what we consider a fundamental part of our party's central principles, a part that accompanies all

stages of building and developing socialism, remains that of prohibiting and fighting exploitation. We are to reject and fight those trends that make ownership and private business values separate from socialist values and a lasting right that may not be touched or disposed of for any reason whatsoever.

"In our book ownership and private business play a definite role that is set by the central government. The legitimacy of private ownership and business is not based merely on the fact that it does not conflict with the socialist course and the socialist movement to build a new society. Private ownership and private business must also serve those objectives. Their activities, precepts and objectives must be coordinated with those of socialism in accordance with what is required by the nature of successive stages and the requirements of the development and change that are being sought. Therefore what is required is not only action to make non-exploitative private business subject to the laws and general directions of socialism, but what is required is action that subjects private business to interim policies and their views of the role private business must play, the stature it must have and the nature of that role and stature as well.

"To say that there is private ownership and there is private business does not imply that this statement applies generally to all sectors and activities in the separate enterprises of society. The place, magnitude and kind of ownership is determined in the light of the ability of socialist sector agencies to manage, control and supervise and in the light of the development of technological and scientific means and their effects on this and other aspects. Ownership is also determined in the light of the development and maturity of society in general and the extent to which the gap had been closed between preparing individuals culturally and psychologically for socialism and the ability to implement and assimilate tasks in a manner that is consistent with the impulse to build socialism. The role that private ownership and private business are required to play under socialism must also be carefully calculated. All this presumes that allocations be made according to the requirements of the situation and the conditions of development. It is not necessary that private ownership be equal or similar in the various sectors, activities and divisions of society, but it must be integrated and coordinated with those sectors of society with regard to performing the public duty of serving society along with the publicly owned socialist sector, as we mentioned. Thus production relations in the publicly owned sector, in the private sector and in private business--and that includes cooperative business--would be socialist relations in a socialist society. The system in that society would be called a socialist system despite the existence of private business and private ownership of the kind that we referred to. Such a system would come about when the basic pillars of support in the social, cultural and economic fields become relatively stable in kind and magnitude and when applications of the basic principles and basic laws for building socialism at a certain historical stage become mature.

"[A policy that] allows private business and private ownership to exist within the limits that are permitted by the socialist application of the Ba'th Party and at the same time rejects exploitation requires that occasional reconsideration be made of the kind, magnitude, direction and area of private ownership and private business in accordance with the accepted standards and courses of the socialist course in the successive and changing stages of life's affairs and principal ingredients. The Revolution and its agencies are thus assuming serious burdens

through renewable precepts to ensure a continuing balance between the requirements of socialist change and the requirements of curbing the private sector to keep it from exceeding its set boundaries.

When we consider the farming sector, we find that ownership in that sector is not stable at all. Ownership in the farming sector is associated with several factors among which are [the following]: changes in the use of machinery in farming; developments in scientific methods of fighting plant diseases; developments in improving the kind and volume of agricultural production; and also developments in the means of irrigation and drainage. In addition, ownership [of land] in the farming sector is associated with the political and social considerations of a revolutionary society. On this basis we find that maximum and minimum holdings are to be found in land that is not completely reclaimed or in land that contains a high ratio of salt, which has a negative effect on production. Land holdings are greater in land that has been fully reclaimed or in land that is fertile and is irrigated by an irrigation device or by flooding. Holdings of rain irrigated land change when the land is irrigated by flooding or by an irrigation device that utilizes an irrigation project that was built for that purpose. Therefore, in keeping with the same reasons we find that [both] the variety and volume of agricultural production change for the better when the necessary pesticides are available, when guarantees for healthy plants and animals are available and when the requirements for such are available to farmers at suitable prices and in suitable quantities or when the role played by the state in this area is improved. This would inevitably cause the value of agricultural production to rise at rates higher than the value of the land designated for a farmer. The increase would be greater than what is required for developing and improving the living and educational conditions of farmers in accordance with the growth and development that are determined for all socialist society, among which are those who work in the agricultural sector. Thus, reconsideration of ownership becomes essential.

"However, one's thoughts must not turn to the idea that reconsidering ownership of farm land is something that is constantly going on. It is assumed that this reconsideration takes place particularly when revolutions begin and early in the process of development. It is land whose real value would be realized only through a series of technical and practical measures in the field of reclamation and irrigation that receives such consideration. In all cases the matter requires that we establish a scientific and a delicate balance between the required reconsideration of matters that has been mentioned and the importance of having relative stability in ownership in general and in ownership of farm land in particular so that beneficiaries would not be worried about their future. It is essential that beneficiaries who are not feudalists and who do not have a propensity to exploit others understand that a reconsideration of ownership according to these criteria will always be based on the best and greatest benefits to them so as to improve their living and educational conditions. This is because this is one of the fundamental objectives of building socialism and struggling for it and not the opposite.

"When we shift [our attention] to consider a ceiling on ownership that is based on the maximum currency value of property or when we shift [our attention] to consider the ceiling on ownership of currency, we must take into account changes in requirements for a comfortable life in the socialist sense based on the nature

of national and pan-Arab changes, on changes in the outside world and also on changes in the value of the currency that is used as a standard. Thus what we may consider an appropriate ceiling on monetary holdings now may become obsolete in 10 years. While a second home in the country may not be considered essential now, for example, it may become essential for socialist ownership in another period of time. The case is the same with regard to ownership of tools for plowing and harvesting and other functions. This [principle] applies by analogy to other cases in all sectors of society and to the setup of building socialism in general. So that our applications in building socialism would become consistent with our premises and our theory of work in this field--which rejects certain socialist modes of non-exploitative private ownership and private business just as it rejects exploitation, oppression and extortion--an occasional reconsideration of the size, kind and direction of private ownership and private business is required to ensure continued improvements in the conditions of a socialist society and to prevent the growth of factors [that produce] an environment for exploitation.

"In capitalist systems now the state plays the role of principal regulator of economic and other activities in society. Its role is thus a limited one. The burdens of social and economic life which the state in a capitalist system has to bear cannot compare with the burdens that a state and its agencies, like those of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party, have to bear. This is because these systems start out with a premise that states, 'Let a man work, and let him go on working.' The basic explanation for this principle is that people are to be allowed to have absolute freedom in conducting themselves in [an environment of] exploitative ownership. Such ownership becomes central to life and to controlling the affairs of society; and the state is used as a means for serving the capitalist, bourgeois tendency.

"We regard the state and its agencies [as tools] serving society in the process of building socialism. Capitalists, however, regard the state and its agencies, in theory only, to be neutral [agents] in a capitalist society. In practice, however, they place the state and its agencies at the service--and this is absolutely--of private business. In a capitalist society the state and its agencies thus serve the exploiting class, while the state in a socialist system serves the majority of the people at a time when the interests of what is left of the exploiting few conflict with the interests of the vast majority of the people in the early stages of a socialist revolution. A state becomes the state of all the people when conflict is eliminated and when a socialist system's general laws and the basic applications of those laws reach maturity.

"Some of our colleagues and also some of the public are sometimes critical of the fact that the number of ministries and government organizations in our socialist administration has grown. They compare [the situation we have now] with the number of ministries we had in Iraq under the monarchy, or they compare the present number of ministries in Iraq with the number of ministries in France and in other western countries. In doing this they ignore one of the scientific and objective facts: that the state is the agency that is basically responsible for taking care of society's affairs in all activities and areas. State agencies grow on this basis. In capitalist, semi-capitalist and semi-feudalist systems matters are the opposite. In those systems the basic activities in society are carried out by private sector agencies and monopolies. Therefore, under such systems the state's duties are limited.

"This clarifies to us an important aspect of the present and historical duties of a state and its agencies in a Socialist Ba'th society or in a society that is in the process of building such a society through various stages of development."

Development: a Distinguished Model

The Eighth Regional Congress advocated "the necessity of realizing development in an 'explosive' fashion to guarantee very rapid and comprehensive development in all areas of life in Iraqi society and in all parts of the country." The congress also advocated that the 5 years following the congress be the period during which "the major leap" in the country's economic and social conditions would be realized. "After that we would advance toward conditions wherein the clear foundations for a solid and a prosperous national economy would be available. The requirements of a modern society and the constant components of prosperity for people would also be available. We have to be very careful in the development process to provide a proper and an inspiring example of how building [socialism], progress and prosperity can be realized under the Revolution's principles and its libertarian, unifying and socialist course. This is quite the opposite of the distorted and impotent experiment that some regimes in the area are trying to offer [their people] through subordination to imperialism and the adoption of isolationist methods and a capitalist course whose inevitable failure have been proven in the experiences of the Third World" (pp 233-234).

This central objective that was defined by the Eighth Regional Congress was evidence of a splendid action undertaken by the course of development in the subsequent period. It may be said that the principal trends of the course of development under the aware leadership of the party adhered splendidly to that objective in principle and in practice. [Adherence to that objective continued] until the course of development in Iraq, despite all impediments, became a splendid model for many Third World countries, particularly the oil-producing countries.

What are the main characteristics of the development process in Iraq under the leadership of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party and the 17-30 July Revolution?

1. One of the most important characteristics of the development policy in Iraq is the fact that it is a patriotic and a nationalistic policy. While development plans in many Third World countries, and particularly in the oil-producing countries, are proceeding in directions that would ultimately strengthen the economic subordination of those countries to the advanced countries and particularly the superpowers, resulting thereby in restricting their national will and their national independence, the Revolution in Iraq under the leadership of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party has pursued a stern, patriotic and nationalistic course despite the difficulty of such a course.

The rapid and comprehensive development of various branches of the economy and other areas of life in society--that is, what the Eighth Congress called explosive development and the major leap--cannot be realized by relying on national capabilities alone, particularly in the area of implementation and in the field of technology, even though large financial resources are available because of the country's sound national oil policy.

It is indisputable that reliance on national capabilities alone means slow

development, lost opportunities for progress and improper utilization of national resources. Therefore, we must rely on foreign expertise and capabilities in the process of comprehensive development. But the difference between the development course pursued by the Revolution in Iraq and the policies pursued by numerous Third World countries--and the oil-producing countries are among them--lies in the fact that the Revolution has tightly and informatively linked the requirements of safeguarding national independence and protecting the free national will and national interests on the one hand with the requirements of dealing with foreign countries and companies in the field of development on the other.

Iraq also relied on its national will in selecting those projects that had to be implemented. Iraq set down its own priorities, unlike many Third World countries, particularly those that lack good economic and practical cadres, those that lack a firm political and national will and those that lack financial capabilities that could provide the capital that is required. In most cases these countries submit to or obey the instructions and decisions of other agencies in determining the projects and activities that ought to be undertaken. [In those cases] priorities are determined to serve the tendencies of advisers or decision makers and not the interests of the state in question.

The Revolution has adopted a basic course of seeking various countries and companies to work in the different areas of development in the country. Although this course has its difficulties, it does, nevertheless, give us better opportunities to choose. Those difficulties are manifested in the following: the state is compelled to deal with scores of parties instead of dealing with specific parties; it finds itself having to cope with a "diverse" technology that is transferred to the country as a result of this course; and it finds itself having to cope with a diversity of executive means that are put into practice in the various branches of development. Despite an extensive need for a specialized and a competent staff--a need that is the result of difficult and complex burdens for the agencies that manage, maintain and assimilate the transferred technology--this development course is considered a major challenge in the contemporary world. It strengthens our national independence and our free national will, and it gives us a variety of perspectives from which we can view the experiences of the world in the field of science and technology.

2. The development plan in its entirety is being put to work to expand and develop the socialist sector in industry, agriculture, culture and public services and to increase people's prosperity. This development is completely socialist, and it is radically different from some development courses that are being followed in some Third World countries--and among them are the oil-producing countries. These countries follow a capitalist mode in development, even though investments that are made in the process of development are government investments. The purpose of these investments is to expand local and foreign capitalist activities and provide opportunities for their growth and prosperity at the expense of vast sectors of the public. In our country, however, all development operations are managed by the state and the socialist sector. In practice these development operations lead to the growth of the socialist sector, enabling it to play its leadership role in the affairs of life and the various basic activities of the national economy, even though there is a certain percentage of different projects [that are managed jointly] by the socialist sector and the private sector. The private sector and parasitic groups do not

participate in any part of the development plan in which the state invests public funds, with the exception of the contracting sector and the easy terms allocated by the state for some branches of private business. The extensive need for the contracting sector to implement development plans has made dealing with that sector necessary. The need [has dictated] that the contracting sector be allowed to grow and make more profits than it deserves. However, the contracting sector remains first and foremost linked with the state and the development plan. It cannot become engaged on a large scale in other activities that do not pertain to the state's plan and its programs. It is the state that determines the volume of its business because basically the contracting sector works for the state. Nevertheless, the growth of the private sector for these reasons and the fact that the socialist sector is dragging its feet in pursuing a prominent leadership role in this field has its well-known disadvantages: on the one hand the contracting sector has made legitimate and illegitimate gains, and on the other hand this has had negative social effects.

3. The party's leadership of the revolutionary process and accordingly of the course of development has ensured decisively and splendidly what may be called "clean development." This is due to the party's profound awareness and its unswerving principles and morals. In many Third World countries--and among them are the oil-producing countries--the development process led to the spread of corruption in the ranks of political leaders and in administrative agencies. Syndicates and gangs were formed for receiving commissions and conducting dubious transactions.

The spread of corruption in the processes of development in these countries led not only to the plundering of people's funds, but it also distorted development trends. Projects and sections within a single sector were manipulated, and there were serious failures. "Clean development" not only brings about moral results, but it also provides capabilities for development that is based on honorable scientific and objective choices, and this has positive effects on the general development in the country.

4. The nationalistic and socialist nature of the development process in Iraq and the fact that that is linked with national and pan-Arab objectives and interests have given development a comprehensive character. Regardless of errors and shortcomings in coordinating and integrating development sequences, the development process in Iraq covers all branches of the economy and all areas of life. Development in Iraq covers industry, agriculture, services and culture. It also covers all areas of Iraq in the Revolution's attempt to bring about balanced development in all these areas.

This does not mean that there were no priorities in the development process. The Revolution gave the industrial sector a position of prominence since it is the sector that contributes the most to the process of development and progress, not only in its own special field, but also in other fields.

[Our] compatriot Saddam Husayn referred to this fact in the pamphlet, "Our Own Way of Building Socialism." He said, "The industrial sector will remain the primary sector in considerations that are taken to establish the material foundations of putting socialism into practice" (p 14).

[Our] compatriot Saddam Husayn added, "The world today, as is well-known, is moving into an age of technological and scientific progress. It is known that any country, no matter how much it develops its agriculture, cannot acquire by assimilation and by assignment the principal modes of scientific and technological progress if it continues to confine its attention to agriculture. Assuming that that is possible then, when our country continues to be an agricultural country, the quantity and quality of its agricultural production will remain backward because our country will continue to be a backward country technologically and scientifically. What is true then is that our country must be both industrial and agricultural. What is also true is that agriculture may not and cannot truly prosper in our country unless our country is an industrial country whose principal circles of industry are being developed and are reflecting its special ability as well as an image of scientific and technological development in general. Likewise, our country, Iraq, cannot become an industrial, developing country that is capable of developing industrially unless there is a close association, for reasons that are well-known and well understood, between the courses of industrial development and the prosperity that is required for agriculture" (pp 44-46).

5. The socialist nature of the development plan in Iraq and the fact that leaders of the party and the Revolution are tirelessly safeguarding the interests and the lives of the people have caused serious attention to be devoted to reducing the harmful and negative consequences of a major development process, particularly inflation and its economic consequences which have many damaging effects on numerous groups of people.

It is certain that development, which is essential for the progress of society, and the achievement of prosperity for the people cannot be pursued in the comprehensive and rapid manner that Iraq pursued them without some occasional negative and harmful results. Among these is the inflation phenomenon which has become a global phenomenon that cannot be eliminated altogether as long as the national market continues to be largely influenced by world markets. However, the difference between the magnitude of this phenomenon and its effects on Iraq and the magnitude of that phenomenon and its effects on other countries--and among these are countries of the region--remains considerable. The rate of inflation in Iraq is lower than it is in the countries of the region and the world. Standards of living in Iraq continue to grow and are not being eroded by inflation factors as is the case in many other countries.

Today explosive development is an actual fact in Iraq; the major leap began several years ago and it is still going on. Iraq is now a large hub for business and construction in every area of the economy and in every field of life.

This characteristic which distinguishes Iraq has become a salient mark of the country's life and of the life of its citizens. It is known in the Arab homeland and in the world.

It has become common knowledge that Iraq is progressing rapidly and correctly in every area. The Iraqi development model is used as a model all over the world by circles [of people] that are friendly and fair.

We mentioned previously a number of significant accomplishments in the area of development in a study of the basic landmarks of the socialist structure under

the Revolution and of the features of prosperity and progress that have been realized in numerous areas of society. One of these areas is the public services sector. Below is a summary of the most notable achievements in the course of development and progress in a number of areas that constitute the principal pillars for development in the country.

Industry

The political report of the Eighth Regional Congress had referred to the fact that the expansion of the socialist sector in industry since the 17-30 July 1968 Revolution had not come about by nationalizing private industry, since some factories had been nationalized since 1964. Industrial expansion rather came about by means of the many new factories which the state built. Consistent with the vital importance of expanding the industrial sector in general and the socialist industrial sector in particular, the years that followed the Eighth Regional Congress were marked by tireless activities and extraordinary efforts to build a national, broad and developing industry that would help strengthen the process of building socialism in the country and establish the objective foundations for realizing economic independence. In a world where relations of unequal exchanges prevail, in a world governed by aspects of subordination to the economies of advanced countries, national industry has to grow quickly and it has to become highly competent so as to curb reliance on the outside world, to achieve better conditions in international trade, to expedite the process of development and to realize economic stability in society.

Despite the major achievements that were made in this sector from 1974 to 1981, this sector is still suffering from some impediments and shortcomings that are affecting the course of its development and the realization of the goals that had been set for it. Although some of these impediments and shortcomings are subjective in nature and although they are the product of the degree of the country's economic development, of the immaturity of the industrialization experiment in the country and of the problems of socialist application, other impediments and shortcomings are spontaneous in nature, and workers in that sector are primarily responsible for them.

One of the most important problems that this sector faced was the low productivity of its workers, despite the development it achieved, compared with its productivity in years that preceded the Eighth Regional Congress. At the forefront of these factors that caused this problem are [the following]:

1. The technical standard of those working in this sector was weak, and they did not keep up adequately with modern technological developments. The quantity and quality of the manpower base for industry is still below the required standard, and major efforts are needed to upgrade and to develop skills.
2. An imbalance in the quantity and quality of mid-level cadres and engineering cadres continues. Engineering cadres are thus inundated with ordinary technical work, and aspects of development and innovation in the process of production are ignored.
3. Modern technology has not been adequately assimilated, and machines and advanced equipment [are beset] by many problems, difficulties and work stoppages.

4. The considerable and rapid horizontal expansion in many industries was not accompanied by a similar expansion in [the process of] preparing the necessary and technically qualified staff. Thus, the old staff had to assume more burdens than they could, and this affected their productivity on the one hand. On the other hand, primary industrial tasks were assigned to people with lower qualifications.

5. Despite the strong need for manpower in past years, signs of hidden unemployment still exist in some branches and industries of this sector, particularly among the professional administrative staff and to a certain extent among workers and technicians.

One of the principal problems faced by the industrial sector was the lack of proportion between the magnitude of horizontal expansion in the industrial sector and [the commitment] to ensure infrastructure projects such as roads, railroads, warehouses, means of communication, and industrial housing projects. Although there were considerable and significant developments in those areas, they continued to fall short of the major needs required by the considerable investments that were made in industry during the years that followed the Eighth Regional Congress.

The industrial sector also faced a serious problem that affected the rates of its growth and development. The policy that defined the functions of private business, of the mixed sector and of the socialist sector lacked clarity. [The following] were among the consequences of this policy:

1. Private business refrained from becoming engaged in many food and conversion industries that would benefit the country. In most cases private business resorted to what may be called trading in the manufacturing process. That is, private business set up small plants which would ensure maximum profit with the least effort. In reality these were no more than large shops for packaging, wrapping, cutting and carrying out other such simple industrial operations.

2. The socialist sector became involved in small and scattered projects that were economically useless. These projects used up capital and technical and administrative staff at the expense of other vital projects. It would have been more useful if these projects had been left to private business while the socialist sector devoted itself to projects that required a large capital and a high added value and to strategic projects that would lead to an efficient, quick transfer of technology and help push the wheel of industrialization forward at higher rates of speed.

Among the other problems that the industrial sector suffered from was the absence of sufficient awareness. [Another problem was] the weakness of controls and accountability; [procedures] whereby quality in private business and socialist sector projects could be controlled. This led to the fact that poor products were offered in the market, and citizens endured that burden. Thus citizens developed a negative reaction towards national industry, and they began to prefer imported goods to national goods.

The fact that cost accounting was not developed and the fact that cost accounting techniques were not brought under control weakened objective controls in the

process of setting prices. Production costs rose without economic justifications. Consequently, on the one hand consumers were hurt, and on the other hand, the economic return of some projects declined.

The effect that these problems and shortcomings had on rates of growth in the private sector was not small. These problems and shortcomings also had an effect on the structural makeup of the private sector. On the other hand, however, these shortcomings did not diminish the high importance and the splendid achievements [that marked] the development of the industrial sector. Despite problems in manpower, staff, primary materials and other areas, the industrial sector has realized major successes in its various branches. In terms of quantity, this success was manifested in horizontal expansion; and in terms of quality it was manifested in ventures into new branches of industry and the realization of high increases in the value of production and in the added value. In addition, the industrial sector succeeded in building production relations that are socialist. This enabled the socialist industrial sector to manage primary and basic industrial activities. This enabled the industrial sector to manage the course of industrialization in the country so as to strengthen the revolutionary socialist regime and firmly establish its objective foundations of support.

To find out what has been achieved in this sector and to find out how much attention it got from leaders of the party and the Revolution, some basic indicators that pertain to this sector's growth and development must be reviewed.

Chief among these indicators is that which shows the growth of investments that were earmarked for this sector in national development plans. The growth of investments has been clearly evident ever since the revolution and until now in 1982. Between 1968 and 1974 investments that were actually made in the industrial sector amounted to 365.4 million dinars. This is an annual rate of growth of 170.8 percent. Between 1975 and 1981 those investments rose to 3,832,300,000 dinars; that was an annual growth rate of 123.6 percent.

The state became involved in numerous areas of industry that Iraq had not previously experienced, such as the iron and steel industry and engineering and electrical industries. In addition it became involved in mining industries, such as phosphates and sulphur. Old industries were also expanded. It may be said that in the past 13 years a huge bastion of industry has been built in Iraq and that that bastion constitutes the solid material foundation of the socialist society that the Revolution built.

By noting some of the indicators of growth and development in the industrial sector, one may understand the magnitude of the change that was realized by the Revolution in this area.

With regard to production, the development realized in the conversion industry was obvious. The value of production rose from 266.5 million dinars in 1968 to 594.9 million dinars in 1974 and to 1,797,900,000 dinars in 1981. This is a rate of growth that amounted to 14.3 percent for the period between 1968 and 1974 and 14.2 percent for the period between 1975 and 1981.¹ The national product in the

1. But if we were to take the rate of growth for the period between 1975 and 1980, that rate would rise to 16.1 percent as a result of the simple effect that the war has had on the rate of growth in 1981.

industrial conversion sector rose from 94.6 million dinars in 1968 to 187.8 million dinars in 1974 and to 594.8 million dinars in 1981.¹ This is a rate of growth that amounted to 12.1 percent for the first period and 14.03 percent for the second period.² At the same time the organization of fixed capital in this sector rose from 36.4 million dinars in 1968 to 123.7 million dinars in 1974 and to 676.5 million dinars in 1981. This is a rate of growth that amounted to 22.5 percent in the first period and to 18.6 percent in the second period.

In applying the strategy of industrialization whose purpose is to expand the socialist sector and make it a leading sector [in the economy], the industrial socialist sector was expanded, and it occupied a leading position in the total industrial activity in the country. The relative importance of the value of what the socialist industrial conversion sector produced rose from 31.7 percent in 1968 to 39.3 percent in 1974 and to 51 percent in 1981. With regard to the national product, that rose from 41.8 percent to 47.1 and to 56.8 percent for the same years.

The relative importance of the socialist sector's share in the conversion industry in the formation of fixed capital rose from 50.4 percent to 97.6 percent and to 97.7 percent for the same years.

Wages in the conversion industry in the socialist sector also rose considerably. This reflects the attention given [this matter] by the Revolution to raise the standard of living of workers in the socialist sector and increase their purchasing power. The relative importance of wages in the socialist sector to total wages in the industrial sector rose from 56.6 percent in 1968 to 59.3 percent in 1974 and to 71.9 percent in 1981. In comparison the relative importance of the number of workers in this sector rose from³ 47.5 percent to 69.5 percent and to 78 percent for the same periods, respectively.

One notices from the foregoing that the dominance of the socialist sector in the conversion industry has become settled in Iraq. No matter how capable the private sector becomes and no matter how much it grows, either by its own initiative or through the state's encouragement, the private sector cannot come anywhere near the dominance and the firm leadership of the socialist sector in this area, particularly if we were to take into account the nature of the makeup of both the socialist and private sectors. Activities in the socialist sector are concentrated on primary, strategic and major industries. The socialist sector has exclusive access to this branch of industry, whereas private sector activities are scattered among small consumer industries.

It is worth noting that the Revolution evidently gave its attention to the mixed sector and provided it with conditions for development and prosperity in the

1. The figure for 1981 is a preliminary figure.

2. But if we were to take the rate of growth for the period between 1975 and 1980, we would find that the rate of growth is 18.47 instead of 14.03 [percent]. This decline is a result of the effects of the war.

3. The figures apply to large establishments.

context of specific controls that would make it strengthen the course of building socialism, support development plans and expedite the rates of progress in the country.

Agriculture

Between the eighth and ninth regional congresses rural areas in Iraq underwent radical changes in various areas and fields: in production, in production relations and in cultural and social development. Objectives emphasized by the Eighth Regional Congress were largely realized. The Eighth Regional Congress had given priority to the task of expanding the modes of socialist production in agriculture so that these modes would become prevalent and do away with the local conditions for man's exploitation of man. The Eighth Regional Congress also gave priority to the task of developing agricultural production and other agricultural services. Those objectives that were in fact realized in past years made the socialist modes in agriculture dominant in the cultivated terrain and in production. Ownership of farm land underwent reorganization in a manner that was consistent with the Revolution's socialist mode and the scientific mode. All feudalist ownership was eliminated, and citizens in rural areas of Iraq prospered for the first time after centuries of backwardness, oppression and exploitation.

However, the revolutionary and radical changes and the positive developments underwent by this sector did not preclude the emergence of shortcomings and problems, particularly since the nature of the agricultural sector does not allow for rapid and dynamic changes. Also the legacy of backward customs and traditions in all of society checked the course of revolutionary changes in society and caused bureaucratic practices to infiltrate the methods of socialist application. This caused the growth of agricultural production to slow down, and it weakened the growth of workers' productivity and the productivity of the land.

It is true that some problems faced by the agricultural sector were normal and inherited and that overcoming them required tremendous efforts and considerable patience. One such problem was the problem of salt in vast areas of arable land; another was the problem of irregular sources of water in the seasons of the year. However, other obstacles were the product of some failures in application. Perhaps the most important of these was the involvement of the state and the socialist sector in small circles of agricultural production and the emergence of red tape and bureaucracy in authorized state agencies as factors that held up the growth, improvement and development of production. It is obvious that the principle of expanding the role of the state in economic life is one that is firm and sound in the theory of the party and of the Revolution. But the observation we are making here concerns extending that role to detailed branches, to small production [enterprises] and to branches and services where the state's modes of action do not respond with the required speed to practical needs. Hence the role of the state ought to be one in which it concentrates on major production and on vital and fundamental projects such as irrigation and drainage projects, road projects and rural electrification projects. The state is to concentrate on a specific aspect that is indispensable to other services in the agricultural sector. It is to leave to private enterprise--in the context of non-exploitative agricultural ownership which it regulates and which is regulated by the Revolution's laws--the freedom to assume the initiative [in those areas] and to work independently and effectively.

One of the other principal problems that the agricultural sector suffered from was that of scarce specialized staff, including in particular technical, cooperative and productive cadres. The horizontal expansion of the socialist sector and the spread of cooperatives and collective farms did not coincide with a similar expansion in the preparation of specialized cadres. In addition, regulatory cadres that supervise the affairs of agricultural cooperatives were ineffectual, and so was the follow-up carried out by the General Association of Farming Societies of the activities of these cooperatives. The effort to investigate the problems of these cooperatives and assist them in finding solutions to these problems was also ineffectual.

On the other hand agricultural projects were set up as state farms and collective farms for considerations that have to do with the ideological posture of the party and the Revolution regarding the problem of universalizing the mode of agricultural production. Economic feasibility standards were not available in these projects, which did not realize economic results that would have underscored their importance and the importance of their survival. Thus, instead of contributing to the development of the agricultural sector, these projects turned into a burden on that sector.

These and other problems must be overcome during the coming period particularly since the working paper on developing the agricultural sector and the discussions that took place around it focused broad attention on the negative aspects from which the agricultural sector is suffering and the obstacles it is facing. The participation of [our] compatriot Saddam Husayn, the country's permanent secretary of state, in the discussion of the forementioned paper had a major effect on enriching this paper, correcting its trends and giving sound and innovative directions and solutions which would suffice in the effort to overcome these shortcomings and obstacles.

Despite the difficult conditions that the agricultural sector faced, the past years have nevertheless been years in which its accomplishments have been valuable and quite significant. These accomplishments reflect the extraordinary attention leaders gave this sector to enable it to overcome obstacles that impeded its growth and development.

The Revolution accomplished the task of radical and comprehensive agrarian reform. During this glorious revolutionary process the Revolution began building a socialist foundation in the field of agriculture. It concentrated on establishing cooperative, collective and state farms. The number of cooperative farming societies (local and specialized) in 1981 was 1,951 societies with 388,500 members. [Collectively] these societies farmed an area of 23.5 million donums; this is compared with 410 societies in 1967-1968 with 55,000 members farming an area of 2.8 million donums. There were 28 collective farms in 1981 with 1,346 members. The area of these farms was 143,000 donums. These farms were being established for the first time in the country after the Revolution. There were 23 state farms over an area of 767,000 donums. [Before 1981] there were no more than five of these farms which had been established at that time for experimental farming over an area that did not exceed 167,000 donums.

What has been realized so far indicates quite clearly that the foundation of socialism in rural Iraq has been built and that this was done quite decisively to do away with feudalism. The material foundation of feudalism has come to an end,

and feudalists no longer have social influence, except for those of them who were simultaneously feudal lords and shaykhs. The influence of feudalists no longer constitutes a blatant contradiction of the Revolution's course, nor does it constitute a source of worry for the Revolution. In the course of changing the methods of production and production relations, the Revolution reorganized ownership of farm land in rural areas and made that consistent with the objectives of building a socialist countryside in the country. Ownership of farm land was reorganized by the two agrarian reform laws, Law No 117 for 1970 and Law No 90 for 1975. These laws finally put an end to feudalism and to large exploitative ownership of land. Ownership of small areas of land (less than 10 donums) now represents 2.8 percent of the total ownership of farm land. The area of this land is 692,000 donums, and the number of landowners [in this category] is 157,050 citizens. A total of 16.4 million donums of land is owned by 492,300 citizens; their holdings of farms that are between 10 and 120 donums make up 66.47 percent of all the land. An area of 4.1 million donums is owned by 28,300 citizens; they own farms that are between 120 and 300 donums and represent 16.9 percent of land holdings. An area of 3.4 million donums is owned by 5,214 citizens; they own farms that are larger than 300 donums each and make up 13.7 percent of land holdings. These areas are concentrated in areas where perennial agriculture [can be found].

By noticing some indicators of the growth and development of the agricultural sector, one can find out the magnitude of the change that was realized by the Revolution in this vital field of economic and social activity.

The bottom line on investment spending in the agricultural sector amounted to 239.3 million dinars for the period between 1968 and 1974. The final figure for investment spending [in this sector] then rose to 2,029,600,000 dinars for the period between 1975 and 1981.

One notices that the value of production underwent appreciable development. It rose from 200.8 million dinars in 1968 to 254.9 million dinars in 1974 and to 1,280,100,000 dinars in 1981. This is a 9.9 percent rate of growth for the period between 1968 and 1974; and 22.1 percent for the period between 1975 and 1981.

The national agricultural product also underwent obvious development. It rose from 167.9 million dinars in 1968 to 278.4 million dinars in 1974 and to 977 million dinars in 1981. This is an 8.8 percent rate of growth for the period between 1968 and 1974 and 20.9 percent for the period between 1975 and 1981. At the same time the formation of fixed capital in the agricultural sector rose from 16.8 million dinars to 47.8 million dinars and to 468.3 million dinars for the same years. This is a rate of growth of 19 percent for the period between 1968 and 1974 and 35.4 percent for the period between 1975 and 1981.

The contribution of the socialist sector to agriculture grew perceptibly and significantly in keeping with the Revolution's socialist course and its tireless efforts to strengthen the standing of the socialist sector in agriculture. This was a result of the reorganization of farm land ownership, of the liquidation of feudalist estates, the distribution of land to peasants and the establishment of socialist modes in agricultural production. The socialist sector's growing contribution to agriculture was manifested by the relative importance of that sector's contribution to the value of the GNP and the formation of fixed capital throughout the agricultural sector. The contribution of the socialist sector to

the value of agricultural production rose from 1.4 percent in 1974¹ to 43.4 percent in 1981. At the same time the relative importance of the socialist sector's contribution to the GNP in the agricultural sector rose from 0.3 percent in 1968 to 0.7 percent in 1974 and to 49.4 percent in 1981.

The average cultivated terrain in the agricultural sector remained constant despite occasional fluctuations in that average over some years. In 1975 the cultivated terrain amounted to 9.2 million donums, and in 1981 it was 10.7 million donums. Nevertheless, the agricultural sector maintained the general level of production and realized an obvious increase in the quantity of production: an increase in plant production² from 3.2 million tons in 1975 to 11.1 million tons [in 1981], and an increase [to] 558,000 tons in animal production.³ In addition, 933 million eggs were produced in 1981.

This increase in the quantity of production is due to a relative improvement in the efficiency of agricultural utilization and to increased productivity. The total cultivated area [in Iraq] continued to fluctuate during the past years, but the quantity of production remained constant, and that implied a clear measure of development.

Modern methods of farming were introduced on a broad scale: covered cultivation was used; greenhouses were established; and the use of experimental agriculture was expanded. The state guaranteed essential services for agricultural production such as seeds, chemical fertilizers, agricultural loans, services to protect plants and animal resources, health services, marketing and agricultural guidance. These services were provided either at no charge or at a very low cost. The role of socialist sector organizations in marketing agricultural products grew. In 1981 the socialist sector marketed 1.1 million tons of agricultural products; in 1968 it had marketed 3,700 tons only.

On the other hand the state offered farmers substantial financial support to help them cultivate their land and develop their production projects and to enable them to utilize automation. The Cooperative Agricultural Bank played a significant role in this regard through the loans it extended to farmers. Whereas total loans extended to farmers between 1968 and 1974 amounted to 25.4 million dinars, the volume of loans for the period between 1975 and 1981 rose to 372.1 million dinars. This development was linked with a major increase in the bank's capital: from 10 million dinars in 1968 to 15 million dinars in 1974 and to 300 million dinars in 1981.

The Revolution devoted obvious attention to soil reclamation operations, and it made large investments in that area. Whereas the total area of reclaimed land turned over to beneficiaries did not exceed 28,000 donums till the end of 1974, the area of reclaimed land turned over to beneficiaries from 1975 to 1981 amounted to 524,000 donums.

1. The figure for 1968 is not available because there was no socialist sector to speak of that year.

2. This includes grains, crops for processing and for producing oils, vegetables, dates and feed crops.

3. This includes red and white meat, milk, wool and pelts.

Irrigation projects and dams received obvious attention during past years so that the use of water resources in the country could be set on the right track and the irrigated terrain could be expanded. So far the (Hamrayn) Dam and six dams in the western desert have been completed. Al-Rutbah Dam is one of those dams in the desert. The al-Tharthar-Euphrates Canal has also been completed. The al-Tharthar-Tigris Canal, Mosul Dam, Hadithah Dam and Dahuk Dam are under construction. Implementation of a significant number of irrigation and drainage projects has begun and some of these projects have been completed. Among them are the al-Khalis, Kirkuk, (Hallah-Diwaniyah), al-Dujaylah, al-Dalaj, al-Rawz, Abu Gharib, al-Ramadi and al-Ishaqi projects. The first phase of the drainage project at the general mouth of the river has been completed; seven flood control dams have been set up on the Tigris River in the governorate of Maysan; seven other flood control dams have been set up on the banks of (al-Hallah) and (al-Dagharah); and implementation of al-Falujah Dam was begun.

Nevertheless inadequate development was realized in the agricultural sector regarding increasing the cultivated terrain or increasing the productivity of every cultivated donum. This was due to numerous factors in addition to those that have already been mentioned. The nature of these factors is quite different from that of inherited topical factors which contributed to slowing down the growth and development of the agricultural sector. These factors were the product of the general development realized by the Revolution in the general conditions of society and in various sectors of the national economy. These factors affected the material world of those who worked in farming socially and psychologically. In one degree or another these factors had an effect on their production and their activities. [The following] are among these factors:

1. The major leap in development can only be realized by a large labor force. Despite the large numbers of Arab and foreign workers working in the country, there is a continuing need for employing large numbers of peasants as workers beyond the limits set by the laws. These laws prevent farmers from changing their profession. But in foreign companies or in the native private sector farmers are resorting to a variety of methods and ways to do just that.
2. Many older peasants have found the rest they had been looking for. Their children graduated from colleges or institutes or they became soldiers in the army. Therefore, they gave up farming, seeking respite [from that profession] and lodging thereby a protest over the harsh conditions of their former life.
3. The leap in the standard of living provided by the Revolution to state employees was not accompanied by a comparable development in education. This made old farmers satisfied with the earnings of their children, and they saw no need to farm when they compared what they were receiving now with what they used to earn in the past from farming.
4. Although the Revolution made extraordinary efforts to eliminate signs of social backwardness in Iraq's rural areas, the degree of social change continued to be, as is well-known, slower than the degree of change in economic, technical and scientific areas. The Revolution increased the capacity of television broadcasting; it increased the activities of party and popular organizations among the ranks of farmers; it enforced mandatory education and [programs to] eradicate illiteracy; and it linked rural areas with a system of paved roads to facilitate communications between those areas and cities. Sufficient time must elapse before

the Revolution's achievements in this area will yield their awaited returns. It is certain that the slower pace of social change and the faster pace of economic, technical and scientific development affected the growth of the agricultural sector. On the one hand, it increased pressures on this sector because of increased demand for food and crops for processing. On the other hand, this sector failed to stay in step with the general standard of development that was taking place in the country.

Trade

In the post-revolutionary period after the Eighth Regional Congress, the socialist sector's domain in trade was expanded significantly. This expansion was two-sided:

First, socialist activity grew automatically because of large increases in the national revenue and the growing need for imports either because of major development plans or because of growing and changing consumption.

The second side of this expansion was manifested in the fact that the socialist sector's percentage of activity in this field grew.

Large increases in import allocations reflect the degree of change that foreign trade has undergone in the context of the national economy. At the same time these increases also reflect the volume of the large categorical accomplishments that were realized in areas of development and the rise in citizens' standards of living. Import allocations rose from 1,805,100,000 dinars in 1974 to 5,523,400,000 dinars in 1981.

There was an appreciable change in the structural makeup of imported goods. This was an indication of the degree of coordination and interaction between import practices and development plans. It indicated how imports under our party's socialist experiment were being made to serve comprehensive development and programs for strengthening the structure of socialism and for increasing the prosperity of the masses.

There was an evident rise in the ratio of capital and intermediate goods we import because of increased investments in development and because of the growing need that various projects have for these goods. This is different from numerous development experiments that are taking place in countries whose financial conditions are very much like those of Iraq. However, their import practices give priority to consumer goods, and that is consistent with their practice of building consumer societies more than societies that are based on development and on changing the economic and social structure of their material world.

In Iraq the ratio of imported capital and intermediate goods rose from 60.7 percent in 1968 to 78.8 percent in 1974 and to 79 percent in 1981.

This is countered by an obvious decline in the ratio of imported consumer goods: from 39.3 percent to 21.2 percent and to 21 percent for the same periods. This decline in imports of consumer goods increases the capability of local production to meet part of the local demand for these goods despite the fact that there was a very large increase in the value of imported consumer goods to meet the growing needs of citizens for these goods. [The increase in demand for these goods] is

the result of the increase in the purchasing power of consumers and the rise in their standard of living in general. These indicators reflect the vital and effective role that import practices played in serving development plans and providing the machines, equipment and raw and intermediate materials needed for these plans.

This categorical change in the makeup of imports was accompanied by a similar change in the retail and wholesale trade with regard to the value of production and the GNP. There was an obvious increase in the value of production in this sector: it rose from 113 million dinars in 1968 to 213.4 million dinars in 1974 and to 1,257,500,000 dinars in 1981. This is an 11.1 percent rate of growth for the period between 1968 and 1974 and a 27.8 percent rate of growth for the period between 1975 and 1981. The GNP also rose from 86.9 million dinars in 1968 to 168.9 million dinars in 1974 and to 851.2 million dinars in 1981.¹ This is an 11.7 percent rate of increase for the period between 1968 and 1974 and a 26.4 percent rate of increase for the period between 1975 and 1981.

In the context of strengthening the socialist course of the party and the Revolution in the area of trade, the Revolution devoted special attention to the socialist sector to enable it to lead this vital sector, to make it serve citizens and meet their needs and to make it serve development and its programs so as to curb parasitic aspects that continued to prevail in some aspects and activities of trade. Thus, the relative importance of the socialist sector's contribution to the trade sector's GNP was 12.08 percent in 1968; 51.3 percent in 1974; and 52.3 percent in 1981. The socialist sector's contribution to the formation of fixed capital was 57.5 percent; 87 percent; and 90.3 percent for the same years. At the same time funds allocated for this sector from total import appropriations exceeded 90 percent of these appropriations for all the previous years: 92.9 percent for 1974 and 91.4 percent for 1981.

Among the other indicators of the socialist sector's development is the considerable growth of its contribution to domestic trade. The state is now directly involved in selling many basic and secondary goods. Besides, it controls the marketing of national industrial products and of imported and locally produced agricultural and animal products. During the past period the socialist sector set up more trade fairs and branches, and it provided opportunities for the growth of a number of dealerships as horizontal outlets that would expand the domestic distribution system. The number of fairs rose from 59 in 1970 to 171 in 1974. In 1981 the number of fairs that were held declined to 122. These are fairs where goods are sold directly to citizens. This decline in the number of branches is consistent with the leaders' instructions, particularly in the past 2 years. These instructions stipulate the necessity of concentrating on the effort to increase the number of citizens who are granted dealerships; the number of fairs is not to be increased. Accordingly, the number of central markets and consumer stores is to be increased; in 1981 there were 16 central markets.

In 1970 the number of dealers for the socialist trade sector was 24,301. That number rose to 50,980 in 1974 and to 126,592 in 1981. In 1981 the branches of trade companies amounted to 123.

1. [This footnote is missing from the text].

The total value of exports and their relative importance continued to be low and not proportionate to the large development in the volume of imports and to the developments that occurred in other sectors of the national economy. The value of non-petroleum exports rose from 22 million dinars in 1968 to 28 million dinars in 1974 and to 73 million dinars in 1981. Their relative importance to total imports was 15.3 percent, 3.6 percent, and 0.2 percent for the same years. The principal reason for the slow growth of Iraqi exports is due to the fact that local demand has been growing since 1974. This has caused most of the increase in the GNP to be directed towards meeting local demand instead of towards export. Although these are good reasons for the slow growth of Iraqi exports, plans must be made to increase non-petroleum exports by building export industries and taking into account the population of the country and what that calls for in determining project priorities. Priority in this field is to be given to agricultural production and processed agricultural products whenever possible so that reliance on oil returns and on the world market can be reduced and so that a concrete change can be effected in the structural makeup of the national economy. The efforts and investments we make in that area are not to be made at the expense of those priorities which are foremost in our strategic thoughts.

In general, it may be said that the past period saw the socialist sector establish almost total sovereignty over foreign trade and a broad measure of sovereignty over domestic trade.

The National Economy

The national economy has made significant strides in the past 14 years towards the objectives set for it by leaders of the party and the Revolution. In reviewing the achievements of some of the principal sectors in the previous pages, one can note that the Iraqi economy has developed in two principal directions.

First, material development was realized in the principal sectors of the economy through large investments and high rates of growth in the value of production, in the national product and in the new areas of production and services that the economy embarked upon.

Second, the domain of the socialist sector was expanded, and it became, as was affirmed by the Eighth Regional Congress, a prevailing sector guaranteeing the establishment of socialist relations in production in the various businesses and activities of the national economy.

The national economy realized satisfactory and good results as a manifestation of these two directions. The value of production rose from 1,487,200,000 dinars in 1968 to 4,883,700,000 dinars in 1974 and to 14,492,200,000 dinars in 1981. This is a 21.9 percent rate of growth for the period between 1968 and 1974 and a 17.05 percent rate of growth for the period between 1975 and 1981.

National production rose from 1,034,500,000 dinars in 1968 to 3,522,600,000 dinars in 1974 and to 9,495,200,000 dinars in 1981. This is a 22.6 percent rate of growth for the period between 1968 and 1974 and a 15 percent rate of growth

1. This decline in the rate of growth is due to a decline in the 1981 rate of growth because of the conditions of the war. Therefore, if we exclude 1981 and take the rate of growth in the value of production for the period between 1975 and 1980, that rate would be 25.12 percent instead of the forementioned 17.05 percent.

for the period between 1975 and 1981.¹ At the same time total capital formation rose from 143 million dinars to 628.6 million dinars and to 4,527,300,000 dinars for the same periods.

Accordingly, the socialist sector's contribution to the national economy as a whole rose. This was true for the value of production and for the national product as well. The socialist sector's contribution to the GNP rose from 24.5 percent in 1968 to 68.1 percent in 1974 and to 60.3 percent in 1981 for the same periods.²

National revenues rose from 812.5 million dinars in 1968 to 2,916,500,000 dinars in 1974 and to 9.147³ billion dinars in 1981.⁴ Thus average per capita income rose from 91.8 dinars to 269.4 dinars and to 666.1 dinars, [respectively].⁵ This corresponds to income levels that are prevalent in many of the industrially advanced countries of the world.

Tasks of the Coming Period

The course of building socialism and development in Iraq under the auspices of the 17-30 July Revolution and the leadership of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party has been a glorious course. It realized many of its goals despite all the difficulties that crossed its path and despite all the shortcomings and bottlenecks that emerged which this report dealt with in a revolutionary and objective spirit that stems from the principle of self-criticism which the party has adopted in its revolutionary course and in its vital relations with the masses. The course of building socialism and development in Iraq has shifted Iraq decisively from a previous age--the age of feudalism exploitation, capitalism, corruption, injustice, poverty and backwardness--to an age that is completely new--the age of freedom, equality, justice, increased prosperity and continued progress in all areas of life.

The course of development and building socialism has not yet achieved all its objectives. We face principal tasks at every stage [of this course], and we must complete these tasks so we can bring about happiness, prosperity and justice for people in our country; so we can set up the Arab Revolutionary Movement as a shining example; and so we can contribute creatively to man's quest for freedom, justice and happiness.

What are the principal objectives and tasks that we face in the coming period?

1. If the rate is calculated by excluding 1981 [figures], the rate of growth in the national product would amount to 26.8 percent for the period between 1975 and 1980.

2. The reason for the decline in that rate in 1981 is due to reduced oil production.

3. In 1981 national revenues amounted to 13,173,600,000 dinars.

4. The 1981 figure is a preliminary figure.

5. Average per capita income in 1980 was 998 dinars.

At this congress, as at the Eighth Regional Congress, we have to deal in a creative revolutionary manner with the problem of defining objectives and tasks. We are not to fall prey to the precepts and solutions we attained at a certain stage because of the experience we gained and the facts we discovered. Instead, in accordance with what our party taught us and in accordance with our courageous quest of struggle, we have to adhere strictly and firmly to principles, and we have to steer the outcome of any quest we undertake towards essential patriotic and national principles and objectives.

The next stage requires that [our] arduous and creative work be continued and developed to expand and develop the foundation of socialism in all areas of the economy, of industry, agriculture, trade and services.

We have to continue working to expand and develop the industrial base by completing the industrial projects which the Revolution began building and by involving ourselves in new principal areas [of activity].

The ultimate objective of this is to transform Iraq into a first class industrial country, to ensure most of the country's principal needs from national production and to link the effort to build industry in the country with efforts for Arab industrial integration in the context of the party's outlook on unification.

Chief among the tasks we are facing in this area is that of bringing about a categorical change in industry. We are to increase production, improve the utilization of machinery and assimilate, adjust and develop the transferred technology creatively in accordance with the conditions of the country and our national and pan-Arab needs.

We also have to make serious and comprehensive efforts to solve the bottlenecks that exist in the fields of industrial production, to regulate the flow of raw materials and to concentrate on locally produced raw materials.

Serious attention must be given to the economics of industrial projects. It is true that we do not approach industrialization questions from the perspective of making a capital profit, and it is true that we [usually] link those questions closely with the question of general development in the country and the required prosperity for the people. However, this provides no justification for not paying attention to developing the economics of industrial projects so that a monetary surplus can be made available to serve the needs of the masses and develop socialist society.

The socialist sector in industry, which for years has been the prevailing sector in society, must proceed firmly on this course. It must be nothing less than a model and an example of efficiency, development and good management.

In agriculture the vertical development of the socialist sector is an essential requirement of the coming stage. We are not to be dragged into horizontal expansions except in areas and projects that are carefully calculated and that serve the course of effecting socialist change and increasing and developing production. We must also emphasize the need to act in accordance with what was uncovered by the working paper regarding prospects for developing the agricultural sector. We are to follow the directions of [our] compatriot Saddam Husayn

in which he emphasized the necessity of bringing about a major and comprehensive change in the course of the agricultural sector. He said that the next 5-Year Plan for that sector must be more comprehensive and more accurately regulated so it can provide the best hoped for results whereby the shortcomings that had accompanied its former course can be overcome.

The low productivity which has characterized projects in the socialist agricultural sector must [be changed], and concrete progress in the coming period must be realized. Administrative and scientific means that are followed in farming must be developed; bureaucratic aspects and practices in this field must be eliminated; and the energies of workers in this field must be properly utilized.

Chief among the tasks we are facing in agriculture are those of continuing the tireless effort to reclaim land, to build irrigation projects; to build modern agricultural-industrial complexes; and to develop the use of machinery in agricultural activity.

The party, the General Association of Farming Societies and the state's authorized agencies have to work tirelessly to develop the cultural and social standards of farmers. Any progress realized in this regard and linked with the process of production would bring about further development in the quality and quantity of agricultural production.

Among the principal objectives we are facing in the coming period is that of ensuring that we produce the food we need. Continued reliance on imports in many basic and secondary materials like grains, vegetables, fruits and meat is considered a failure that must be overcome; or much of that reliance on food imports must be overcome in the coming period. Self-sufficiency in food is no longer a matter of sheer economics; it is now related to questions of national independence and sovereignty, and it will become even more so as the need for food grows in the world.

In trade the socialist sector has to maximize its creative efforts to develop its means and increase its efficiency to ensure the ready availability of basic and other goods at suitable prices in accordance with the leaders' central plans.

The bottlenecks that occurred in the past period must be brought to an end. We must provide for citizens the means by which they can obtain what they need without hardship.

Horizontal expansion of trade in the socialist sector has reached the level that is required at this stage. However, this does not mean that trade services are not to be developed and expanded in those areas where expansion ought to be carried out. The country still has an urgent need for improving activities in those areas.

In the services sector considerable progress is to be realized in the quantity and quality of services.

In the previous period the services sector did not receive its adequate share of investments and attention from the development plan because of the emphasis that was placed on other branches [of the economy], particularly industry and

agriculture. Now, however, a major effort must be made to develop this sector, and huge investments must be made in it. We are not to deal with services as though the matter of services were secondary. First, the Revolution succeeded in building an industrial base, and it met many of the country's principal needs. Therefore, we must turn in earnest to [the effort to] expand the field of services and develop the quality of services; our efforts to expand and develop services must be commensurate with financial resources.

The principal problem that must be emphasized in that sector is that of housing. While taking into account the main obstacles to development in this sector, more efforts and more investments must be made to ensure proper housing for citizens.

We must also bring about significant developments in municipal services in cities and rural areas. This is urgently required now in this area to get Iraq out of the conditions of backwardness and to place it on the threshold of extensive and more far-reaching progress.

The state has to continue its energetic efforts to connect electricity and fresh water projects to all rural areas in Iraq.

The state must also continue building schools and developing the quality of those schools. It must build hospitals and clinics and develop their services.

The state must also continue working energetically and earnestly to expand the system of public and rural roads and to develop the means of transportation, particularly the railroads, land and river transportation and air transportation between cities and principal centers in the country.

We must continue developing telephone systems covering all parts of Iraq at a level that is suitable to the needs of development and social change in the country.

We must also continue working energetically to ensure recreational facilities in all parts of Iraq and to develop recreational services in a manner that would ensure the comfort of citizens. It is also essential that the required efforts and sufficient investments be made to provide for citizens the means for relaxation and harmless recreation in all parts of Iraq, such as public gardens and parks, amusement parks for children, swimming pools and others facilities.

The plan to develop services in Iraq on a comprehensive scale requires a comprehensive change in the conditions of the administrative agencies that undertake this task. It also requires a comprehensive reconsideration of administrative relations between these agencies and central agencies. It requires that an emphasis be made on decentralization in providing and managing services. It requires that broad authorities be granted to governors and municipalities to complete and manage service projects. It must be pointed out at the same time that the development of different services which are offered by the state requires the participation of the citizens themselves. They have to bear part of the responsibility in this vital sector. They are to cooperate with authorized agencies; they are to make their jobs easier; and they are to comply with their operating methods and their instructions, particularly in the area of health, education, the eradication of illiteracy, transportation, tourist facilities and others. These essential objectives must be applied in the coming stage under

those conditions that stem from the war of aggression launched by Iran on the country and the resulting economic conditions which may or may not be short-lived. However, they remain principal objectives so long as financial resources for their implementation are available.

Social, Cultural Changes Discussed

Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 29 Jan 83 pp 7-10

[Text] Chapter Four: Social and Cultural Changes

The process of changing, fashioning and advancing society which has been led by the party since the 17-30 July 1968 Revolution has been a sweeping and a closely connected process that covered all areas of life. The socialist and nationalist revolution is basically a radical and a sweeping process whose parts are closely connected.

This report has dealt with the achievements of the Revolution in a number of principal areas. Here we deal with the Revolution's achievements, particularly in the period between the Eighth Regional Congress and the Ninth Regional Congress, in the area of social and cultural changes.

The basic principles which guided the process of social and cultural change are [as follows]:

1. The development which the Revolution is seeking in accordance with the party's principles is not the material development of man or society. The development we are seeking is one that is spiritual and material in every sense.
2. Any imbalance in the course of this spiritual and material development will seriously disrupt the process of development and will lead to a crisis.

A revolutionary process that concentrates for a long period of time on the spiritual aspect of development only and ignores the essential and legitimate material aspects of this development will ultimately turn into an ideal process that will have to clash with the realities of the material world. It will become isolated from the vast majority of the masses, and it will ultimately end in failure.

The same [principle] also applies to a revolutionary process that interests itself in the material aspects of development only and ignores the spiritual aspects. The process of change then becomes a superficial, lifeless process that is alienated from the broad masses. Such a revolution is likely to wither away, to experience crises and to end in abysmal failure.

For the party and its Revolution man is the highest objective. Therefore, one's struggle and one's work must be devoted to the development of the individual's and society's spiritual and material life. In addition to realizing the objectives of material development in the life of man and society, the Revolution has to strive to fashion a new human being, a human being with perfect characteristics, who is sound of mind and body, free and happy and deeply committed to the interests of the homeland and the nation and their principal questions.

That individual has to be culturally and socially developed, energetic, productive, creative, capable of taking on difficult and sensitive missions and capable of confronting dangers that face society and the nation. He has to love life and at the same time he has to be prepared to sacrifice even his own life for the country and for the interests of society.

The section on "Tasks of the Coming Stage" in the "Political Report of the Eighth Regional Congress" made the following reference to the matter of social and cultural changes:

"In the past period social and cultural changes did not proceed as rapidly, as radically and as sweepingly as had been hoped for by the party and as required by its tasks, its national and socialist objectives and the role which the revolutionary experiment in Iraq was required to play in the Arab Revolutionary Movement. A concentrated effort must be made to correlate social and cultural changes with the changes that are taking place in other areas. This is to be done with revolutionary resolve and an informed outlook so that all changes can be moved forward toward national, socialist and democratic objectives."

This objective, which was set by the Eighth Regional Congress, has been the object of attention ever since that congress convened. This attention is commensurate with what the congress had advocated and what the party believes in. Although the period which preceded the Eighth Regional Congress was one in which cultural and social changes were somewhat slow, the period that followed the congress was the opposite. It was a period in which cultural and social changes flourished. It was a period of major accomplishments that one can be proud of and cherish because of the positive results that were achieved in fashioning the new citizen, the new society and new social relations. The intellectual, educational and humanitarian sides of individuals grew perceptibly; authentic national and revolutionary values and traditions were strengthened; and the infrastructures on which the social structure is based, such as educational, media and health institutions and organizations for young people and for women, were developed. To a large extent reasons for imbalance and manifestations of that imbalance in the country's social makeup, such as exploitation, social discrimination, backwardness and illiteracy, were removed. Large social forces which had not been contributing to the course of fashioning and advancing society were liberated [and were able to join that course]. In general, it may be said that what has been realized in this area over the past 8 years is consistent to a large extent with what was defined by the Eighth Regional Congress, despite the difficulties and obstacles that impede the course of making changes in a field as complicated and complex as the social and cultural field.

The social and cultural field is not a material quantity whose old parts can be removed and replaced by new ones, as is the case in some other sectors. The social and cultural field is rather an area that has to do with people's minds, with their inherited customs and traditions and with the effect of counter and hostile forces. A categorical change in that field requires a high [level of] competence and a large measure of patience and perseverance. What were the most prominent social and cultural changes that took place in the country during the period that followed the Eighth Regional Congress? What were the most important signs and indicators of those changes?

Culture and the Media

The culture and media sector received noteworthy attention from the leaders of the party and of the Revolution. The Revolution followed the development of that sector continuously and guided it constantly to improve its methods of operation. In fact, Saddam Husayn gave that sector his direct attention because of its importance to the life of the Revolution and society and because of the direct effect that sector's role has on citizens' ideas and inclinations. The culture and media sector is actually the social sector that is most directly related to people's lives and to all levels of the party's and the Revolution's programs and policies. The culture and media sector was and still is the principal scene of daily clashes with hostile cultures and intellectual trends that are alien to the thoughts of the party and the Revolution and the heritage of the Arab nation. It is one of the important tools that can be used to rally the public around the party and the Revolution. It [may be used as] a means for disseminating culture among the masses and for furthering their political awareness and their commitment to fight for national and patriotic objectives.

In this area the party is facing strong activity that is being prodded by imperialist and Zionist circles and other hostile and greedy forces. These forces are harnessing large institutions, tremendous capabilities and advanced means to influence Iraqi and Arab citizens psychologically and culturally so they can achieve their objectives and ambitions. Among these objectives and ambitions are the consolidation of a defeatist spirit, the creation of doubts about the utility of a national and pan-Arab commitment and about the Revolution's values, the propagation of anti-Arab tendencies and western values in our society and the consolidation of regional tendencies. These and all other such objectives would weaken Arab society materially and spiritually and would fragment it and turn it into spheres of influence. Therefore, the Revolution's media has to assume its responsibility in this field, and it has to turn itself into a strong, energetic and integrated tool so it can face all these serious challenges and forge its own route. The effects of counter propaganda can thus be confronted, and each citizen can become invulnerable to all attempts that seek to undermine the integrity of his character and the profound attachment he has to his country and his nation.

Significant developments have been realized in the various activities and arts [programs] of the media in past years. As far as people in this sector are concerned, it may be said that the party and the Revolution have established their decisive leadership over the media's principal agencies and directions. The party and Revolution established their leadership not only in administrative methods--this was established in the past--but also in setting directions and in the creative and innovative process.

Today we can say that the party and the Revolution have attained a satisfactory measure of control over their culture and media agencies which are strongly and sincerely committed to their course and their objectives. As far as horizontal expansion is concerned, the media and culture sector now covers a vast area of fields and disciplines that include radio, television, the theater, the press, foreign information, books, translations, antiquities, music, art and sculpture, children's education, native costumes, popular culture, Kurdish culture, documentaries and other [activities]. As far as the creative aspect of this sector is concerned, many cultural and media activities flourished, particularly music, songs, art exhibits and poetry festivals. The press, radio, television and the

publishers' movement played an obvious role in mobilizing the masses during the period of the war against Khomeyni's regime. They improved morale, sustained a spirit of victory and won support for the justice of the cause for which our people have been fighting.

Between 1974 and 1981 [the following] was established in the field of radio broadcasting: Babylon, Nineveh and al-Hurriyah radio; an FM radio station; and a number of new broadcast studios and transmitters. This was accompanied by an increase in broadcasting power over the medium wave. Broadcasting power rose from 1,950 kilowatts in 1974, at a rate of 4.5 watts per square kilometer in the country, to 7,050 kilowatts in 1981, at a rate of 16.4 watts per square kilometer. Thus, all areas of the country could receive simultaneously radio broadcasts of two programs. In 1974 the broadcasting range was such that not all areas of the country, and particularly the border areas, were able to receive radio broadcasts. Another number of radio broadcasting stations are now under construction, and the total capacity for broadcasting to areas of the Arab homeland and some areas of the world rose from 1,300 kilowatts in 1974 to 3,200 kilowatts in 1981. When projects that are under construction are completed--these projects will strengthen broadcasts to the Arab world and to the world--total broadcasting capacity will be 12,300 kilowatts.

In television the number of television broadcast stations rose from 4 stations in 1974--these are the stations in Baghdad, Nineveh, al-Basrah and al-Ta'mim--to 14 television stations in 1981. In addition to those that have already been mentioned, there are stations at Maysan, al-Qa'im, Dhi Qar, al-Najaf and Umm Qasr. Thus, total television broadcast capacity for all areas of the country rose from 80 kilowatts in 1981 to a level at which all areas of the country could receive television broadcasts. Some areas in neighboring countries also receive Iraq's television broadcasts.

In the culture and information sector sales of Iraqi publications became very brisk, rising from 25 million copies in 1974 to 240 million copies in 1981. Between 1974 and 1981 the Ministry of Culture and Information published 1,083 books. Besides, children's education flourished satisfactorily. Since 1974 [two magazines], MAJALLATI [My Magazine] and AL-MIZMAR [The Oboe], and two series of books, MAKTABAH AL-ATFAL [Children's Library] and MAKTABATUNA [Our Library] have been published; their success and popularity have been quite evident.

For the first time work in antiquities received marked attention under the Revolution. Huge archeological projects were undertaken to save and uncover the cultural heritage. There were in particular the projects to save the antiquities of Hamrayn Dam and Hadithah Dam and the project to revitalize the cities of Babylon, (Ashur) and (Samura'). Excavation, exploration and maintenance operations are underway at 17 other archeological sites. In addition, a large number of archeological, maintenance and surveying projects have also been completed. At the same time 12 specialized museums for antiquities are being built.

Between 1974 and 1981 the number of foreign press offices rose from 7 to 21. In 1981 the country had 10 cultural centers abroad; in 1974 it had only one.

The arts of the motion picture and theater [industry] and popular arts as well clearly flourished. Between 1974 and 1981 [a total of] 18 narrative motion pictures, 247 documentaries, 133 newsreels, 54 films about the battle and 6 military movies were produced in the country. There were 7 theater companies that

presented 69 plays. The National Company for Popular Arts also presented new shows in the country and abroad.

The Eighth Regional Congress has determined that the next stage will require that a large number of artists, intellectuals, writers and media people be recruited and actually asked to join the Revolution and participate in the revolutionary process that is being led by the party in this field. An effort must be made to attract competent Arabs in all these fields. The information and culture sector has actually succeeded in coming close to [its objective of] building a revolutionary media that is backed by a good staff and advanced equipment. It has been able to overcome a good portion of the shortcomings it used to suffer from, particularly the bureaucracy and the lack of revolutionary initiative and enthusiasm. It has been able to replace these shortcomings with positive attributes, and it has been able to appoint a specialized revolutionary staff with the appropriate skills and abilities which can change with time so that the needs of the party and the Revolution in this vital sector can be met.

Despite the major change realized by the culture and information sector, it is still being called upon to make massive efforts to improve the standard quality of performance in its various activities and operations. This sector is particularly being called upon to rely on the given factors of modern science, which have to do with its own area of work, so it can formulate information plans, direct the means of [disseminating] information and utilize modern information technologies in an advanced way. These technologies have become a modern feature of information activity in the world.

Education

The party realized that the educational system is one of the vital systems that should receive serious attention from the party and the Revolution so it can be rebuilt according to national and socialist principles. The educational system is to undergo sweeping and profound development so that all of society can be awakened and the requirements of the development plan met. The educational system is considered the most influential system in the process of preparing children and young people [for the tasks they have to do as] patriots, nationalists, socialists and scientists. The educational system is the system that provides the cadres that are required for the process of developing and modernizing society. It contributes to the achievement of balance in the course pursued by the various sectors of society. Besides, it plays a role in immunizing a broad sector of society against foreign cultural invasion, against different ideas and against anti-nationalist and anti-socialist movements.

The Eighth Regional Congress demonstrated the party's interest in this sector when it diagnosed the shortcomings that the sector suffered from, particularly during the period that immediately followed the Revolution. The Eighth Regional Congress showed considerable interest in the need to work to liquidate people who have reactionary, bourgeois and other such tendencies and who still linger in the system, from its kindergartens all the way through the highest levels of official university education. The Eighth Regional Congress stressed the importance of preparing new textbooks and school programs that stem from the principles of the party and the national and socialist revolution. It stressed the importance of making plans and programs in this field that are consistent with the development plan and the country's present and future needs.

Leaders of the party and the Revolution have given extraordinary attention to the education sector. They placed at its disposal relatively large material and human requirements, and they provided it with legislative principles that would strengthen its course, facilitate its reconstruction and enable it to democratize and socialize education. They accomplish that by making education mandatory and free and by expanding educational institutions so all citizens could have an equal opportunity for admission. Much has been accomplished in past years: buildings and dormitories for boarding students have been built; books and educational requirements for the various stages of education have been provided; institutes and universities were expanded; and school and university curricula have been rewritten according to central trends in the party and the Revolution and the requirements of the new society which the Revolution is fashioning. Many bourgeois, right-wing and backward precepts inherited from the pre-Revolutionary period were removed from these courses of study, and [the new courses of study] came closer to expressing the nationalist and socialist principles of the party and the Revolution. Large numbers of teachers in various stages of education graduated from their institutions of learning. These teachers have closer ties to as well as more faith in the party, the Revolution, the country and the nation.

Among the achievements that must be mentioned is one pertaining to kindergartens that was realized by this sector. There was a significant change in the number of kindergartens and in the number of teachers working in them. In this area Iraq is approaching the rates that are prevalent in advanced countries: in 1981 the number of kindergartens in Iraq amounted to 387, and the number of children attending them was 76,500.

There were obvious and significant changes in the other stages of education also. In 1981 the number of students enrolled in elementary schools was 2.6 million; students enrolled in secondary schools were 1.01 million; and students enrolled in universities were 112,400.

Although the political report of the Eighth Regional Congress affirmed that in 1974 the Revolution had not yet set up its own educational system, it may now be said that the Revolution has made good progress toward setting up its own educational system, one that is based on nationalist and socialist premises and is closely tied to development and the needs of society. However, the Revolution is still facing this task, particularly in the university where a sufficient number of professors who fully subscribe to the party's thoughts and the Revolution's course is not available. Besides, the need to develop manpower and technical resources continues, and so does the need to enrich educational curricula and to make them more compatible with the Revolution's tendencies and objectives and the new society's need for change.

Leaders took a significant step in developing the quantity and quality of all stages in higher education when they supervised the preparation of an all-inclusive working paper that studied conditions of this sector and the means for developing it. This working paper was broadly discussed, and Saddam Husayn, members of the [Revolutionary] Command, authorized ministers and all concerned specialists took part in these discussions which were broadcast by the media and which thus gained a significant popular dimension. Saddam Husayn also called upon all educators to discuss this working paper and to understand it. Thus, after it was approved, this paper set forth a good program that all authorized agencies

ought to implement in the coming period energetically and creatively so as to improve this sector in a manner that is consistent with the ambitions entertained by the party and the Revolution for fashioning a new Iraqi citizen and an advancing society.

Legislation

The legal and judicial components of the course of legislation after the Eighth Regional Congress underwent fundamental changes that were compatible with the principles of the party and the Revolution and with [those principles] that were advocated by the report of the Eighth Regional Congress. This is because the creation of the new society which the party has been working for requires legal and judicial adjustments. These adjustments were required after the party settled the matter of taking over power by means of a revolution and an armed uprising. As in all political systems laws are merely the code by means of which a regime expresses its philosophy, principles and objectives. The more the spirit and the letter of the laws express the philosophy of a regime, the more compatible society's actual actions will be with that regime's legislation and the less it will resort to emergency legislation.

Because the Ba'th Party is the party of the people and their broad national groups, the substance of the laws which govern the society of the Ba'th Party has to express the interest of the vast majority of the people. The political report showed an awareness of this matter and devoted maximum attention to it. It affirmed that in light of the categorical change realized by the Revolution in all areas, the present stage required that a decisive change be made in Iraqi laws in general to make them compatible with the Revolution's present requirements and its requirements in subsequent stages of its development. These changes must also be compatible with the decrees and laws that were issued by the Revolutionary Command Council in all economic, administrative, political and social areas.

A good standard of revolutionary change was realized in the principal components of the body of legislation. The Legal Reform Law No 35 for 1977 was one of the noteworthy achievements in this field. It constituted the beginning of a legislative revolution that became a point of departure and a foundation for the enactment of laws in the new society. The forementioned law sought to reform the code of laws and statutes that was in effect in the country. This code of laws was no longer compatible or in step with the revolutionary change that was being led by the party in various areas of life. This revolutionary change required legal precepts and rules that would reflect the actual degree of society's economic, democratic and social development. It required legal precepts and rules that would achieve the principle of uniform legislation and ensure sound and precise execution and follow-up. The process of reforming the legal system included approval of the principles in whose light amendments or changes are made and the drafting of the required bills. The outcome of this legislative revolution was the enactment of several laws; another number of bills are still pending or are being drafted.

Two kinds of legislation were seen during this period. The first kind was legislation that was part of the plan to reform the legal system; this included the preparation and completion of economic, social, cultural, political, administrative and judicial legislation. The second kind was legislation that was not

part of the plan to reform the legal system. This kind of legislation also contributed to the establishment of the new legal system.

This legislative change was associated with a similar change in the Ministry of Justice which is responsible for enforcing the laws and achieving justice with a spirit that embodies the nature of the changes. The Ministry of Justice issued Law No 101 for 1977 reorganizing the ministry on scientific principles. This law created a set of agencies and specialized departments that were compatible with the magnitude of the statutory and legal tasks which the ministry is assuming.

Women

The total emancipation of women from all backward and inherited restrictions is one of the Revolution's principal objectives. The Revolution is genuinely trying to achieve that. The emancipation of women is a natural and human right; besides, it is an essential condition for the realization of economic, social and cultural development. A society half of whose members suffer from backwardness, unemployment and from being viewed as inferior has to be a sick and a backward society.

The emancipation of women is a basic condition for the creation of an Arab socialist democratic society because it would liberate half the population from a state of passivity and from a state in which they play a marginal role. It would make women participate in forging the democratic experiment, in the development process and in the national struggle. It would make them play a role in educating and raising the country's children.

Women in Iraq, like women in the rest of the Arab homeland, have suffered from the constraints placed upon them by backwardness, by being viewed as inferior and by being assigned a passive role in society. In the process of conducting the business of government and creating the revolutionary society and the base that has been liberated from the Arab homeland, the party had to devote attention to this problem. It had to devote to it the attention it deserved, and it had to set up the ideological and objective principles for the total emancipation of Iraqi women. These principles would make Iraqi women as valuable as Iraqi men and would establish an objective balance in men's and women's social rights to enable women to play a positive role in creating and practicing democracy and fighting for the Revolution.

With regard to this question the party faced a reality that was complex and social conditions that were conservative. It had to balance the degree of social maturity which would be attained by society against what was feasible in the emancipation of women, not from the standpoint of hesitation and conservatism, but out of concern for steering the course of society in this as in other areas in a revolutionary, logical and balanced manner. This is because rushing headlong into a sensitive question like that of the emancipation of women and ignoring the obstacles that are placed by the material world could have harmful effects and could be counterproductive. The Eighth Congress had cautioned about this matter and warned against hasty, emotional and unconsidered measures to emancipate women. Such measures would give local and Arab reactionaries the excuses [they need] to act against the Revolution. The Eighth Congress also warned against using the reactionary mentality as an excuse to waver in going ahead with a programmed plan to accomplish the tasks of the required emancipation.

The party is aware that in objective terms the process of emancipating women cannot be accomplished by legislative decree or merely by means of a women's organization. The emancipation of women is fundamentally linked with the structure, the social philosophy and the degree of cultural advancement of a political system. Objective opportunities for the emancipation of women are available inasmuch as society in general is liberated; the emancipation of women would be commensurate with the degree of liberation and progress realized by society. Therefore, the process of emancipating women and giving them human rights equal to those of men runs parallel to the actual phases realized by society in [its efforts] to do away with exploitative and backward relations and to replace them with socialist and advanced relations.

According to this view of women's rights and women's liberation, women won equal opportunities in employment, education, legislation, and in political, professional and trade union activity. Women went into factories, assumed positions [in business] and joined military and security organizations. Women participated effectively in the political struggle, in elections and in running for elective office. The ratio of females in education is high: 46 percent in primary education and 37.2 percent in university education in 1980-1981. The ratio of females in the labor force is 18 percent; this is a high ratio compared with women's conditions in developing

The General Association of Iraqi Women played a prominent role in developing the women's movement in the country; it enabled Iraqi women to have an active part in the life and activities of society. The General Association of Iraqi Women is no longer a specialized women's organization. Over the past years, with direct support from leaders and the personal support of the fighter, Saddam Husayn, the Association of Iraqi Women has become a broad, grassroots national organization that can be found in all parts of Iraq. It contributes to all national operations and activities, and it contributes energetically and creatively to the process of social development and to [the task of] building the new [society]. Through their association Iraqi women were well represented at Arab and international conferences. The role of the association and of Iraqi women was not confined to the fore-mentioned fields of activity. The women's association and Iraqi women contributed actively to the national battle against Khomeyni's aggression. The association organized visits for its members to the fighters on the front so they can encourage them and boost their morale. The association was also involved in raising the consciousness of the female public, and it organized visits to the families of those who were killed in battle and those who are fighting. The purpose of these visits was to find out what these families needed.

It may be said that satisfactory progress has been made in the course of women's liberation in Iraq under the party's leadership of society. This progress is quite compatible with what was affirmed by the Eighth Regional Congress. This course must be continued and developed. Problems that impede it must be solved in an objective manner with a daring, revolutionary spirit so that greater progress can be made in the maximum utilization of Iraqi women's energies in the process of building the nation and making women participate freely and creatively in the new life.

Eradicating Illiteracy

The fact that illiteracy is widespread in developing societies is one of the most

serious social phenomena that impede growth and progress. Illiteracy has a harmful effect on the effectiveness of society. It divests an individual of his humanity; it paralyzes him; it suspends his creativity; and it turns him into a passive creature in the life he leads from day to day. To the same degree illiteracy denies society [the opportunity of] benefiting from an individual's latent capabilities and inclinations. The eradication of illiteracy in our country is considered a vital, national mission that is directly related to the over-all course that our party is leading to build and liberate society. The eradication of illiteracy is one of the principal foundations of that course. The party's Eighth Regional Congress called attention to the gravity of this phenomenon and to its negative effects on political liberation and economic progress. The Eighth Regional Congress called for a solution to this problem by "launching a sweeping national campaign led by the party in which major popular organizations and specialized state institutions would work together to eradicate illiteracy once and for all in a set period of time."

The Eighth Regional Congress had studied the feasibility of the efforts that had been made by the party, the state and by popular organizations to eradicate illiteracy during the years that preceded the congress. The congress found that although these efforts were important, they did not add up to a decisive remedy for the problem of illiteracy. The only thing that was accomplished by these efforts was that illiteracy was checked, and it became less widespread. Therefore, the congress determined that the method of adopting a national sweeping campaign to eradicate illiteracy was an effective means for eradicating illiteracy. What gives this major revolutionary measure its maximum significance and its urgency is the fact that the party is interested in having the broad masses take part in programs for creating the new society, for preserving the accomplishments of the Revolution and for defending the homeland. It is obvious that the fact that not a small percentage of the population remains the prey of ignorance--and that entails other negative aspects such as disease, poverty and unemployment--is at odds with that objective and clashes with it. A democratic structure for our society requires the liberation of the popular masses from [the shackles] of illiteracy and ignorance so they can express their objectives and their hopes and be prepared to take part in forging the course of revolutionary changes. Furthermore, the productivity of an illiterate person is considerably less than that of an educated person. This affects the pace of growth and of economic and social progress.

To implement what was set by the Eighth Regional Congress regarding this matter, the sweeping national campaign for the mandatory eradication of illiteracy began on 1 December 1978. The objective of the campaign was to eradicate the illiteracy of 2.3 million male and female citizens who were illiterate according to the 1977 Census. Leadership of that campaign was assigned to the country's permanent secretary of state so that it can be given the importance it deserves and so that all material and human requirements for its success can be provided.

Between the end of 1978 and October 1981 thousands of literacy centers were opened, and the vast majority of illiterate people enrolled in them. At the present time there are 1,024 literacy centers for the rest of the people who have not yet been liberated from their illiteracy. A Popular Schools Act was enacted so that people who overcame their illiteracy could complete their education to a stage that is equivalent to the elementary stage. At the present time there are 23,655 people's schools other than those which the armed forces have. So far the

sweeping national campaign to eradicate illiteracy has enabled 76.4 percent of all those who were illiterate to overcome their illiteracy. This percentage figure represents 1,117,493 women and 413,504 men: a total of 1,588,997 citizens. There are only 402,315 male and female citizens who are illiterate. This is the total number of students who are enrolled at present in the forementioned centers. It is evident that the sweeping national campaign to eradicate illiteracy, which coincided with the actual implementation of mandatory education during the academic year of 1978-1979, was obviously successful regarding the objectives it set [for itself] at the outset of the campaign.

Although the war with Khomeyni's regime caused a high percentage of university instructors, teachers and students to go to the front, the campaign against illiteracy continued non-stop even though it lost some of the momentum it had before the war. What is important in this regard is to emphasize the necessity of continuing this campaign with great resolve so that its basic missions can be accomplished. It must be emphasized here that the sweeping campaign to eradicate illiteracy is doing away with only the major portion of this phenomenon, or it is [merely] breaking its back. For numerous reasons, however, this campaign cannot put an absolute end to the phenomenon of illiteracy. In a broad campaign of this kind there could be a significant number of people who slipped through the system, and there could be numbers of people who did not join the campaign in the first place. There could be numbers of people who did join the campaign but who did not achieve the minimum required standard of literacy. Therefore, after the basic tasks of the campaign are completed, the phenomenon of illiteracy or semi-illiteracy must be traced and observed so that what is required for teaching adults can be provided on a continuing and a changing basis and the most success [possible] in this field can be realized. Continuing this campaign is extremely necessary in terms of building a new society.

Young People

Ever since it was founded our party has shown considerable interest in getting young people to join its ranks and prodding them to assume their responsibilities toward issues of revolutionary struggle. At one time the party organization depended basically on young people; it derived much power and capability from their vitality and their enthusiasm. Under the party's leadership of the revolutionary government, the matter of educating and preparing young people in a sound, patriotic, national and socialist manner became extremely vital. As [our] compatriot Saddam Husayn said, "He who gets young people to come over to his side is guaranteed the future." Because a child and a young man in a patriotic, national, revolutionary and socialist society are closer than anything else to being a patriotic, national, socialist and revolutionary project in an embryonic stage, this fact has made it necessary that the best formulas of care and education be furnished to the young generation and that this begin when they are children and continue until they reach maturity. These stages in the life of an individual are the sensitive stages in which an individual would respond readily to the precepts, methods and philosophies of instruction, guidance and education. Without special broad-based programs, young people cannot be really and truly reached.

The numerical weight of the youth sector in relation to the size of society and the vitality, drive and skill they have makes it necessary that young people receive clear priority among other sectors. It is from the youth sector that society's future leaders, its productive energy, its combat force, its scientific

capabilities and its vitality in life will emerge. It is on the shoulders of young people that the greatest burden falls: they have to carry out the tasks of struggle in both national and pan-Arab terms; they are the ones who have to confront all the challenges and dangers that surround the country.

Consistent with the prestige of the youth sector, both the party and Revolution have been looking after it and in many cases observing it directly so that young people can be educated and instructed. The Revolution furnished the youth sector with material and technical requirements, and it provided the human cadres that are necessary for shaping that sector in a nationalist and socialist manner on advanced scientific bases.

The political report of the Eighth Regional Congress had referred to the fact that during the early years of the Revolution the youth sector had been neglected and interest in it had been confined to a very limited interest in those young people who were involved in sports. Therefore the congress emphasized that the next stage requires that the party itself direct broad and concentrated activities that would make the youth organization--the General Association of Young Iraqis--a broad and an effective popular organization in society. The organization was to include the largest number of young males and females in the country, and it was to contribute actively in the dissemination of patriotic, nationalist and socialist principles among young people. It was to instill in their ranks a revolutionary spirit and revolutionary practices, and it was to make them participate effectively in the process of building the revolution, defending the country and carrying out national missions.

The years that followed the Eighth Regional Congress saw considerable change in the conditions of young people. This change came about through the activities of the General Association of Young Iraqis and the Ministry of Youth. These two agencies worked together to carry out their tasks in a manner that allowed each one to complement the other. The ministry would assume the responsibility for furnishing the basic cadres, establishments and capabilities that are necessary for carrying out these activities of mobilizing and educating young people, and the General Association of Young Iraqis would benefit from these activities. In addition there are activities that are directly supervised by the ministry, such as the Olympic Committee, clubs and various sports teams.

The General Association of Young Iraqis offers its members a series of cultural, scientific, artistic, athletic and military activities through central annual programs that are implemented by local committees. These programs are offered through the association's three organizations: al-Tala'i', which was founded in 1974; al-Futuwwah, which was founded in 1978; and al-Shabab, which was founded in 1980. As a result of the party's continuous support and ongoing care of this sector, appropriations earmarked for it rose from 255,000 dinars in 1974 to 30 million dinars in 1980. The General Association of Young Iraqis now includes the majority of the country's young people [as members]. The number of young people who are members of al-Tala'i' amounted to 1.1 million; the number of young people who are members of al-Futuwwah amounted to 127,300; and the number of young people who are members of al-Shabab amounted to 61,800.

The Ministry of Youth consists of vital organizations that carry out the tasks of training young people and sponsoring sports, academic and cultural activities and the arts. The ministry's appropriations rose proportionately to the expansion of

its activities, from 4.4 million dinars in 1974 to 47.6 million dinars in 1980. In the context of its program to furnish training and educational requirements for young people, the ministry set up scores of youth centers, youth homes, indoor gymnasiums, clubs and learning centers. In addition, it set up the National Institute for Apprentices, and it was involved in other activities and endeavors.

The slogan proclaimed by the leader, Saddam Husayn, "We are to get young people on our side so we can guarantee the future," must be a strong inspiration to the party and to organizations who work with young people. There is much work to be done in this field so we can achieve our objective. Despite what has been accomplished with young people, there is still a significant number of young people who are outside the direct and organized influence of the party and its ideas, practices and values. Also further expansion and development of a variety of youth activities are still needed. We must embark upon new fields of activities, and the highest standards of inventiveness must be attained.

The Revolution is 14 years old now. This means that most young people in Iraq were born or spent their formative years under the Revolution. This mere fact must be reflected on all areas of life and fields of activity in society. The sector which concerns itself with young people bears a very large responsibility in this.

New Values and Practices in the Revolutionary Society

A new society is truly a society in which new values and practices are formed. These new values and practices express the nature of that society and are consistent with its political, social and moral objectives.

The Revolution that was led by the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party in Iraq was not a mere superficial change in politics and economics. It rather was and will continue to be a radical and a sweeping process of changing, developing and fashioning a new person and a new society. That new person and that new society will be integrally related to their ancient creative heritage, and they will contribute in an authentic and creative manner to the radiant and glorious present and future of Iraq and the Arab nation.

We do not exaggerate at all if we affirm that the level of success which is realized in this field--the field of new values and practices--is the most accurate and the most sensible measure of the level of success realized by any revolution. If the Revolution's success in this field is not outstanding, its other political and economic accomplishments become hollow and lifeless victories that are likely to be shattered or distorted under pressure. The new person and the new society that would be formed by the Revolution would be the noblest accomplishment, the one that can yield the most good and the one that can provide the strongest guarantees.

To what extent has the Revolution succeeded in forming its new values and practices?

The political report of the Eighth Regional Congress gave special attention to this problem which is a basic source of anxiety for leaders of the party and the Revolution and for the leader Saddam Husayn who thinks about it and gives it due

consideration in his practices. However, the success that was realized in this field was and still is associated with all the conditions that the course of the party and the Revolution had suffered from, particularly in the declared or undeclared goings on inside the party and the Revolution.

There is no doubt that from the outset the revolution of 17-30 July 1968 did launch a new age in the life of Iraqis. However, this new age was not always very clear from the beginning, and it was not always going in the same direction throughout the past course. Therefore, the matter of new values and practices was influenced by that mark [of the Revolution].

As the Revolution's course became perfectly and brilliantly clear, when the leader Saddam Husayn assumed his direct responsibilities in July 1979, this clarity was reflected on all its aspects. Clarity and stability in the field of new values and practices in the revolutionary society became quite evident.

It is essential to emphasize here a matter that is very basic; this matter may not be ignored, nor may its importance be minimized. This is [what must be emphasized]: the problem of new values and practices in a new society is not merely a matter of theories and cultural or educational efforts; nor is it a matter of slogans to be repeated over the media or at popular meetings and demonstrations. In addition, the matter of new values and practices is closely associated with the national symbol and with the general practice of leaders in the new society. It would not be possible to emphasize forcefully the value of heroism in a new society and to make heroism a prevalent and a desirable value if the national symbol does not set a radiant example of that heroism and if this value is not practiced in a concrete and a convincing manner by the leaders of the new society. The case is the same with regard to integrity, justice, truth, ingenuity and other values which the Revolution is trying to develop and promote. Any conflict between theories and slogans which are formulated about values and the concrete material world which is visible to the masses would create profound doubts that would lead to a general sense of frustration and undermine the masses' faith in the utility of these values.

Patriotism and [a sense of] loyalty to the people and the country that is absolute and profound are at the forefront of values that were emphasized by the party and the Revolution. This may seem to be an ordinary statement since all regimes emphasize these values and all educational programs place them at the forefront of the values [they teach]. However, these values take on their own importance and their own significance in Iraq.

Iraq spent numerous centuries as a conquered country under occupation and foreign control. It was prey to numerous foreign political, cultural and psychological influences. Although the patriotism of Iraqis remained strong, resisting invaders and seeking independence, patriotism did not assume its full dimensions until the 17-30 July Revolution under the leadership of Saddam Husayn. This is a major fact that history will note.

Patriotism is not the simple general feeling of love and yearning for one's country. Patriotism is a profound, strong and constant feeling of love for one's country, of being tied to it, of being loyal to it, working for it and sacrificing oneself for it when it is threatened by danger. Patriotism manifests itself in insisting on all these feelings when doubts prevail, when conspiracies and

dangers multiply and when the country is beset by hostile trends that seek to harm it in a variety of ways. Patriotism actually means putting one's country and one's association and loyalty to the country first under the harshest and the most complex conditions. It means putting the country first when doing so in certain cases conflicts with one's ties and one's loyalty to religious, denominational, tribal matters or any of the other numerous matters in Iraq, including an individual's selfish interests.

This is what has been realized in Iraq, and this was undoubtedly what was splendidly and forcefully affirmed by our battle against the aggression of Khomeyni's regime. Patriotism now has its own value and its own significance in the lives of all Iraqis. It has become firmly established, and it has become a constant and a powerful fact.

Patriotism does not stop with defending the homeland and being concerned about it. It goes beyond that to loving the country; cherishing its past, its present and its future; and discovering all its marvels and its cases of creative ingenuity. Iraqi accomplishments in literature, art, war, industry, agriculture, architecture, tourism and in every other field have become the object of affection, endearment and concern for all Iraqis.

Courage was the other basic value that was emphasized by the party, by the Revolution and by the leader Saddam Husayn. Iraqi citizens have never lacked individual courage. Courage has always been a basic value in Iraqi society. However, what has historically been accomplished under the Revolution and under the leadership of Saddam Husayn was that what was affirmed was the value of courage in the sense of national action to serve and defend the country, as opposed to courage as an individual value that is exercised in individual or in narrow tribal struggles that are destructive to society.

This value was affirmed, and it assumed its civilized and constructive patriotic dimension in the battle against Iranian aggression. Thousands of Iraqis who are proud today to wear the badge of courage bestowed upon them by the leader Saddam Husayn provide an example of those who receive primary honors in Iraq's new society. They set the example which young people look up to.

With the affirmation of patriotism, courage and other values in the new society, another important value was strengthened and widely promoted. That value is love for the military. The military uniform is now the object of pride for young people. Military toys are now the most popular toys with children in Iraq. Military jargon has become widespread, and military terminology can now be heard in social settings. This affection for the military is not an expression of an aggressive tendency in Iraq's new society. Quite the contrary, it is a strong and radiant expression of genuine and legitimate concern for the country and for people's gains. Despite the difficulties and sacrifices involved in expressing this concern, it is done with pride in an energetic framework. One of the most important aspects of the new society may be the high rate of volunteers in the army and the high rate of enrollments in military colleges and institutes under the Revolution in general and during the war against Iranian aggression in particular.

The value of collective effort was affirmed under the Revolution. It is a very important value for Iraqi society [in particular] and for Arab society in general.

The matter of collective effort and the success of a collective effort is an ordinary matter in advanced societies which succeeded in reconciling between the ability of an individual to work and to create and the ability of a group [to do the same]. In societies that lived under foreign domination and dispossession, suffering from fragmentation and denominational, tribal and family infighting, collective effort becomes a matter of major importance because it has an immediate and a powerful effect on the unity and solidarity of a society and its efforts to develop.

The most prominent and the most advanced model for collective action is the party, the leader and vanguard of the Revolution. The party is the foremost and most active collective action organization in the new society. The fact that thousands of men and women from all segments [of society], all professions and all ages are members of this revolutionary, collective organization is a fact that assumes major social importance. In the context of the party petty loyalties and individual and selfish tendencies coalesce; the need for common collective action is affirmed; and the usefulness of such action in serving the country, accomplishing things and struggling for major issues is also affirmed.

Besides the party, popular, professional and other organizations exercise significant influence over the conduct of individuals and of groups. All public activities in Iraqi society also affirm [the value of] collective action.

We have to affirm this style of action in its specific areas according to the course of the Revolution. We have to make sure that collective action is always creative and useful without restricting the specifics of individual action and activity in all fields.

The other important value that was affirmed and refined by the Revolution is that of integrity. By nature, a nature they inherited [from their ancestors], Iraqis are honest individuals who love justice, who are direct and who are as far as anyone can be from being devious. However, centuries of foreign dominance and persecution; the penetration of the country by all kinds of foreigners, including corrupt ones; the weakness of patriotic feelings; and other negative characteristics which marked the conduct of rulers and influential forces in the past had their effects on society and on the conduct of individuals. This affected conduct to a certain degree; although the influence of these factors was not great, it was nevertheless significant.

The Revolution has forcefully brandished the sword of justice. It has made bribery and the lack of integrity a major social crime that deserves harsh punishment. Besides, emphasis was placed on justice and integrity in theory and in practice.

The example that leaders set in society plays a basic role in affirming this value. One cannot imagine a righteous and a just government administration functioning under a government that is neither righteous nor just. However, one can imagine the existence of the opposite situation for a period of time. This is what the Revolution faced, and this is what it tried with determination and with faith to change.

Iraq can be proud of the standard of integrity in its government administration. It has one of the highest standards of integrity not only in terms of a region

where corruption is rampant, but it is also one of the highest standards worldwide.

The party and the large numbers of its fighters who are scattered in every nook and cranny in society play a principal role in affirming this value, not only by fighting conduct that is not righteous, but also by safeguarding the integrity of principles and of conduct in the most particular details of living.

Every day under the Revolution the value of justice and of the true equality of citizens is affirmed.

Justice and equality in society are not achieved simply by spelling out these two principles in the laws. Also general economic applications alone are not enough to guarantee justice and equality.

The matter of [achieving] justice and equality goes beyond that. It has to do with seeing citizens as having equal value regardless of their social background or the position they hold in society.

Although laws and statutes in past administrations stipulated that there be justice and equality among citizens, there was no justice in Iraq and no real equality among citizens as to their worth as human beings. An individual's social standing was measured by his wealth, his relationship to the ruler--whether that relationship was a blood relationship or one that had to do with [mutual] interests--and the grade of the position he holds in the state hierarchy. All these constituted advantages which gave those who had them an edge over other citizens in terms of human worth in addition to other matters. These considerations gave them privileges to which they were not entitled in any dispute that would arise between them and citizens or in their daily dealings with others.

The rights of the vast majority of citizens used to be lost and squandered because of this discrimination despite the fact that it contravened the laws and statutes.

A junior civil servant who would be unfairly treated by a senior civil servant could not get the satisfaction he was entitled to. Farmers, workers and other poor citizens lost their rights--material as well as moral--when these rights conflicted with the interests and wills of individuals who are socially influential.

The unlawful wishes of individuals who had influence in society infringed upon the dignity, the interests and the honor of many male and female citizens who found no one to protect their interests, their dignity and their honor, particularly when the aggression that was committed against them did not constitute a very clear case of aggression in the legal sense. Many forms of aggression against a citizen's honor and dignity and even against his interests cannot be classified under a legal framework that the courts can deal with. These cases are rather social cases, and a citizen would be afforded protection [from such attacks] only in a sound society with a sincere, [honorable and] stern view of justice held by its highest leaders who are faithfully committed to this course.

* These words, missing in the Arabic text, were added by the translator.

In the old society, [injustice],* aggression and humiliation trickled down the social and occupational hierarchy to the people. The ruler, who was under foreign domination and who felt humiliated by that, would turn around and humiliate [other] citizens; and a senior civil servant who was reproached by his superiors would turn around and reproach those under him and so on.

The 17-30 July Revolution created a new climate in Iraqi society, a climate that affirms and preserves the dignity and honor of citizens and treats them as people of equal worth.

The matter of justice and equality in the human worth of citizens is basic in the education and practices of the new society. Under the party, which is the organization that looks after the interests, rights and dignity of citizens under the direct supervision of the leader Saddam Husayn--this supervision which extends to the minutest details in society is tireless and unyielding--a citizen can take his complaint to the highest authorities in the party and the state if he is subjected to any attack on his rights, his dignity and his honor, whether or not that attack is supported by legal evidence or is an attack of the kind that laws cannot deal with. In many cases a citizen can take his complaint to the leader himself who would be fair to the citizen regardless of the social or occupational standing of the individual who [allegedly] committed the aggression.

Today, every official in the party and the state knows this fact. Every official is well aware of the fact that his position does not entail any unlawful privileges in his dealings with other citizens. Every official is aware of the fact that he is accountable for his conduct.

A very significant value has been affirmed in the new society: it has to do with society's aspirations for progress. This is the value of productive activity and work. One of the most prominent aspects of the new society is that it has become an active society. This characteristic has an important value in Iraq and in countries with similar conditions which lived for many centuries under different authorities. These societies have been indolent; they have not cared about work; and they have not given work and activity basic consideration. Backwardness and indolence had triumphed over work and activity in those societies.

Today energetic civil servants, energetic workers and energetic administrative leaders are appreciated by the Revolutionary government and by the leaders of the party. Today, a lazy individual whose productivity is low is considered to be a sick case, an individual to be spurned.

It is essential, however, that we make a conscious association between activity, part of which may be superficial, and a real love for work. It is essential that we transform this love for work into concrete production in all areas of life. It is not enough for a person to appear to be active even though that is important too. But it is essential that a person associate himself closely with his work, that he devote his life to it and that he make it yield as much as he can.

The productivity of an Iraqi individual in all areas of life has grown appreciably, but we have to admit that this productivity is still below what we aspire to. There is more that ought to be done in all fields during the hours of work.

* This word, missing in the Arabic text, was added by the translator.

Time is still being wasted, and production is still insufficient.

The Revolution can pride itself on the fact that it introduced into Iraqi society the value of patience and the ability to plan. Patience and the ability to plan are becoming widespread in Iraq. Old Iraqi society and pre-revolutionary Iraqis were known for their impatience, their nervousness, their rashness, their lack of deliberation and their impetuous reactions. They were known for their inexperience and for their lack of interest in long-term planning.

In this regard the Revolution was ultimately able to reduce to a large extent these negative characteristics and to express the fact that it had a firm and deep commitment to sincerity, spontaneity and generosity. The Revolution accomplished that by maintaining a steady course, a perseverant style and a long-term strategy in all fields. Under the Revolution the Iraqi character became more mature and more capable of dealing with things and circumstances. These characteristics were confirmed in the war experience against Khomeyni's regime. For Iraqis have been patient, and they have been dealing with this war in a spirit of determination and perseverance to resist [aggression] and realize victory despite the fact that the war has been protracted, despite the major sacrifices that were required and despite the momentous dangers that were involved.

One of the significant values developed by the Revolution is that of optimism and having a sense of joy and assurance about the future. The Revolution caused the antithesis of that feeling to diminish. Iraqi individuals and Iraqi society were marked by a sense of sorrow, pessimism and a lack of confidence in the future. These feelings were reflected on the lives of Iraqis, in their literature, their arts and in their dealings with the affairs of life, including political affairs. A new Iraqi society and a new Iraqi individual have come into being under the Revolution. Today, Iraqi individuals and Iraqi society are optimistic: they believe in the future, and they handle the affairs of life with confidence and with joy. Just as the past negative characteristics were reflected on the lives of Iraqis and in their literature and their arts, the new characteristics are being radiantly reflected today in the literature, the arts and the lives of Iraqis.

An extremely important value to societies that are similar to Iraqi society has been developed in the new society which was forged by the Revolution. This is the value of effecting a balance between rights and responsibilities.

Under foreign control and despotic governments that dealt arbitrarily and irresponsibly with citizens' rights, it was not possible to effect a balance between rights and responsibilities. Individuals and society [in general] looked at government with hatred, fear or suspicion. All responsibilities imposed on them by government were viewed in the same way. In such a situation neither individuals nor society would know exactly what their responsibilities and what their rights were.

This balance between rights and responsibilities can be realized only in a society where government is patriotic first; just second; and closely committed to the interests of the majority of the people, third. A balance can be achieved with such an equation. Nevertheless, the achievement of such an equation requires some time and arduous efforts in education and discernible conduct.

The party, which is the vanguard of society, plays a prominent role in controlling this sensitive balance that was recently developed in Iraqi society. The party exercises this control so that it can firmly establish this balance and make it a permanent fact in society.

The extreme concern shown for resisting any shirking of responsibilities and for resisting favoritism, which gives those who practice it rights they are not entitled to at the expense of the rights of citizens, provides support for the firm establishment of this balance in the minds and hearts of citizens and in society. Eventually, this balance would become a matter of normal practice.

The personal role that the leader Saddam Husayn plays in his direct dealings with citizens and in his continuous meetings with them to find out what their problems are and to solve these problems, many of which have to do with balancing rights and responsibilities, is a principal role in the process of establishing this new value in society. Nevertheless, every member of the Ba'th Party in particular must continue playing that role where he works; he must continue playing the role which the leader is playing.

The Revolution can be proud of the fact that in 14 years it made significant progress in developing a new society and a new person in Iraq.

This mission which the party and [our] leader Saddam Husayn have been careful to complete and to brighten will always be a basic mission. The success that has been realized must be confirmed, furthered and turned into a permanent and inventive state. What is left of the negative aspects [of the past] must be pursued, and the new values and practices of the new society which the Revolution is developing must always be affirmed. This is what the party, the Revolution and the leader aspire to, and this is what millions of Iraqis aspire to also, as well as millions of Arabs who are looking at Iraq's experience with admiration, appreciation and hope for deliverance and progress.

War With Iran

Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 30 Jan 83 pp 6-11

[Text] Chapter Five: Saddam's Qadisiyah

Part One

Ever since the oldest days of history the eastern part of the Arab homeland has been the scene of struggle between Arabs and Persians. Although this report does not deal specifically with the history of that struggle, since that would require a specialized and a detailed study of history, it is a certain fact that the significance of the battle we are fighting at the present time with Khomeyni's regime cannot be understood without understanding the historical background of the Arab-Persian struggle.

The principal feature of the struggle is the fact that it is a national and a cultural struggle. It is also a struggle over strategic interests.

The land of the Tigris and Euphrates was the birthplace of one of the oldest and

most advanced civilizations. It was in that land that one of the first super-powers came into being. It was normal for strife to develop between people who inhabited that land and their neighbors, particularly the Persians who are also an old nation with their own civilization and their own religions. In addition, most of Persia is semi-arid, hilly terrain that is suitable only for pasture. Therefore, the inhabitants of that land would head west toward Iraq where they would find fertile land and an abundant supply of water and other good things. They would head toward Iraq either as conquerors or as new settlers.

The struggle between Arabs and Persians had its ups and downs: sometimes Arabs would win, and other times Persians would win. When the last great Arab state in Iraq fell in 539 B.C., part of Iraq fell under Persian domination.

But despite this propensity to control, Persian domination of Iraq did not succeed in becoming total. Iraqi Arabs struggled courageously against Persian control: they preserved their language, their culture and their values. During the pre-Islamic period Iraqi Arabs established their own state, (al-Manadhirah), albeit the state was officially under Persian influence. Iraqi Arabs also maintained their human, cultural and economic relations with their Arab brothers in the Arabian Peninsula. These relations provided Iraqi Arabs with a profound sense of nationalism and security and an unbreakable kinship with their brothers in the Arabian Peninsula.

The battle to liberate Iraq from Persian domination began before the advent of Islam and the onset of the epic battles that were fought to spread Islam among the human race.

The battles to liberate Iraq have a special historical and national significance. These battles were fought not only to spread the new religion; these battles were at the same time national battles of liberation that were being fought against Persian domination. Christian Arabs of Iraq fought alongside their fellow Muslims, the Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula who were carrying the banner of the Islamic message. Only a small number of people was the exception to that rule.

Ever since that date and for over 6 centuries Arab sovereignty has prevailed in Iraq and in other Arab countries.

Even under Arab sovereignty, however, the struggle between Arabs and Persians continued under the administration of the orthodox caliphs, under the Umayyad State and under the Abassid state. This time, however, the struggle took on a new form. The Persians had adopted Islam after the fall of their state and the collapse of their religion, Mazdaism. They could not publicly deny this and openly rebel against the Islamic Arab state. However, they used everything that was available to them in this situation to weaken, destroy and infiltrate the Arab state and to avenge their historic ideological and military defeat to the Arabs who had brought down their empire and destroyed their religion, Mazdaism.

Arab history during that age, particularly during the Abassid age, saw a fierce struggle between Arabs and Persians. Sometimes that struggle was secret, and sometimes it was fought openly. The struggle between al-Mansur and Abu Muslim al-Khurasani and the struggle between al-Rashid and the Barmakids were examples of these struggles.

As the Arab state grew weaker, Persian penetration of that state grew and the danger of Persian conspiracies against it rose until the Arab state fell in the 13th century, in 1258 A.D.

In subsequent centuries Iraq became the scene of foreign influence exercised by different ethnic groups. The Persians were one of the ethnic groups that invaded Iraq repeatedly, regarding the land as fair game. Even after full Ottoman control over Iraq was established, Persians used to take advantage of opportunities to realize their ambitions in Iraqi territory and to obtain privileges to which they were not entitled.

The rulers of Tehran continued this policy after the establishment of the modern Iraqi state, taking advantage of the weakness of the reactionary monarchy and practicing a policy of extortion against Iraq.

After the outbreak of the 17-30 July Revolution in 1968, the Shah's regime was one of the first to launch an attack against the Revolution. The Shah's regime tried various means to overthrow the revolutionary regime and to upset national unity in Iraq.

It is essential to point out that the Shah's regime used religion and sectarianism primarily in its conspiracies and propaganda campaigns against the Revolution. This method has been repeated under Khomeyni.

The Shah's regime, however, soon realized that conspiring against Iraq was becoming a costly proposition and that these conspiracies would not bring about the fall of the revolutionary regime. The revolutionary regime weathered all kinds of conspiracies: it became stronger with time, and it became more firmly established. Iraq's reactions to the conspiracies of the Shah's regime began creating for that regime much harm and danger because Iraq was harboring the Shah's opponents, including Khomeyni, who came from all parties. Iraq was providing financial, military and media assistance to the Shah's opposition.

It was this conclusion that proved at that time to be the principal incentive for the Shah to accept a settlement with Iraq. The 1975 Agreement was the result of that development in the struggle between Iraq and Iran, and it was the result of this level in the new balance of power between them.

However, the fact that the Shah's regime had yielded to these new facts did not mean that his ultimate ambitions in Iraq had disappeared. The Shah's regime held on to its hatred of the Arab nation and to its ambitions in the Arabian Gulf. The Shah's regime was well aware of the fact that these ambitions could not be realized with an Iraq that was becoming stronger and with a patriotic and national government that was sovereign under the regime of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party. Therefore, it continued to keep a few contingency plans. [One of these plans] in particular had to do with al-Barzani and his set. However, until the date of his fall from power, the Shah had failed to change the existing balances of power in his favor, and he was forced to honor the articles of the March 1975 Agreement.

Khomeyni and the Hostile Attitude toward the Party and Iraq

Leaders of the party and the Revolution were not surprised by the hostile

attitude that Khomeyni and his followers declared against the party, against the Revolution and against Iraq when Khomeyni was residing in France and after he came to power.

Khomeyni had lived in Iraq for a long time. Despite the struggle that Iraq had fought against the Shah's regime and despite the assistance that the Revolution had offered Khomeyni's people in their struggle against the Shah, at no time did Khomeyni express a friendly attitude toward Iraq or toward the party and the Revolution. His attitude was basically negative because it stemmed originally from deep Persian hatreds and from backward and deviant tendencies that are hostile to the party's nationalist and socialist course. Although Khomeyni used to oppose the Shah's policies and positions, he did not condemn the Shah's insistence that Iran exercise sovereignty over half of Shatt al-'Arab, and he also did not condemn the Shah's occupation of three Arab islands in the Arabian Gulf.

Despite its awareness of this fact, the Revolution did Khomeyni no harm. It accepted his presence in Iraq out of a sense of commitment to Iraqi and Arab hospitality. After the 1975 Agreement was reached the Revolution overlooked Khomeyni's political activities against the Shah's regime as long as these activities were clandestine.

However, after conditions deteriorated in Iran in the second half of 1978, Khomeyni became engaged in public activities against the Shah's regime. Therefore, Iraqi leaders decided to inform him that it was necessary that he refrain from any public political activity for two reasons: first, any political activity of this kind would place Iraq in a state of confrontation with the Shah's regime, and that would impede the return of Iraqi territory to actual Iraqi sovereignty as stipulated in the 1975 Agreement and in previous agreements. Iraq would thus have paid the Shah a price for Iran's sovereignty over half of Shatt al-'Arab without receiving what it wanted from the 1975 Agreement.

Second, Khomeyni's activities were incompatible with the principles of good neighborliness and of non-intervention in [each other's] domestic affairs. These principles were stipulated in the 1975 Agreement. Khomeyni's activities would give the Shah of Iran an excuse to renege on the articles of agreement, allowing him to resume his intervention in Iraq's domestic affairs, chiefly mobilizing and employing al-Barzani's mercenary group.

Khomeyni, however, decided to resume his political activity, and he decided to leave Iraq. He headed for Kuwait, but Kuwaiti authorities refused to admit him into the country, so he asked [for permission] to return to Iraq, and he was allowed to return. Then he left Iraq and went to Paris.

We state as a matter of historical truth that the prime minister of Iran, (Emir 'Abbas Hovida) had sent a letter to [our] compatriot Saddam Husayn through Iran's ambassador in Baghdad. In that letter Iran's prime minister said that it was his opinion that Iraq should not deal strictly with clergymen. In his reply [our] compatriot Saddam Husayn said, "We reject intervention in our domestic affairs, and we will not allow any clergyman to practice politics on behalf of our party and the state. If the clergymen intended here are Iraqis, this would be our reply. If those clergymen are non-Iraqis, then anyone who does not like our policy can leave the country and practice the politics he wants on the outside." We state as a matter of history also that the Shah's regime, which was annoyed at

first with Khomeyni's activities, asked Iraq not to apply pressure to Khomeyni so as to make him leave Iraq. This request was made amidst attempts that were then being made to contain the Iranian opposition and to look for a settlement to the crisis. However, Iraqi leaders informed the Iranian regime that their position on Khomeyni's activities would be determined primarily by the requirements of respecting Iraqi sovereignty and the existing regime in Iraq.

Our authorized agencies were also aware of the fact that arrangements for Khomeyni's departure to France were being made by Iranian and French intelligence.

After Khomeyni took over power in Iran, campaigns that vilified and attacked the party and the Revolution were launched and gradually expanded. Iraqi organizations in Iran were attacked, and transgressions were committed in the border areas.

In order to avoid giving any excuses to this regime and to the suspect elements that had infiltrated its ranks, elements that had been making plans for a clash with Iraq, Iraqi leaders adopted a policy in dealing with Khomeyni's regime; that policy was characterized by wisdom, clarity, firmness and patriotic and national pride.

At a time when numerous Arab and international parties were flattering and praising Khomeyni's regime and being servile to it, Iraqi leaders conducted themselves toward this regime according to the following principles:

1. They affirmed unequivocally that Iraq was prepared to establish good neighborly relations with Iran and that it was prepared to cooperate with the new regime in Iran on the basis of respect for [each country's] sovereignty and mutual interests.
2. They showed pride in the Iraqi and Arab revolutionary experiment and in Iraq's and the Arab nation's past, and they dealt with the Iranian Revolution on that basis.
3. They handled Iran's transgressions and propaganda campaigns against Iraq and against the party and the Revolution with wisdom. They cautioned the new regime continuously against the dangers of these transgressions and campaigns and gave it to understand that Iraq's position did not stem from weakness, but rather from a sense of responsibility and an earnest desire to maintain good neighborly relations and avoid a struggle between the two countries, a struggle that would benefit no one but Zionists and imperialist forces.
4. They gave the Iranian regime to understand quite clearly that Iraq, which had resisted the Shah's ambitions in the Arabian Gulf, will resist the ambitions of the new regime regardless of the excuse it will use and regardless of the justifications it will make [for its aggressions] regarding the nature of the existing regimes in the Gulf.

Despite this clear policy of principles Khomeyni's regime stuck to its hostile positions. Iraqi leaders had no doubt that Khomeyni's position was a basic cornerstone of his policy. [They were certain that Khomeyni's] position was unshakable and that it would not be changed by the nature of Iraq's dealings with that regime.

Iraqi leaders were nevertheless patient, and they continued to practice a policy of self-control, pursuing a balanced and a resolute style in doing unto Khomeyni's regime as that regime was doing unto them. Iraqi leaders practiced self-control because they were extremely concerned about convincing all Iraqi people of these facts. Iraqi people were to be convinced that this suspect regime had initiated the conspiracy and the aggression and that it had harbored ill intentions toward Iraq. Iraqi leaders were also concerned about having this conviction become as widespread as possible in the Arab world and on the international scene as well.

We must call attention here, however, to the fact that Iraqi leaders at that time did not become engaged in broader and in intense activity in this regard on the Arab and international scenes. This was not because they felt this activity was not important, but it was because they thought the situation was not appropriate for such activity. Numerous Arab and international parties were falling over each other to ingratiate themselves with Khomeyni's regime. Therefore, any activity on Iraq's part to convince Iraqis and Arabs of Iran's real intentions toward Iraq would inevitably be interpreted in these Arab and international circles as a kind of weakness. And this would tempt Khomeyni to conspire further. It would also tempt enemies of the party and of socialism in both the Arab and international scenes to intensify their conspiracies against Iraq.

What were the reasons that forced Khomeyni's regime to keep up its conspiracy against Iraq to the point of starting a war? What were the Arab and international conditions and interests that pushed events in that direction?

1. As we've already explained, the attitude of Khomeyni and his people is basically one that is intellectually opposed to the party and the Revolution. Khomeyni's people know that the nationalist and socialist ideology of the party, which was inspired by the spirit of Islam and correctly and thoroughly applied in Iraq, constitutes the primary challenge to their intellectually backward and divisive premises.

Thus, despite their intellectual differences with numerous other parties, including communist, Marxist parties and tendencies and reactionary regimes and monarchies, Khomeyni's people considered a strike against the Revolution and the party to be their primary mission. They thought they could not spread their own revolution in Arab countries, where they entertained their own ambitions, before achieving this objective.

Expansionist Persians know quite well that their plan for expansion cannot materialize as long as there is a free, independent and strong Iraq whose leaders are patriots and nationalists. Therefore, the primary task of any Persian expansion plan is to strive to weaken Iraq, to strike its patriotic and nationalist regime and to bring anti-Arab elements to rule Iraq. This was not only an essential step to control Iraq, but it was also a step that was to be taken to expand in the Gulf and in the entire Arabian Peninsula.

2. The deviant, narrow-minded and backward religious outlook of Khomeyni's people became associated and very closely related to the Persian intellectual background and to the deep-seated hostility harbored by Persians toward the Arab nation. Khomeyni's people found in Iraq, which was being led by the Arab Socialist Ba'th

Party and the leader Saddam Husayn, an example that reminded them of Arab pride. It was this Arab pride that had borne the banner of Islam and spread Islam in Persia. Among the other Arab regimes and leaders Khomeyni's people found only trivial and feeble examples that were ingratiating themselves with them and acting helplessly in front of them.

3. Khomeyni's people, who overthrew the Shah's regime, a regime that seemed strong and powerful, entertained illusions for a long time of repeating the Iranian experience in other Islamic countries. Because of the factors that we already mentioned and other factors we will mention, they considered Iraq a likely candidate [for their endeavors]. But they were ignoring the basic facts about Iraq: that the regime in Iraq was a patriotic, popular and progressive regime and that it handled domestic and foreign challenges in the highest manner of adhering to principle, courage and prudence.

4. Elements of al-Da'wah Party, who were able to build an organization with a sizable number of followers and a remarkable measure of effectiveness and daring and who did that under conditions we will deal with in the chapter on the religious question, conveyed to Khomeyni's people in Iran that the revolutionary regime in Iraq was weak and that a clash with Iraq, and consequently war with it, would unsettle the Revolution and cause it to fall.

5. Military powers in Iran, who lost much of their standing after Khomeyni's regime came to power, found that a military confrontation with Iraq would give them a golden opportunity to regain their prestige and to make plans for eventually seizing power in Iran.

6. Escalating the struggle with Iraq was an excuse that all parties struggling for power in Iran benefited from and utilized [to ensure] the success of their plans. It was also an appropriate excuse which all these parties, chiefly that of Khomeyni, used to cover up political, economic, social and security problems in Iran. In escalating the struggle with Iraq Khomeyni's people created the right climate for settling domestic accounts.

It is important to emphasize here that regardless of statements made by Bani Sadr and others who left the regime in Iran, everyone in the Iranian regime did participate in one way or another in escalating the struggle with Iraq.

7. Zionist circles, which had penetrated Iran before and since the Shah's administration, and the international extension of Zionists in intelligence agencies, media agencies and political circles were encouraging Khomeyni's people to engage Iraq in a struggle. Through a variety of channels and means they were offering Khomeyni's people information and analyses indicating that conditions in Iraq were "ripe" for change.

Before and after Khomeyni came to power in Iran, western media agencies, where Zionists exercise a great deal of influence, began concentrating [their attention] on a broad scale on sectarian matters in Iraq. They published news and contrived reports about alleged sectarian struggles in the country.

Zionists regard the process of distracting and weakening Iraq a basic question as far as the security of the Zionist entity and its strategy in the area are concerned. Iraq is the largest and strongest Arab country in the East. When

Zionists achieve this objective, they will consider the primary threat to their entity eliminated. Zionists know that if the Khomeyni formula is generally applied to Iraq and to the other countries of the region, that formula will most certainly lead to the partitioning of Iraq and of the countries of the region into small sectarian and ethnic states. The Zionist entity would thereby gain a legitimacy which it presently lacks among the countries of the region, and it would become the strongest and the most advanced small state among the small sectarian and ethnic states of that region. Thus, the Zionists' historical dream of having absolute supremacy in the region would be realized.

8. The forces of international colonialism--and the United States is at the forefront of these forces--thought that forcing the Iranian regime into a confrontation with Iraq would create for them immediately and in the future better conditions for regaining control of Iran, [especially] since their positions there had been shaken following the fall of the Shah's regime. A struggle with Iraq would weaken the Iranian regime militarily and economically and would place it realistically, regardless of political demonstrations and propaganda, in a position of having a greater need for assistance in these two strategic areas from the United States and from western countries, both during and after the war. The war experience confirmed this assessment. The Iranian economy continued to be closely associated with the western economy. In fact, it became more subordinate to the western economy than it was in the days of the Shah. Khomeyni's regime found itself having an urgent need for resuming direct and indirect military cooperation with the United States, with western countries and with the Zionist entity to ensure the formidable and complex requirements of the war. In the opinion of these forces a war also meant strengthening the standing of Iran's military power, which is basically a creature of the United States, in the new regime. That would create for the United States possibilities for controlling the sovereign power in Iran.

Colonialist and international forces--and the United States is at the forefront of these forces--also have a vested interest in undermining Iraq and dragging it into a long-term war of attrition that would diminish its activity and its influence on the Arab scene and weaken its role in the struggle against the Zionist enemy. This would provide these forces with better opportunities for arranging conditions in the Arabian Peninsula, in the Arabian Gulf and in the entire area. This is what did in fact happen, and this is what we will discuss in the chapter on "Arab Conditions."

9. Despite its public condemnation of the war and despite its statements that it was imperialism which was benefiting from it, the real position of the Soviet Union in that period was determined in accordance with Soviet strategy in the area. Communist parties in the region, including the Iraqi Communist Party openly reflected that real position.

It became quite evident that the Iraqi Communist Party thought that it would certainly be in its interests to undermine the regime that was being led by the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party in Iraq. This would make this party's plans and its good-for-nothing dreams of having a special place in Iraq easier to achieve. Therefore, any conduct that would undermine the party and the Revolution as well as the leadership of the fighter Saddam Husayn, regardless of who was behind that conduct, would serve its plans against the patriotic and nationalist revolutionary regime in Iraq.

We have found that the sympathies which Iraqi communists had with Khomeyni's regime were opportunist in nature. Iraqi communists cooperated with the people of al-Da'wah Party despite their total ideological and political incompatibility.

It was this position and the intensifying pre-war hostility of communist parties in the region to the party and the Revolution that was one of the factors which encouraged Khomeyni's regime to go ahead with its conspiracy against Iraq and to engage it in a struggle.

10. The hostile posture assumed by some Arab parties toward the party and the Revolution played a very important role in making a clash with Iraq attractive to Khomeyni's people. The client regime in Syria was providing false information about the weak and deteriorating conditions in Iraq to prod Khomeyni's regime to escalate the situation against Iraq. The client regime in Syria was cooperating with al-Da'wah Party, with the Iraqi Communist Party and with a few suspect Kurdish groups. The hostile and malicious postures of the Libyan regime, of some parties in the Palestinian Resistance and of other Arab circles also contributed to making the struggle attractive for Khomeyni because of the trumped up news and false analyses they relayed about the weakness of the Revolutionary regime. They portrayed the regime in Iraq as one that was isolated from the Arabs and from progressive circles in the world. Accordingly, it could be isolated and dealt with.

These incentives wherein local and international factors overlapped forced Khomeyni's regime to precipitate the struggle with Iraq in order to have an actual war.

The question may be asked, "Was it possible to avoid the war?" Certainly not.

It is true that the firm decision to oppose the aggressive war which was launched by Khomeyni's regime was an Iraqi decision. However, it was not in our power to change the factors that forced Khomeyni's regime to resort to war or to influence [its course], and the only thing we could do to protect our country from destruction was to oppose the aggression.

The leaders had only one choice: they could submit to Khomeyni's plan to occupy significant parts of Iraq, to have free access to Iraqi territory and to blow up that territory and turn it into a scene of killing and destruction. This would inevitably lead to a loss of sovereignty, and all the security, dignity, prosperity and progress achieved for the people would be lost. Iraq would become the scene for either all kinds of foreign influence or resolute opposition.

Naturally, opposition was inevitable. This opposition stemmed from the spirit of Great Iraq, from the spirit of the great Arab nation and from the principles of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party. Opposition was inevitable to defend sovereignty, honor, dignity and basic national interests.

The conspiratorial attempts of Khomeyni's regime did not stop with propaganda campaigns and with actions that encouraged conspiracy, domestic sabotage and border transgressions. These methods could have been handled forcefully and decisively without turning the confrontation into a state of war. In fact for several months the Revolution reacted patiently and firmly to such transgressions and conspiracies, responding forcefully to propaganda campaigns and retaliating with

double force when the Iranian regime would exceed proper bounds. The Revolution also launched a broad, partisan and popular campaign to break and liquidate the gangs of al-Da'wah Party.

Nevertheless, Khomeyni's regime, motivated by all the factors that we mentioned, shifted to a formula of direct aggression.

On 4 September 1980 long-range heavy Iranian artillery shelled the cities of Khanqin, Mandali and Zarbatiyah and the oil region of Khanah. This attack was backed by far-reaching military troops that were massed on Iraqi borders and inside Iraqi territory: [in] Zayn al-Qaws, Sayf Sa'd, Haylah and Khadr.

In real terms, this conduct signified a declaration of war.

Doing nothing about it would have meant accepting the notion that the scene of battle was transferred to Iraqi territory.

In view of this development Iraqi leaders decided to give Iranians a taste of their own medicine and to shell Iranian cities on the border. Iraq decided to remove Iran's artillery from those positions where Iran could shell Iraqi cities on the border.

Completion of this mission, however, required the liberation of Zayn al-Qaws, which is Iraqi territory. Iraqi sovereignty over that region was established by the 1975 Agreement and by all previous agreements. At first Iranian authorities had dragged their feet in returning it to Iran, citing technical reasons. [Subsequent reasons] for delaying the return of this territory were declining conditions at the end of the Shah's administration and political reasons in Khomeyni's age. Zayn al-Qaws was used by Iran's artillery in shelling Khanqin and other Iraqi border regions.

On 6 September 1980 the leaders met and decided to recommend that the nation's armed forces liberate Zayn al-Qaws.

On the following day, 7 September 1980 the armed forces overran the region of Zayn al-Qaws and seized it from Iranian forces in a swift and daring battle. Before the battle began a memorandum had been delivered to the Iranian Embassy in Baghdad. This memorandum was to make Iranian authorities feel that it was necessary to restore this land to Iraqi sovereignty. Otherwise, Iraq would take the necessary measures which would be consistent with its rights to exercise sovereignty on its own territory. The purpose of this and other memoranda delivered later to the Iranian side was to make Iranian authorities feel that Iraqi measures were limited and confined to the restoration of Iraqi sovereignty to Iraqi territory as established in international agreements. This would prevent Iranian troops from attacking cities and border areas in Iraq.

But the Iranian regime, which was determined to pursue evil and aggression, did not reply to any of the memoranda we presented to it, and the regime began publicly declaring its aggressive intentions to occupy and destroy Iraq. The most famous statements were those made by Defense Minister (Fakuri) who said, "Iraq will be obliterated from the map." Iranian authorities continued their military activities, and before 22 September 1980 they used the Iranian air force in their military operations. A general call to arms was declared, and Iranian authorities

proceeded to issue military bulletins about border clashes. They increased their reinforcements and their massing of troops on our borders, and they escalated [their] aggressive postures, including shelling the city of Basra and using force to close Shatt al-'Arab [to traffic] before 22 September.

After liberating Zayn al-Qaws our armed forces resumed their mission to recapture Iraqi territory. On 11 September 1980 they recaptured the region of Sayf Sa'd, and by 16 September 1980 our forces, which had fought daring battles, had recaptured all Iraqi territories established as such by international agreements. They also recaptured all the border posts that were under Iraqi sovereignty but had been illegitimately controlled by Iranian authorities.

On 17 September 1980 the president convened an emergency meeting of the National Assembly. At that meeting, which was attended by members of the Revolutionary Command Council and by the ministers, President Saddam Husayn announced the abrogation of the 1975 Agreement.

In that historic address [our] compatriot Saddam Husayn spoke about the conditions that had led to the agreement at that time, and he also spoke about the reasons and justifications for abrogating that agreement.

The president said, "The agreement that was reached in March 1975 constituted at that time a courageous and a wise decision; it was a patriotic and a nationalist decision. Courage is expressed not only by someone on the front lines using a gun and a sword competently in a defensive or offensive confrontation with the enemy, but it is also expressed, particularly in positions of leadership, by bold political decisions that are made to defend the nation and preserve its sovereignty when a sword alone and a gun alone cannot realize these objectives.

"Under those conditions that decision saved Iraq from serious dangers that were threatening its unity, its security and its future. That decision gave our people an opportunity to go ahead with their Revolution, to go ahead with the process of construction and progress and to achieve a high level of power, progress and prosperity that would preserve the honor and sovereignty of Iraqis and set a strong and capable Iraq on a course of serving the Arab nation and its great mission.

"The decision did not represent surrender to a bitter reality, even though that reality was bitter and dangerous. That decision rather transcended reality with a capable act of leadership that was balanced against considerations of conditions and capabilities.

"The March Agreement was a product of its time. Our people understood it and considered it a major victory in that context. They hailed it with great joy. Although our army was fighting fearlessly in the trenches, unaware of the bitter facts that we referred to about shortages in vital equipment, and inflicting heavy damages upon the treacherous renegades, it too hailed the agreement with great joy because it realized its significance to the unity and future of the homeland and because it appreciated the topical conditions under which the agreement was made."

[Our] compatriot Saddam Husayn then said, "There was much talk after the signing of the March Agreement, and many contacts were made for the purpose of putting

the articles of that agreement into practice, particularly those that had to do with drawing the borders, establishing border reinforcements and other affairs of a technical nature. The three principal protocols which are based on the agreement were signed. These are the protocol which defines land borders and that which defines security on the borders. The Iranians had benefited earlier from the agreement [the third protocol ?] which defined the borders on the Shatt al-'Arab waterway, whereas additional time was required for enforcing the special protocol on land borders. This was not unusual. Measures of turning over the land were later delayed because of the conditions the former Iranian regime was experiencing in 1978 and 1979. Then the new Iranian government came into power, and our land continued to be under the control of the other party. It was our judgment then that the new regime would need some time to carry out its commitments in accordance with the agreement. However, ever since its first day in power the ruling junta in Iran has shown its hostility to us, and it has violated good neighborly relations. We began hearing from Khomeyni's people statements about the fact that they would not abide by the March Agreement. At a very early date the ruling junta in Iran violated a basic article of the agreement when it summoned the client leader of the rebellion from the United States to Iran. [At that time] the client al-Barzani and his children were getting ready to return to Iran to resume their aggressive activities against Iraq. However, al-Barzani died before leaving the land of his benefactors, but his children and the [other] leaders of the client rebellion returned to Iran, which they used as a base, with the clear support of the ruling authorities in Iran, to threaten the security and national unity of Iraq.

"Ever since they came to power the conduct of Iran's rulers has confirmed the fact that they were violating relations of good neighborliness and that they were not abiding by the articles of the March Agreement. Therefore, they bear the full legal responsibility for the fact that this agreement is considered dead.

"Despite the difficult conditions that surrounded Iraq when the agreement was signed, the components of that agreement were balanced against each other. Disturbing any one of them was considered a violation of the spirit of the agreement.

"Whereas the rulers of Iran have been in violation of this agreement since the beginning of their administration with their blatant and deliberate intervention in Iraq's domestic affairs; whereas they have been backing up the leaders of the rebellion, which is supported by the United States and Zionists, and providing them with supplies, as the Shah did before them; and whereas the rulers of Iran have refrained from returning to us Iraqi territory, which we had to liberate by force, I hereby declare in front of you that we consider the 6 March 1975 Agreement to be abrogated. The Revolutionary Command Council has already made a decision to that effect. Thus, legal relations in Shatt al-'Arab ought to be restored to their pre-6 March 1975 status, and Shatt al-'Arab must once again become, as it was throughout history, an Iraqi and an Arab waterway in name and in fact with all the full rights of sovereignty."

If Iranian authorities had not been determined to pursue an all-out war against Iraq, they would have pondered for a long time the address that [our] compatriot Saddam Husayn delivered on 17 September 1980. That address meant specifically [the following]:

1. Military clashes on the Iraqi side were to be confined to responses to Iranian aggression against Iraqi cities and to the recapture of Iraqi territory proven such by international agreements, including the 1975 Agreement. Until that time Iraqi troops had not advanced a single meter into Iranian territory.

2. The historical right to Shatt al-'Arab which Iraq had had to relinquish in 1975 under extraordinary conditions was to be regained.

3. Iraq's desire to establish good neighborly relations between itself and Iran was to be emphasized.

But Khomeyni's plan, which was prodded by all the factors that we mentioned, did not come to a stop. Instead, the authorities of the Iranian regime went very far in their aggressive actions: they shelled the city of Basrah, and they shelled ships in Shatt al-'Arab. This suspended navigation in the waterway and virtually shut down this only vital outlet that Iraq has to the sea.

This conduct was a continuation, an affirmation and a confirmation of the actual declaration of a state of war which Khomeyni initiated on 4 September 1980.

In view of this development leaders met on 21 September 1980. Their accurate evaluation of the military situation was that the Iranian regime was making preparations for an all-out land and sea attack on our territory, our cities, our vital Iraqi installations and our air bases. Therefore, to pre-empt such a hostile strike, the leaders made a historical decision to launch an all-out attack on Iran's military positions and to occupy certain areas of Iran so as to guarantee the realization of the following objectives. The leaders charged [their] compatriot Saddam Husayn, general commander of the armed forces with this mission.

1. Military clashes were to be kept out of Iraqi territory, and the safety of Iraqi territory and cities was to be ensured from Iranian military aggression, particularly shelling by Iran's artillery.

2. The Iranian regime was to be given a sense of Iraq's power and ability to prevent aggression; it was to be freed from illusions it may have had about controlling Iraq; and suspect Arab and international reports that had encouraged Iran to commit its aggression were to be refuted.

3. The Iranian regime was to be forced to abandon its expansionist ambitions in Iraq and in the region and to respect Iraq's sovereignty over its territory and its waters. The Iranian regime was not to interfere in the domestic affairs of Iraq and of the countries of the region. It was to end the state of war and reach an agreement that would ensure these objectives.

At noon, on the 22nd of September 1980 the airplanes of Iraq's air force raided Iran's military air bases and airports, and Iraqi armed forces crossed into Iranian territory at two main points:

1. The point at the central border toward Qasr-e Shirin, (Sirbil Zahab), Kaylan West, (Sumar) and (Mahran).

2. The point at the southern border toward (al-Mahmarah), Ahvaz, Dezful and (al-Shush).

In 6 days of fearless fighting and fast, bold action the armed forces reached all the targets that had been laid out for them by the leaders.

Annals of the War and the Iraqi Armed Forces

In talking about our battle with Khomeyni's regime, which has taken on the glorious historical name of Saddam's Qadisiyah with its annals of intrepidity, we must also talk about the process of building up the Iraqi armed forces spiritually and materially; this process took place in the period between the Eighth Regional Congress and the date of the battle.

The political report which was issued by the Eighth Regional Congress dealt with the affairs of the armed forces and the development of the Revolution's activities in the armed forces during the period that followed the Revolution until the time the Eighth Regional Congress was convened. The Eighth Congress defined two principal missions for the subsequent period.

1. The party's leadership of the army was to be strengthened: the party's principles and the general nationalist and socialist culture were to be disseminated among members of the army; ideological and military principles and controls were to be firmly established so that the army can do its job in the best possible way and be protected from corruption and blunders; the full solidarity of the army and the popular movement, which is being led by the party, was to be ensured; and the army was to contribute effectively and correctly in building the Revolution and in carrying out patriotic and nationalist tasks.

2. The army was to be organized on modern, scientific principles, and its methods of training were to be developed. The army and its combat and technical capabilities were to be mobilized; its organizations were to be increased; and it was to be furnished with the strongest and most modern weapons and equipment so it can carry out its sacred mission in the best possible way and protect the unity of the country, ward off the imperialist-Zionist aggression and stand up to foreign ambitions.

During the period that followed the Eighth Regional Congress it was necessary to go ahead with efforts to achieve these two principal missions. However, internal conditions in the party and in the Revolution did not always allow these efforts to proceed on a straight course. Several years went by during which independent efforts were made that were not ideologically, politically and militarily compatible [with the Revolution's ideas] on how the army was to be built, how the qualities of the leaders were to be determined and how its means were to be modernized. Despite the difficulties and circumstances involved in those conditions, however, the process of furnishing the army's modern weapons and material requirements did not stop. In this area diligent and energetic efforts were kept up, and huge sums of money were earmarked for that purpose.

As of the end of 1977 and subsequently, the leaders had conditions that were more appropriate for building the army according to these principles and for reorganizing it according to modern and effective principles.

A sweeping and a prudent process that rearranged the positions of leaders in the armed forces was completed during that period. Broad opportunities were given to those military leaders whose patriotism, loyalty to the party and to the Revolution and military competence were affirmed. Legitimate opportunities were also

given to young leaders who had been reared under the party and the Revolution, who had learned the arts of modern combat and who had been trained in the use of modern and advanced weapons.

After [our] compatriot Saddam Husayn took over the duties of front-line leadership in the party and in the Revolution and after he assumed the responsibility as general commander of the armed forces, a categorical leap was achieved in the leadership style, the organization, the arming and the mobilization of the armed forces.

One of the significant strategic achievements that was realized in the past period is that of diversifying the sources of our arms. Leaders made a bold decision to let Iraq have new sources of weapons: from France, Italy, Brazil and a number of socialist countries. The armed forces thus had broader opportunities for obtaining good weapons, and the possibilities that an embargo would be imposed on our armed forces at times of peace and war to undermine our free national will were thus diminished.

At the time when it embarked upon the battle of Saddam's Qadisiyah the Iraqi army had truly become the army of the Ba'th, the army of the Revolution and the army of the people. It had become a very powerful and competent army. It had become the foremost army in the Arab homeland and among the countries of the Middle East.

Annals of the Battle

In his address to the people and the nation on 17 September 1980, the one in which he announced the abrogation of the 1975 Algiers Agreement, the leader, Saddam Husayn said, "An associate asked me at one of the party meetings, 'What is the combined reserve you are committing to the task of confronting the racist, suspect aggression of the new regime in Iran?'

"I told that associate, 'The people in Iraq have become accustomed to the fact that their leaders have always had a combined reserve to be used at historical moments to take enemies by surprise. I am telling you and all Iraqis, however, and I am also telling all honest Arabs that the Iraqi people are the basic combined reserve--that which is public and that which is secret--with which we surprised all the plans of suspect clients in Iran who acted out of backward mentalities and racist motivations. The Iraqi people are the basic reserve with which we will face all hostile, colonialist, Zionist and racist plans. Our basic reserve lies in the people of Iraq with their new spirit, their unlimited willingness to sacrifice and give of themselves and their insistence on their rights. Our basic reserve lies in the people of Iraq who are inspired by their great historical heritage--the heritage of the great message of Islam, the glorious history of the Arab nation and the glories of the Great Iraq. Our basic reserve lies in the fearless army of Iraq which was born of this spirit; our army lives by the principles of the Revolution and manifests in its life and in its battles the radiant history of its nation and the glorious history of Iraq.'

"You, all the honest, fearless Iraqis who are officers and soldiers in our army; you, the men, women, old people and children who are citizens of our nation, are our combined reserve. Our combined reserve lies in the honorable spirit of Arabs who fight against aggression, usurpation, exploitation and subordination. Our secret reserve lies in those Arabs who refuse to yield to the hateful Persian

occupation just as they refuse to yield to the treacherous Zionist occupation of Palestine and other Arab lands fighting that occupation most forcefully and fearlessly."

What the leader Saddam Husayn said that day was not emotional and rhetorical talk. It was rather a profound and an accurate assessment of the condition of the people and their brave armed forces in their preparations to confront the Iranian aggression. This condition has continued since the outbreak of the war on 4 September 1980.

The Iraqi army which has had a glorious history in national battles and which contributed, as the political report of the Eighth Regional Congress mentioned, to all the masses' and the nation's battles for freedom, independence and dignity, has been given a historical opportunity to fight in an all-out national battle to affirm its profound patriotism, its brave characteristics, its first-rate military capabilities and its unlimited willingness to give of itself and to make sacrifices for the homeland and for the objectives of the party and the Revolution.

The battle of Saddam's Qadisiyah is the first broad scale regular battle that the Iraqi army fights in its long history. It has the following characteristics:

1. It is a direct battle that is being fought to defend the homeland, Iraq, and the people of Iraq. This battle is being fought to defend the dignity, honor and the basic interests of the Iraqi people against a foreign, greedy and malicious enemy.

2. It is the first battle which the Iraqi army itself, with all its forces, categories and individuals planned and conducted. The Iraqi army relied directly on the profound support of the people with regard to material and moral capabilities based on the general and comprehensive conscription of the state's capabilities. The other battles that the Iraqi army had fought for the Palestinian cause were battles in which Iraq's army had fought with other armies, and these armies had planned and conducted these battles. The Iraqi army had not participated in those battles with its full forces and formations.

3. The battle of Saddam's Qadisiyah has been the longest battle, not only in the history of the Iraqi army, but also in the history of all modern Arab armies. It has been the longest regular war between two countries since World War II.

Because of these characteristics, evaluating the annals of the battle is a full-fledged task, just as the lessons derived from the battle have been full-fledged lessons.

Iraq's armed forces have been fighting a grinding war for over 2 years. They have been fighting against a state whose territory and population are three times the territory and population of Iraq. Iraq's armed forces have been fighting against an army that until 1978 was considered the fifth or the sixth in the world.

Iran's armed forces were not weak when the legions of our armed forces advanced on them on the 7th, 11th and 22nd of September 1980, as some circles tried to show.

The army which the Shah had built over many years and for which he had spent scores of billions of dollars and employed U.S., Zionist and other western expertise, had only lost part of its power and its competence when the war began in September 1980. This loss had been brought about by the fact that Iranian authorities had executed some of the army's generals and officers up to a certain rank. Iran's army most certainly was in possession of all its weapons and its ammunition.

When the war began, it was evident that Iran was numerically and technically superior to Iraq in two of the basic three forces in wars. Iran's air force and navy were superior to those of Iraq, but Iraq's armored forces were superior to those of Iran.

During the first months of the battle Iran's air force was consumed in the battle primarily because of the Iranian authority's arrogant and swashbuckling methods. There were other reasons for that which had to do with Iranian conditions. Iran lost its best pilots, and it lost the larger portion of its airplanes. Iraq, however, used its air force in a good military manner and thus fared well in the battle. Iraq retained all the elements of its power, and it did in fact increase its abilities and capabilities. In addition, Iraq gained profound experience in the war. This experience was continuous because Iraq's air force had preserved all its basic manpower, and after the strikes it had carried out against Iran's air force, Iraq's air force became for a long time the master of the spheres of battle.

Iraq's small navy, which is defensive in nature, and the air force of the navy opposed the enemy's navy, which was considered one of the most remarkable in the world. This was done with a spirit of courage and dauntlessness. Iraq's navy inflicted heavy damages on Iran's navy and virtually paralyzed it. The numerical and technical superiority of Iran's navy thus no longer had any serious bearing on the balances of the struggle.

Iraq's armored forces were the gallant knights of the battle on land ever since the first moments an advance on Iran was contemplated. Iraq's tanks broke through Iranian positions like thunderbolts, reaching their set targets in 6 days, between 22 and 28 September 1980.

In the glorious tank battles which took place in the war, and the most prominent of these battles was the first battle of al-Khafajiyah in January 1981, Iraq's tanks showed their overwhelming superiority over the enemy. They destroyed hundreds of Iran's tanks and seized hundreds of those tanks in good condition.

Because of the decisive superiority of this strategic force, particularly after the first al-Khafajiyah battle in January 1981, the Iranian enemy began avoiding direct confrontations between its tanks and our intrepid tanks.¹ What was left of Iran's armored force, which had lost much of its power during the war, was to be found either in rear positions waiting for an opportunity to provide direct support occasionally to the infantry or it was used on the front as the muzzle of a gun.

1. Reference must be made here to the battles of the intrepid tanks in the epic battles of East Basrah which occurred between 13 and 31 July 1982 after this report was prepared and approved by the Congress.

The artillery fared well in the battle. The war had begun with the clear superiority of Iran's artillery, particularly its heavy, long-range artillery, which had been provided to the army of the Shah of Iran by the United States. Iraq, however, had not received from the Soviet Union artillery that was as efficient as that which Iran had: Iraq's artillery did not have the same maneuvering capability as that of Iran, and it fired bombs whose weight and range were not comparable to those fired by Iran's artillery.

But as the battle went on, Iraq's artillery began playing a significant or rather a basic role in many instances. Because of the leaders' active policy of ensuring weapons for our armed forces despite the conditions of the war, the capabilities of Iraq's artillery developed appreciably and it gained clear mastery over the scene of battle. Iraq's artillery used to pound the enemy's positions and to fire shells at those positions daily.

The competence and formations of infantry [divisions] developed as the battle went on. Infantry personnel had made extraordinary efforts to increase their efficiency. Before the war began, this branch of the military had not been as efficient as the armored units and the air force were despite the fact that it was the oldest branch in our fearless army. There were two reasons for this: first, this branch of the military had been preoccupied in an irregular war for a long period of time; infantry personnel had been involved in fighting rebellion and mutiny in north Iraq. The second reason had to do with political conditions. The experience of revolutions and counter revolutions proved that political groups which oppose the government were inclined in most cases to set up their secret cells in the armored force and in the air force. Accordingly, the party had concentrated its basic secret cells and cadres before the Revolution in the armored force and in the air force. After the outbreak of the Revolution, the same considerations were behind the fact that the Revolution focused its attention on the psychological development and preparation of these two forces. Thus the best officers of the party were to be found in the armored force first and in the air force second.

The development that occurred in the infantry during the war strengthened the capabilities of that force. During those long periods during which the war became a war of positions, the infantry played a prominent role. Infantry personnel fought fearlessly, and their sacrifices were notable. The infantry played this role in the battle despite Iran's numerical superiority, with a population that is three times that of Iraq, and despite the ability of Khomeyni's regime to throw large numbers of peasants and young Iranians repeatedly into the battle, compared with our limited capabilities in this regard because of the difference in the number of the population.

The brave forces of the popular army contributed significantly to the task of meeting the need which the armed forces had for the infantry to hold positions that the army had to occupy to safeguard those positions from enemy attacks.

For the first time in the history of the Iraqi army and in the history of Arab armies and armies of the region helicopters played an effective role in the war. A special day, the 27th of October 1980, has been designated helicopter day to proclaim the beginning of the distinguished role played by helicopters. Iraqi helicopters efficiently and courageously destroyed many of the enemy's positions and machinery and tanks, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. Helicopters continued to play a significant role in the battle.

Reference must be made here to the fact that the modern capabilities that were provided by the state for use in the war were among the most important factors of victory. This emphasizes the difference between [a situation] in which armies go to war while the people stand by and watch, remaining psychologically, politically and militarily detached from the battle and [a situation] in which armies go into battle with the full participation of the people. The battle of Saddam's Qadisiyah also established the error of the theory which states that it is possible to build an advanced and capable army in a backward state.

State agencies underwent earnest development, and morale in those agencies after July 1979 proved to be far-reaching and expansive on a broad scale. This expansive and far-reaching development in state institutions was a necessary prelude to victory in the war.

The corps of engineers established its efficiency and its boldness in the battle. The corps was successful in its first experience of building bridges over rivers in Arabistan. The corps of engineers also fulfilled its duties in ensuring fortification requirements, planting mines, detonating mines, providing the requirements for rapid and efficient maintenance and carrying out other such tasks with which it has been charged.

Administrative agencies carried out their duties satisfactorily despite the large numbers of fighters who took part in the battle and despite the fact that the front was deep and extending hundreds of kilometers. This battle was distinguished by the fact that all the requirements of soldiers and officers were ensured at all times, even at forward positions. This accomplishment was extremely valuable in providing material requirements for fighters. It was one of the aspects of the categorical development in Iraq's armed forces and in the new society that the Revolution built.

Military health agencies offered fighters good services. At the forward positions of the battle military physicians and nurses would be found administering first aid to the wounded and transporting them to rear positions.

The efficiency of military medical agencies is a basic component in a war. In addition to the tremendous energies they provide in saving the lives of the wounded, treating them and getting them ready and fit again to resume combat, their efficiency raises the morale of fighters and increases their confidence in their army and their leaders. In addition, military medical agencies reduce losses in life, which is dear to us.

The heroic deeds scored by the Iraqi army in this glorious battle are greater than records could show. We will need a long period of time and a variety of means to depict some of them.

Courage ran extraordinarily high. In many of the battles one of the most difficult tasks was that of identifying a certain number of officers and soldiers to honor them as the bravest fighters. On numerous occasions commanders would say that everyone had been brave, and they would all be telling the truth.

A high percentage of officers and commissioned officers and soldiers would refuse to be evacuated from the scene of a battle when they were wounded and moved to rear positions. They would insist on receiving the treatment that was available

on the front lines so they would be able to resume fighting. In many instances they had to be evacuated under stern military orders to protect their health and their lives.

A high percentage of soldiers would refuse to go on leave. Even when they would go on leave, they would cut their leave short and rush back to the battlefield when battles were actually going on.

One of the most difficult matters in the history of the entire battle was the withdrawal of Iraqi military units from positions they held, even when that was required by the exigencies of military security.

Commanders and commanding officers would refuse to retreat from their positions or move to the right or to the left regardless of the strong pressure that the enemy would place on them. In many instances the leader, Saddam Husayn would intervene personally to persuade commanders to change and adjust their positions so as to strengthen these positions at better locations even if that were done by retreating a short distance or by moving to the right or to the left to land that was more suitable for defense purposes.

The best description of the courage of fighters can be found in those words that were spoken by the leader Saddam Husayn about his soldiers. President Saddam Husayn described the courage of Iraqi soldiers in speeches he delivered on numerous occasions in [the course of] the battle.

In his address on 28 September 1980 the leader, Saddam Husayn said, "Our brave men, the members of our armed forces put up a courageous and a splendid fight. With their ability and efficiency they proved themselves worthy of the honor of bearing arms and carrying the banner of victory. They should be proud enough of the fact that the Zionist enemy was not able to hide the fears and anxieties which their strength and their ability generated. The Zionist enemy began declaiming his warnings and his fears and then declared that he would help save the Mazdaic Persian enemy from the defeat that he suffered. Despite the Zionist enemy's spiteful conduct and his attempts to take advantage of the situation, [our] dear strong Iraq and its brave army achieved a splendid victory. God willing, Iraq and its army will achieve a decisive victory.

"This, brothers, is a major honor for the army of Iraq, the army that we prepared and are preparing with the help of God to liberate Palestine. Those who were fighting in Zayn al-Qaws, in Sayf Sa'd, in al-Mahmarah and in Ahvaz were paving the way to Jerusalem, to Ramallah, to Hebron and to Java.

"May God grant you success, fellow Muslims and fellow fighters. May God grant you success, brave officers and soldiers, and bless your abilities. May God have mercy on all those who lost their lives in the battle of honor and dignity. As God said in His cherished Book, 'They are alive and well provided for by their Lord' [al-'Imran: 169].

"Our people will remember them with honor and pride. Our people will turn their glowing names into glittering pearls and crowns of laurel. Their chastened blood will bring about a new dawn for the nation, lighting its path to [achieve the] liberation of Palestine and all occupied Arab lands.

"Greetings to the lions of the land and greetings to the eagles of the sky. Greetings to the brave men of the sea. We are grateful to those men, and we are grateful to you, brothers. You have made your country proud, and you have made your nation proud. You have fulfilled the pledge and you have carried out your charge.

"It is certain that the spirits of 'Ali ibn Abu Talib, of al-Faruq, of Sa'd ibn Abu Waqqas and of al-Qa'qa' were with you, protecting you in the battle. It is certain that they felt proud of what their descendants were doing to defend truth and virtue. It is certain that they were blessing your victories and praying God Almighty that He bring you a decisive victory."

In his Great Bairam address on 18 October 1980 [our] compatriot Saddam Husayn said, "You brothers who are fighting and seizing territory in al-Mahmarah one inch at a time and paying dearly in blood for every inch of that land, you are fighting on behalf of past, present and future history. You are fighting so that all Arabs can wake up from their stupor and shake off their degradation. You are telling them to wake up. You are telling them that the time has come for them to wake up. You are telling them, 'Don't you see how Iraqis are progressing? Don't you see how Iraqis are fighting for their rights with their swords and even with their bare hands when their swords become dull?' It is certain, oh brothers in al-Mahmarah, that you are fighting in the manner used by your forefathers, the knights in the early days of Islam and by the valiant fighters of Salah al-Din in Hattayn. It is certain that since the time of these memorable battles, none of the Arabs fought as you are fighting today. Indeed, it is certain that very few men in the world fought or are fighting as you are fighting today. Brothers, this is the highest honor. We are with you at every moment; we are with you in every breath you take and in every attack you launch. What is more important is that God is on your side.

"You men who are in front of Dezful, on the outskirts of that city, what am I to say about you? You were in front of those men who turned the arrogance of the Mazdaic Persian, President Bani Sadr into a mirage and an illusion. Wasn't he the one who promised the Iranian peoples, who have been plagued by him and by the impostor Khomeyni, that he would launch a counter-attack and put an end to the Iraqi attack within 1 week? You men were in front of our comrades in arms who made that week stretch out into [many] gloomy weeks for the band of liars and swindlers in Qom and Tehran.

"Did you not continuously stand up to them and in spite of everything refuse to be lodged from your van defense positions?

"Brothers, you are indeed the valiant fighters of the 20th century. It is certain that those of you who fought, as we know you did, fought with the spirit of Imam 'Ali. You brave men, lurking on the outskirts of Ahvaz and around that city, there were those among you who fought as Khalid ibn al-Walid did. Weren't the units that penetrated Khanqa your units, with swamps and water to their right and sand dunes several meters high and 15 kilometers long to their left? The front was only 300 meters. You penetrated the bases of the ill-reputed TAU missiles, and you penetrated those enemy defenses which are reinforced with all kinds of advanced American weapons.

"Aren't there in your midst those whose units were fighting in al-Mahmarah to fly

the Iraqi flag there at the outset of the fighting while the foremost legions of the army were on the outskirts of Ahvaz? Is it possible to lead a division in the modern age with simple lines of communication and ensure good management and control on a battle front that stretched as far as the distance between al-Mahmarah and Ahvaz? Yes indeed, brothers, you are these brave units. Their leaders come from your midst. You brave officers and soldiers are the brave men who fought with honor and pride in Mahran, in Qasr-e Shirin, in Hawd Sumar, inside the administrative borders of Kaylan, between the Straits of Baytaq and Qasr-e Shirin and in Mahran.

"Your portion of the honor of fighting fearless battles coincides with that of your brothers in arms for the same high honor. We hold you in great esteem. We pray that God give you strength, power and patience. You, brothers, are at all fronts; you are in all formations and divisions. You are the lions of the fearless Iraqi army. You have made us proud, and you have honored us in the world at a time when we are praying God most sincerely that He protect us from our mistakes and honor us in the hereafter.

"You brave eagles of the sky have given a splendid example in the battle. You shattered the enemy's technical superiority in the air. Your airplanes would fly in the skies of Iran and drop bombs on the aggressive Mazdaic Persians. Aren't you the descendants of Sa'd, Khalid and al-Qa'qa'? Aren't they the descendants of losers like Kisra and Rustum? Despite technical difficulties you were able to protect the skies of your homeland. You were able to disturb the sleep of your enemy and the enemy of God. You hit your targets in Tehran, in Kirmanshah, in Tabriz and in other cities deep inside Iran. Your strikes were extremely precise, and your raids were a symbol of courage and rare heroism. Aren't you the heroes of the 22nd of September? You were the ones who taught the arrogant Mazdaics an unforgettable lesson in history. Those arrogant Mazdaics have many bases that are equipped with the most modern American equipment; they are the ones who have hundreds of advanced airplanes. You sailors, descendants of the heroes of Dhat al-Sawari, aren't you proud that your growing navy enabled you to put an end once and for all to the myth of the policeman of the Gulf, that suspect role which the Shah played and Khomeyni wanted to continue playing?

"You chased their navy which is superior to yours in numbers and equipment, and you made it roam throughout the Arabian Gulf looking for a place to hide, fearful of clashing with you. You carried out your duty with courage and precision, and you protected the waters of the nation from Persian arrogance, which drowned in defeat in the deep waters of the Gulf.

"Greetings to the People's Army and to the special agencies that supplied us with information. Greetings to civil defense agencies and to citizens whose energies supported and are supporting their brothers in the battles.

"Do you know, brave fellow officers and soldiers, what Zionists in the United States, in Europe and in their monstrous entity in the usurped territory of Palestine said? Do you know what all those who were infuriated by your decisive victory over your enemies said? They said that Iran's weapons were not as technically effective as your weapons. Let me say, brothers, that their fully-loaded airplanes, as far as their technical specifications are concerned, can reach any part of Iraq because they have a much greater range than that of many of your airplanes and because the area of Iraq is smaller than that of Iran.

"Furthermore, Iranians have more airplanes than you do. If their airplanes wanted to bomb Baghdad, all they would have to do would be to fly a distance of 120 kilometers. Your airplanes, however, would have to fly 800 kilometers if they wanted to bomb their targets in Tehran. Iranian guns have a bigger range than Iraqi guns, and can fire heavier and more shells than your guns. Their tanks are the most advanced western tanks, and their navy is larger than your navy, with a range that is bigger than that of your navy.

"The same circles that wanted to mar and detract from your victories are the ones who were saying that Iran has a long reach. They are the ones who spoke of Iran's alleged technical superiority in the air force and in the navy and said that all their officers and many of their soldiers were trained by the best experienced trainers the Americans and their allies have.

"Yes, this is their force which you smashed in the skies of Baghdad and of other Iraqi cities with the will of brave eagles of the sky and with the rockets and defense missiles of our capable air defense. You also destroyed or captured fair and square their force on the battlefield. The long arm of the Iranian navy accepted a serious challenge from our navy only twice. In both times Iran's navy was defeated, dragging itself in shame in front of your brave navy after suffering grievous losses."

Saddam Husayn then said, "You may wonder, weren't there in this crowd valiant fighters who were shaken up or who became weak in [the course of] the battle? I tell you yes there were, but they were a minority, and history will record their failure, which will discredit their people. History will record for the heroic fighters [accounts of the war] which will make them and their children and grandchildren after them proud. Brothers, when they visit you during their leave or when the war ends with a decisive victory, God willing, you will find that the glorious, proud heroes will relate to you stories of heroism and honor and you will see in the gleam of their eyes the heroic deeds they are proud of and the truth of what they are saying. Such people make up the vast majority of our fearless army and of our people. You will find a small number of men whose eyes will not be gleaming with glory and pride. Brothers, this is the thin line, but it is a difficult line that separates a person who is a hero and a fearless and proud fighter from a person who does not have any of these qualities.

"We are certain, however, that with God's help this victory will crown the victorious course of Great Iraq and of all the citizens of the illustrious Arab nation."

In the address he delivered on 6 January 1981, on the anniversary of establishing the Iraqi army Saddam Husayn said, "The battle that our fearless army is fighting today in the eastern part of the Arab homeland is a splendid expression of this profound feeling which was realized between the country, the people, the party, the army and the leaders. Today the army is fighting not only as a military institution, carrying out orders issued to it in the context of military discipline laws, but it is also fighting as men who hold in their hearts and their hands the spirit of the homeland, the spirit of the people and the spirit of principles. The army is fighting as though each officer and soldier in the army were all of Iraq; the army is fighting as though all Iraqis and all the principles of the Revolution were fighting. The army is fighting as though each officer and soldier in it were Khalid, Sa'd, al-Muthanna, Tariq, al-Qa'qa' and Salah al-Din.

"Fourteen months of fearless fighting have confirmed the truth about this great army. Our army has confirmed the fact that it is a brave army and that it is indeed a capable army.

"Leaders, officers and soldiers went to the battlefield with one grand objective: to prove that the Arab nation is a vital nation and a capable nation that does not accept aggression, humiliation and extortion. They proved with their valor, their competence and their dear sacrifices that Arab land is no longer fair game for anyone who wants to attack it and usurp parts of it. They proved that Iraq is a strong unit that no one can harm regardless that Iraq is a strong unit that no one can harm regardless of the means and pretexts he uses to deceive and misguide. They proved that when Iraqi territory, Iraqi honor and Iraqi integrity are threatened, Iraqis turn into a steely weapon with an impliable will in the face of a usurping aggressor whoever he might be.

"All the enemies of the Arab nation--colonialists, Zionists and racist Persians--have always tried to move battles inside the Arab homeland. For the first time in contemporary history our fearless army was able to move a battle to the land of the aggressors. Our army did this after hundreds of years of our nation enduring past defeats and broken spirits. Our fearless army was able to assure the whole world with considerable competence that the army of Iraq today [is dedicated to] the service of the Arab nation: it defends the Arab nation's territory and dignity just as it defends the territory and dignity of Iraq.

"In battles for liberation that our Arab ancestors fought, leaders used to fight at the head of the ranks. This was a great advantage which distinguished the Arab army, the army of Islam.

"During the ages of decline and deterioration this illustrious picture disappeared, and enemies began to treat us with condescension, boasting that their officers and leaders would fight in van positions. This is what Zionists bragged about in their repeated attacks on our nation.

"Today, the sun is shining again on the land of the Tigris and Euphrates, the land of the first Qadisiyah. When war broke out in the second Qadisiyah in defense of principles, sovereignty and dignity, leaders and commanders among Iraq's fearless officers were heading the ranks, [fighting] side by side with their brave soldiers. You extraordinary men have thus regained the combat practices of your great ancestors, and you proved that the Arab nation has risen and reclaimed its great historical characteristics."

Then, addressing the men of the armed forces, Saddam Husayn said, "Greetings to you on your glorious day! Greetings to you from all the citizens of Iraq, from Baghdad, Basrah, Karbala', al-Sulaymaniyah, Nineveh, al-Muthanna, al-Najaf, Irbil, al-Anbar, Dhi Qar, al-Ta'mim, al-Qadisiyah, Maysan, Diyala, Salah al-Din, Wasit, Dahuk and Babylon. Greetings to you from the old people, the children, the youth and the men and women of Iraq. You are truly dutiful citizens of Iraq, the symbol of the country's pride and dignity, its glory and its progress. You are shaping the present [for our country], and you are blazing the trails for the radiant future. Your sacrifices will be remembered by the people and by the nation.

"And you dutiful martyrs, an affectionate and a respectful greeting to you, our

more illustrious people. You set a great example in self-sacrifice. You were the best descendants of those great ancestors who carried the banner of Islam and spread truth and justice throughout the world.

"You have been laid to rest with clear consciences. At the time of your death you attained the height of glory which legions of our victorious army and our great people reached. But you rose above all of us in honor, and you outpaced those of us who are living in attaining that high honor. You became the prime, proud mark of honor in the standard of victory. You stood out as a shining example in history at present and in the future. You have been an undistinguished flame in the conscience of the people and the Arab nation, and you will be that flame for present and future generations as well. You have been a symbol for us just as you have been the most generous among us. You have been even more generous than those who always set themselves up as candidates to die for their principles.

"We pledge to you as we pledge to our great people that we will continue to fight in the quest for truth and principles. We will not waver and we will not weary. With God's help we will look after your families just as the best of you looked after their families in life.

"Men, the great dignity you hold in life lies in the fact that many of Iraq's men who consider themselves candidates for martyrdom envy your high position. Your women, your children and all your relatives offer you more love, appreciation and honor than even the women, children and relatives of brave Iraqis who are setting themselves today on a course of martyrdom. Greetings to you from us, and from all the people of Iraq we offer the most sincere prayers with every sunrise and every sunset. You should be proud of this honor in addition to the honor bestowed upon you by God Almighty Who said, 'You must not think that those who were slain in the cause of Allah are dead. They are alive, and well provided for by their Lord' (al-'Imran: 169]. God Almighty spoke the truth.

"Men, in the eyes of your Lord and in the hearts of the people of Iraq you are alive. You heroes, your names will be a sign of your country's greatness; your names will be a beacon that will light the people's way on the road to construction, pride and honor."

The Style of Conducting a Battle

The battle of Saddam's Qadisiyah is considered a truly integrated battle. It is a political, military, intellectual, psychological, economic, media and diplomatic battle. It is a battle that has all the ingredients of war.

For more than 2 years all the sequences of the battle were proceeding regularly, each sequence complementing the other and supporting it with power, optimism and the requirements for success and victory. This went on despite the difficulty of the battle; despite the vicious, hostile positions of some Arab parties; and despite international attempts to blockade Iraq and conspire against it.

Chief among the factors that provided the battle with this high level of success was the extraordinary style used by the leader, Saddam Husayn in conducting the battle.

From the very first moments the leader, Saddam Husayn was the one steering the

course of all the basic parts and grounds of the war. Beside him were his colleagues in the General Command, and chief among them was the minister of defense.

During the battle of Saddam's Qadisiyah the General Command of the armed forces was not only a military staff organization, but it was also an integrated leadership organization headed by the leader, Saddam Husayn. Military plans were made and discussed at the General Command, and the requirements for those plans were ensured. Political conditions were reviewed and discussed and political, military, economic and media decisions that had to do with the battle were made. All members of the command and officials in the state who had anything to do with these matters took part in these discussions and decisions. After each battle, a full analysis of that battle was conducted, and lessons would be drawn. These lessons were then made generally available to the military commands and units so they can be used advantageously.

The activities of the General Command were democratic and firm. The leader, Saddam Husayn gave all officers of the General Command ample opportunity to express their opinions and make observations and recommendations. Leaders who had something to do with these matters would be summoned from the field to take part in [the process of] drawing up plans and discussing conditions pertaining to their divisions and their fronts. In some cases even the commanders of formations in van positions were included [in these discussions].

Officers and experts of the General Command used to go to the battlefield to find out firsthand what conditions were: they would then discuss these conditions with the commanders in question. Plans drawn up by the command, therefore, were not theoretical; they were rather closely related to the reality of the battle and to the needs and vital assessments of fighters. The battle of Saddam's Qadisiyah is one of the most illustrious military battles where total harmony was achieved between the political leadership and the military leadership and between these two leaderships, which are led by one commander, and all the leaderships of the army and its formations.

In spirit and procedures the battle of Saddam's Qadisiyah resembles the glorious battles of the Arabs that history spoke of with appreciation and admiration.

For the first time in modern Arab history leaders were at the forefront [of the battle], not lurking in rear positions.

The leader Saddam Husayn set a splendid example of leadership in this battle.

In addition to his basic duties in the General Command of the Armed Forces, in the party and in the state, the leader, Saddam Husayn was involved in most of the significant battles. He conducted these battles himself: he was the one who made, amended or changed plans; and he was the one who communicated with fighters in the front lines. Saddam Husayn would not leave the site of a battle until victory was decided.

The minister of defense, the chief of the general staff and the officers of the General Command would accompany their leader on such visits to the battlefield, or they would go there under his direction and conduct the battles from forward positions.

Most commanders of large military units, divisions and brigades would follow the course of their leader in combat. In most battles and significant clashes they would be found in forward positions in accordance with the nature of [their] responsibilities.

In none of the battles of Saddam's Qadisiyah were officers not to be found in the rear while soldiers fought in the van, as is the case according to the standards and principles of organizing and leading formations in wars. Instead, officers were with their soldiers on the van lines. The battle scored a record for the highest percentage of casualties among officers in relation to the number of casualties among soldiers and in relation to all wars, beginning with World War I.

This spirit constitutes a high honor bestowed upon the army of Iraq, which truly drew its inspiration from the spirits of the great ancestors.

The leader Saddam Husayn followed an objective and a daring procedure in selecting leaders. Those leaders who did not prove they had the required competence or ability to shoulder their responsibilities, or those whose lack of courage was revealed by battles were removed from their positions. In some cases they were severely punished, and they were replaced by qualified leaders who had established their abilities in the throes of combat.

The leader took pains during the course of the battle to honor the fighters according to their deserts and to do so in a way that would make them feel they were being held in esteem by the leaders and by the people. In itself the act of honoring a fighter or the manner in which this was done was one of the most notable methods used to uplift morale and set an example that the leader and the army could follow.

This method strengthened the capabilities of the army and developed leadership competence in the army. There is no better climate than that of a battle for applying the principle of the right man in the right place. This method also gave fighters additional motivation.

The leader, Saddam Husayn would personally see to it that the requirements of the fighting forces were ensured. The blockade which was intended to impede our ability to achieve victory and to influence our political decision and our free will failed abysmally.

During the course of the war we were able to ensure all the weapons, munitions, spare parts and other requirements for the armed forces. Extremely bold decisions were made in this regard, and large sums of money were earmarked for that purpose.

After more than 2 years of combat Iraq's army today has more and better weapons, munitions and equipment than it had before the war. This is considered a great and unique achievement. Wars usually consume the military capabilities of armies, and they cause those armies, particularly those whose weapons and furnishings do not depend on their own industry, to suffer considerable losses in equipment.

This accomplishment is not only an expression of Iraq's international standing and capabilities and the soundness of its financial position, but it is also the product of the splendid and capable manner in which the battle and all its requirements were managed.

The leader Saddam Husayn managed the political battle with the same standard of management he used in the military battle.

All blatant or secret attempts made by Iran and other circles to undermine Iraq's political position failed despite the hostile positions assumed by some Arab regimes and numerous circles on the international scene. These attempts to undermine Iraq's political position failed despite the material reality which was brought to life by the battle--the presence of Iraqi armed forces for a long period of time on significant parts of Iranian territory--and despite questions about who began the war--and this is a matter around which hostile Arab and international parties are still creating much confusion.

[Our] compatriot Saddam Husayn attended the Arab Summit Conference in Amman; this was the first action he took outside the country after the war. His presence aroused the admiration of friends and the consternation of enemies. Saddam Husayn played a prominent part in the conference, and his presence had an appreciable effect on bringing about a relative change in our favor in the position of some Arab parties.

The fact that he attended the Islamic Summit Conference in al-Ta'if had strong repercussions. There, he delivered an address that covered everything and was corroborated by historical facts and established incidents.

This fact strengthened Iraq's international position and increased the isolation of Khomeyni's regime.

President Saddam Husayn also managed the political activities which have to do with the mediation efforts that were made by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, by the Islamic Conference and by the UN Secretary General's representative with a great deal of sophistication based on high principles. This strengthened our political position and weakened to a large degree the position of the Iranian regime.

All our Arab and international relations with Third World countries or with countries of western Europe were conducted with the same level of sophistication. Iraq thus preserved the standard of its relations with these countries, and it developed its relations with many countries. This had a significant impact on efforts that were made to provide part of the military and economic requirements for the battle. Besides, it had a significant political impact [on Iraq's international relations] at a time when the Iranian regime was floundering in its international relations and falling into deep isolation.

According to the course he had mapped out for all previous battles and confrontations, the leader Saddam Husayn would design political and military plans and consider what was required [for a battle] according to a theory of expecting the worst. Therefore, leaders were not taken by surprise when strategic matters pertaining to military service in any area of the battle were jeopardized by major events that had not been taken into consideration and account. In relation to the standard set by the worst possibilities and the requirements that were originally made available for that standard, the results were always favorable.

Popular Support For War

Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 31 Jan 83 pp 6-11

[Text] Chapter Five: Saddam's Qadisiyah

Part Two

The People's Army

The People's Army has been one of the party's and the Revolution's distinguished experiences.

The experience of setting up militias is one of the most complex in the world, particularly if the militias are being set up [to serve] alongside an old and a large army, as is the case in Iraq.

We all remember the shameful experience the communists had in Iraq when they established the Popular Resistance after the revolution of 14 July 1958. This Popular Resistance consisted of gangs that were out of control. These gangs, which practiced terror, corruption and extortion, were made up of society's losers. People hated them, and the national armed forces resisted them.

We also remember the bitter experience under which the party toiled in 1963 when it established the National Guard.

This splendid experience which is unique in the history of the Arab Revolutionary Movement failed, and its shortcomings were numerous. Although the reasons for that failure were self-created and had to do with the organization itself, the principal reason for the failure had to do with the sum total of the general conditions which the Revolution experienced. These have already been explained in party documents among which is the political report of the Eighth Regional Congress. Party leaders at that time were primarily responsible for these conditions.

When the 17-30 July 1968 Revolution broke out, what the leaders had in mind was to found a para-military organization made up of party fighters and the masses who support the Revolution. This organization would become an additional arm, helping the party and the Revolution resist domestic conspiracies. The national armed forces would thus be charged with fighting battles to defend the country or uphold national issues.

However, the experience of the National Guard on the one hand and the difficult and complex conditions which surrounded the Revolution in its earliest stages, on the other--and these conditions have been explained in this report and in the political report that was issued by the Eighth Regional Congress--caused leaders to take their time considering this matter before coming up with a new formula for this organization. This formula would be compatible with the Revolution's new conditions, and it would grow with the capabilities of the Revolution and with the leadership position of the party in society and in the state.

Fighters of the Ba'th carried weapons throughout many of the stages of the

people's struggle. In more than one stage of the party's struggle followers of the Ba'th would receive training in the use of weapons, and they would then use those weapons in their struggles.

After the outbreak of the 17-30 July Revolution the party resumed this practice. Then training camps for people were opened, especially to help the Palestinian Resistance with volunteers.

However, the official legislative decree establishing the Regular and Technical Organization of the People's Army, which is the name leaders chose for this new organization, came in 1970. The creation of that army began on 8 February 1970, that is, on the anniversary of the 8 February Revolution. [The choice of that date] showed an appreciation for that everlasting memory in the history of the party's struggle and of the national struggle. It also showed that the experience of the National Guard was being resumed, and that it was being surrounded by all the ingredients for success in the new revolutionary phase.

This experience was sponsored by the leaders, chief among whom was [our] compatriot Saddam Husayn who prepared its bylaws and its [organizational] structure. Saddam Husayn used to keep track of [the People's Army] at that stage from his position. After assuming official responsibility in July 1979 he kept track of the People's Army from his foremost position [as president].

A growing plan was drawn up for building up the People's Army, increasing the number of its members and developing its combat capabilities and administrative requirements.

It is the mandatory duty of all party fighters to join the People's Army. Only members of the party's regional command, because of their position or occupation, and people with special health conditions are exempted from this requirement under the narrowest of conditions. In the People's Army one finds workers, peasants, civil servants, general managers, organization presidents and deputy ministers. One also finds supporters, followers and members; and leaders of teams, cells and branches. Penalties imposed on a party member in the People's Army are linked with the penalties of the party and are reflected on that person's standing in the party.

The organizations of the People's Army are linked with the organizations of the party. The permanent secretary of a branch or the official of the principal organization in the governorate is the commander of the People's Army for that governorate. The division commander in a governorate is the party official for the region where the division operates. And so it goes down the line to the smallest combat unit which consists of 15 fighters and would be led by the fighter with the most seniority in the party.

This formula guaranteed that the People's Army would be completely led by the party. It left no opportunity for any overlapping of their functions. The leaders thus avoided one of the basic shortcomings of the National Guard experience in 1963.

With regard to women, the establishment of women's organizations in the People's Army began in 1974 after objective conditions in society and in the makeup of the

People's Army were ready for that development. Whereas joining the People's Army is mandatory for male members of the party, it is voluntary for female members of the party.

The People's Army was built according to a timetable and a progressive plan for admitting party fighters in each governorate or for going into the governorates where a People's Army had not been founded. In 1977 the experience of the People's Army was being put into effect in all the governorates of the country.

Fighters are trained according to specific and serious principles that are based on an annual plan that is drawn up at the beginning of every year at a conference for regional officials of the People's Army in the country. This plan is drawn up according to rules that are set by leaders. Disciplinary principles that are inspired by the rules of discipline in the party and in the military are applied in the People's Army.

Preparations for the People's Army began in the border regions. This was followed by preparations in the border governorates and then in the [other] governorates and major cities in the country.

The People's Army was also to be found in the autonomous region where the same formula and the same spirit were applied in the establishment of its formations. At first, however, the attempt to establish a people's army in the autonomous region encountered obstacles.

The command had drawn up a 5-year plan from 1981 to 1985 whereby the number of people in the People's Army would amount to 500,000 fighters [by 1985].

Although the conditions of our sacred battle created additional burdens and responsibilities for the People's Army, these same conditions provided better psychological conditions for increasing the rate at which people volunteered to serve in that army. It is thus possible that the [target] figure of 500,000 fighters will be reached by the end of 1982.

Until 1978 the formations of the People's Army included only regular party fighters. But after that date citizens who were not members of the party, particularly in the autonomous region, began joining the People's Army voluntarily. Since the sacred battle citizens who are not party members have been joining the People's Army in most of the governorates of the country.

The People's Army took part in the battle against Khomeyni's regime with considerable enthusiasm and on a broad scale.

The formations of the People's Army have fixed positions all along the three northern, central and southern fronts with the Iranian enemy. There are approximately 120,000 fighters there at all times. These fighters are replaced by others according to a certain timetable and according to battle conditions.

In addition to their direct participation on the front alongside their fellow-fighters in the fearless army, fighters in the People's Army are now carrying out broad scale duties in protecting the domestic front. They are guarding party offices and locations of economic, military and strategic importance. Fighters in the People's Army also work with air defense forces inside the country. At the present time they are manning several hundred anti-aircraft guns.

The battle against Khomeyni's regime proved to be a golden opportunity for developing the combat efficiency of the People's Army. A certain percentage of those who are taking part in combat on the front may be considered soldiers carrying out many of the duties in their divisions that are required by the battle. Therefore, the means of training the People's Army were developed, and the means of furnishing that army were also developed to meet the requirements created by the presence of this large number of fighters on the front. Some weapons were also introduced in the arsenal of some divisions so as to improve their capability. For example, the anti-aircraft Haun 82 mllm gun and the 57 mllm gun were introduced in accordance with instructions from [our] compatriot, the country's permanent secretary of state, the general commander of the armed forces.

Although the People's Army is a combat formation which includes primarily fighters from Iraq, it became after Saddam's Qadisiyah an ideal framework where Arabs who wanted to take part in this national battle fulfilled their wishes and volunteered in the People's Army. The number of these people amounted to several thousand.

A number of Arab fighters lost their lives in the battle, and the ethnic character of the battle was thus confirmed by the blood of Arab citizens.

Among the glorious deeds of the People's Army we recall that a number of its fighters had volunteered in 1976 to fight in Lebanon alongside the Palestinian Resistance and the Lebanese National Movement.

The participation of the People's Army in the battle of Saddam's Qadisiyah is quite significant.

This defensive formation is no longer merely a combat formation that defends the party and the Revolution, but it has also become an additional reserve army for the country. It has become the true backup on the battlefield for the fearless army of Iraq.

Nothing is more indicative of the maturity of the Revolution's experience and the closeness between the People's Army and the national armed forces than the fact that today army officers and commissioned officers are the ones who are training the People's Army. They are leading some of its formations with the same enthusiasm and spirit they show when they prepare the formations of the army. Military commanders are also more solicitous of the formations of the People's Army, under the dangerous conditions of the battle, than they are of the formations of the army. This is not because they prefer the formations of the People's Army, but because of the difference between the two armies' combat experience and duration of training. There have been no conflicts whatsoever between the national armed forces and the People's Army. This is what usually happens in all experiences with militias. In fact, we are to be proud of the fact that the relationship between them has been one of mutual respect and coordination.

The fact that fighters in the People's Army are taking part in the battle alongside their brothers, the members of the armed forces, has strengthened their solidarity in a splendid manner. These two organizations have truly become two parts of one army: the People's Army and the army of the party and the Revolution.

Fighters in the People's Army deserve all the appreciation and admiration of their

people, their party and their leaders. They proved themselves to be dutiful citizens of Iraq. They are the fighters who joined the party when it was in power not in order to use their membership and gain by it. They rather joined the party to make contributions to and sacrifices for the party's noble principles and for the objectives of the Arab nation: unity, freedom and socialism.

Mobilization and the People's Participation in the Battle

The people believe in the leadership of the party and the Revolution; they believe in the leadership of the fighter, Saddam Husayn. The people have confidence in the higher patriotism of [their] leaders and in the propriety of their decisions and assessments. This faith and confidence were splendidly reflected during the war. We can say truthfully and objectively that all Iraqis took part in the battle of Saddam's Qadisiyah and that only a few traitors and malicious people did not.

The number of individuals in the armed forces, in the People's Army, in the coast guard and in the police who took part in the battle amounted to hundreds of thousands. In practical terms this meant that each Iraqi family had at least one son in the battle, and many families had more than one son.

When the masses in every city and village in Iraq show their enthusiasm for the battle and rally around the party, the Revolution and the leader, we can then appreciate the real attitude of the people toward the battle.

The brave patriotic attitudes assumed by the relatives, wives, children, mothers, fathers, brothers and sisters of those who died in battle will become splendid chapters in the history of Iraq and the nation. When the leader would visit Iraqis in their homes, they would welcome him with songs and prayers for victory. They would receive [the bodies of] those who died in battle with cries of joy.

The fighter Saddam Husayn wanted to give a moving example of the attitude the public had toward the battle.

He issued a bulletin in which he stated that "There was a need for fighters over 60." Many people were surprised by this bulletin, but there was a response to it.

In a few days more than 30,000 old Iraqi men volunteered. Carrying their old rifles, their turbans and their canes, they clamored in front of the volunteering centers demanding to go to the front and take part in the battle.

The attitude of the old men was a splendid expression of the attitude of all Iraqis.

If this was the attitude of old men toward a battle waged by a young revolution and young leaders, we can then imagine how much enthusiasm young people, men and women have for the battle. The prevailing song among young people, students and even young students was "Wadduna lil Jabhah Niharib" [Get us to the front and we will fight]. This [broad popular enthusiasm] was confirmed when the party began recruiting volunteers on a broad scale. Large numbers of citizens volunteered: they were from different age groups, and they all expressed their profound wish and strong determination to participate in the battle.

The battle with the Iranian enemy has strengthened national unity in Iraq and made it as strong as steel.

Khomeyni, colonialists, Zionists and malicious people had counted on the fact that religious, sectarian and ethnic chauvinism and dissension would be stirred up during the battle. But they lost their bets, and Iraqi citizens of all sects, religions and ethnic groups fought as one man; they defended their country, their honor, their integrity and their legitimate interests.

We can say quite confidently that this is the first time in many centuries that Iraqi patriotism has been expressed with such forcefulness, universality and depth. It is the first time that Iraqi patriotism has turned into a formidable weapon striking terror in the hearts of enemies and realizing miracles in all the military and civilian areas of the battle. This patriotism is accompanied by efforts to continue building the foundations and the financial base of socialism, and it is accompanied by the splendid victories on the battlefronts.

Despite the suspect positions of some Arab regimes and their blatant complicity with Khomeyni's regime, the Iraqi character of Iraqis did not emerge as a national or regional phenomenon. It served rather as a basic brace for the national bond. This was achieved thanks to the national education provided by the party and thanks to the depth of national feelings Iraqis have.

The battle refined all the positive and radiant characteristics of Iraqis, and it worked effectively to eliminate and overcome shortcomings.

Iraqis exercised extreme patience in enduring the consequences of the war. They also put their intelligence and their capabilities for planning and completing [projects] to good use.

The splendid participation of the people in the battle was evident in the great achievements of workers, technicians, engineers and civilian drivers. They built roads at the front; they built dams; and they conquered nature. They defied death in the actions they took as military fighters under enemy fire and during enemy air raids.

The leader spoke about those men on 2 May 1981. He said, "We came to your organization in particular because it is one of the distinguished organizations. Its presence on the battlefield was distinguished among many and perhaps all Iraqi organizations. It is certain that had we charged other Iraqi organizations [with the tasks you carried out], they too would have done the same thing. But it is certain that the magnitude of your presence and the magnitude of your civilian influence in helping your fearless Iraqi army was a distinguished experience not only in Iraq but also throughout the world in general.

There were casualties and wounded in your midst. They used to build and pave roads to make combat and the management of your fearless army easier. The magnitude of cement operations, as the president of the organization mentioned, amounted to 37 million cubic meters. He was the first one in your midst in his activities, his sincerity and his efforts. The lengths of the roads that were built and paved by your organization at operation sites to make the function of managing the army easier amounted to 2,400 kilometers in 7 months. This was a major effort; the length of those roads exceeded the length of Iraqi roads that were paved before the Revolution."

The Iraqi economy proved itself in the battle to be strong and solid. A state of war is one which inevitably leads to economic hard times. However, despite the fact that our oil production was suspended for several months and was then later resumed at a lower rate, the economy, whose foundations were built by the Revolution, continued to be strong and to flourish. People retained their standard of living; in fact, the people's standard of living continued to rise. Because of the sound economic policy outlined by President Saddam Husayn in 1979-1980, in 1981 and in 1982 all the necessities of life were available to citizens at a standard that was better than that of the pre-war period. Thanks to good financial capabilities significant decisions were made to honor the families of those who lost their lives in the battle. [This gesture] stemmed from the highest appreciation we have for those who lost their lives in battle. Generosity was to be observed in ensuring the financial requirements of those families, and the handicapped were to be provided with excellent care. Decisions were also made to raise the standard of living for fighters and to offer bonuses to those who demonstrate outstanding courage and competence.

Development projects were suspended for only a few weeks after the war. With the exception of a few projects located near the front, work was resumed on those projects with enthusiasm and vigor. All development projects are progressing now in a normal fashion.

This accomplishment had wide-ranging repercussions in all international circles where it was commended and considered tangible and significant evidence of the fact that conditions in Iraq were solid. This helped strengthen Iraq's international standing.

However, in the aftermath of the decision that was made by the client regime in Damascus banning the export of Iraqi oil through Syria, we find ourselves being called upon to be extremely wary of the conspiracy which is intended to create an economic embargo and an economic war against us at the same time that Khomeyni's regime remains determined to continue the war.

The decision of the Syrian regime is part of a major conspiracy that is targeting the Revolution and the entire country. Therefore, leaders have taken precautionary measures to face this new situation. The scrupulous, effective and sincere application of these measures will foil the conspiracy and ensure the appropriate requirements for continuing the battle until it is crowned with [our] victory. The national foundations of our economy would remain sound, and the basic components of citizens' standards of living would be preserved.

Party activists must give this matter special emphasis during the coming period. They are to set for the people an example and a model of implementing leaders' decisions and of strengthening the country's economic resistance to the conspiracy which has targeted it.

Activities in all areas continued: in health, education, in the eradication of illiteracy, in public services and in culture. These activities, acquiring from the battle the positive ingredients of strength and maturity, were carried out according to the developed programs that had been laid out for them.

The various accomplishments that artists, poets, writers and media men realized in their respective fields in the course of the battle were splendid.

Artists sang wonderful songs [about] the battle. Today, these songs are sung by all Iraqis on every occasion of their lives. They sing these songs at weddings and at other happy personal occasions.

Poets and authors of popular verse wrote splendid poems depicting scenes of the fearless battle. These poems inspired the public with enthusiasm and expressed affection and admiration for the leader.

The media were active inside the country and abroad, clarifying the dimensions of the battle and responding to the enemies' biased propaganda. [Our] media exposed the enemy's propaganda and used argument, persuasion and information to strengthen [Iraq's] political position.

Journalists, photographers and producers would accompany fighters to the front lines of action. They provided splendid copy about the fighters and pictures of them. A number of them fell beside their fellow fighters, and some of those brave men lost their lives. Others were wounded, and their wounds became the decorations they wore [for their courage].

Despite the fact that hundreds of thousands from the reserves and from the People's Army took part in the fighting on the front--peasants, workers, civil servants and craftsmen--the state's machinery and production did not stop. In fact, operations in state agencies were better than they were before the war. There was no drop in agricultural and industrial production despite the manpower shortage that was due to the fact that large numbers of people had joined the armed forces or the People's Army. Factories and production organizations continued to operate at regular capacity and sometimes at higher than regular capacity. Workers were engaged in many national initiatives: they increased production, maintained equipment or provided reserve tools. Workers thus made a contribution to this battle by using their brawn and their brain on the battlefield and in the fields of production.

The battle has created new life for the people of Iraq. Iraqis have been reborn. Born again Iraqis are patriotic, strong and creative. Iraq has truly become an invincible power and a vital land of creativity and luminous energy.

The Political Battle

Managing a political struggle is a process that complements that of managing a military struggle. It is an essential condition for victory in a battle. If military success is accompanied by political failure, that situation could have grave consequences that may divest a military victory of its positive outcome.

Ever since the battle began leaders have therefore been careful about carrying out political activity on a broad scale. The objectives of such activity may be summarized as follows:

1. To explain the reasons for the war and to bring to light Iran's transgressions and attacks which led to the war. Iraq's earnest and sincere attempts to avoid escalation of the struggle and avoid war are to be made evident, and its legitimate demands and constant position on ending the war and reaching a peaceful, just and honorable settlement are to be explained.

2. To win international sympathy and support.
3. To foil any attempt to intensify the political blockade on Iraq.
4. To maintain and develop in all possible areas the good international relations which Iraq had before the war.

A short time after the war, international attempts were begun to stop the war and reach a peaceful settlement. To anticipate any resolution coming from the UN Security Council or from any UN organization calling for an end to the war--such a resolution would make Iraq, if it accepted it, appear to have yielded to [UN pressure]--[our] compatriot Saddam Husayn delivered a speech of historic importance on 28 September 1980. This speech was made after Iraq's armed forces had carried out all the missions with which they had been charged. It was quite evident that Iraq was poised for a decisive victory. [Our] compatriot Saddam Husayn expressed Iraq's sincere and earnest desire to stop the fighting and reach a peaceful, just and honorable settlement to the dispute on the basis of Iran's recognition of Iraq's legitimate territorial rights, Iran's respect for good neighborly relations and sovereignty and [its pledge] not to interfere in Iraq's domestic affairs and to abandon [its] expansionist policies and ambitions.

On the day the president delivered his address, the Security Council issued a resolution calling on [the parties] to stop fighting and begin negotiations to reach a peaceful settlement. Iraq immediately agreed with the resolution, relying on its own position. Iran, however, rejected it.

There was an important debate in the Security Council between Iraq and Iran. Iraq presented its position on the war and on the peaceful settlement that it was seeking. Its presentation was objective and supported with evidence, proof and documents. The Iranian position, however, was paroxysmal, haughty and lacking in objectivity.

Iraq complied with the efforts of the president of the Islamic Conference at that time, Pakistan's president Muhammad Ziya-ul-Haqq, and it unilaterally agreed to a cease fire provided that the other party also would observe it. But the Iranian side turned down this initiative too.

Iraq also complied with the initiative of Cuba's President Fidel Castro in his capacity as president of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. Castro had charged his minister of foreign affairs with this mission. Iraq explained its position clearly and indicated its full willingness to reach a peaceful settlement according to the forementioned principles.

When the UN secretary general appointed a personal envoy to mediate between Iraq and Iran, Iraq dealt with him on positive and unequivocal bases.

The Third Islamic Conference which was held in al-Ta'if in January 1981 was a very important occasion for political activity which had to do with the battle. Iran boycotted that conference, but the president attended it. He delivered a speech that was well documented with historical evidence that had to do with the struggle, with the aggressive and expansionist conduct of Iran in past administrations and in Khomeyni's administration, with Iraq's serious and sincere

attempts to avoid dispute and war and with Iraq's peaceful initiatives after the war. The president's address was very well received at the conference. Most leaders of Islamic countries made a point of calling upon the president in his quarters and assuring him of their wishes that friendly and cooperative relations with Iraq continue. They assured him that they understood his position on the dispute with Iran. The Iranian regime, however, suffered a major political defeat.

Iraq complied with the resolution of the Islamic Conference that a goodwill committee be formed. This committee was to be made up of a number of heads of Islamic countries, and it was to be chaired by Guinean president Ahmed Secou Toure. The president of the PLO and the secretary general of the Islamic Conference were members of that committee. When this committee started working, Iraq cooperated with it seriously and sincerely, explaining its position to it with objectivity.

When the conference of foreign ministers of non-aligned countries met in New Delhi in February 1981, a four-member committee was formed of [the foreign ministers of] Cuba, India, Zambia and the PLO. This committee was to make efforts to reach a peaceful settlement for the dispute. Iraq dealt with this committee in the same manner it had dealt with the other committee.

The motives behind the activities of all the members of these committees and commissions were not objective. Because some parties in those committees were influenced by the positions of the superpowers, they tried to adjust their activities in accordance with the strategies of these countries.

It may be said that the early activities of these committees were not in Iraq's interests. In fact, the early activities clearly favored Iran; this was not out of affection for Iran, but rather because the superpowers who were behind some of the countries taking part in these committees wanted to undermine Iraq's position. They wanted to make Iran's role easier, improve their image with the regime in Iran and accordingly gain something from that regime.

Despite the sensitivity of the political situation and the fact that many influential international parties were using direct but in most cases underhanded methods to back that position, the leaders were able to foil many attempts [against Iraq] with their sophistication, with the clarity of their positions and with the steadfastness of the principles and foundations they relied upon in their political activities. Iraqi leaders were able to give Iraq's position legal, political and logical significance. Iran's position, however, was shaky, weak and contradictory. Except for the time when Iran called for the withdrawal of Iraqi troops, Iran's position was not appreciated by the international [community] which did not sympathize with it either.

We have to expect conspiracies and political schemes whose goal is to harm our position and deprive Iraq of any significant political victory in the battle. Many important world powers are spending a significant amount of time making tactical plans. Zionists also have a very important direct or indirect role in this. Collectively these forces know that any outstanding and direct political victory realized by Iraq in this battle will inevitably be reflected on the Arab situation in its entirety. It will particularly be reflected on the balances of psychological, material and political powers in the Arab-Zionist struggle.

However, since we have been able to scuttle these schemes and attempts, [our] leaders will have to continue steering the political struggle using the same spirit and method they used when they steered the political battle from the outset. We will fight forcefully and efficiently to get all those rights which we can get under [present] conditions, and we will continue to strengthen our national and international position.

Victory: the Spirit of Victory and Actual Fact

It is certain that Iraq was victorious in its just and glorious battle against the aggression of Khomeyni's regime. Iraq achieved a military victory, a political victory, an intellectual victory and a victory in all other areas.

[Our] compatriot Saddam Husayn affirmed these facts. At an early time he warned about attempts by hostile powers to play down the importance of the great victory realized by Iraq in this battle.

In the address he delivered on 6 January 1981 he said, "Hostile forces are trying everything to play down the grandeur of this historical accomplishment. Despite real or superficial differences and conflicts between numerous international parties and the rulers of Iran, the sole concern of these parties since the battle began has been the attempt to play down the great and glowing significance of this victory. This is because these parties, and primarily international Zionism, know quite well that this great victory sparks the real Arab awakening. They know that ever since the 4th of September 1980 when our army returned the aggression of the Persian enemy against Iraqi territory and cities, a new age in Arab history did begin. It is the age of independence, power, progress and dignity."

Addressing fighters on the front, the president also said, "The historical value of your achievement lies not only in the occupation or liberation of land and in the destruction of the tyrannical enemy's power. The basic historical value of your accomplishments lies in the fact that you initiated a new age of psychological and actual awakening in the history of your nation.

"The enemies of your nation have been trying everything to rob you of the spirit of victory after your victory became an undeniable actual fact. However, you are proving today and you will prove tomorrow, just as you did during the past 4 months, that the spirit of victory will continue to shine on you and be a source of inspiration to you on all battlefields. The spirit of victory will shine throughout Iraq, from the farthest point in the north to the farthest point in the south and from the farthest point in the east to the farthest point in the west. The purity and warmth of that [spiritual] flame will be felt far in Arab land and in the hearts of millions of Arabs who aspire to glory."

Today, more than 2 years after the battle the statements made by the leader Saddam Husayn on 6 January 1981 are confirmed by actual facts.

The party and the Revolution realized a sweeping intellectual victory over the regime of Khomeyni and his followers. Our nationalist and socialist ideology, which is inspired by the spirit of the nation's heritage--at the forefront of which is the message of Islam--and by the requirements and challenges of the modern age, proved in the heat of the battle and in the historical challenge with

the regime of Khomeyni and his followers in Iraq and in other countries that the Revolution is sound, necessary and provides the road to the future.

Meanwhile the Khomeyni craze flourished for only a few months. Then it began floundering in intellectual and practical contradictions. It was eroded by sharp divisions as it approached its inevitable destiny after having spread destruction, devastation and death in Iran without offering any concrete or serious solution to any political, economic, military or social problem.

But Iraq which is led by the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party, the party with the nationalist and socialist ideology, became more unified, more powerful and more prosperous. Iraq really became the foundation of the invincible Arab Revolution and the center from which the Arab Revolutionary Movement will radiate in the future.

As we indicated in previous chapters and as we will indicate in coming chapters of this report, Iraq realized outstanding political victories in the political battle, despite the constant fact that it had penetrated Iranian territory and stayed there for over 20 months. Iran, however, was defeated politically everywhere it had faced us. Today, Iran lives in deep isolation.

Militarily, through a fierce battle that lasted for over 20 months of combat, we were able to maintain our control of significant regions of the enemy's territory so as to ensure the principal objective of our presence there since the beginning of the battle. That purpose is to keep the danger and the evil away from our cities and our people. We were also able to destroy on a very broad scale the enemy's military power. This was the power that the Shah had built with the support of imperialists and Zionists. It was a power that was built to be an invasion, threatening and expansion force to be used against Iraq and the countries of the region. Iran has regressed militarily to a dangerous degree, whereas Iraq, despite the fact that the battle has gone on for a long period of time, has continued to be a formidable military power. This is in addition to its other strengths.

Not only did Iran lose a major portion of its weapons and equipment, but it also lost a large portion of its military formations, particularly in the air force. Iran will need a long time to regain its pre-war levels of power, or the levels of power it had during the Shah's administration. This is happening at a time when Iraq has all the components [of military strength it needs] to move forward towards excellence.

Although it would be premature to calculate the degree of Iraq's military superiority over that of Iran in a specific number of years, it is certain that Iraq is now several years ahead of Iran. If we were to add the difference in quality between the capabilities of the two countries to continue developing their military capabilities, this superiority will continue to grow exponentially as far as Iraq is concerned, and that will increase Iraq's superiority every year.

The rate of superiority that Iraq has over Iran is determined not only by the standards of Iran's military and political defeat in the battle. There is a major factor [contributing to] Iraq's superiority: it is the difference in general conditions in the two countries.

Iraq entered the battle with Iran when it was in a phase of power and political, military and economic maturity. Iraq has also matured in all other areas as well; the Revolution has been in Iraq for 14 years. Political, economic and social organizations have become well-established in Iraq. Today Iraq does not have any political, social or economic problem or crisis that would limit its development and its progress in all fields.

Iran, however, is living today in a grinding domestic battle which has caused progress in all areas to come to a standstill. Human and economic capabilities are being eroded, and bloody political strife is so prevalent that it is almost an all-encompassing and destructive civil war.

Whether this regime stays or goes--and even if the regime that would come were strong and capable, even if it enjoyed the broad support of the Iranian people and even if it had influential international relations, and this possibility is neither certain nor easy to achieve--such a regime will need several years to heal Iran's wounds and to restructure political, military, economic, security and psychological conditions in an acceptable manner.

Iran is facing a long journey of struggle, strife and erosion. Iraq, however, is looking ahead to broad prospects of development and progress.

Our assessments of future prospects stem not only from confidence and enthusiasm, as important as these are, but they are rather based on an objective, balanced analysis that takes into account all the basic factors which affect the balances of the struggle.

The leaders are quite confident that no matter how long the battle, the victory that has been achieved will be sustained, and the factor of superiority will continue to be in our favor. The leaders are very carefully watching every private or international factor that is added to the balances of the existing struggle with the Iranian regime. [Our] leaders are capable of tracking down these factors and taking the political, military or other measures [that would be necessary] to contain their negative effects on the balances of the struggle or to benefit from them in developing the positive elements of the situation.

An example of this was the discovery of military cooperation between the Zionist entity and Khomeyni's regime. It is true that this cooperation furnished Khomeyni's regime with some military equipment which it needed in its war with us. For us, however, this was a "positive" element that led to a major political loss for Khomeyni's regime and a major political gain for us. We can use this political gain--and we have--not only in a political context, but also in ensuring the other requirements of the battle.

Continuation of the War and Future Possibilities

We know quite clearly and precisely the objectives of Khomeyni's regime and of the forces that prodded him, stood behind him and supported him directly and publicly or indirectly and secretly to start the aggression and the war against Iraq.

The first and foremost objective of Khomeyni's regime and of those forces is to

conquer Iraq and divide it into mini-states that would be subordinate to Iran and to international powers. Their objective is to destroy Iraq's progress and everything Iraq had built and realized in the way of accomplishments, gains and a free and happy life.

This objective is not confined to Iraq alone. The Arab nation, particularly the eastern part of the Arab nation, is the target of that objective. What is required is the destruction of the nation and the break up of that nation into subordinate, feuding mini-states.

The primary beneficiary of this evil plan would be the Zionists. After them would come the superpowers and the Iranian regime, which has expansionist goals. During the Shah's days and under Khomeyni's administration the Iranian regime served as the cat's-paw in carrying out these criminal plans.

These forces undoubtedly know that this objective cannot be realized in Iraq as long as the party and the Revolution exist in Iraq, as long as Iraq's leaders and its leader are heading the party and as long as the Revolution, the state and the armed forces [exist and are functioning]. These powers know that the leader and the party are the true brave protectors of Iraq. They do not hammer our deals [about Iraq's sovereignty]; they do not retreat; and they do not fear danger. They accept challenges no matter how formidable, and they make up their minds to face those challenges with a planning mind and a sharp sword.

It was for this that the war began. It was for this that the war continued this long despite all the peaceful initiatives that were made to Iran. A large part of these initiatives favored Iran; however, Khomeyni's regime was determined to carry out this plan to the bitter end. It is for this that the Khomeyni regime, along with Zionist and imperialist circles, has been insisting again and again on focusing the hatred and hostility on the party and the leader.

What the party, chiefly its higher cadres, and the people must know is that this war was inevitable unless we wish--and this will never be--to surrender to the Khomeyni-Zionist-international plan to destroy Iraq. The insistence that the war continue means an insistence that this plot continue. Therefore, although the leaders have made and are making every possible effort to achieve peace and preserve the safety, sovereignty, freedom, dignity and legitimate rights of Iraq, we have to make preparations to resume the fight against this plan no matter how much this costs us. We emphasize, [we will do this] no matter how much it will cost us.

Iraq made major sacrifices in this battle, but the sacrifices we made were much less than the losses the country, the people and the party could have sustained if we had not resisted this evil plot. We are not to be afraid of making sacrifices in the future: there is nothing more precious and more valuable than the sovereignty and honor of one's country and the freedom, security and happiness of the people.

Militarily, we scored a strategic success when we held the enemy at bay for over 20 months and kept him from harming our territory, destroying our cities and threatening the life and security of our people. This was a major achievement in the face of a very grave danger from a state whose population and territory are three times larger than ours. Despite all the weakness and fragmentation that has

befallen it under Khomeyni's administration, Iran's resources are still considerable. On the other hand, Khomeyni's administration gave Iran a temporary shot in the arm. This is because Khomeyni's religious tendency influences Iran's ignorant masses who are swayed by myths and fairy tales.

As the battle took its course, we had to meet every situation with appropriate measures. In the past year we had to withdraw from territories over which the Iraqi army had established control in the first months of the battle. Some of these withdrawals were made voluntarily, and others were made under the pressure of circumstances imposed by the battles between us and the enemy. These withdrawals were made to reduce our losses and ensure better defense and security conditions for our divisions.

As the leader Saddam Husayn declared numerous times and as he emphasized particularly in his well-known letter to the commander of the Fourth Corps on 29 March 1982, "The basic objective of the ongoing battle between us and Khomeyni's regime is not to hold on to land. Since we have affirmed our willingness to return all this territory peacefully, land in itself then is not the objective. The basic objective is to protect the territory, the people, the freedom and the accomplishments of Iraq. Therefore, our presence in Iranian territory is to be measured according to this central objective and not according to anything else. To achieve that central goal, the other basic mission that we have to concentrate on very intensely in this battle is that of destroying the enemy's power by all means and in all divisions because the enemy cannot achieve his evil objectives against Iraq if he loses his power."

In light of this assessment and for the reasons explained by the leader Saddam Husayn in his historic address on 20 June 1982 the leader made a strategic decision to withdraw from Iranian territory. This withdrawal was completed on 29 June 1982.

Saddam Husayn's address is considered a highly significant document. It accurately summarizes all aspects and elements of the annals of the battle we fought with Khomeyni's regime. Therefore, the Ninth Regional Congress, which was convened in the few days that followed the address, considered it one of its basic documents and thought it necessary to add it here to the chapter which has to do with the battle to complete the picture.

In his address to the people on 20 June 1982 the leader said, "I greet you with pride and honor, with dignity and glory. You, the citizens of Iraq, from the farthest point in the north to the farthest point in the south, deserve this greeting. You deserve to have much said about you at the present time and in the future when history records the events of the day and treats men and this great nation with justice.

"With God's help you accomplished something significant; its impact on the present and on the future is tremendous. For the first time in the nation's contemporary history, or rather since the fall of the Arab state several centuries ago, you were able to accomplish something of significance, unique in its kind and tremendous in its impact.

"More than 20 months have gone by since the battle that you fought against evil

and aggression began. Today, you stand proud and capable despite all the sacrifices you made, despite all the conspiracies that the enemies contrived and despite all the losses they wanted to inflict upon you in order to weaken your will and to steal the victory that could be seen in your eyes and felt in your hearts and in your arms.

"Brothers, you fought with courage and with honor. You fought to defend your land, your sovereignty and your families. You fought to defend the present and future of your country, the honor of the nation and the pride of Iraq.

"We've said from the outset that the battle we were forced to choose was a defensive battle. But it is a defensive battle of a new sort. We did not stand with our hands tied behind our backs when faced with aggression. We did not allow the tyrannical enemy to invade our land, destroy our cities and humiliate our people and then cry on the ruins as some rulers like to do when faced with the tyrannical Zionists. These rulers accepted the occupation of their land and the compromising of their dignity. They would cry for help and mouth statements of opposition and resistance. But they would not bite the bullet to liberate their land and regain their dignity. Citizens of Iraq, you did not do that. You bit the bullet. You fought the enemy when the aggression became clear and blatant. This is one of the reasons that provoked the spite of people and the hatred of sick, suspect rulers whose impotence and appeasement were exposed by your heroism.

"We did not start the war. It is the suspect regime of Tehran that initiated the aggression and the war. It is this regime, which was brought into power by suspect forces moving the currents of international politics, that considered Iraq its primary enemy. [This hostile action by the Tehran regime] has no justification that is consistent with that regime's declared slogans. Iraq is a Muslim, liberated and independent country. It is a country that is sincerely and tenaciously working hard against Zionism and colonialism. In these efforts it endured formidable sacrifices. Why is it then that those who proclaim Muslim slogans are being hostile to Iraq? Brothers, it is because [their slogans] are a sham. The rulers of Tehran have borne false witness in proclaiming these slogans. This is what they did to deceive people and implement their evil plot which was prepared in the circles of Zionists and enemies of the nation. They sought to arouse civil strife in the country and to destroy Iraq. They wanted to divide the country into weak mini-states that would be subordinate to Iran, to Zionists and to the enemies of the nation. They wanted to destroy the independence and unity of Iraq, and they wanted to tear down the towering structure we built with our blood and our sweat. We had been building this structure until we made Iraq strong, united, sound, advanced and prosperous. Iraq is now a country whose standing among Arabs and among the human race is high. Khomeyni's suspect regime was well aware of the fact that Iraq is the impregnable barrier that protects the eastern wing of the Arab homeland. If, God forbid, Iran can destroy that barrier, it can then realize its expansionist ambitions of sharing control and influence over the Arabian Gulf, the Arabian Peninsula and all the countries of the east with the Zionists and the foreign forces who have ambitious designs in the area and are lying in wait.

"Khomeyni's people began their provocation of Iraq even before they came to power. They escalated their conspiracies after they took over power. They violated the 1975 Agreement, describing it as suspect, and they initiated sabotage and destructive attempts against Iraq. We were patient for a long time,

and we resorted to wisdom and deliberation. A number of brothers and friends tried to intervene between Iraq and Iran so as to establish normal relations between the two countries, but they failed. The Tehran regime had become arrogant and was insisting on pursuing its aggressive and expansionist course against our country, our people and our nation. We patiently and wisely endured all the aggressive postures of Iran that we could endure without compromising our sovereignty and dignity. But when the rulers of Tehran began making preparations for invading Iraq; when they massed their troops along our borders and in our territory; when they prepared their air force to strike our cities, our vital installations and our air bases; and when they began shelling our border cities on 4 September 1980 from our own territory, we did not sit in silence. It was not possible for us to sit in silence. Instead, we put ourselves in God's hands, and we proceeded to resist the source of aggression and his evil forces out of concern for our country. We believed in the legitimacy of our position, and we relied on our people. We thus faced the military legions of the enemy, which had been gathered on our land and on our borders, in a brave and fearless confrontation. We drove their forces behind the borders so as to protect our territory and our cities.

"Fearless Iraqi troops completed their defense mission in 6 days. They gained control of territory and positions inside Iran that are strategically very important, ensuring thereby the protection of Iraq. A few weeks after the battle began, our forces stopped advancing inside Iranian territory. This was a final political decision that was not made for military reasons. Some people used to say at that time, 'Why don't Iraqis occupy this or the other city or this or the other position?' We would say unequivocally that we are not aiming at occupying the territory and cities of Iran. We are essentially defending our country against the aggression of the rulers of Tehran. The fact that Iraq lacks the geographic depth which would enable it to defend itself from its borders or from its own territory is what made us resort to this method. We are prepared to withdraw from Iranian territory any time when Iran recognizes our borders, our rights, our sovereignty and our right to choose our political and social system. We used to say this from a position of unquestionable military capability. But despite its military defeat Iran's regime persisted in its aggressive positions and its expansionist tendencies. Iran's regime was counting on the war; it was counting on the fact that the protraction of the war would realize its objectives.

"Brothers, we had to fight. We had to face a curious case that is without precedent in [the history of] strife among nations. Here is a state forced to enter the territory of another state to defend itself and saying every day that it is willing to withdraw from this territory unconditionally. The only thing we want is recognition of our sovereignty and our rights. However, the country that was defeated militarily is refusing and resisting [our offer]. It is insisting that the war continue, and it is making threats that affirm its expansionist tendencies and its desire to interfere in the internal affairs of Iraq and of the countries of the region. In all the political talks we've had with agencies that have tried to mediate between us and Iran, the rulers of Tehran rejected the principle of negotiations and the principle of a peaceful settlement. They would say that a solution would have to be found on the battlefields. Many of our brothers who were trying to do good urged us to show some flexibility here or there so as to create a suitable climate in which the other party would be persuaded to end the war. We went along with that. We went along with the appeal made by Pakistan's president in October 1980, and we unilaterally stopped the war

and indicated that we were willing to respond to appeals made by numerous parties and effect a partial withdrawal as an expression of good will. But the Iranian regime rejected all this and insisted that the war continue. So far, no official statement has been made by any Iranian official, particularly by decision makers in Iran, indicating that Iran would recognize the international land and sea borders between it and Iraq.

"The enemy has spoken a great deal about the need to identify and condemn the aggressor. We informed the committees that undertook the mediation efforts between us that we were willing to make that identification. On the 19th of March 1982 in a letter to President Ahmed Sekou Toure we proposed that Iraq wished to have a fact-finding Islamic committee formed to find out who began the aggression and the war. Before that we had informed the office of the president of the Non-Aligned Movement that we were willing to look into that matter and to conduct a sweeping analysis of the agency that began the aggression and the war. Last April 24 in an official letter to the late King Khalid, in his capacity as president of the Islamic Conference, and to President Sekou Toure, in his capacity as chairman of the goodwill committee, we suggested that the Islamic Committee and the Islamic Conference arbitrate the dispute between Iraq and Iran. We indicated that Iraq was willing to accept the results of that arbitration. We submitted a similar proposal to the same effect to the president of the Non-Aligned Movement, President Castro on 25 May 1982. In my address to the National Assembly on 11 April 1982 I announced that Iraq was prepared to withdraw all its troops from Iranian territory unconditionally if we had sufficient guarantees that Iran would not resume its aggression against Iraq. We had discussed these ideas in a positive vein with the Islamic Committee, with the Non-Aligned Committee and with the representative of the UN secretary general. Finally, we informed the Islamic goodwill committee that we were prepared to accept its invitation to go to the holy city of Mecca to look for a peaceful and an honorable settlement to the dispute. But the Iranian regime turned down the invitation of the Islamic Committee as it had turned down before all previous attempts and initiatives. The Iranian regime disregarded all these positions and insisted on continuing the war. The Iranian regime refused to make any commitment that it would recognize the borders between Iran and Iraq and reach a peaceful settlement. It declared conditions that it knew quite well Iraq would not accept. These conditions were shameful: they were incompatible with the rules of sovereignty, international law and international relations; they were an infringement upon Iraq's honor and upon the right of its people to choose their way of life.

"What did this posture mean other than the fact that the Iranian regime was determined to keep the questions of borders and rights pending until it could realize its ambitions in Iraq?

"Iran's posture cannot be explained otherwise. This is the only explanation for Iran's posture, for its refusal, despite the presence of Iraq's troops on its territory, to indicate where Iran's borders and Iraq's borders are. And the matter did not stop here. Senior Iranian officials stated quite clearly that they did not recognize these borders and that they wanted to spread their authority over other Islamic countries. They claimed falsely that they were representing Islam, even though they are as far as anybody can get from the True Religion and from its magnanimous teachings.

"Khomeyni's regime counted on the fact that the continuation of the war would

weaken Iraq and that that, eventually, would enable Iran to cross our borders and realize its expansionist ambitions. What other explanation is there for Iran's determination and its willful refusal to take back Iranian territory in return for a pledge that it would respect Iraq's sovereignty?

"The war which the Tehran regime waged against us has revealed astonishing facts. It was not that we were not able to explain these facts, but these facts did contain curious contradictions. This suspect regime which is founded on deceit and trickery would hurl countless insults against the east and the west. It disdained international laws and conventions, and it behaved in a manner comparable only to that of the Zionist entity in its lack of respect for international relations and disdain for all values and conventions that regulate relations between nations. Respecting the sovereignty of others and not interfering in their affairs are among those values and conventions. However, numerous parties who on the surface appeared to have conflicts among themselves in their political directions and strategic interests and who appeared to have conflicts with the slogans declared by the Tehran regime were flattering that regime, dealing with it and providing it with material, military, political and propaganda assistance.

"The Zionist entity supplied Iran with weapons, equipment, spare parts, experience and information. At the same time the Syrian regime looked the other way as far as this scandal was concerned, and it allied itself with Khomeyni's regime against Iraq. At the time when Khomeyni's regime was getting the weapons and munitions it needed from western sources, the government of North Korea was organizing an air lift that began when war broke out. The purpose of that airlift was to provide this regime which was insulting socialist countries with weapons, munitions and experts. Countries that are in one way or another identified with one of the two opposing camps stood by Iran. At least two Arab regimes stood by Iran with all their military, financial, political and intelligence capabilities and energies. They did that shamelessly, openly and blatantly. This is above and beyond the positions assumed by numerous parties and movements in the region that have thousands of conflicts among themselves. Nevertheless, they agreed on supporting Khomeyni's regime in its aggression and conspiracy against Iraq.

"It is curious that all this time the superpowers continued to watch the bloody dispute between us and Iran. They made no concrete effort to stop the war although they used to and would still apply pressure quickly to settle military disputes in the world which may last only days or weeks. The superpowers did nothing [in this case] despite the sensitivity of the region where the war was being fought and its close association with international interests. Contemporary international life has not seen such a case in which a struggle was allowed to go on for 2 years without any serious attempt to stop it.

"Brave Iraqis, a broad front has been formed against you upon which all the conflicts in Arab and international conditions have converged. But you overturned those odds, and you proved that your faith in your cause and your defense of your country and your nation were [the factors] that weighed the scales in your favor.

"Iran has more territory and more people than Iraq. Iran had outstripped Iraq in many technical fields: in weaponry and military preparedness, in industry and in other fields. Nevertheless, Iraq was able to defeat Khomeyni's regime with the faith of its citizens, the courage of its armed forces and the capabilities

provided for it by the Revolution. Iraq was able to defeat Khomeyni's regime despite that suspect alliance which had gathered behind that regime.

"Illustrious people of Iraq, you should be proud of the fact that you fought under those difficult circumstances. You fought an enemy bigger than you. You fought an evil alliance that included many countries and hostile agencies. You fought against false slogans and false allegations. You continued to fight the enemy for 21 months on his territory. Your undaunted army is still holding four Iranian cities: Qasr-e Shirin, (Sumar), Mahran and (Khisrawi); and it is still holding large areas of land that amount to 4,000 square kilometers. You fought alone. Thanks to some of the brothers who stood by us. However, the fact that they stood by us regarding direct action on the scene of military operations does not contradict the statement that you fought alone. In addition there was a modest number of Arab volunteers whose zeal was such that they would not be dissuaded from taking part in this national, fearless and honorable battle. Meanwhile, Iran's Arab and non-Arab allies stood by it in every way officially and publicly.

"This is the principal reason why Iran was able to regain the land which it did regain by fighting. Had it not been for this broad and evident support, Iran with its own capabilities would not have been able to budge our forces from their positions. This was confirmed throughout the first year of the war when Iran failed and all its attacks on our forces were smashed.

"Brothers, the same parties that formed an alliance against you ever since the war began are trying today to portray the outcome of the battles between us and Iran as a defeat for Iraq and a victory for Iran. These are the parties that are still in an alliance against you. They are the parties that are helping Iran's bankrupt and failing regime stand on its feet, continue the war against you and become a source of terror and fear in the region, despite their conflicts and different interests.

"Those people are altering the facts, spreading false information and promoting false analyses to attain something that is intended to weaken morale in Iraq and in the Arab nation.

"All those people are forgetting the essential facts in the situation. They are forgetting that it was Khomeyni's regime that started the aggression and the provocation of Iraq. They are forgetting that it was Khomeyni's regime that was calling for the occupation of Iraq and for changing the revolutionary regime in Iraq. They are forgetting that Iraq wanted from the outset to establish normal, good neighborly relations with Iran. They are portraying the matter as though it is Iraq that wanted to expand at Iran's expense and that it failed to achieve that. Everyone knows that it is Khomeyni's regime that has been and still is talking about extending its control and influence over Iraq and the countries of the region and that it is Khomeyni's regime that failed in this course and not Iraq. It is Khomeyni's regime that failed for 2 years in its fight on its own territory, and now its magic has vanished. It is Khomeyni's regime that has suffered tremendous losses. Even technical military facts about which experts do not disagree have been turned around. Any Iranian action, no matter how small, was portrayed as a victory, and the importance of Iraq's military achievements was always played down.

"Have we forgotten what they used to say when the war began? They used to say that the Iraqi army entered Iran in the summer and that it would face difficulties in the winter and get bogged down in the muds of Arabistan. But the Iraqi army went on fighting forcefully, courageously and competently for 2 full years: in the summer, in the fall, in winter and in spring.

"In 6 days only Iraq's army was able to reach the farthest point that had been set for it in the 22 September 1980 operation. Iran tried and has been trying for 21 months to regain the territory over which Iraq established its control in these few days. So far, Iran has not been able to regain all this territory.

"In every battle Iran would suffer grievous losses that no other government responsible for its country and concerned about its citizens would tolerate. Iran would force thousands upon thousands of young men, old men and children to their death in the minefields or [in the battlefields] where they were struck down by the bullets of Iraqi defenders. Many of the people who were associated with our units would fight until they would run out of ammunition, and you know the meaning of that in practical terms with regard to the amount of losses that are inflicted on the enemy. Nevertheless, these massacres that were carried out by the rulers of Tehran were portrayed as victories. All nations that fought and all experts who know that war means a strategic, tactical struggle can reach the objective conclusion that it was Iraq that won in this confrontation because it was able to achieve its defense objectives, whereas the Tehran regime suffered a historic, political and military defeat.

"For 21 months Iraq was able to resist the Iranian aggression on its territory and its cities and to shift the battle to the enemy's territory. Although Iran was able to regain important parts of its land, that fact does not change the reality of Iraq's victory if we take into consideration Iran's intentions before and during the war, the ratio of Iraq's population and area to those of Iran and the losses both sides suffered in the war in men, in the economy or in military equipment.

"Those who are promoting these analyses and this false information most certainly know these facts. But they do not want it said that an Arab country like Iraq and an Arab army like the Iraqi army were able to accomplish all this and were able to endure a war that lasted for 21 months under very poor Arab and international conditions such as those which we referred to.

"The emergence of this accomplishment would effect a basic change in Arab morale and in the process of calculating the balance of powers between the Arab nation [on the one hand] and the Zionist enemy and those who have ambitious designs in Arab land [on the other].

"There have been attempts to tell Iraqis and Arabs, 'You were defeated by Khomeyni's regime,' even though the defeated and broken party is that failing and ragged regime which no longer has any ideological or realistic justification to continue to exist in Iran, [especially] after its false nature and its alliance with Zionists have been revealed. Khomeyni's regime has emerged as a backward and impotent regime, a brutal regime that is hated by the Iranian people who are trying to get rid of it. Major countries, in addition to countries of the region, used to tremble in fear of the regime and its demagoguery, its ambitious designs and its objectives.

"The enemies are emphasizing some details of the battle that was fought between us and Iran; [but] they are forgetting the final outcome of these battles. They are emphasizing in particular the men we lost as prisoners, particularly in the battle of al-Shush-Dezful and in the battle of al-Mahmarah. However, these people do not talk about what Iran lost in personnel and equipment in those battles. We know we lost a significant number of men who were taken prisoners in these two battles, but the number of prisoners is not the only factor in the process of evaluating battles. In World War I if there were millions of prisoners, and the two warring parties--the victorious and the defeated--lost tens or hundreds of thousands and sometimes millions of men who were taken prisoners by the other side in the attacks and retreats that occurred in that war. However, a war, any war, is evaluated by its final outcome which is related to the objectives of the warring parties. A war is not to be evaluated according to one part of its components. In the final analysis Iraq was victorious in this war in so far as that war was a strategic struggle. Thank God, Iraq was able to protect its security, its sovereignty and its freedom to choose. It was also able to protect its gains and accomplishments and continue the course of advancement, progress and prosperity in all areas.

"Brothers, this battle was a difficult test of the independence of Iraq and of your strong will for freedom. I have explained to you the danger of the alliance that was formed against us in this battle. This alliance was aimed at the existence of Iraq; it was also aimed at the existence and the future of Arabs. Among its principal objectives, however, is to paralyze the will for freedom and independence in Iraq and to force Iraq to abandon its true and strong independent position and go along with international movements and alliances after it is divided and each part is turned into a submissive state subordinate to foreigners. The Iranian regime which is falsely proclaiming slogans of independence and non-alignment has become bogged down in negotiations and alliances with numerous parties so it can [make itself] stand on its feet and carry out its criminal conspiracies against Iraq and the Arab nation. This suspect regime betrayed all the slogans and principles that it claimed it believed in. This regime betrayed the Palestinian cause, which it had bragged about for a long time, when it allied itself with Zionists. It betrayed the principles of independence and freedom when it negotiated with all international agencies and movements. It betrayed the Non-Aligned Movement and its principles when it assumed hostile and spiteful attitudes to achieve its selfish objectives. Finally, it betrayed the unity of struggle of the OPEC countries, a unity that was built over many years of struggle against monopolies and exploiting countries, when it violated the rules of the market that were set by the organization. Iran sold [its] oil on the black market and made suspect deals that threaten the unity of the organization and its operating methods.

"You, the citizens of Iraq, have continued to be free and independent despite the blockade that many tried to impose on you and despite this alliance in which all conflicts in the Arab homeland, in the region and in the world converged against you. You have continued to control your own wills, and the decisions you make stem from your hearts and your minds. You have continued to uphold the principles and values that you believe in, and you did not deviate from them at all. You preserved the unity of the people and territory of Iraq, and you consolidated the principles of optimism in the future and proud continuity of the glorious past. Iraq is proud of the fact that it is a free and completely independent country. When Iraq talks about the principles and policies of non-alignment, it gives

concrete form to these principles, and it applies these policies truthfully and sincerely. It is this that has earned for us the respect of sincere, honorable people in our nation and in the world. It is this that made people choose Iraq to host the seventh conference for non-aligned countries so we can perform our duty in this movement. Our affiliation with this movement is considered a true manifestation of our independent patriotic and nationalistic position and of our basic interests.

"The conditions of the war did not shake our constant principles and policies. We have been patient; we have endured; and we came out of the test with our principles and our free position intact. This is a major achievement that is not less than our other achievements in this battle. History will show that no country in this world has been able to embark on a vicious, broad-scale and lengthy war as the one which we fought against Iran's aggression, with all the alliances that were behind it, without relinquishing some measure of its freedom and its independent will and without leaning to some extent on one of the international blocs or movements. You, illustrious Iraqis, the descendants of Babylon, Assyria and the great Abbassid state preserved your historical glory. You turned out to be the true descendants of this great nation that gave [the world] great civilizations and lofty values. You continued to be free and independent. You were not intimidated and you were not weakened; nor did you rely on anyone. Brothers, our independent policy does not mean we are to keep to ourselves or to live in isolation: quite the contrary. It is one of the exigencies of our independent policy that we set up the broadest relations with the countries of the world on the basis of patriotic and national interests and on the basis of principles. And this is what we did. We earned the respect and appreciation of friends who continued to cooperate with us in many areas. Also our faith in the principles of non-alignment and independence does not mean that we look for disputes and hostilities which are uncalled for. Quite the contrary, these principles make it incumbent upon us to strengthen and expand our friendships in the world and to avoid provoking hostilities with countries, except those that conspire against us and against our nation, threatening our interests and our security. This policy also requires us to make all possible efforts to neutralize all enemies that can be neutralized provided they are prepared for that on the basis of setting up balanced relations that do not infringe upon our interests and haggle over them and provided they do not threaten our security, our independence and our national struggle.

"The conditions of the battle proved to be a difficult test for us in this thorny area. We thank God that your Revolution with its unyielding principles, its profound experience and its sophistication, sharpened by patriotic and national experience, passed this test.

"Brothers, we had to fight with honor and with courage to defend our land, our people, our dignity and our happy lives.

"The danger that was posed by the suspect regime in Tehran, which is allied with Zionists and with the enemies of the nation, was not only a danger that threatened Iraq from outside, but it was also a danger whose aim was to destroy Iraq, to divide it and to arouse civil strife among its citizens. What was intended for Iraq was not an incomprehensible plan; what has happened and is happening in Lebanon and in other Arab countries is plain for us to see. [Enemies of the nation] created civil strife in Lebanon and turned it into a laboratory from

which they can transport civil strife to the Arab homeland. They knew that the survival of a strong, united, independent and prosperous Iraq would have to be a principal factor in the early demise of this Zionist sedition. Therefore, they sought to conspire against Iraq. They tried this after the Revolution. They tried in the early seventies and until 1975 to use the client al-Barzani to create civil strife in Iraq and to divide that country. Cooperation between Zionist circles and the client, al-Barzani was evident, just as the cooperation which is taking place today between Khomeyni's regime and the Zionist entity is evident. The conspiracy of the client, al-Barzani in Iraq coincided with the civil strife that was incited in Lebanon. However, the awareness of the Revolution, its strong will and its superior ability to contain Zionist and hostile conspiracies and schemes enabled us to kill this conspiracy and preserve the unity, sovereignty and independence of Iraq as well as its ability to advance and to make progress. Then enemies carried out several attempts to contain the Revolution and to tempt it to abandon its patriotic and nationalist independent course. They tried to sabotage the Revolution from within and even from the party. But all their conspiracies and their schemes failed; they were shattered by national unity, by the awareness of Iraqi citizens and by the courage of the fighters of al-Ba'th, the standard bearers of the mission of patriotic and national struggle.

"Finally, international political currents brought Khomeyni to power in Iran, pushing him to realize for them what others had failed to realize. A halo of attributes and false superlatives were spread around Khomeyni who was portrayed as a formidable power capable of changing all conditions in the region and even in the world. Khomeyni was not the only swindler who had appeared in Persia under the guise of religion. Several centuries ago, and particularly after it embraced Islam, this country saw the emergence of many swindlers and tricksters who tried to destroy Islam in the name of protecting it and exercising their independent judgments. They tried to destroy Arab nationalism under a variety of slogans and guises. Arab and Islamic history is full of instances and evidence of that. [Enemies of the Arab nation] brought Khomeyni to power imagining that he can carry out their schemes for them. But the people of Iraq who truly believe in Islam and in the divine religions were aware of this evil process from the very beginning. They prepared themselves for it, and they were not deceived by it even though many were. Numerous countries, parties, movements and individuals joined this wave: some of them did so consciously after coordinating their efforts to achieve suspect objectives, and others did so because of a low level of awareness, an opportunist spirit and a lack of self-confidence.

"We, the people of Iraq, guardians of the eastern gate to the Arab homeland, had to confront this ill wind just as our ancestors over the centuries had confronted the invasions of the Persians and the Tatars and the suspect anti-Arab movements which were aimed at Islam and Arabism. It was our destiny that we fight this battle. With God's help we fought this battle and we won.

"Our sacrifices in this battle were momentous. We lost thousands of our best citizens, dutiful martyrs, brave men, the bearers of Iraq's standard who shed their blood on the battlefields as they aspired to an Iraq that is proud, cherished, strong and prosperous.

"We lost money and we endured difficulties in this battle, but, thank God, we feel that we won and that we gained because the evil which was intended for Iraq was much greater than the sacrifices we made and the losses we suffered.

"Let us imagine what would have happened to Iraq if, God forbid, Khomeyni's conspiracy, in which he was allied with Zionists and with all the enemies of the nation, had succeeded. We see in front of us the experience of a torn Lebanon, a country whose conditions did not allow it to protect and to spare itself from the conspiracy. Lebanon's losses in people--men, women and children--in the economy, in security, stability and in sovereignty were many times more what they could have been had conditions in Lebanon been normal and sound as those in Iraq, and had Lebanon resisted the conspiracy forcefully and consciously from the beginning. [The enemies of the Arab nation] wanted to move the battles into Iraq, inside the cities of Iraq and the streets of Iraq. Tens of thousands of us would have been killed; in fact, hundreds of thousands of our men, women, children and old people would have died; our cities would have been destroyed; our people would have been torn; and our advancement and our progress would have been crushed. Enemies of the Arab nation wanted to turn Iraq into feuding mini-states that would fight and then crush each other. In reality they would be abject subjects to the Persian-Zionist alliance and to the ambitious schemes of others who are enemies of the nation.

"This is what was intended for Iraq. There is no other meaning for the ill wind that was blown by Khomeyni and carried to Tehran by Zionist and colonialist circles, those circles which furnished Khomeyni with weapons, munitions and expertise when Iraq opposed him and fought him forcefully and courageously. [Fellow] Iraqis, you won. You won and you killed the conspiracy. For your victory you made momentous sacrifices which lose their importance in front of the preservation of Iraq, of its people, its unity, its progress and its independence. These sacrifices lose their importance when they become the only way all this can be defended. This battle of yours was not only a patriotic battle, but it was also a national battle. Had it not been for the impregnable barrier you set up on the eastern wing of the Arab homeland, the winds blown by Khomeyni and Zionists would have swept over all the countries of the Arab east, and the Arab homeland in its entirety would have turned into a new phase: a phase of feuding sectarian mini-states that would be subject to the domination of Persians and Zionists and all international forces. This could have been the death knell of Arab existence, and Arab future and Arab hopes for freedom, progress and unity could have remained dead for a long time, even for hundreds of years.

"This is what was intended for you, citizens of Iraq, citizens of the Arab nation. But you fought; you won; and you changed the course of history. The sacrifices you made were not made in vain. Today, these sacrifices constitute a great record in the history of this country and in the history of this nation.

"As far as we in steadfast Iraq are concerned, the battle which began in September 1980 was an extension of the battle for freedom in the Revolution of the twenties, in the revolution of May 1941, in the first July Revolution and in the second July Revolution. It was an extension of the battle to liquidate spies, the battle to nationalize oil, the battle to build Iraq and the battle to protect its national unity. It is a patriotic battle in every sense of the word. It is an extension of the battles for freedom and independence which the people of Iraq fought to liberate themselves from the yoke of foreigners, from factors of fragmentation and dissolution and from conditions of backwardness. It is a major battle like the major battles that change the course of history. If suspect characters and clients and people with sick minds who are backed by imperialist and Zionist circles are trying to play down the importance of this historic

battle, the Arab nation, despite current ailments and complications, will have to bring to light the great historical importance of this battle which Iraq and the people of Iraq fought.

"Many sincere and honorable citizens have realized this fact, and the day will come when this brave battle will be evaluated objectively throughout the Arab homeland with depth and comprehensiveness.

"Illustrious men and women of Iraq: we have explained to you the numerous peaceful initiatives that Iraq carried out. Under all conditions we assumed these postures from a position of power and capability and from a position of having a sense of responsibility to our people, to our basic interests, to our national commitments and to the non-alignment movement with which we are sincerely affiliated and whose leadership responsibility we are assuming in the next stage.

"When the Zionist invasion of south Lebanon began, the Islamic Peace Committee called upon both Iraq and Iran to end the war immediately. We complied with this appeal, and the Revolutionary Command Council issued its historic bulletin at dawn on the 10th of June. The bulletin contained a statement about Iraq's willingness to effect a cease fire, to withdraw its forces from Iranian territory and cities and to turn to arbitration by the Islamic Conference, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries or by the UN Security Council.

"The conniving Iranian regime turned down this appeal and insisted on continuing the state of war.

"Brothers, Iraq which has fought courageously and fearlessly does not need to undergo a test of courage and endurance. This has been confirmed through 2 years of battles that others could barely tolerate for days before starting to look for solutions and putting a cease fire into place even though the enemy they were fighting is the enemy they have to fight so he can be made to leave their territory and leave Arab land. However, out of a sense of responsibility we are being called upon to make some decisions that would make the enemy miss an opportunity. Our decisions would foil his excuses and scuttle the evil conspiracy that is being contrived against Iraq and against the Arab nation. One of the most serious chapters of that conspiracy became evident during the occupation of Lebanon by the Zionist enemy while Iraq was preoccupied with the war and Iran was insisting on continuing the war despite all our generous offers. We do not forget here that the Zionist enemy bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor while we were at war. This was done on the basis of the bet that the war would continue with the collusion of Khomeyni's suspect regime. What was required was that Iraq remain preoccupied with this war until the Zionist enemy realized his plans in Lebanon and in the region. Khomeyni's regime paid back the Zionist entity for the assistance it had received in weapons, munitions, spare parts, information and experience. Also those who made dramatic claims about confronting the Zionist enemy silenced their guns after a few days of fighting. Their action contributed in a basic way to the continuation of the war and to the fact that Iraq continues to be preoccupied with it.

"Citizens of Great Iraq, citizens of the glorious Arab nation, our deep sense of responsibility toward our country and our nation and our knowledge of the nature of the conspiracy that is being contrived against Iraq and against the Arab nation in this sensitive situation in which Zionism, Khomeyni's regime and a few

Arab traitors are participating call upon us to make responsible decisions that would help in a basic way foil this conspiracy and protect Iraq and the Arab nation. Although Khomeyni's response to the bulletin that was issued by the Revolutionary Command Council on 10 June was negative, the Revolutionary Command Council decided to uphold its commitment to the substance of that bulletin. We will begin withdrawing our troops from Iranian territories and cities within the period set by the bulletin. This is a period of 2 weeks beginning with this date. We will also continue exercising our efforts with the agencies that tried to mediate to end the dispute and reach the just and honorable settlement that we have been calling for from the beginning.

"This responsible decision is based primarily on the following considerations:

--"Shooting down one of the important pretexts the suspect regime in Tehran has been using to continue the war. The Tehran regime was to be put to a decisive test that would expose its true intentions.

--"The sensitive conditions that the Arab nation is going through, which are the result of the Zionist occupation of Lebanon that is, subjecting the Palestinian Resistance to liquidation, make it incumbent upon us to be vigilant and prepared for all possibilities. Although we know from experience the truth about the close relationship between the scheme that Tehran's rulers have to continue the war, the position of some Arab rulers who prodded that war and the Zionist aggression against Lebanon and the Palestinian Resistance, we still have to expose this collusion and shoot down all its false pretexts.

--"A number of Arab rulers stood by the Tehran regime as is well known, and others dragged their feet in showing their support for Iraq in its just battle. They used false and flimsy excuses and pretexts [for being slow in coming to Iraq's aid]. One of the excuses they always used was the fact that Iraq was still occupying parts of Iranian territory. The responsible decision we made in that regard invalidates all these excuses and pretexts, whether they are the result of evil or of good intentions, forcing the Arab countries to face their responsibilities in this dispute.

--"Our responsibility to the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the fact that we will host the movement's seventh conference next September require us to shoot down any pretext used by some to conspire against the movement of non-aligned countries. We feel responsible for providing all the suitable conditions for convening the conference and [ensuring] its success.

--"We believe that this decision will make a major contribution to the development of positive relations with the forces of good among the Iranian people who opposed the aggressive war that was waged by Khomeyni's regime against Iraq. These forces of good are striving to establish normal relations with Iraq and with the Arab nation in the future.

"These, fellow [citizens], were the justifications for our decision.

"[Fellow] citizens, our certain feeling of victory in this battle makes it incumbent upon us to come to an accurate understanding of the nature of the new stage that grew out of the responsible decision that we made. We have to understand the functions that this stage requires us to do and the sacrifices it requires us to make.

"The basic matter that we must keep in mind is that despite all our attempts to shoot down the enemy's pretexts, this suspect and greedy enemy did not abandon his aggressive intentions and his ambitious designs on Iraq. Therefore, we have to expect him to continue his aggression on our land and our people.

"In 21 months of the battle our forces fought on Iranian territory to defend Iraq. Iraqi fighters had some elbow-room and could move about in the land where they were located. Our basic plan did not emphasize holding on to territory; it rather emphasized destroying the enemy's war machinery. It is for this reason that we would agree to withdraw a distance here or a distance there in order to cut down on sacrifices and achieve the basic objective. But now after our forces are on our borders, we do not have that elbow-room as far as land is concerned. Any retreat would mean that Iran's invasion forces would enter into our dear land, our great Iraq.

"Let us not forget that our Iraqi cities, Basrah, Maysan, Khanqin and others are only a few kilometers from the borders.

"Any rush by the enemy, God forbid, into Iraqi territory would mean shifting the battle into our country. Our losses when we were fighting in the enemy's territory to defend Iraq in the previous period were losses in lives, in equipment and in funds. But now any advance made by the enemy inside our territory means that losses will not stop there. The enemy will bomb and destroy our cities; he will kill our children and our women; and he will destroy our country.

"These are the intentions of the enemy. If Iraqi fighters were fighting with courage and determination on Iranian territory to defend Iraq, that courage and that determination must be multiplied tens of times when Iraqi soldiers fight on their borders to defend their land, their cities, their people and their honor.

"Brave Iraqis, you are facing a clear case of self-defense; you have to defend your country, Iraq. You refused to surrender; you refused humiliation and degradation; you opposed the enemy; you destroyed his troops; and you protected your country for 21 months. You have fought fearlessly and tenaciously. You made a decision to withdraw out of your sense of responsibility. You are now facing the highest mission of combat: combat that is most fearless and most tenacious.

"Because we know Iraq and we know the men and women of Iraq, we are confident that the enemy, who has suffered tremendous losses when we fought him inside his territory, will find that every particle of Iraq's soil will be a spear that will pierce his bosom and a lance that will pull out his eyes.

"It is now incumbent upon us more than any time in the past to draw our swords and to mobilize all national energies in defense of the homeland and in the face of all possibilities.

"Brothers, it is the duty of leaders to give the people a true picture of what is going on and to define for every citizen his duties at every stage of the national struggle.

"This is the situation we are facing. These are the duties of the men and women of Iraq. Being one of you I know your spirit; I live the same way you live; and I sense your determination and your ability to sacrifice and to die in battle. I am

confident that the strong and dear Iraq which was victorious and which shone in the Arab sky will continue to be victorious with God's help. I have no doubts whatsoever about our ability to achieve victory. I am confident that the brave men and women of Iraq who resisted the aggression and who conquered the enemy on his own turf will be able with God's help to bury the conspiracy, destroy the dreams of people with ambitious designs, protect the great Iraq and raise its flag to fly high in the sky.

"Let the banners of fighting, steadfastness and sacrifice be flown; let the citizens of Iraq live a life of pride; let every particle of Iraq's soil turn into a sword drawn in the face of enemies; and let every breath of air in the land be a spear piercing the bosoms of the malicious.

"May God give you success and protect you. With God's help, you will be victorious."

Less than 1 month after this speech was delivered, all the analyses and expectations that the leader mentioned in his address came to be true and with remarkable accuracy. Khomeyni's aggressive and expansionist regime, which is determined to continue the war to achieve all its evil plans, did not change its position after Iraqi troops withdrew from Iranian territory. In fact, Khomeyni's regime became more arrogant and supercilious after being mistaken by its erroneous conclusions. Some international circles and Arabs in collusion with that regime had given it false illusions by promoting erroneous and suspect conclusions about the battles that preceded the decision to withdraw, particularly the battle of al-Mahmarah. On 13 July 1982 the Khomeyni regime launched a major, large-scale attack on our borders in the area of East Basrah for which it had amassed all its forces. In those days when Khomeyni and the principals in his regime imagined that their aggressive and expansionist plans could materialize, they gave vent to all their intentions and their ambitions, and they declared in no uncertain terms that their aim was Iraq. They wanted to change the revolutionary regime and establish a regime subordinate to Khomeyni's authority. That regime would make Iraq a state subordinate to their state.

And just as the leader expected in his address on the 20th of June, the Iraqis fought in a rare manner. Our brave troops turned back 5 major attacks between the 13th and the 30th of July 1982, inflicting very heavy losses on the enemy.

The battles of East Basrah are considered among the fiercest battles that showed the heroism and might of our armed forces. In their value and in their political and military import, these battles are equal to all the battles fought by the Iraqi army in Saddam's Qadisiyyah, and this is how our leaders evaluated these battles after the congress concluded its business. The results of these battles had a considerable impact on all the factors of the struggle between us and Khomeyni's regime. At the time when these battles confirmed the accuracy of the objective and careful analysis made by the leader Saddam Husayn on 20 June 1982--that Iraq was the victor in the battle when one takes into account all the factors of the struggle--these battles also confirmed the political and military defeat of the Iranian regime and its decline toward dissolution and failure.

These fearless battles strengthened Iraq's Arab and international standing, and the futile dreams of many Arabs and international forces were dashed. Those Arabs and international forces had spoken in evil voices, particularly after the battle

of al-Mahmarah, about overthrowing the Revolution and changing the revolutionary government. They presented hateful alternatives to a regime that has proven itself to be the regime of the people, a regime of freedom, pride, dignity and progress.

Religious Phenomenon

Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 1 Feb 83 pp 6-11

[Text] Chapter Six: The Problem of Religion

The problem of religion, which would come up every now and then in Arab political life and in some international circles, has become a conspicuous issue in recent years. When the Iranian Revolution broke out and succeeded in overthrowing the Shah's regime, religion became a hot issue. Interest, inquiry and controversy around religion grew in the region and on the international scene.

In recent years the activities of some groups in Iraq grew at an accelerating pace. These groups, particularly al-Da'wah Party, used religion as a cover for their political objectives and purposes. They took on a terrorist and destructive character that was hostile to the people, the party and the Revolution.

The Attitude to the Problem of Religion

What is the party's attitude to the problem of religion, and how did the party deal with that problem? Why did this precept emerge at this stage in the country and in the region? How should the party deal with this problem now?

The Arab Socialist Ba'th Party is the only socialist and revolutionary party, not only in the Arab homeland but also in the region, that devoted noticeable attention in its doctrine and in its political and social [code of] conduct to the problem of religion.

From the beginning the party defined its attitude to religion. As [our] compatriot Saddam Husayn said, "We are not impartial [when it comes to a choice] between having faith and being non-believers. We are believers."

The party placed a basic value on Islam in its thought and in Arab life as well throughout history and in the present age. The party considers Islam to be a great revolution in the history of humanity, and it gives the Arab nation historical credit for spreading Islam among the human race.

In the contemporary process of reviving the Arab nation the party urged that we turn to the spirit of the Islamic message for inspiration. In 1943 on the anniversary [of the birth] of the Arab messenger the founding leader said, "Muhammad represented all Arabs; today, let all Arabs represent Muhammad." This statement specifically means that contemporary Arabs must draw inspiration from the spirit of the Islamic message. He must take on the characteristics and the morals of its

1. The last battles in the areas of Mandali and Maysan confirmed these facts about the determination of Khomeyni's regime to target Iraq. These battles also confirmed facts about Iraq's singular ability to withstand attacks and to achieve victory.

great leader, the Prophet Muhammad, may God bless him and grant him salvation, and of the other great leaders who carried the banner of Islam.

It is the view of this Ba'th Party activist [i.e., Saddam Husayn] that the Prophet Muhammad, may God bless him and grant him salvation, was a great leader, a great inspiring figure and a great revolutionary. Saddam Husayn also thinks that Muslim leaders like Abu Bakr, 'Umar, 'Ali, al-Husayn and others were great leaders whose lessons in courage, sacrifice and contributions for the nation can be turned to for inspiration.

There were no problems between the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party and religion over more than 30 years of the party's life--if one may make such a statement. In fact, it was because of its posture toward Islam that the party was accused of being reactionary or right wing. Those who accused the party were the same circles that were driven by opportunist tactics to follow religious political movements or those movements that hide behind religion. However, the party faced all these charges with an unequivocal position based on principle. This is because this problem touches the heart of the party's doctrine. It touches the essence of the revolutionary process which the party is directing to bring about the awakening of the Arab nation and to achieve its objectives of unity, freedom and socialism.

Attempts made by a group of party members to drag the party into atheistic postures failed. Those party members, who later left the organization, acted under the influence of a weakness for Marxist interpretations and the effect these interpretations had on the makeup of their thoughts. This phenomenon emerged in the aftermath of the failure of the party's experiment to lead the revolutionary government after the 1963 Ramadan Revolution in Iraq and before and after that date in Syria.

However, the party was able to overcome this phenomenon in Iraq and to eradicate it altogether because it was alien to it. The party's course on this matter has become evident: it is linked with the origins of its thoughts, its principles and its theory of work whose foundations were established by [our] compatriot Saddam Husayn, the man who led the party in various areas including this vital and decisive one.

The party did not call for a state to be set up on a religious model. Instead, it called for a state to be founded on the national bond that exists in a single country and on the ethnic bond that exists in the context of the great Arab homeland. That state would be inspired by Islam as a [divine] message and a revolution. The party considered Islam to be the fundamental essence of Arab nationalism. The party also called for the Arab nation's ties with Muslim nations to be strengthened on the basis of the common spiritual bond that brings them together and on the basis of the common hopes and objectives for which they are fighting in the present age.

Several choices have been presented to the Arab nation in the modern age. Forces with ties to the West or those that are influenced by western politics, interests and culture were urging that the components and ingredients of western civilization be imitated. Communists called for materialism and for an association with and the imitation of the Soviet Union and the communist bloc. Religious movements

invoked anachronistic approaches that were unable to offer any real and revolutionary solution to the needs of a contemporary nation.

The party's doctrine and political course did not produce a mix or a compromise between these conflicting trends. Instead, the party's ideology and political course gave expression to an authentic, ethnic Arab posture that stems from the ethnic and religious heritage of the nation and from the needs and specifics that are set forth by the modern age in every Arab country in the context of an all-encompassing ethnic view. Therefore, the party's posture has always been solid and cohesive on all the essential questions that came up before it: questions of patriotism, nationalism, religion, and socialism. Other tendencies, however, were swept by prevailing winds at this or another stage.

Religious Movements and Arab Nationalism

It is essential to refer to an important historical fact in the political development of the Arab homeland in the modern age. That fact is this: religious-political parties, movements and trends are not a new phenomenon; they have existed since the beginning of the modern Arab awakening. Among the outstanding characteristics of these parties, movements and trends is the fact that they were not founded on a unifying basis in Islam. They were rather sectarian movements. One party would become widespread on a sectarian basis among Sunnis, but not among non-Sunnis. Another would become widespread among followers of the Ja'fari sect but not among non-Ja'faris. And the matter did not stop there. In their activities these parties and movements stirred up and added fuel to the fires of sectarian conflicts, bringing to mind memories of sectarian and political struggles in some of the Islamic ages. In most cases the leaders of these calls, movements and parties carried out these activities for political purposes: they had aspirations for power; they rejected other sectarian calls; or they responded to these calls with similar ones.

From the beginning these parties, movements and trends also opposed the call to nationalism. They fought and opposed nationalist leaders, such as those of al-Ba'th, 'Abd-al-Nasir and others who carried the banner of liberation, unification and nationalism. In their struggle with the Movement of Arab Nationalism these parties, movements and trends placed themselves numerous times in positions that were hostile to the masses and their hopes and aspirations. They lined up, sometimes voluntarily and sometimes as a result of their posture, on the side of Arab reactionary forces and regimes and even on the side of some colonialist circles.

In their attempts to reach power or in their clashes with existing regimes or with other political parties and forces, these parties, movements and trends resorted many times to terrorist and violent methods.

Although some of these parties and movements achieved a significant amount of power, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood Movement in Egypt during the forties and fifties, none of these parties, movements and trends was actually able to become a dominant popular force around which the masses would rally with the power and awareness rally that would actually make them turn the corner to political power. In most cases these parties, movements and trends continued to have limited influence and limited popularity. Arab societies did not take them

seriously in so far as their ability to bring about revolutionary and progressive change in their lives was concerned. They continued to be isolated from the masses who, in most cases, were attracted to Arab Nationalism and drawn to national battles and objectives, particularly those of national liberation, unity and the liberation of Palestine.

Why Has the Religious Phenomenon Emerged now in the Arab Homeland and in the Region?

Why has this phenomenon re-emerged? Why has it re-emerged in recent years with such power?

It is essential that this question be preceded by another: why has this call, the religious call, emerged as a cover and a tool for politics in the world? The answer to that question lies in the fact that the capitalist world has turned its back on [matters of] the spirit after becoming deluged with the material details of life which now make up all the standards for success and failure in life in that world. These standards even became an ideal in the capitalist world which lacked an ideal that had to do with the spiritual components and principles of people's lives and with their longing to develop. Marxism was also immersed in materialism; it even denied the spirit any role in the formation of the universe and the evolution of peoples and nations, etc. As a result of this fact and because human beings are in most cases looking for "deliverance;" because they are looking for something that satisfies the soul, something that would serve as a noble objective of their abstract quest, people intensify their quest and their efforts in two cases. People intensify their efforts when they are oppressed and when the concrete and material means that are available to them, along with a materialistic outlook, cannot save them from the persecution they suffer. People then look to the heavens and beyond everything that is concrete. In the other case [people intensify their quest] when everything [they need] is available in their material lives. That abundance becomes psychologically and actually burdensome because it makes them unable to have ambition and to aspire, and this is often reflected in something like a sense of loss. Something like that mostly happens with people whose souls and minds lack creativity; it happens when they lead prosperous and self-sufficient lives with little or no effort. Since the vast majority of nations and peoples are not capable of intellectual creativity at all times, and since in all cases nations and peoples when faced with the possibility [of losing their direction] would not have produced responsible leaders who would be capable of getting them out of such crises, these nations and peoples find deliverance from such a situation by looking to heaven. They evoke solutions reached by predecessors in their relations with divine powers. [They evoke the solutions of predecessors] despite all the shortcomings and deviations associated with this course, without taking into account the factors of change and the factor of time.

On this basis it is essential that the relevant reasons for this phenomenon be carefully considered and accurately understood so they can be dealt with properly in a manner that would strengthen the national struggle for liberation, unity and progress and preserve the Islamic faith from the distortions which some of these religious-political movements, parties or trends try to attach to it.

The outstanding phenomenon of the modern age is that the principal feature of the Arab struggle is the national struggle.

The roots of Arab nationalism in Arab society are deep, and the historical justifications for them are very strong. It would be a mistake to say that the nationalist tendency came into the Arab homeland as a result of the Arabs' contact with Europe and because they came under the influence of European ideas of nationalism. Arab Nationalism is an indigenous movement; in the modern age it is a sweeping and far-reaching process of revival. The Arab nation is not a young nation that wants to bring itself forth in this age, as was the case with European ethnic groups. The Arab nation is rather an ancient nation that has been trying to revive its historical identity, its authentic civilization and its effective role in human life. The Arab nation spent several centuries in a state of weakness and decline, and it came under foreign control. It lost its direction and the proper patriotic, national and human objectives of the movement. What made the revival of Arab nationalism easier was the fact that the persecution against which the nation rebelled was ethnic, racist and foreign. The persecution was perpetrated by Iranians and Turks hiding behind religion. Thus came the national awakening--the Great Arab Revolution. However, this revival did not run its full course for reasons that are well-known. Chief among those is the fact that the confrontation with foreigners was not based on a profound analysis of what the nation's role would be after foreigners are expelled. The revival thus turned into a political case that was based mainly on rejecting foreigners without having a full and a comprehensive view of the cultural alternative to them in both national and human terms. Therefore, Arabs in this epoch relied on nationalism, but they did not revive its spirit and its continuing cultural role.

The growth and diffusion of the Movement of Arab Nationalism particularly in the countries of the Arab East was helped by the nature of the Ottoman sultanate which dominated the countries of that region in a backward and despotic manner in the name of "the succession" without having any spiritual or historical backing for claiming the succession. The Ottoman sultanate was definitely founded on force and despotism. Even when British and French colonialists came to these countries, they did not place themselves at loggerheads with religion in its official or superficial sense. Instead, colonialists tried to form an alliance with religion, and to a certain extent they succeeded in doing so when they allied themselves with opportunist clergymen who would go along with any power. In general, the only exception to that phenomenon in the Arab homeland was the colonialist regime in Algeria. That regime tried to put an end to both the national and religious identity of the Muslim Arab people of Algeria. Later this created a kind of special bond between Algerian nationalism and religion.

We must also take into account the fact that Marxism was largely unknown during the period of the Arab struggle against the Ottoman sultanate and during the early stages of the struggle against British and French colonialism. The Russian Revolution broke out in 1917 after the national Arab struggle against the Ottoman sultanate had begun. Even after the outbreak of the Russian Revolution, neither Marxism nor communism was widely known in the Arab homeland. Neither had the ability to shape events there. Marxism or communism continued to be limited phenomena in Arab life. At no time was either of them able to become a popular movement capable of bringing about the profound change that the Arab nation is hoping for.

It was this historical situation and the movement's historical justifications as well that made Arab Nationalism the fundamental choice for the nation in its

struggle to get rid of the backward and despotic Ottoman domination, to get rid of British and French colonialism, to obtain full independence and to realize progress and unity.

As we said the Arab masses were strongly attached to the nationalism movement and to its objectives: liberation, unity and the liberation of Palestine.

National battles that were fought in any one of the Arab countries, such as the Iraq uprising in 1941, the Algerian Revolution in 1954 and the national liberation uprisings in the east and in the west were widely echoed amidst the masses in most Arab countries. When the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party was founded in the forties and when Nasirism emerged in the fifties, the Movement of Arab Nationalism was strengthened. It assumed a social and a socialist dimension, and it went on the offensive against colonialism and reactionaries. The religious-political phenomenon lost ground to Arab nationalism. Marxism also lost ground to Arab nationalism although it sometimes assumed the character of its adversary or its underdog.

Arab nationalism, however, suffered [a series of] successive setbacks that began in the sixties. The experiment of unity between Syria and Egypt failed; the 8 February 1963 Revolution in Iraq failed; there was a setback in Syria on 23 February; and then there was the crushing defeat in June 1967. As accurately diagnosed by the political report issued by the 11th National Congress, these setbacks led to "the creation of a wide state of unrest and psychological and intellectual anxiety in the circles of intellectuals, parties and political movements and among the masses. After the setback there were strong, broad-scale tendencies to review many of the values, standards and precepts--intellectual, political social, religious, military and economic--that were prevalent before the defeat. A large number of intellectuals and writers and many individuals in political parties considered these values, standards and precepts responsible for the setbacks.

During that period there was also a broad-scaled tendency toward Marxist ideology and toward some global revolutionary experiments such as those that took place in China, in Vietnam and in Cuba and those that followed the course of Che Guevara. In general however, that tendency was characterized by rashness and impetuosity.

Thus we find that the wave which followed the setbacks that befell Arab Nationalism was not the religious wave; it was rather the Marxist wave.

This wave, however, was a superficial one and did not have deep roots in Arab life. It was not able to offer relevant solutions to the needs and challenges of the current stage, and it was not able to turn itself into a constant popular force.

As the political report of the 11th National Congress accurately indicated also, it was at this stage in particular that the Palestinian Resistance Movement attracted the enthusiasm and support of the masses. It also became a source of

1. The political report that was issued by the 11th National Congress, p 28.

inspiration for young people who were eager to join the movement and to fight under its banner. However, the Palestinian Resistance Movement soon lost its former luster, and its revolutionary role in the region was weakened.

It was during the period when the party's revolution was in the making and when preparations were underway to turn that revolution into a new national center for spreading the Arab Revolutionary Movement that the religious-political phenomenon began to grow and to spread. It was also at this time in particular that the party went through difficult labor pains to regain its leadership role in the Arab Revolutionary Movement. It was attracting a number of young people to its ranks, and it was preparing them for actions they would carry out involving risk and sacrifice.

Hence we find out that the growth of the religious-political phenomenon was not--if one may say so--a normal, positive growth manifesting genuine needs and [backed by] strong and constant justifications. It was rather tantamount to a superficial reaction to the temporary setback that befell the Arab Revolutionary Movement. It temporarily filled a vacuum that was created because of the temporary erosion of the Arab Revolutionary Movement.

The Arab homeland--and to a certain extent the Middle East region--is going through a tense state of political, social, economic and cultural changes. In facing the sharp and complex problems of the modern age this region stands out among other regions of the world, particularly the Third World, by the fact that it is influenced by its ancient past and by all the religious, ethnic and cultural ingredients of its formidable heritage. Thus, the Arab homeland and countries of the region have a deep need for spiritual forces to drive them on their course.

In the absence of large political movements with popular power and strong leaders who can mobilize the energies of the people and inspire the masses, particularly young people, to work for battles of struggle and for noble objectives, it is inevitable that attempts would be made to fill this vacuum. These attempts do not necessarily have to be successful, nor do they have to achieve constant, positive objectives of struggle, but they do emerge anyway.

In this historical situation in particular the religious-political phenomenon began to grow and to spread, and it attracted certain groups of young people. Some parties and religious movements also tried to interact with contemporary intellectual and political movements and trends, and they tried to benefit from their operating methods.

The negative characteristics that we ascribed to some religious movements, parties and trends--and they are true and derived from actual experiences--do not deny the fact that in some historical periods some of these religious parties, movements and trends were engaged in activities against colonialism and against client and corrupt forces. The Muslim Brotherhood Movement in Egypt, for example, did play a significant role in the struggle against British colonialism and the corrupt monarchy before its clash with Nasirism.

Faith in religion gives human beings tremendous spiritual energy which prods them to struggle and to make sacrifices. The fault, however, lies in the fact that leaders of these movements, parties and trends are determined to dominate

political life, to come to power and to exercise control over all the affairs of contemporary life and its complicated requirements. They exercise that control according to anachronistic religious standards, and they use forceful and compulsory methods that ultimately cause them to become corrupt and to stand against the tide of history and against the interests of the public.

The Religious Phenomenon and Colonialist and Zionist Schemes

What is the relationship between the religious-political phenomenon and colonialist and Zionist forces?

It would be a mistake to say that the religious-political phenomenon was the creation of colonialist and Zionist forces. This phenomenon is a normal one in Arab-Islamic society. It derives its reasons for being from actual factors in that society, from the conditions of ongoing changes in that society and from the profound problems that society is facing.

But superpowers and colonialist circles keep a watchful eye on all the political, economic and social phenomena in the world, in Third World countries in particular, and even more so in those countries that were subject to their colonialist influence and where they still have colonialist ambitious designs. The superpowers and colonialist circles try to use [this information] to achieve their colonialist objectives.

In some cases religious-political movements would assume positions that were harmful to the presence and interests of colonialism. In other cases, however, these positions turned out to be in favor of colonialist schemes.

The basic game that colonialist powers and circles are playing in Third World countries and in the Arab homeland in particular is that of stirring up political, social, religious, sectarian and racial divisions and strife. The sharper these divisions and struggles become, the weaker the Arab homeland becomes politically, economically, militarily, socially and culturally. This means that opportunities for prolonging colonialist hegemony and colonialist interests would be improved.

Colonialist circles most certainly know about the sectarian nature of religious-political movements. They know that the activities of these movements, despite all their harmful secondary consequences, ultimately lead to the creation of religious and sectarian divisions in Arab society. These divisions seriously weaken Arab society and distract it from [its pursuit of] progress and advancement. Hence colonialist forces and circles benefit from this phenomenon. This is one of the basic reasons why all sorts of evil means are used sometimes blatantly and other times secretly to promote religious and sectarian divisions.

Colonialist powers and circles also appreciate the fact that the presence of religious-political parties, movements and trends creates an anti-communist climate that prevents communism and all tendencies for radical progress in general from spreading. This is another reason why colonialist powers and circles are using the method we referred to to encourage and promote these movements, parties and trends.

As we've said already the fundamental phenomenon of the past three decades in

particular was the opposition of religious-political parties, movements and trends to the Movement of Arab Nationalism. At that stage this posture was considered one of the most important reasons for colonialist and Zionist forces and circles to encourage these religious movements, parties and trends.

It has become unquestionably certain that the Movement of Arab Nationalism with its libertarian, unifying and socialist principles and with its posture of independence from international blocs poses the greatest threat to Zionist and colonialist presence and influence in the Arab homeland. This is because this movement can attract the support of the masses and because it has a unifying character whether it operates in one country or throughout the Arab nation. Arab nationalism thus has the capabilities for achieving success in the struggle to achieve total liberation from colonialist and Zionist control. [It has the capabilities to succeed in its efforts] to build society on modern principles and to develop that society in political, economic, military and cultural areas in such a way as to drive away colonialist influence, colonialist interests and Zionist dangers.

At the same time colonialist propaganda does not find enough material it can use to influence and defame this movement and its principles as it can do with communism, which it brands as an atheistic movement, serving the Soviet Union and [the course of] extremism. Colonialist propaganda attributes to communism other such descriptions that can influence the masses and isolate them from it.

This fact was confirmed in the course of the revival of the Movement of Arab Nationalism in the fifties and in part of the sixties. After the setback that befell the Movement of Arab Nationalism, which we referred to, colonialist powers and circles were extremely careful about preventing the revival of this movement and preventing the emergence of an outstanding and influential Arab leader who would be able to attract the masses and mobilize them for the purpose of liquidating colonialist interests and bases, establishing unity and liberating Palestine.

Colonialist powers and circles know quite well that religious movements, trends and parties serve as significant checks on the Movement of Arab Nationalism. In fact, if these religious movements are destined to succeed, they would be the only power that can destroy Arab Nationalism.

The Religious Phenomenon and the Arab-Zionist Struggle

The other side [of this question] is the extent to which the religious-political phenomenon is affecting the course of the Arab-Zionist struggle.

The Islamic-political phenomenon is most certainly anti-Zionist. Its declared principles are generally opposed to Zionism and to the Zionist presence in the occupied land. The Islamic-political phenomenon can induce sectors of the public and of the young to engage in operations of struggle against the Zionist entity.

However, this fact is one thing and the overall practical consequences of the religious-political phenomenon on the course of the Arab-Zionist struggle are another.

As we already mentioned the religious-political phenomenon is divisive and not

unifying. Therefore, no religious-political party, movement or trend can attract more than part of the Arab people in one country or throughout the Arab homeland, depending on whether that group of people subscribed to one or the other religion or whether they were from this denomination or that sect. In the process of attracting followers a major part of a religious party's activity is spent in conflicts and clashes with other groups of Arab people who belong to other religions, denominations or sects.

This means that in the final analysis and despite its anti-Zionist posture, the religious-political phenomenon cannot mobilize all Arab people, nor can it mobilize all Muslim Arabs in a confrontation with the Zionist entity. In this practical outcome lies a realistic gain for Zionism. At the same time, however, the Movement of Arab Nationalism did establish its ability in the past--and it is still proving its ability--to mobilize all the Arab people of all religions and sects in the struggle against Zionism.

This is one side of the coin. The other side of the coin is that hostility to Zionism which stems from a religious premise and which helps Zionism attract more support from Christian western countries.

In its propaganda plan Zionism has been careful from the beginning to appear as the underdog, asking people who believe in freedom to assist it in establishing a homeland for Jews. However, this Zionist propaganda was weakened and eroded after the aggressive and racist character of the Zionist entity was exposed, particularly after the aggression of June 1967. This created a change in world public opinion which continued to develop gradually, albeit slowly, until it turned against Zionism as a racist, aggressive and expansionist movement. At the same time the Arab posture, which stems from humanitarian premises that oppose Zionism and its entity, is receiving more international understanding and support. Thus, Zionism can benefit from the religious-political phenomenon, whereas the Movement of Arab Nationalism constitutes a crucial threat to it.

There is another basic aspect [of this matter] which has to do with the influence of the religious-political phenomenon on the Arab struggle against colonialism and Zionism.

It is self-evident that colonialist domination of the Arab homeland took place at a time when the Arab nation was weak and backward in all political, economic, military and cultural areas. The Zionist entity was founded under similar conditions also.

During scores of years in the 20th century the conditions of the Arab nation changed in these areas, and it got rid of the direct domination which had been imposed on some of its countries by colonialists. Although the Arab nation has not yet realized sufficient progress to enable it to liquidate colonialist influence and interests and put up a strong opposition to the Zionist entity, there is absolutely no doubt that at the present time the balance of powers between the political, economic, military and cultural capabilities of the Arab nation on the one hand and those of the colonialist powers and the Zionist entity on the other lies in favor of the Arab nation. This is more so now than it was over 30 years ago when the Zionist entity was imposed [on the region], or before that date when colonialism exercised stronger and broader influence on the Arab homeland.

It is also certain that despite all the negative factors in current Arab conditions, the nation's capabilities are set on a course of growth not one of decline.

What would happen to this balance if the religious-political phenomenon dominated Arab societies and established in them religious regimes?

Religious parties and movements that control government in any part of Arab society will need between 10 and 20 years to dismantle the political, economic, cultural and social structures that exist in that society and the to rebuild those structures according to religious principles, as required by their course of thought and as the ruling group in Iran is trying to do now.

In realistic terms, assuming that this process is possible and will succeed, this means that 10 to 20 years in the course of political, military, economic, social and cultural development will be lost between the Arab nation on the one hand and colonialism and Zionism on the other. It would not be difficult to know who would benefit from this.

What is certain, however, is that such a process, despite the length of time it will require, cannot be crowned with success.

Divine messages and the political movements that give expression to these messages in their earliest stages were revolutionary and progressive both in thought and in practice. They shifted the societies where they evolved from one state to another that was more developed spiritually, culturally, socially and even economically. As far as the Arabs are concerned, Islam gets primary credit for building a strong and prosperous Islamic state in addition to realizing the forementioned accomplishments. The religious-political phenomenon in the present age, however, is a phenomenon that harks back to the past and is backward in outlook and in practice. It comes in an age whose principal feature and whose conditions for progress and strength are science and technology and the creation, full utilization and distribution of wealth on bases that socialists deem just. Therefore, the domination of an anachronistic and backward religious-political phenomenon over Arab societies cannot bring about any positive results in the way of liberation, progress and power when these societies are facing colonialist and Zionist challenges as well as modern day challenges. Instead, they rather lead to the cultural, scientific and technical regression of the nation. Instead of creating and developing national wealth, this phenomenon destroys it. At any rate, the Iranian experience today is the clearest example of what such a phenomenon can lead to.

What is serious is that some Arab circles were prompt in backing this religious-political phenomenon. We are referring to those who were driven to do that out of good intentions and not out of planned motives. This was done particularly after the Iranian Revolution; it was done without analysis or earnest and in depth consideration of the possibilities of its final outcome. Those Arab circles were dazzled by the vehement cries that were made by Iranian clergymen against imperialism and Zionism. They were dazzled by the claims they made about the struggle to liberate Jerusalem and Palestine, and they thought that Iranians could add a sizable and a serious force to the Arab struggle against imperialism and Zionism.

The bitter experience that the Arab Revolutionary Movement went through in its

various epochs requires authentic nationalists and revolutionaries to consider every new or renewed phenomenon in depth and to analyze its possibilities and its possible total outcome [with care]. They are not to be driven by their emotions or by demagogic postures to back certain aspects of this phenomenon and ignore others.

A stable scientific analysis of the religious-political phenomenon indicates with certainty that the prevalence of this phenomenon in the Arab homeland, and particularly in the eastern part of the Arab homeland, will lead to the breakup of all existing entities in the Arab homeland. These will be partitioned into sectarian, feuding and weak mini-states. In addition, it will lead to the cultural backwardness that we referred to and that will last a long time.

Who Will Benefit from this Destructive Outcome?

The Zionist entity, which was founded on a fanatic, religious basis, has continued to be an alien element in the Arab surroundings where political entities were founded on a national basis leaning toward Arab unity. This Zionist entity will find itself in full possession of the legitimacy that it has lacked since it was founded after the religious-political phenomenon becomes prevalent in the Arab homeland or at least in the eastern part of that homeland. For the final outcome of that situation, if not its intention, can be nothing but sectarian and fanatic. And among this group of feuding and backward mini-states which would be dominated by anachronistic forces the Zionist entity will undoubtedly become the strongest and the most advanced mini-state scientifically, technically and militarily.

Today, the struggle against the deviations of the religious-political phenomenon is at the forefront of the tasks that the Arab Revolutionary Movement has to undertake. Anyone who does not realize this is either shallow and incapable of making a profound analysis of matters and therefore unsuitable for leadership, or a suspect conspirator who wants to demolish Arab entities, divide them among international blocs and uphold the Zionist usurpation of Palestine forever.

The Iranian Experience

The Iranian experience, which in the eyes of supporters of the religious-political phenomenon is an exemplary "positive" example of this phenomenon, has actually provided an integrated and a three-dimensional, live model of a situation when the religious-political phenomenon has absolute control over a contemporary Islamic society. Today, the Iranian experience is the exemplary "negative" experience of this phenomenon. It will be the principal reason for the defeat of the religious-political phenomenon at this stage: its defeat in thought, in politics and in application.

The condition that the Iranian experience has come to affirms not only the propriety of the posture that the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party has assumed in its thought, in its politics and in its application and the incisive experience it has had in Iraq with this phenomenon, but it also expresses the profound far-sightedness which characterizes this experience and its leader, Saddam Husayn. This [farsightedness] comes at a time when superficial and hasty assessments made by the followers of the religious-political phenomenon and by many leaders, parties and regimes in the Arab homeland were met with frustration and

failure. Those leaders, parties and regimes were carried away by the Iranian experience: they belittled themselves in front of it, or they promoted it for various reasons and pretexts.

Ideal conditions presented themselves in Iran for the emergence and sovereignty of the religious-political phenomenon. For this reason the failure of this phenomenon could not be considered a partial or an interim failure; it would rather be a historic and a devastating failure.

What are the circumstances and conditions that were conducive to the growth of this phenomenon in Iran, helping it get the absolute control it has at the present time over conditions in that country?

Before the revolution Iran had a monarchy that gradually turned into a totalitarian state ruled by the Shah. In the last years of the Shah's rule all parties, organizations and political activities were abolished, and political activity was monopolized by one political party that was created by the government. That party, which included a small group of the government's supporters and beneficiaries, exercised no real political influence on the material political world of Iran. Nor did it exercise any intellectual or political influence on the Iranian masses or on the social circles that were benefiting from and supporting the Shah's rule.

The Shah's regime was a capitalist and a semi-feudalist regime where wealth was held by a small minority of families and members of the royal family. On the other side there was extensive poverty, unemployment and backwardness among the vast majority of the population in rural areas and to a certain extent in the cities. There was also a very high rate of illiteracy.

Economic and social corruption became widespread during the Shah's administration. Functionaries of this regime almost openly joined the Shah and his family in this corruption, doing so in a manner that provoked the masses as well as the enlightened and traditional forces in society. Social corruption was not restricted to a small percentage [of the people] in society or to the upper classes of society. It was rather widespread on a broad scale, and it created a serious case of social imbalance which was met on the other side by a strong case of fanaticism and social narrow-mindedness in some religious and social circles.

The prevailing tendency in Iran in the Shah's administration was the Iranian nationalist tendency in general and the Persian tendency in particular. [The latter] tendency is characterized by chauvinism and expansionist tendencies. Besides, the Shah and his regime went too far in [their efforts] to borrow and imitate the methods and values of western civilization. They did that in a superficial manner that was as far as it can be from the spiritual values of the Iranian peoples and from most of their cultural and social standards. Besides, the Iranian regime developed close ties with U.S. imperialism and established broad relations with the Zionist entity in a manner that aroused the resentment of Muslim Iranian peoples.

In addition, Islam is the religion of all except a very small minority of the people, and the Shi'ite sect is the sect to which the absolute majority of Muslims [in Iran] belong. Less than 20 percent of all Muslims in Iran subscribe to other denominations.

These conditions have produced the following results:

The majority of the impoverished masses strongly resented the exploitative system and the manifestations of corruption that were gaining ground in the ruling regime.

All patriotic and progressive parties, movements and figures, from the far right to the far left--communists or Marxists--who played an active role in society and who were prominent in society and in Iranian politics in the forties and early fifties were dismissed from political life in the country and shifted to the opposition. Some of these parties, movements and figures had attained political power in the days of Musaddaq.

There was a major split between the regime and intellectuals of all inclinations in the country: liberals, leftists and religious. In addition, there was a broad cultural and social split between the majority of the Iranian masses, who are backward and deeply involved in old religious and social traditions and rituals, and the affluent ruling class, caught up in its practices which it copied from standards of western civilization.

There was a struggle between most clergymen and the regime because clergymen were kept out of political life, [a right] granted to them by the 1906 Constitution. The struggle with clergymen was also caused by the Shah's modernization policies, which were being carried out according to a western model, and by his efforts to spread in Iran western values and western cultures that contradicted Islamic values.

It was not possible to concentrate on a national theory that would preserve the unity of the people and realize their cultural development because there were five ethnic groups in Iran. The largest ethnic group makes up only 40 percent of Iran's population.

In this society, a society full of contradictions and explosive situations, Iran became fertile ground for all kinds of opposition political trends and movements. [The ranks of] the opposition included liberals and communists: there were communists who followed the Moscow line; communists who followed the China line; Trotskyites; other Marxist groups; and Islamic groups influenced in some measure by Marxism or by contemporary intellectual and political tendencies. There were also numerous religious tendencies and movements in the opposition. These movements and tendencies practiced all kinds of political activity: traditional, extraordinary, peaceful and violent. This was countered by the government's despotic posture and by a vast, strong and repressive police agency that was well entrenched on a broad scale in opposition circles. Thus the methods, tactics and objectives of political parties, movements and tendencies were like an open book to the regime and its international allies, and it became impossible to set up any secret organization without a general cover that would arouse the direct sympathies and reactions of the people against police oppression. In addition to all the other considerations, a religious cover became an urgent necessity for [the effort] to change the regime and unite the people for that purpose.

In recent years in particular most of the evidence indicated that the Shah's regime did not have what was necessary to survive. Even the Shah's U.S. allies became convinced in recent years that despite all its outer manifestations of power, this regime was actually about to fall.

Early in 1978 conditions in Iran began to explode. Popular demonstrations and strikes erupted on a broad scale, and acts of violence became widespread throughout Iran. Political and religious opposition was gradually and more rapidly coming out of its cocoon or its hiding place.

The Shah's posture toward this popular uprising was obdurate. He confronted this uprising with oppressive measures and made no concessions to this growing popular tide. When the situation became extremely serious, the Shah began making successive concessions from positions of weakness. On the one hand, this drove all factions of the opposition to intensify the struggle against him until he was sent out of Iran. On the other hand, opportunities were thus created for circles of devout people and clergymen who were considered proteges of the Shah and of foreign forces to join the ranks of the opposition. They thus became familiar with the opposition and with the national record [of the opposition] in Iran.

The Shah's obdurate posture, which lasted a long time, ruled out a moderate and interim solution to the Iranian crisis and weakened the forces of moderation that were facing the extremist forces of the religious tendency on the one hand and all factions of the left on the other.

When the cabinet was formed with figures in the liberal opposition and Shahpur Bakhtiar as prime minister, Iran's crisis had peaked and the Shah's regime was barely holding its own as it stood on the edge of a precipitous fall. There was no peaceful way out of the crisis. Iran had one of two choices: [launching] a bloody military coup in which a large number of people would lose their lives and which would not bring to an end--not even for an average period of time--the historical justifications for the opposition; or giving in to the popular wave that ultimately came under the control of the religious movement that is led by Khomeyni.

The religious movement in general, and Khomeyni's movement in particular, was not the most capable religious and opposition movement from a revolutionary point of view. The religious movement was able to control events only because of the Shah's obduracy and his refusal to look for moderate solutions to the crisis at an early time. Conditions became extremely critical, and decisive choices had to be made. These are the ideal conditions in which extremist tendencies prevail. Khomeyni rode this wave of extremism until the regime was destroyed and he took over power.

The power of the religious movement in Iran is due to several reasons. The first of these is that clergymen--and there are tens of thousands of them in Iran--exercise remarkable influence on social life in Iran. They [also] have an old political role that would sometimes get strong and other times become weak.

In practical terms there is a basic factor which placed clergymen historically and for a long time in a powerful position opposite the government. This factor is that of the finances which clergymen control. The money comes from the one fifth that legally capable Muslims are required to pay to ordained clergymen.

The other reason for the power of the religious movement lay in the fact that the climate of universal and stern police repression under the Shah's administration was not suitable for either civil, liberal political activity or revolutionary leftist political activity. Religious activity, however, [could continue] under

many spiritual and social guises which helped it continue and become widespread. It was difficult for the regime to discover the political content of religious activities and practices that opposition clergymen were engaged in. The regime was also compelled to treat clergymen in the opposition, even when they were arrested, less harshly than they treated civilian politicians, leftists and particularly young people.

When possibilities for finding moderate solutions to the Iranian crisis failed, it became evident that it would not be possible to unify the political forces and trends that were intellectually and politically different. It became evident that it would also be impossible to unify the multi-ethnic Iranian people unless that was done under the banner of a communist party with an international character or under the banner of a religious movement which can bring the Iranian peoples and the forces of the opposition together to overthrow the Shah's regime. It was not feasible in practical terms for a national progressive movement to develop [in Iran] according to the model that was set by the Arab Revolutionary Movement because the ethnic Persian group which controls power in Iran constitutes only 40 percent of the population which is made up of 4 other ethnic groups: Azerbaijanis, Kurds, Arabs and Baluches. Because of the indigenous Persian character of the religious movement in Iran, the religious course and the national Persian course became markedly confused. It was for this reason and because the Iranian communist party was weak and the uprising was not originally a communist uprising--in fact, most of the parties that had taken part in it were rejecting communist control over them--that the forces of the opposition rallied around the religious movement and around the leadership of Khomeyni to realize a single central objective: the overthrow of the Shah.

Until that historical moment the role of the religious-political movement in Iran had been a positive one: it had devoted all its energies to the overthrow of the former regime, and it had thus attracted broad popular support.

Therefore, according to the standards of this and other cases the religious-political movement may be appropriate in one case or in special cases for overthrowing regimes that are hostile to their peoples, but it cannot be appropriate for leading a nation from a position of political power. Nor can it manage the affairs of a country, particularly when it has sole power in that country and when it imposes its authority by force and terror.

But the religious movement under Khomeyni's leadership, which soon formed its own political party, the party of the Islamic Republic, was not satisfied with what it had accomplished and, accordingly, it did not keep this positive historical role.

The religious movement and the party of the Islamic Republic were absolutely determined to assume full power in Iran and to impose an absolute religious formula on the new regime. An Islamic Republic was thus imposed [on the country], and that was followed by imposing the sovereign power of the expert theologian.

Sharp political divisions began in Iran from the earliest weeks of the Revolution. The numerous parties that had participated in the Revolution had been in agreement on only one objective: that of removing the Shah's regime. In one measure or another they differed in all other objectives.

Although these parties accepted at the outset the Islamic characterization of the new regime led by Khomeyni, they did not agree with [the notion of] changing Iran into a religious state in the manner which Khomeyni and the party of the Islamic Republic insisted on.

After the Islamic Republic was imposed and the theologian installed [in power], Khomeyni and the Islamic Republic Party worked to overthrow the liberal provisional government that was headed by Bazargan. This was done through the ploy of holding the hostages at the U.S. Embassy in Iran. After a period of political unrest Bani Sadr was elected president. He represented a group of intellectuals who were trying to build a society that would reconcile Islam and contemporary life. They lacked a clear intellectual basis [for their efforts] and a political organization they could rely on. But the religious movement, led by the Islamic Republic Party gained almost absolute control over parliament, the Advisory Council, and the government. It formed a repressive organization, the Revolutionary Guard, that was subordinate to it and to Khomeyni's office. Although the struggle heretofore had been one between Khomeyni and his followers [on the one hand] and political groups which had been mere allies or partners of Khomeyni and his followers during the uprising, the struggle exploded sharply this time between parties that were ideologically and politically considered to be in Khomeyni's camp. This struggle went on for numerous months until the religious movement was able to get full control over power by removing Bani Sadr and gaining control of the presidency, the government, parliament, the media and all other organizations. During the period of this struggle Khomeyni pretended to assume the posture of an arbiter between the feuding movement. It has become confirmed [since then] that he had assumed that posture only to use the conflicts for his own good and to strengthen his own power. For Khomeyni soon revealed his total bias for the religious movement and for the Islamic Republic Party. This was a normal position that was consistent with the premises of his thoughts and with the origin of the formula of the sovereign power of the theologian which he relied upon in his absolute authority over Iran.

In over 3 years of the domination of the religious-political movement under the leadership of Khomeyni, all the hopes that had been held by many political circles in Iran, in the Arab homeland and in the region were dashed. The religious-political phenomenon and the Iranian experience had dazzled these circles making them hope that this regime might establish a genuine Islamic experiment of a revolutionary and democratic character that would be anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist.

The religious movement which was forced at the outset to accept some democratic practices and which had said nothing about some liberal and leftist tendencies, maintaining a dialogue with them in its efforts to consolidate the foundations of its power, soon gradually revealed its thoughts and its Fascist practices. It began directly and indirectly repressing those who opposed it, and it tried to gain exclusive control over all organizations. When it took over complete authority, it revealed its nature fully. It seized absolute power, and it did not accept any measure of participation. It no longer allowed any criticism, dialogue or opposition in any form, and it proceeded to attack members of the opposition in the most violent and brutal manner. Its methods outdid those of the Shah many times, and Khomeyni's regime became one of the most Fascist and the most brutal regimes in the whole world. Tudeh Party, which is involved in an opportunist alliance with the regime, was the only party exempted by the regime from its

oppressive campaigns; but it is lying in wait for an opportunity to seize power in a "professional" operation. Even clergymen who disagreed with Khomeyni's role in "the sovereign power of the theologian" and with his policies were subjected to Khomeyni's tyranny as was the case with Shari'atmadari.

The Iranian experience has failed not only in democratic terms by turning into a Fascist and a brutal experience, but it has also failed dismally in all other areas.

The Iranian experience has failed dismally in setting down any economic or social program that society could follow. It did not come forward with any formulations of its Islamic view of social and economic questions. Neither Khomeyni nor the other clergymen, not even those who were called in the earlier stages the ideologues of the Revolution, were able to come up with any solutions or formulations for these urgent questions. All they have done so far is make superficial and paroxysmal statements against the values and principles that were inherited from the past age. They proclaimed non-eastern and non-western slogans in the face of any problem that came up, after taking over full power and becoming responsible for managing all aspects of life in society, and they did not clarify precisely what their choices and their own formulations were with regard to practical application.

Some of those who do not want to admit to the dismal failure of the Iranian experience claim that "all" revolutions go through such a period. This is blatant falsification of history. It is true that revolutions do go through a period of political and ideological differences, but there has never been a serious revolution in history whose proponents did not propose a political, economic and social agenda at least in a broad framework. As far as the Islamic Revolution is concerned, which was led on Earth by Muhammad, may God bless him and grant him salvation, it presented its agenda gradually from the earliest stages of the Islamic call: it presented its theory in the Holy Koran and its basic theory of action in the Prophetic Tradition and in the tradition of the orthodox caliphs.

The hollow allegations made by Khomeyni's people about resisting imperialism and Zionism were fully exposed. For a long time this band exploited the matter of the hostages which was portrayed as "the greatest" blow dealt to U.S. imperialism. [Actually], it was not that at all. It was nothing more and nothing less than a psychological nuisance for the U.S. administration, and it did not imply any serious struggle against U.S. imperialism. The Iranian economy continues to be fully subordinate to the imperialist economy. In fact, it lost the partial independence it had gained under the Shah because local industrial and agricultural production has been suspended and government administration has disintegrated. This has increased Iran's need to import from all foreign markets, chiefly western markets. This is not a manifestation of prosperity, but it is one of the consequences of the economic crisis.

After the question of the hostages was exploited to liquidate domestic accounts as we've indicated, Khomeyni's people came back and settled this problem with an agreement that included shameful concessions.

The truth about the allegations made by Khomeyni's people concerning the struggle against Zionism and the liberation of Palestine and Jerusalem was revealed when their military dealings with the Zionist entity were brought to light during their aggressive war against Iraq.

Khomeyni's regime revealed its racist and Fascist nature when it denied the rights of Iranian Arabs and Kurds. It waged against them a war of extermination, and it persecuted their religious leaders like al-Khaqani and al-Husayni.

The Iranian experience failed dismally in the area of culture and education. It condemned the educational and cultural precepts that were handed down from the days of the Shah as non-Islamic, but it was unable to offer any alternative to them. To cover up this shameful impotence in this area it shut down schools and universities.

The false allegations made by clergymen in power about their adherence to religious and moral values is becoming clear every day. The clergymen [merely] replaced the despotic and exploitative classes of the Shah's days. Not only do they wield power in the country, but they also plunder and abuse their influence. They are engaged in moral corruption on the broadest scale and in a Fascist, backward manner.

This dangerous measure of lies and falsehoods with which the men who are in power in Iran are managing the affairs of the country and the people is also becoming clear every day. Lying, which is forbidden by all religions, is the prevalent characteristic of the clergymen's morals in Iran. They lie about politics, about the economy and about the information they provide about the war with Iraq. Those people no longer have any credibility in the outside world. In Iran enlightened groups have lost confidence in them once and for all. No one is influenced by their allegations except some segments of the masses who are the most backward and the most ignorant. They have become the only supporters of the clergymen's rule in Iran, and that support is diminishing daily.

This fact is an indication of the level to which this experience has sunk.

A revolution is a unique historical process around which social groups with the most awareness and the highest aspirations for progress rally. The Islamic call led by the Prophet Muhammad, may God bless him and grant him salvation, attracted the best men in Quraysh and in Arab society. It was based on persuasion, argument, knowledge and enlightenment. But in Iran it is only the ignorant, the illiterate and the deviant who continue to adhere to this regime, and these are people whose attitudes cannot be relied on. In addition to the fact that vast numbers of them are dissociating themselves from the government every day and every month, what is left of them can turn against the ruling authority at any time.

[The regime] may practice against them the same brutal methods of liquidation and murder that the ruling power in Iran is practicing today against the opposition. This is what the experiences of history are teaching us.

The Iranian experience has not yet come to an end, but it has failed miserably in all areas. All the hopes that its advocates and all its variously motivated followers had were lost. Only a small group of people who became involved with [the ruling powers in Iran] and whose destinies became closely associated with theirs do not want to recognize this fact. These are either the regime's followers in Iran or in the Arab homeland: for example, the regime of Hafiz al-Asad, some gangs of al-Da'wah Party and people like them who are malicious and disturbed.

The fact that this experience has so far not fallen does not mean in any way that its revival is possible. This experience is dead, and it is waiting for someone to carry it to the graveyard of history.

The historical outcome of the Iranian experience indicates that the religious-political phenomenon can have tremendous destructive power if circumstances are conducive to such destruction. This destructive power can be harnessed for progressive ends in special chapters of the movement of history if it is used against a reactionary, dictatorial regime that is corrupt and has ties with imperialism and Zionism, as the Shah's regime did. This power can also be harnessed against colonialist occupation or against an imminent foreign threat to a country. Religious-political movements, parties and trends cannot build their own state. Although this may seem possible in theory, it is not possible in practice in contemporary society; and the Iranian experience has confirmed that with concrete facts. When religious-political parties, movements and trends deny this major and momentous historical conclusion, their denial means that, motivated by their hateful fanaticism and their lust for power, they are leading the society in which they act to dissolution and destruction. This is what history will record about this phenomenon and its full manifestation in the Khomeyni experience in Iran.

The Religious-Political Phenomenon in Iraq

As we said before the religious-political phenomenon is not new. It has existed for a long time in countries of the Arab homeland and in countries of the region. Iraq was one of those countries where religious-political parties, movements and trends were founded. Naturally, they were founded on a sectarian basis as was the case with other countries. In Iraq, however, there were special details and complications which during the days of the Ottoman state were the result of the proximity with Turkey on the one hand, and proximity with Iran on the other. These special details and complications were also due to the fact that for almost 8 centuries Iran and Turkey took turns in controlling and occupying Iraq under the guise of religion and sectarianism.

Although these parties, movements and trends opposed communism and clashed with communists, particularly after the revolution of 14 July 1958 and the flow of the terrorist communist tide, the basic adversary which these parties, movements and trends have always targeted was the Movement of Arab Nationalism and its fearless revolutionary vanguard, the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party.

Despite the fact that the activities of these parties, movements and trends have been around for a long time and despite all the distortions and allegations made for numerous years against the thought and revolutionary experience of the party, these parties, movements and trends continued to represent a minority of individuals isolated from the masses and even from the devout public and most religious circles.

In numerous ordinary and heated confrontations between them and the party and Revolution, the difference between their influence and popularity and the influence and popularity of the party and the Revolution was vast.

However, these parties movements and trends did not come to an end in the revolutionary period. Despite their forementioned isolation and the blows that were

directed at them when they resorted to activities that were blatantly destructive, this phenomenon continued.

One of the most active groups during this period was a party called al-Da'wah Party. Its sectarian character was well-known, and it had suspect tendencies which became known in detail to most circles of the people. However, this party and other religious movements and trends did not at any time get to the point of presenting a serious threat to the party and the Revolution. Matters changed, however, after the Iranian Revolution.

Before explaining [this statement], we have to consider why this religious-political phenomenon continued under the Revolution in the context of the new society that the party was building. We have to consider how this phenomenon was able to attract a number of young people, misguide them and force them to carry out aggressive acts against the party and the Revolution.

First, we have to take a significant fact into account: that the religious-political phenomenon remains one of the permanent or semi-permanent fixtures [in human society] because it grows and develops in religious circles and among devout citizens. [Religious-political parties] use religious places as centers of activity. In many cases they can use religious rites and rituals to cover up their destructive political activities, which are anti-party and anti-Revolution, and to conceal their long-range political plans. Because the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party is basically a party of believers who respect religion and who observe religious rites and support clergymen and religious institutions, it will always be difficult for the agencies of the party and the state to make an early distinction between those who observe religious rites out of their faith and those who use those rites as a cover for political purposes.

Second, because of the normal relations that exist in the Islamic world communications between Muslim clergymen of different denominations in different Islamic countries are normal, and it is difficult to distinguish between normal and honest relations and those relations that cover up conspiracy and sabotage.

There are special additional circumstances pertaining to the religious-political phenomenon. It was primarily al-Da'wah party whose involvement in that phenomenon during that stage was hostile.

The primary authority for the Ja'fari sect is located in the city of al-Najaf in Iraq where sacred shrines frequented by a large number of Muslims are also located. Therefore, these areas continue to be areas of religious activity, not only for Arab clergymen, but also for Persian clergymen and clergymen of other nationalities. In objective terms this makes it possible for normal religious observance to become confused with the political schemes and activities of religious parties and movements, and it makes matters easier for them.

Both past and present experience have confirmed that the Persians and those who adopt their characteristics in religious circles and who are driven by their racist, anti-Arab complexes, by their aspirations and by the political aspirations of their governments to act against the Arab nation and against the Movement of Arab Nationalism have always been the most active and the most driven element in religious-political parties and movements. They are the ones most likely to use methods of treachery and destruction. These elements used to depend

on the assistance they received from Iran in the Shah's administration and in Khomeyni's. They received this assistance from ruling circles, from religious or capitalist circles or from all of them collectively.

In addition to the cover provided by religion and by sacred shrines, this assistance provided these elements with the material and technical components [that enabled them] to go on.

Third, the other reason that caused devoutness to become widespread among certain circles of young people--and this created fertile ground that religious-political circles used for their vile objectives against the people, the party and the Revolution--is due to what we previously mentioned about the crisis. This crisis had developed amidst the masses after the setbacks that befell the Movement of Arab Nationalism and the Arab Revolutionary Movement. This movement was unable to face the major challenges that were being presented by the present stage: in particular the challenge of liberating Palestine, that of changing the client and corrupt reactionary regimes and that of achieving independence from the super-powers with such power and effectiveness that would rally the majority of the Arab masses and awaken the enthusiasm of young Arabs. Although devoutness among young people and other social groups is to a certain extent a normal phenomenon that has to do with the question of faith, with the relationship between a person and religion, with that person's need for religion and with the special romantic notions which are exclusive to young people especially during their adolescence, the growth of this phenomenon would always have social and political significance.

On the other hand, a decisive period of transition from one age to another creates a state of disorder, anxiety and imbalance in certain circles of society. Under such conditions numerous phenomena emerge as a reaction to the stage of transition. Devoutness is one of them. Arab society in general is moving today from one age to another. Although the appearance and substance of this change differ in all the countries of the Arab homeland--and [this is] particularly true when the changes that are occurring in Iraq are compared with the changes that are taking place in other countries--this state of transition is a central phenomenon that is prevalent in all Arab society. Therefore, some of the reasons for this phenomenon are national; others are due to special regional conditions which are undergoing comprehensive and rapid change aimed at the establishment of a revolutionary, socialist society in which cultural standards change; standards of living grow at increasing rates; the modes of economic, social and cultural life change at a fast pace; and a decisive political change is also taking place in the country.

Most people understand these changes and stand by them. They consider them to be responding to their basic interests and their patriotic and national ambitions. However, individuals who do not understand the significance of these changes, who do not take part in them for one reason or another, or those whose inherited values, cultures or individual interests collide with these changes assume a negative posture toward them. Because of the inherited character of Iraqis, one that is charged with extremist emotions and reactions, such a negative attitude can turn into a hostile one if it is exploited by evil and organized forces working on a broad-scaled plan to impede the course of the Revolution and do away with it. Religion and devoutness constitute a very appropriate medium for attracting the formentioned people with negative attitudes. An individual who develops emotional problems because of the social changes [occurring around him] finds

emotional peace in religion and devoutness. He finds in them deliverance from the anxiety and tension he suffers from in the face of these changes. Under such circumstances in particular religious-political parties can take advantage of these phenomena, entice a number of young people and induce them to carry out their objectives. This is what actually happened in Iraq. Al-Da'wah Party took advantage of those young people with cases of anxiety and purposelessness. It filled them with fanatic, religious and sectarian emotions against the party and the Revolution and then forced them, when they were still in their adolescence, to carry out terrorist acts. At the same time that party failed completely to become a power and to have popular influence.

Fourth, the other reason [that caused devoutness to become widespread among young people] is to a certain extent related to the third reason: it is the nature of the previous stage of the party's and the Revolution's development.

As we said previously the party had spent numerous years after the [outbreak of the] revolution developing its own revolution and getting rid of many negative conditions and factors from within. When the Eighth Regional Congress was convened, the party felt that it was strong and that it had made progress toward achieving that objective. But the fact is that the party had not yet fully completed that task. Until a short time ago the party was still in the process of being developed.

Although the previous period was full of great accomplishments and profound and comprehensive progress in all areas of political, economic, cultural and social life, it lacked steady and growing continuity according to standards that would spread out to all those who look forward, who look for something to fill the vacuum, and who look for heroism and glory within the course and details of the daily and entire life of the revolutionary process. The previous period was also full of heated battles of struggle some of which were reminiscent of the historical battles of the nationalization of oil. And although the party did attract the support of the masses who rallied around it, the broadest sectors of support came from students and young people who believed in the party's principles. They worked under the party's banner and they joined the party's student and youth organizations. There were times of stagnation during this period which suggested that the Revolution had become a mere regime. Although the party occasionally paid attention to this matter, providing incentives to move the revolutionary process forward, progress was neither continuous nor sweeping. It did not include all of Iraq and all the areas of intellectual, political and organizational life. Therefore there remained in the revolutionary society a certain percentage of citizens, albeit small--particularly young people--who remained outside the revolutionary process. They did not experience the fervor of this process and were not directly influenced by it. Thus, their attitude toward it was negative. Religious-political parties, and particularly al-Da'wah Party, concentrated on this group, enticing them into their ranks and promising them combat action and heroic challenges. We must refer here to the fact that errors which were committed in the methods that were used to organize young people and students forced some of these young people and students to be entrapped by al-Da'wah Party and the other religious-political parties. We have to bear in mind that if the party fails to attract some ambitious young people and respond to their ambitions in a legitimate framework, these young people may go out looking for illegitimate and deviant ambitions amidst hostile forces.

The Iranian Revolution and the Religious-Political Phenomenon in Iraq and in the Region

The religious-political phenomenon which antedated the Iranian Revolution is one whose activities in one country or another would increase for a while and then subside, but it did not gain control over the popular movement or acquire the ability to take over power in any one of the countries. This phenomenon was forcefully invigorated to the point of frenzy after the revolution in Iran succeeded and after the religious-political group that is led by Khomeyni took over power there.

Doubts within and outside the circles of the religious-political phenomenon about the possibility that a religious-political style revolution could take over political power were substantially weakened if not altogether dissipated. These circles began to dream about the possibility of repeating the Iranian experience and taking over power wherever such religious-political parties, movements and trends of some power could be found.

Many political parties and movements and many intellectuals and writers were stunned by this major and surprising Iranian phenomenon. It seemed as though a tyrannical religious-political tide were sweeping the region.

In 1979 a tempestuous climate developed around the Iranian experience because of a mixture of opportunist and tactical attitudes assumed by some regimes, parties and movements that began trying to take advantage of the Iranian phenomenon and because of the superficial postures and emotionalism of some parties, movements and intellectuals. In this climate admiration was mixed with exaggeration and the self-belittlement of some. In reactionary and right-wing circles in particular the tempestuous climate around the Iranian Revolution aroused anxiety and even terror.

These conditions encouraged religious-political circles in Iraq, particularly al-Da'wah Party which had close relations with Khomeyni during his stay in Iraq, to shift to a phase of opposing the revolutionary authority in Iraq. Violent and destructive methods were used in expressing this opposition which was all but completely open and hysterical. Leaders of al-Da'wah Party moved to Iran, coming there under the full control of Persian elements who began to urge party members to carry out terrorist and destructive activities against individuals, organizations and public gatherings. They thought that such actions could undermine the revolutionary situation in the country and create sectarian strife there in preparation for the overthrow of the Revolution and the annexation of Iraq as a subordinate state to Iran under the leadership of Khomeyni and his followers.

Within a short period of time the party and the Revolution had mobilized a general campaign against this band and against the Khomeyni regime which was backing it up. This regime had revealed its true identity as a racist, anti-Arab regime, whose aim was to break up the Arab nation through sectarian strife and spread its influence and its control over Iraq and other Arab countries.

The terrorist acts carried out by members of the al-Da'wah gang aroused the strong condemnation and wrath of the masses. This increased the isolation of al-Da'wah Party, which became without qualification an enemy of the people and was being chased everywhere by the masses, by the party and by the authorized agencies of the state.

The party confronted the attempts that were made by this gang with a posture of patriotic and nationalistic principles. It frustrated the hopes of this gang and of the Khomeyni regime that has been backing it up. It also frustrated the hopes of those who thought that the party and the Revolution could be dragged into a sectarian course on the basis of the fact that the elements of al-Da'wah Party covered up their suspect intentions by affiliating themselves with a certain sect.

As a matter of principle the party and the Revolution have gone to considerable lengths to make a clear distinction between their attitude toward Khomeyni's regime and the al-Da'wah gang and their attitude toward religion and toward the devout popular masses. These masses are above all else the masses of the party and the Revolution. The party has emphasized the patriotic and national bond that binds together citizens of the same country, and it has also emphasized its genuine attitude toward religion: it did not assume any position or take any measure that was extremist or involved a reaction in this or another direction.

However, while we emphasize that the religious-political phenomenon in general and the gang of al-Da'wah Party in particular have become completely isolated from the masses and that their counteractions are merely actions and "technical" dangers of the terrorist and destructive actions they might carry out against individuals, organizations and public gatherings, it is essential to emphasize two important points:

First, the religious-political phenomenon will not die altogether. It will continue to have some measure of power as long as the present Iranian regime survives. Although this phenomenon has been weakened by the failure of the religious-political experience in Iran, by facts about the Iranian regime coming to light and by the dissolution of that regime, the religious-political phenomenon will not undergo a terminal setback unless the Khomeyni experience fails completely and finally. We have to expect that even when this experience fails--and that will not only break the back of the religious-political phenomenon in Iraq, but it will also break its back in all the countries of the region--the religious-political phenomenon will not disappear altogether from the political and social scene.

Second, it would be a mistake to assume that the religious-political phenomenon in Iraq is a phenomenon that is associated only with the Ja'fari sect. This phenomenon does in fact exist among followers of the Sunni sect whose attitudes against the party and the Revolution are similar to those of their counterparts in al-Da'wah gang. The struggle against this phenomenon must be aimed at it wherever it is found in one or another sect and among the followers of this or the other religion. All those who are part of the religious-political movement manifest attitudes of hostility toward the people, the party, the Revolution and the national cause.

However, when faced with any case of this kind, we must set priorities that are relevant to our methods of confrontation. We must set these priorities according to the degree of danger posed by a specific case and the kind of counter-methods that are being used in that case against the party and the Revolution.

If a case [of hostility] remains confined to a general organizational and political framework, it would be confronted in a way and with methods other than those which would be used when weapons are used and conspiratorial activity is undertaken against the party and the Revolution.

The Attitude toward the Religious-Political Phenomenon

In dealing with the religious-political phenomenon attitudes that were held in the past toward this phenomenon as well as the conduct of some party members toward the religious problem as a whole must be taken into account. This approach stems from the party's method of being critical as well as self-critical so it can overcome mistakes and proceed on a revolutionary course in a more correct manner. As we said previously, the religious-political phenomenon is not a new one. Ever since its outbreak, the Revolution has faced this phenomenon and the different hostile postures [it has generated]. Before the revolution in Iran broke out, there were direct and violent confrontations between the party and the Revolution on the one hand and between religious-political groups on the other.

During the past period a number of party members of various ranks assumed improper attitudes toward the religious problem and the religious-political phenomenon. These attitudes were incompatible with the principles of the party or its proper essential practices. This fact was reflected to one degree or another on the reality of this phenomenon in the country, and it compromised the operation that was undertaken by the party and the authorized agencies of the Revolution to confront that phenomenon.

What specifically were the errors that were made in this area?

Some party members began showing off their religious rituals. Gradually, religious notions began to outweigh party notions when basic questions of thought and application were being dealt with in all areas the party was facing in the process of comprehensive revolutionary change.

The phenomenon of devoutness began to spread gradually in some party circles. Devout practices and their outcome were affected and prodded by the wish to imitate high-ranking party members. It was thought that these practices were required by the leaders and also urged by the phenomena that used to appear to a certain degree in some circles.

The matter did not stop there. Some colleagues began considering [the observance of] religious rituals as a standard for making party evaluations.

This conduct created harmful cases that had an indirect effect on the religious-political phenomenon in the country.

The diffusion of these practices to a certain degree created a state of confusion in the ranks of the party. These practices were debated by party members some of whom were bewildered by this matter. Should a party member engage in religious rituals in an affected manner in order for him to be a good member of the Ba'th Party? Or isn't this one of the conditions for a good party organization? There were other questions as well. These practices also generated a kind of opportunist behavior in which some people became engaged. These people became engaged in religious rituals to satisfy their officials who were carrying out these rituals and asking their colleagues to do the same so they can rise to higher positions in the party and in the state.

This situation placed the party in a position in which it could not be as attentive as it needed to be to the growth of the religious-political phenomenon. It was not able to mark with accuracy the measure of hostility between it and that phenomenon.

When the thoughts and conduct of party members about the religious problem and about religious practices are confused, their vigilance in the face of attempts to exploit religious practices is weakened, whether these religious practices are ordinary or slanted in a political direction that opposes the party and the Revolution. This created an opportunity for the religious-political phenomenon to grow in the absence of adequate vigilance by the party.

The pervasiveness of contrived religious practices among party members and the fact that this phenomenon was passed on to followers and supporters created a state of relative confusion between the general membership of the party and the general membership of religious-political parties. Two individuals would be engaged in religious rituals at the same time and sometimes in the same place. Their understandings of some problems and some intellectual, social and psychological questions would thus get closer. This situation helped weaken the party's vigilance in the face of the growth of the hostile religious-political phenomenon in the country, since the general membership of the party acts basically as the party's watchful eye in tracking anti-revolutionary activities.

On the basis of methods of practice [that differ] from one sect to another religious practices must follow a certain sectarian format when the religious centers of this or the other sect are frequented. Religious practices must assume a sectarian character when they are contrived; they are not like ordinary practices that are carried out when the relationship between a person and his God is an ordinary one.

This conduct gradually causes distinctions to be made between party members on a sectarian basis. At the same time the party had formed a unifying organization for all members regardless of their religious and sectarian origins. This is a very dangerous phenomenon that affects the substance of the party relationship and creates irrelevant divisions within the party.

Also the fact that the public watches party members engage in such behavior intensifies sectarian feelings, affiliations and divisions which the party and the Revolution have been trying to contain within a unified patriotic and national framework for the people.

Before the outbreak of the revolution in Iran and several years before the religious-political phenomenon emerged as a political threat of some consequence, [our] compatriot Saddam Husayn had called attention to the forementioned mistakes that were being committed by party members in the face of the religious problem and the religious-political phenomenon. He had also warned that persistence in these mistakes would foster this phenomenon, encourage sectarian divisions in the ranks of the people and weaken the party and the Revolution.

[Our] compatriot Saddam Husayn had sounded these warnings repeatedly on numerous occasions. He had warned the leaders again and again at staff meetings. A special interview focusing on this matter was also published under the title, "A View of Religion and the Heritage." It is essential to record here the leadership's regret that these warnings were not taken as seriously as they should have been by those colleagues who were making these mistakes. They continued their practices for a long time after these warnings were made and until a late date. When the leadership became strict about these erroneous practices, they were relatively diminished.

We are being called upon in this congress to assume an integrated and a final position of principle on this matter so that the party can come out with a position that is unified in outlook and in conduct.

But before we do that we have to wonder: if some of our colleagues have considered notions of devoutness and devout practices to be a moral or an ideological alternative to the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party and a way to solve the essential questions of life, why then did they choose [to join] the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party?

Religious tendencies and religious-political tendencies have been in existence for a long time; they are not recent discoveries. Why didn't those colleagues choose these tendencies as their way of changing life, building a similar life and outlining its goals?

Why is it that after spending a long time in the party, they want to impose these religious tendencies on the party or spread them within the party when these tendencies have no basis in the party's ideology and traditions and when these notions and practices have not been approved by a responsible party leader or by a responsible party congress?

This pertains not only to this phenomenon but also to an essential matter regarding the party that we must always bear in mind. This is something that we may not be lenient about at all in the future. No member of the command nor anyone of any rank in the party and no group in the party has the right to spread among the ranks of the party or impose on its members new notions, standards or measures of evaluation that have not been approved by party congresses and by the higher command and that were not arrived at through democratic debate.

The proper course for dealing with the religious problem and with the religious-political phenomenon is that whose main outline was delineated by [our] compatriot Saddam Husayn in the pamphlet, "A View of Religion and the Heritage."

Saddam Husayn says, "When we talk with pride about religion and [our] heritage, we must understand that our philosophy does not consist of heritage or religion as such. Our philosophy consists of what is expressed by our intellectual premises and our policy, which is related to those premises. One of the central matters in our society which influences our characters, our heritage and our traditions is the past with all its factors of life and all of life's traditions and laws. Religion is another; but our faith is not the product of everything in the past and in religion. Our faith is rather a comprehensive, dynamic view of life; a comprehensive solution to life's tight and rough spots which can push life forward on the road of revolutionary change."

Saddam Husayn also says, "Our party is not impartial [when it comes to a choice] between atheism and faith. Our party always sides with faith. But our party is not a religious party, and it ought not to be that."

He also says, "What is required of us is to oppose the state's politicization of religion in society. We are to oppose the forcible intrusion of the Revolution into the religious problem. We are to go back to our original belief, and we are to cherish religion without having politicizing it. When one turns oneself into a preacher or a religious guide and asks people from an official or a party

position to observe religious rituals, one is then required to tell people how to perform these rituals. And this will entail obligations that would create problems and complications if one were to become involved in them. It is there that differences based on the individual judgments of Islamic sects begin."

He also says, "Let us let people observe the ordinary religious rituals of their choice without interfering in their affairs. Our basic condition for this is that people do so without contradicting or clashing with our policy of changing and building society according to the choices made by the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party. We warn them against using religion as a cover for politics or as a cover for creating a state of conflict and contention between the Revolution's course and objectives and religious practices."

He also says, "We cannot react to the political use of religion by advocating heresy or the adoption of a religious appearance or by calling for interference in religious affairs and rituals."

Party activists have to adhere to this proper course of principle, and they are to translate it into their private practices, in their dealings with the masses and in their treatment of the religious problem and the religious-political phenomenon. As far as individuals are concerned, the party guaranteed individuals in the party and in society the freedom to practice the religious rituals they believe in as individuals. These practices will not be used as a basis for making negative or positive evaluations of them. The party's basic standards of struggle, principles and morals--are the standards [that are to be used] in evaluating party members and in evaluating individuals in society.

Arab Conditions, Positions Discussed

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[Text] Chapter Seven: National Questions and Arab Conditions

The political reports issued by the Eighth Regional Congress, which was convened in January 1974, and by the Eleventh National Congress, which was convened in September 1977, dealt exhaustively and in depth with national questions as well as international questions and relations. Both reports looked ahead at future horizons, defining for the party and its Revolution in Iraq their tasks during the subsequent stage.

The political report of the Eleventh National Congress concentrated on Arab conditions in general. It presented an exhaustive and an accurate review of the development of conditions in the Arab homeland over a long period of time between the Eleventh Congress and the Tenth National Congress in 1970. On the other hand, the report covered the period that preceded the Eighth Regional Congress as well as a period of over 3 years following the congress. The report also dealt with international conditions and developments and their relationship to the party, to the Revolution and to basic national questions, particularly the Palestinian question and [the question of] Arab unity. The report also defined the directions and functions of activity on the international scene.

The political report that was issued by the Eleventh National Congress stressed

the importance of knowing accurately and precisely the principal ingredients in Arab and international conditions. The report also stressed the importance of observing at an early time the directions in which these conditions develop.

On its observation of the previous period the political report says that the experience of that period indicated that "At the time when we did not have adequate interest, experience and ability, we rushed headlong into grievous errors and we were dragged into perilous grounds. This hurt the party considerably and weakened its role and its standing in the Arab Revolutionary Movement and on the international scene. The picture changed, however, when the party began showing an interest in studying Arab and international conditions, when it acquired the experience and the ability to analyze these conditions correctly and when it acquired the ability to understand the complicated and tangled aspects of these conditions. Most of the major steps that were taken by the party and its revolution in Iraq were taken after the forementioned factors [of interest, experience and ability] had become available. With these steps the party and its revolution in Iraq made progress toward their objectives and avoided attempts made by colonialists, reactionaries and forces of regression to conspire and isolate them" (p 63).

The report also emphasized that what we can conclude from the experience of the previous period is that "The Arab Revolutionary Movement lost much in the struggle against colonialists, Zionists and reactionaries. This was not because the colonialists, Zionists and reactionaries were actually stronger than the Arab Revolutionary Movement in all instances; those losses were rather due to reasons that had to do with the movement itself. Among those reasons is the fact that the Arab Revolutionary Movement lacked an accurate understanding of Arab and international conditions as they really were. It also lacked the ability to discover developments in these conditions at an early time and to devise a proper strategy and appropriate tactics accordingly. The movement was thus defeated on one battlefield after the other" (p 163).

The basic components of Arab and international conditions, which were defined by the political report that was issued by the Eleventh National Congress, did not undergo fundamental change. However, since that congress was convened in September 1977 and until this congress convened, significant developments did take place in Arab conditions, in regional conditions and in international conditions. It is essential that these conditions be described and analyzed and that their relationship with basic national questions and with the development of the Arab Revolutionary Movement be understood. In the previous period, since the Eleventh National Congress, and since this regional congress in particular, the party and the Revolution have been engaged in remarkable and effective activities on the Arab and international scenes. These activities differed in many ways from those in which they were engaged in the previous period. During that period also the influence of Iraq, which is led by the party, on Arab conditions grew, and its international relations and international standing changed.

1. The Camp David Accords

The political report that was issued by the Eleventh National Congress analyzed the course of the settlement which began after the June defeat, particularly in the period that followed the 1973 October War. The report analyzed the role that Arab and international parties played in this course, and it analyzed the positions of each one of these parties and the possibilities for change in these positions.

The analysis made by the Eleventh National Congress was exhaustive and accurate. It emphasized accurately the ingredients and basic facts of this course, and it affirmed in a correct outlook toward the future that this course would always harbor variables, possibilities and new elements that had not been previously taken into account. This requires that leaders continue to analyze situations and assume proper positions in the face of those variables and new ingredients in the Arab and international posture [in general] and in the course of the settlement in particular.

A short time after the Eleventh Congress was adjourned, there was a very serious development in the course of the settlement. Al-Sadat visited occupied Jerusalem and entered into direct negotiations with the Zionist enemy. The negotiations were sponsored by the United States, and al-Sadat negotiated until he signed the Camp David Accords on 18 September 1978 and the so-called Peace Treaty in March 1979.

Al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and the Camp David Accords created a significant change in the political map of the Arab homeland. They created a new line-up on the Arab and international scenes regarding the question of the settlement.

As indicated in the political report of the Eleventh Congress, a broad pro-settlement front did exist before al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, notwithstanding the relative differences that existed in the policies and postures of members of that front. Al-Sadat's regime was one of its foremost elements. The Syrian regime, the Jordanian regime, [some] PLO leaders and all Arab right-wing regimes were members of that front which also included the eastern and western camps.

After his visit to Jerusalem al-Sadat broke away from that front and entered into direct negotiations with the enemy and with Zionists. His negotiating style was overly submissive and overly subordinate to U.S. imperialism.

The other Arab parties in this broad pro-settlement front could not follow al-Sadat's course because of the same conditions and factors which the political report of the Eleventh National Congress referred to. It was conditions and factors such as the Kilometer 101 talks and the Sinai Agreement that caused other Arab parties in the settlement process to part company, relatively speaking, with the course that al-Sadat followed in the settlement process after the October War. The split between these parties and al-Sadat became greater after the Sinai Agreement.

This created new confusion and disarray in the positions of Arab and international parties on the settlement question. New conditions arose, and these had to be dealt with in light of these variables.

The first notable reactions that followed al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem were those efforts that were made by so-called progressive regimes and parties of the Palestinian Resistance to convene a meeting to look into this new and serious development in the situation and to consider what must be done about it. In those days two invitations were issued simultaneously for such a meeting. One was issued by Iraq, and the other was issued by Libya.

It became evident that the parties which were invited to the meeting--the Syrian regime in particular and the international forces that were behind that regime--

were supporting [the notion] that the meeting be held in Libya. Iraq's posture was not merely an organizational problem or a mere negative posture on its part. This matter involved a central political trend that was later confirmed by the results achieved by that conference and by the organizational nature and directions of the so-called Steadfastness and Confrontation Front.

Convening the conference in Baghdad would have meant giving the leadership role to the party and the Revolution which have their own position regarding the foundation and the outcome of the settlement course. This would affect the directions and the outcome of the conference. But convening the conference in Libya, despite the dramatic demonstrations staged by the Libyan regime rejecting the settlement would have meant confining the course of the conference to the framework of the settlement course that preceded al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. An attack on al-Sadat's capitulatory policy and on his visit to occupied Jerusalem would have been considered satisfactory.

The conference was held in Tripoli from 2 to 4 December 1977. During and after that conference in which Iraq took part, participating Arab parties became engaged in a sharp and broad debate about the settlement course and its consequences on the Arab Revolutionary Movement and on basic national questions. It was quite evident that the Syrian regime was persistent about this course and that it was supported in this by the leadership of the PLO. The Algerian regime adopted what it called a policy of supporting the PLO's and the Syrian regime's choices since the two are parties that are directly concerned with the problem. In real terms this meant supporting the settlement course. The positions of the Libyan regime were mostly ludicrous and emotional and ultimately served the settlement course too.

The Tripoli Conference did not produce any specific results, nor did it generate any real power that could put an end to al-Sadat's capitulatory course or stop that course from spreading to larger areas on the Arab scene. The Tripoli Conference was merely a political propaganda demonstration that lacked serious results and the ability to survive.

After that conference leaders of the party and the Revolution called for a new conference in Baghdad, and they prepared a draft charter for a real front which they called the Steadfastness and Liberation Front. This document contained an accurate national analysis of the Arab situation, and it defined the requirements for a serious confrontation by designating certain obligations for all the parties of the front. In composing this document the leaders made every careful effort to use a positive style and to maintain a flexibility that would not conflict with principles. They did that to prevent the Syrian regime or any other party from using superficial excuses for not attending the conference and ratifying the proposed document. The leaders made every careful effort to see to it that the document they proposed would be regarded as a preliminary draft, and they affirmed their willingness to talk about the document and to discuss any point made in it.

But the Algerian regime, prodded by the Syrian regime and supported by other parties, played a trick. Instead of responding to Iraq's invitation to convene the conference in Baghdad and instead of making serious preparations for discussing the document that Iraq had presented at a suitable time before the conference was to be convened, the Algerian regime made arrangements to convene a conference in

Algeria, and it considered that conference an extension of the Tripoli Conference, that is, an extension of the peaceful settlement course which that conference had adopted. The leadership [in Iraq] decided to boycott the Algeria Conference and it communicated its opinion unequivocally in letters that were sent to the president of Algeria and to conference participants.

Subsequent experience has shown that the course which the leadership adopted was the correct course. [Although] the second conference was called [the conference of] the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front, it did not produce any serious results that had any effect to speak of against the course of al-Sadat. In this it was like the first conference.

In fact, the consequences of that conference were harmful from another standpoint.

Al-Sadat's policy should have been confronted in one of two ways. A cohesive and a serious front made up of a number of Arab parties was to be set up. This front would propose a national agenda, and it would invite other Arab regimes to join. Those who wish to join the front and take part in the agenda would, and those who did not wish to do so would not. At that time a specific line-up [of countries] would take shape on the Arab scene. [The other way would be] to strive to reach an agreement on a minimum agenda against al-Sadat's course in which all or most of the regimes would join. But organizing a front made up of a small group of countries that do not have a serious and a concrete agenda and that have no real power to influence the situation would create in practical terms an unjustifiable division on the Arab scene. This would enable al-Sadat to rally other regimes to his side to one or the other degree. And this is what actually happened after the conferences of the so called Steadfastness and Confrontation Front. There were outcries, demagogic and ludicrous postures on one side and bewilderment and confusion on the other. All this weakened and destabilized the Arab position. Al-Sadat used that to his advantage, going as far as he could in his policy by signing the peace agreements.

2. The Arab Summit Conference in Baghdad

The accurate analysis of the Arab position made by leaders of the party and the Revolution and their precise judgments about the positions that must be assumed after the signing of the Camp David Accords were confirmed.

Al-Sadat pursued his policy to its ultimate outcome. The group that [called itself] the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front had not been able to find any effective forces or factors that could impede this policy or curb its possible expansion on the Arab scene. After al-Sadat signed these accords there was a strange case of anxiety and confusion. Despite the cries of anger and protest that prevailed on the Arab scene against these accords, the feeling prevailed that the Palestinian question had died and had ceased to exist. After Egypt was no longer part of the Arab confrontation against the Zionist enemy and after al-Sadat's regime had allied itself completely with U.S. imperialism there was nothing to do but despair or adapt and adjust to this new situation.

1. To review the details of these events see, "Madha Jara fi al-Mintaqah wa ma huwa al-Matlub fi al-Marhalah al-Rahinah" [What Happened in the Region and What Is Required at the Present Time], Dar al-Thawrah, February, 1978.

At this critical stage in the life of the Arab nation and in the course of the Arab-Zionist struggle, an enormous historical responsibility was placed on the shoulders of the party and the Revolution. They had to take the initiative to stop the decline in Arab conditions; they had to formulate a new position for the Arab nation in the face of al-Sadat's policy and the Camp David Accords.

These were difficult historical moments, and the choices were difficult and critical. But it was inevitable that the initiative be taken and the historical responsibility assumed regardless of possible losses and difficulties.

After lengthy discussions in the command and a detailed investigation into all possibilities, [our] compatriot Saddam Husayn presented a program for facing the situation that contained three essential points. These points are:

First, Iraq and Syria were to be considered a single confrontation field against the Zionist enemy.

Second, an Arab summit conference was to be convened in Baghdad where a unified Arab position on the policy of the Egyptian regime was to be adopted.

Third, a pledge was to be made to the Egyptian regime that payment of 5 billion dollars would be guaranteed over a period of 10 years if it abandons the Camp David Accords so that Egypt can face its economic problems.

These proposals were approved at a joint meeting of the national and regional command and the Revolutionary Command Council, and a historical statement comprising these principles was issued by the command in October 1978.

We will deal below with the subject of the summit conference; and we will deal with the subject of relations with the Syrian regime in a subsequent chapter.

Ever since Arab summit conferences began in 1964, when President 'Abd-al-Nasir convened one, and until the last such conference was held in Cairo on 25 October 1976, the party has not believed in that medium being the best [that can be used] to express the true Arab position. With the exception of a mini-summit conference that was held in Tripoli, Libya in 1970--the head of the Iraqi state participated in that conference--and the Seventh Arab Summit Conference that was held in Rabat--and compatriot Saddam Husayn actively participated in that conference too--Iraq did not send high-ranking delegations to take part in Arab summit conferences. Iraq was critical of the outcome of these conferences, and it [also] boycotted some of them, such as the Cairo Conference that was held during the events in Jordan and the Algeria Conference that followed the 1973 October War.

Each one of the summit conferences that was held after the June defeat gradually made the settlement process easier. The summit conference that was held in Algeria after the October War, the one which Iraq boycotted, helped legitimize the settlement course which was pursued by the Egyptian and Syrian regimes and by the leadership of the PLO. Therefore, both the principles and the politics behind the postures of the party and the Revolution on these conferences were proper. From the standpoint of principle the party and the Revolution had to endure, regardless of the consequences and losses that could befall them, the responsibility of exposing the settlement course and criticizing it. From the standpoint of politics, Iraq's participation in these conferences was not very likely to have an effective influence [on their outcome].

After the Camp David Accords, however, conditions changed appreciably.

First, the party and the Revolution had to assume the historical responsibility of doing at least the minimum to oppose these accords. That is, they had to stop the impending breakdown in the Arab condition, and they had to prevent other Arab parties from joining al-Sadat's course.

Second, the historical situation at that time and the growth of Iraq's influence on the Arab scene gave Iraq a better opportunity than that which it had in the past to influence the course of Arab events effectively.

Therefore, this historic opportunity had to be seized, and the Arab summit had to be used in the face of this situation.

Events [later] confirmed that the command's analysis was correct and that the agenda which had been proposed by [our] compatriot Saddam Husayn was far-sighted. Although most Arab parties tried to prevent Iraq from assuming a position of leadership among the Arabs and although U.S. imperialism and al-Sadat's regime tried to stop this conference from being convened, that conference was convened and participation was good both with regard to the number of participating countries and the level of principal officials who attended. This conference was to thwart one of the basic plans of U.S. imperialism in the region, and it was to thwart a major political program for which the U.S. president had assumed personal responsibility, even though a rather considerable number of Arab regimes is associated in some measure with U.S. policy and is thus subject to its pressures.

The time was right, but the command did not depend on that alone. Instead, it took energetic and intelligent action to contain all the attempts that were being made to prevent the conference from being convened, to have it postponed or to weaken the level of participation in it so that it would fail to make important decisions. And the conference was convened in Baghdad as scheduled.

Despite all the tricks and attempts that were made at the conference to delay its proceedings or to water down its resolutions, the command was able to steer the conference to success with its political acumen which stems from principles. The command was able to make the conference come out with unequivocal and concrete resolutions against the Camp David Accords and the Egyptian regime's policy. These resolutions had such a significant impact on the Arab and international scenes that the Baghdad Conference came to be considered one of the most important, if not the most important, of Arab summit conferences and one of the most prominent events in contemporary Arab history. The conference was a significant turning point in Arab policy which had to do with the joint action of Arab regimes.

What were the main results of the Baghdad Summit Conference?

The Baghdad Summit Conference succeeded in formulating a unified and a clear Arab position that rejected the Camp David Accords and condemned al-Sadat's regime for effecting them.

The Baghdad Summit Conference also came out with significant resolutions offering substantial financial assistance on a regular basis to Syria, Jordan and the PLO to enable them to shoulder the additional military, economic and other burdens

they would have to bear for not entering into peace negotiations and for opposing the Camp David Accords.

Although the resolutions of the Baghdad Conference about the Palestinian question and the Arab-Zionist struggle represented the minimum and were much less than the party and the Arab Revolutionary Movement had aspired to, they did constitute a clear and an agreed upon agenda that could stand up to the capitulatory program which was represented by al-Sadat. This fact later had an effect on the international attitude toward the Palestinian cause: it modified that attitude gradually in favor of the Arabs.

The conference set certain political and economic penalties that were to be used against al-Sadat's regime if it continued to pursue the Camp David course and signed an agreement with the Zionist enemy. When this treaty was signed the following March of 1979, a conference of Arab ministers of foreign affairs and the economy was convened to make practical and executive decisions in the light of the Baghdad Summit resolutions. Although tricks and attempts like those which were made at the Ninth Summit Conference were repeated to prevent concrete and strong positions from being taken, this conference ultimately came out with resolutions requiring a full boycott of al-Sadat's regime and the transfer of Arab League offices from Cairo to Tunisia. These resolutions were approved by a majority of Arab regimes. It was the first time in the history of Arab conferences, both summit conferences and conferences on other levels that something like that had happened.

One of the important results of the Baghdad summit was the fact that it put together a steady mechanism for joint Arab action on the summit level. An agreement was reached at the Baghdad summit to hold an annual conference for Arab heads of state and kings. One year after the ninth conference the tenth conference was convened in Tunisia, and the eleventh conference was held in Amman on schedule despite the fact that the Steadfastness and Confrontation group had boycotted it. Under pressure from the Syrian regime Lebanon too did not attend the conference.

Organizing joint Arab action in this manner on a regular basis would strengthen this action which mostly continued to be irregular and produced no actual results.

Thanks to the Baghdad Summit Conference and the serious and concrete results of that conference, the situation on the Arab scene changed considerably. After the state of confusion and pessimism grew into despair, atmospheres of solidarity and optimism prevailed again. The bases for this optimism were clear and unequivocal despite the enormous betrayal of the Egyptian regime and despite the imbalance that Egypt's temporary departure from the scene of confrontation with the Zionist enemy had created in the balance of the Arab-Zionist struggle.

The Baghdad Summit Conference confirmed the analysis of the political report that was issued by the Eleventh National Congress. It had defined the Arab and international elements of a settlement and indicated the difficulty such a course would have to reach its ultimate objective even if all concerned parties were in agreement. The results of the summit conference also confirmed the accurate diagnosis made by the forementioned report of the concrete variables in the relationships that Arab regimes have with international powers. The National Congress had actually referred to the fact that Arab regimes which have close

ties to the United States had gotten in a position in which they could assume postures that manifest some independence from U.S. policy. Despite the close ties these regimes have with the United States, they did in fact assume a position at the Baghdad Summit that was counter to the American plan. They endured some pressure from the United States, and some of that pressure was intense.

The positions assumed by these regimes were the product of a set of reasons, and they were taken under complex and involved circumstances.

At first, as we indicated, these regimes were not inclined to assume very stern and strong positions on Camp David and on al-Sadat's regime. They tried various ways to take the edge off the situation, but they were subjected to strong pressures from the masses in their countries and from Arab public opinion whose wrath against Camp David and against al-Sadat's policy had risen. Conditions in Iran during the last days of the Shah were on the verge of collapse, and U.S. policy was surrounded by suspicion and pronounced impotent. The region was awash with all kinds of possibilities, and a general sense of anxiety prevailed in reactionary regimes. The relative independence from U.S. policy manifested by some regimes, a characteristic that is likely to grow or diminish depending on circumstances, helped make these regimes assume these positions. Also al-Sadat's personal insolent behavior against these regimes and their officials helped these regimes assume these positions. That was an additional factor in the situation.

Al-Sadat's treacherous plan faced a series of setbacks after the Baghdad Summit, which was the primary cause of these setbacks. Had there not been an Arab consensus against the Camp David Accords, al-Sadat, the Zionist entity and U.S. imperialism would have been able to proceed more easily with that plan.

Also international forces that sided at the outset with the Camp David course showed considerable interest in the results of the Baghdad Summit. When the resolutions of that conference were implemented in March 1979 and when the course of the Baghdad Summit was confirmed at the Tunisia Summit in November 1979, most international powers began dealing with the Palestinian question and the Arab-Zionist struggle in a manner that was closer to that of the unified Arab position as defined by the Baghdad Conference.

The resolutions condemning the Camp David Accords that were made at the Islamic Conference and at the summit conference for non-aligned countries; the positive development that took place toward condemnation of these accords by African countries; and the relatively positive development in the position of western European countries would not have taken place had not a unified Arab position on the Camp David Accords been formulated. It was that unified position that came out of the Baghdad Summit.

But al-Sadat persisted in his course despite all these setbacks. He challenged the Arab nation and dug in his heels on his policies and his positions. This increased the intensity and the breadth of the popular opposition to him in Egypt until the matter ended with his assassination on 6 October 1981. His vice president, Husni Mubarak, then came to power.

Al-Sadat's death has actually created a new situation whose full features are not yet distinguishable. There are, however, preliminary indicators of this situation which are to be given continuous consideration by the command. Appropriate

positions that are based on principles and on the political given factors that are associated with serving those principles are to be assumed.

One of the clear indicators of this situation is Husni Mubarak's knowledge that it was the fact that al-Sadat had gone too far in his treacherous policies, as well as his erroneous positions, that cost him his life. These treacherous policies and erroneous positions almost did away with the entire regime. Therefore Mubarak has been very slowly and gradually following new methods vis a vis the questions that Egypt and the region are facing. On the domestic scene Mubarak has been trying to relax tensions and reduce fears. He has also been trying to distance himself from the atmosphere of corruption that characterized al-Sadat's administration.

On the Arab scene Mubarak put an end to the propaganda campaigns that were waged against Arab countries, and he was harshly critical of the Zionist entity's aggression on Lebanon. Mubarak also declared a positive position on the battle we are fighting against Iran. He has been affirming Egypt's Arab identity and the obligations of Arab Egypt.

Despite its commitment to the Camp David Accords in its relations with the Zionist entity, it is evident that Mubarak's regime does not want to submit to Zionist pressures, particularly after the withdrawal of the Zionist entity from Sinai on 25 June 1982. In fact, Mubarak's regime is trying to confront the Zionist entity in a gradual and escalating manner. Husni Mubarak has also begun affirming Egypt's identity as a non-aligned country, and he has been trying to soften relations with the Soviet Union.

Although it would be premature to make a final judgment about Husni Mubarak's administration and how it could end up, it is essential to affirm objectively that a positive development is taking place now in Egypt. It is necessary that this development be considered with a sense of national responsibility, and it is also necessary that we use the means that are available to us under current Arab conditions, without giving any cover to Camp David, to change this new situation as much as possible.

In this regard we have to become clearly aware of the demagogic campaigns that are being waged against this tendency [to change this situation]. These campaigns do not stem from positions of principle. Those who organize these campaigns, like al-Asad's and al-Qadhdhafi's regimes are known for their treason and their collusion against the Arab nation. Their alliance with Khomeyni's regime, which is allied with the Zionist entity, is the best evidence of this. The primary intention of these campaigns is the continued isolation of Egypt. In practical terms this means making Egypt the prey of the Zionist entity and of U.S. imperialism, and that is the foundation of the Camp David plan and the foundation of the Zionist scheme against Egypt.

What is required on a national scale is the use of all possible means to isolate and weaken the Camp David course under the new conditions on the Arab and international scenes. It is not the isolation of Egypt that is required. The resolutions of the Baghdad Summit were quite unequivocally resolutions against Camp David and not an attempt to isolate Egypt.

The ultimate isolation of Egypt from the Arab homeland and the failure to

interact with any positive development that takes place in Egypt, either through the present regime or through any other method, is not a national position. It would undoubtedly serve the Zionist scheme.

3. Relations with the Syrian Regime

The historical statement that was issued by the command on 1 October 1978 included a paragraph that affirmed the willingness to make Iraq and Syria one battlefield opposite the Zionist enemy. Although the statement confined itself to this aspect of the relationship with the Syrian regime, it did consequently imply a willingness to set up a set of guidelines for political relations with this regime that differed from the previous set.

The command was fully aware in making that decision, which stemmed from the historical responsibility that fell on the shoulders of the party and the Revolution after the Camp David Accords. The magnitude of al-Sadat's betrayal and the major loss that resulted from Egypt's departure from the circle of the Arab-Zionist struggle placed a momentous historical responsibility on the shoulders of the party and the Revolution. In light of that fact many matters almost lost their significance, even if they were extremely difficult and bitter.

The image that the command had of the Syrian regime's basic nature and ultimate aims had not changed when that decision was made. The analysis that had been made of that regime by the Eleventh National Congress was on everyone's mind when that decision was made.

At the time that the command's statement was being announced on 1 October 1978, Hafiz al-Assad sent a letter to the command proposing that a dialogue between the two countries be started and that new relations be established between them.

The command gave this letter serious consideration out of its historical appreciation of the Arab situation and its earnest wishes that no opportunity or possibility be lost to provide an effective opposition to al-Sadat's betrayal.

On that basis and on the basis of the principles [articulated] in the statement of 1 October 1978 the command decided to assume a favorable position toward the letter from the president of the Syrian regime. It sent a letter in reply to al-Assad's letter affirming its position of principle on the Arab situation and on confrontation requirements. The command expressed its willingness to upgrade the foundations and results of relations of struggle with the Syrian regime. That action would be aimed at opposing the treason and continuing the course of liberation. The command sent an envoy seeking explanations from the president of the Syrian regime about the nature of his letter which was general and ambiguous. The command wanted to know the nature of the relationship between the two countries that the Syrian president was envisioning in the subsequent stage.

As is his custom, the president of the Syrian regime did not define his ideas and his thoughts with precision. Instead, he spoke in general and ambiguous terms about the fact that he was willing to establish relations between the two countries on any level. He placed the responsibility of setting the guidelines for the relationship on the shoulders of the command in Iraq.

The command reconsidered the problem with all the earnestness and sincerity such

a problem required, and without changing its judgment of the Syrian regime, it decided to set up guidelines for relations between the two countries. If adopted and honestly applied, these guidelines would ensure close coordination between the two countries. That coordination, which would take place in political and military areas in particular, would be the foundation of opposition to al-Sadat's treason. Such coordination would create broad prospects for developing those guidelines further into some form of unity between the two countries. Because of the party's judgment of the Syrian regime's position on the basic questions of the party, these guidelines were confined to the official government. Consideration of coordination on the level of the party was to be postponed to a subsequent stage after the effects of that stage [become known].

The guidelines that were set up by the command were based on a theory defined by [our] compatriot Saddam Husayn at that time. [According to that theory] we would have to seize the historical opportunity and work according to the notion, as expressed by Saddam Husayn, that "clean water drives away brackish water." The command had no illusions about the nature of the Syrian regime. But on the basis of its principles, its deep and romantic faith in the question of unity and its inclination to give the other party the benefit of the doubt, the command concluded that it would not let the nation lose this opportunity. For it may harbor some good that could change current deteriorating conditions and create a new situation that would provide the nation with better conditions for opposing al-Sadat's treason and imperialist and Zionist threats.

The Syrian regime accepted the proposal that was made by the command. On that basis the president of the Syrian regime visited Baghdad on 24 October 1978 and signed what was then called the National Action Charter on 26 October 1978. A Supreme Political Organization was created to coordinate relations between the two countries.

At that time and subsequently the president of the Syrian regime used his well-known secret methods to show that he wanted to turn a new leaf in relations between the two countries. While the summit conference was in session, an agreement was reached to develop relations beyond the stipulations of the National Action Charter. This was to include consideration of guidelines for unity between the two countries and consideration of relations on the Arab scene as well.

After that date the joint committees that were set by the charter went to work to coordinate activities between the two countries and standardize the laws, regulations and structures that can be standardized. Joint committees also began trying to solve economic problems that were pending between the two countries, such as the oil pipeline question, the transit question and the question of the waters of the Euphrates.

Despite the fact that the Syrian regime and its president pretended they wanted to develop relations, it was evident to anyone who was carefully following the course of relations between the two countries, and particularly in the sensitive areas, that the Syrian regime was acting with extreme caution in dealing with Iraq and that it was taking every precaution to avoid rushing into areas that would really count in the unification process. In the area of propaganda, however, the Syrian regime was plunging into directions and dashing off guidelines that would make Syrian and Iraqi citizens believe that it was the Syrian regime that wanted unity and that it was Iraq that did not, etc.

In the context of military relations, the Syrian regime did not agree to any serious step despite the fact that circumstances at the time urged that there be prompt and effective military unity and that Iraqi military divisions be moved to the Syrian front to ensure what was called "a strategic balance" with the Zionist enemy after Egypt got out of the battle. The Syrian regime behaved in a manner that attenuated matters, and it forced [consideration of] that aspect of the relationship to be postponed and delayed.

An agreement was reached that the Syrians would offer their proposals on the form of constitutional unity between the two countries, and the command [in Iraq] would make its proposals on the form of party unity.

On the eve of the departure of compatriot Saddam Husayn to Damascus on 28 January 1978 to head the Iraqi delegation to the meetings of the Supreme Organization, the command [in Iraq] received from the Syrians ambiguous proposals about the guidelines for unity. These proposals contained numerous and overlapping guidelines from which no specific constitutional formula could be derived. Actually that ambiguous and bombastic style was the prevailing style that was used in all the proposals made by the Syrians, whether these proposals pertained to the constitution or to other areas.

In the talks that were held between compatriot Saddam Husayn and the president of the Syrian regime in Damascus, the required formula for unity was discussed. Would that formula retain the international character of the two countries, or would the two countries unite and form one international entity? The Syrian president hesitated about determining the formula. In his well-known manner he [eventually] accepted a formula that was proposed by compatriot Saddam Husayn: that there be a federation and that it be one international entity.

The command looked into this matter very carefully, and numerous meetings were held to discuss it. A constitutional formula defining the relationship between the two countries was drawn up. According to that formula the two countries would unite and form a federation that would be one international entity, but each country was to keep its own regional organizations. This formula was an expression of a genuine desire to proceed with the unification process. It was also an expression of an accurate, objective and responsible judgment of the conditions and obstacles that stand in the way of the unification process, which required an original program that was realistic and dynamic and could advance that process forward.

This was an original, balanced and flexible formula that created in a serious and practical manner earnest prospects for furthering the unification process between the two countries.

At the same time the command proposed an original and a balanced program to unite the party and establish an interim national command that would manage the party's affairs during the period of transition, until it is fully united and a federation between the two countries is established.

The command's two proposals to unite the party and unite the two countries were presented to the Syrians who delayed their response to these proposals. Although the command [in Iraq] informed the Syrians that it was willing to answer any questions about the matter, the command of the Syrian regime procrastinated and

delayed making a determination of its position on both plans. The Syrian regime even cut back on the boisterous propaganda campaign that it had organized in the early weeks that followed the charter.

The Syrian regime's replies to the proposals of the command [in Iraq] came after a long delay. They demonstrated in a concrete way the Syrian regime's true positions vis a vis the unity of the party and the unity of the two countries. As far as the unity of the party was concerned, the proposals of the Syrian regime asserted the existence of two parties and not two branches of the same party. The Syrian regime proposed a preliminary relationship which resembled the formula of the Supreme Political Organization in both countries. These proposals were miles apart from the view that the command [in Iraq] had of the matter. The aim of the command [in Iraq] was to reunite the party which had been divided as a result of the setback that occurred on 23 February in 1966. The command [in Iraq] wanted to reunite the party on a firm, partisan and national basis that takes into account the lengthy conditions for the division and overlooks previous disputed questions in order to achieve that noble objective. Statements were being made in the circles of the Syrian regime and in internal bulletins that there were two parties that could not be reunited to form the party that used to exist before February 1966.

Although the command [in Iraq] had presented one plan that expressed its point of view about the appropriate formula for uniting the two countries at the current stage, the Syrian regime once again presented two dissimilar plans. One of them appeared to be a merger. When its main ingredients were analyzed, however, it turned out to be an ambiguous plan for a federation in which the limits of central and regional authorities were not accurately defined. That plan also deliberately confused tendencies for a merger with tendencies for a federation in an illusory attempt by the Syrian regime to embarrass the command. On the aspect of the economy, for example, the Syrian proposal brought the national wealth of the two countries under the jurisdiction of the central authority which would distribute the wealth to both countries at its discretion. But in popular representation the Syrian proposal regarded both countries as equal despite the difference in their populations. This principle is inconsistent with the merger formula that is implied by the matter of disposing of the national wealth, etc.

The second formula which the Syrian regime proposed was that of a fragile confederation similar to the formal union it had established with al-Sadat's and al-Qadhdhafi's regimes. The command rejected that formula in view of its basis.

When the talks of the Supreme Organization were held in Baghdad in June 1979 with the president of the Syrian regime attending, discussions about the unity of the party reached a dead end. The president of the Syrian regime insisted on the Syrian position of rejecting unity for the party, adopting the course outlined in the Syrian proposal and establishing a "front" between the party [in Iraq] and what was called the party in Syria. It was evident that this proposal would be rejected by the command because it had nothing in common with the principles of the party and the joint national struggle. And as far as the state was concerned, no clear agreement was reached there either even though we accepted in principle the first formula they had proposed, which was called the United Arab Republic, after some essential changes were made in it to resolve its contradictions on the one hand and to affirm the formulas of collective leadership in the supreme organizations of the federal state on the other. The matter remained pending.

In its talks with the president of the Syrian regime in Baghdad in June 1979 the command adhered to its principles and its candor. The command agreed to all the points about unity that were mentioned in the proposals of this regime. It was obvious that these proposals had been made to embarrass Iraq because the Syrian regime believed that its proposals would be rejected. The command agreed [with the notion] that the wealth in any country was to be considered the central wealth of the united state, and it was to be enjoyed by the people of the united state who make up one nation. However, the command reminded the president of the Syrian regime that the national principle must be applied to all the formulas of the unification process between the two countries.

However, this position that is based on principle and stems from good intentions was countered by trickery and contradictions in the assumptions that were made by the president of the Syrian regime.

The June talks were actually a failure. It was evident that the president of the Syrian regime actually wanted the charter formula to continue, and he wanted to gain time.

In order to keep this failure from popular public opinion, which would be disappointed by it, the command figured that it was necessary to give the unification process more opportunities, even if that were done at the expense of actual fact. This was because the command believed that the fight for the process of unity must continue. On that basis the command proposed a formula for a unified political command, which involves a superficial change in the formula of the Supreme Political Organization. It was a change whose import could become stronger if the Syrian regime wanted that.

Although we gave Syrians the benefit of the doubt in analyzing all the appearances and practices of their regime in the period between the signing of the charter and the discovery that the president of the Syrian regime had been conspiring against the party and the Revolution in July 1979, many of the actual practices of the Syrian regime on the local, Arab or international scene did not indicate that there was a genuine and a sincere determination [to pursue] unity.

The Syrian regime had kept up all its previous practices in Syria, particularly in the face of our fellow fighters. In fact, oppressive measures against our fellow-fighters were tightened. When the charter was in effect, people in Syria expected some kind of relaxation in the regime's policy toward other forces. People expected the Syrian regime to scale down its sectarian course, but the actual practices of the regime were the exact opposite.

Despite the fact that new climates in the relationship between the two countries emerged, the Syrian regime held on to all the gatherings and elements that oppose the party and the Revolution, and it kept its close relations with these elements. These elements have been using Syria as a center for their hostile activities.

On the Arab scene the Syrian regime kept up all its former relations and lines [of conduct] regardless of their congruity with the charter. As far as Lebanon was concerned, the Syrian regime would always dodge the command's sincere appeals to find a national solution that would preserve the unity, the Arab character and the stability of Lebanon and restore normal conditions in that country.

Although the Iranian regime began its hostile campaigns against Iraq during the period when the charter was in effect, hopes for the unity of the two countries were running high and flourishing. [At that time] the regime of Hafiz al-Assad was extending bridges to the Iranian regime, and his press was praising that regime.

In the talks that were held between representatives of both sides to reach common guidelines for Arab and international positions, the Syrian regime was once again evasive. It did not assume a clear position of principle on the settlement process and on UN resolutions 242 and 338, [resorting instead to] methods of indecisiveness and delay.

Finally, in July 1979 the facts behind the Syrian regime's rapprochement with Iraq were revealed. A letter sent by Hafiz al-Asad in October 1978 [was discovered]; it was part of a conspiratorial plan in which a number of traitors who were former members of the command had participated.

The techniques of indecision and delay which were used by the president of the Syrian regime in the unification process were part of that scheme. The aim of the Syrian regime was to play for time until the circumstances for the conspiracy which it had been preparing with that band of traitors were right.

When the conspiratorial scheme was discovered, all the sensitive information regarding that scheme was presented to the representatives of the Syrian regime when they visited Baghdad in July 1979. In yet another attempt to deceive they tried to deny their conspiratorial role in that scheme. But it was no longer possible to overlook these facts and to proceed with a process whose falsehood had been established [and with people] who had conspired against the party, the Revolution and the cause of unity.

The command does not regret this experience despite its bitterness. A historical leadership is one that confronts challenges, embarks on experiences and faces all good and evil possibilities. But what is important is to preserve principles and maintain constant positions. Embarking on any experience may provide an opportunity for the achievement of national objectives and for exposing forgerers, swindlers and conspirators. What matters in this regard is winning the confidence of the people. The masses of the people have confidence in the sincerity and wisdom of the command. But the Syrian regime, which is wallowing in conspiracies and evil, is losing the confidence of the people every day and is digging its own inevitable grave.

4. The Declaration of President Saddam Husayn on 8 February 1980

In talking about the Baghdad Summit Conference we referred to the new conditions that developed in the Arab scene. We talked about the new methods of national action that were required by these new conditions without which the independence of the Arab nation and the integrity of Arab territory and of basic national rights and interests could not be preserved. We also referred to the harmful consequences which the Camp David Accords have had on the Arab-Zionist struggle and on the national questions of the nation. Actually, one of the grave consequences of this agreement is the fact that possibilities for the international polarization of the Arab homeland and of the countries of the region have increased.

The fact that Egypt shifted from the position of being a liberated, non-aligned state that supports liberation movements to a position where, on the one hand, it is opposing all these notions and, on the other hand, becoming completely associated with U.S. imperialism has created a significant change in the balance of powers in the region. Before the Baghdad Summit some circles, who are clients of U.S. imperialism in some Arab countries, were encouraged by that matter to call for closer association with U.S. imperialism. On the other hand, Arab communist circles, some Arab parties thought to be satellites of the Soviet Union and some superficial circles that are not nationalistic began calling for relations with the Soviet Union. But what they were calling for under the pretext of confronting the growing danger of the influence of U.S. imperialism [in the region] was more like subordination.

On the basis of the party's national principles of independence and non-alignment, Iraq tried to head off these deviant tendencies during the Baghdad Summit and to affirm the independent national course that lies in opposing the schemes of U.S. imperialism. It tried to affirm that the limits of friendship and mutual cooperation with the Soviet Union were not to be exceeded for precepts that infringed upon the independence of the Arab nation. Iraq also forcefully affirmed this course of independence from international blocs. It affirmed its adherence to the policy of non-alignment at the Havana Conference for Non-Aligned Countries, and it reaffirmed its adherence to that policy forcefully at the Tunisia Summit Conference.

But successive changes in the region pressed the need for a shift to clearer guidelines which would be more compelling in sparing the Arab nation the dangers of international polarization.

Therefore, the command felt that it was necessary to undertake a new initiative of such a nature as to affirm the principles of the Arab nation's independence from international blocs. The command felt that it was necessary to adhere to the principles of non-alignment in international relations and to refuse any form of foreign presence on Arab soil.

[Our] compatriot Saddam Husayn put this initiative in the form of an eight-point declaration which he announced at a mass rally in the People's Stadium on 8 February 1980.

The declaration included essential principles that have to do with the nature of relations between Arab countries. It called for prohibiting the use of armed force in disputes that arise between Arab countries for whatever reason and for joint Arab action to solve these disputes. The declaration also included basic principles on relations between Arab countries and neighboring countries that are based on [a mutual] respect of sovereignty, on banning the use of military force between Arab and neighboring countries and engaging in fruitful cooperation in all fields.

Reference must be made here to the fact that the command had anticipated the difficulties that would impede the application of the principles of this declaration. The command anticipated which Arab parties in the countries of the region and on the international scene would oppose this declaration directly or indirectly by devious methods. The command anticipated that it would be necessary to consider this declaration a long-term agenda for which we would fight on the

national scene to win the support of the masses. We would fight to obtain for this declaration the approval and the commitment of the largest number of regimes.

The national declaration received broad support from many Arab regimes which made their positions known to Arab officials officially or through direct deliberations with the president and his deputies.

The national declaration also won earnest and sincere support from honest national forces that believe in Arab nationalism and in the principles of independence. These national forces are not influenced by international parties.

As the command had anticipated, the circles that directly or indirectly opposed the declaration were the same circles that have ties with foreign powers, which feared the effects the contents of the declaration might have on their ambitious designs or their opportunist policies. These are the powers that do not want Iraq's leadership role to take its course.

Communist circles began denouncing the principles of the declaration. They claimed that Iraq was putting U.S. imperialism on an equal footing with the Soviet Union which has stood beside the Arabs in their struggle against Zionism. Communist circles also distorted the contents of the declaration and claimed that its purpose was to preserve existing regimes.

The Libyan regime supported the declaration, but it soon withdrew its support because of the emotional problems it has with the leadership of the party and the Revolution. The Libyan regime withdrew its support for the declaration under the influence of the communists and the Syrian regime.

The Syrian regime found that the principles of the National Declaration would deprive it of [the chance to] pursue its opportunist policies of suggesting rapprochement with the Soviet Union in order to exact payments from the United States, the West and sometimes right-wing Arab countries. Sometimes the Syrian regime would exact payment from the other side by suggesting a return to closer relations with the United States another time.

The unequivocal principles of the declaration forces every party that accepts it to follow a constant policy of principles in the face of international blocs. And this does not suit the nature of this unprincipled and opportunist regime.

The position of the Syrian regime is based on the problems it has with the leaders of the party and the Revolution who gained the respect and appreciation of the Arab masses after that declaration and because of all their national positions that are based on principle. The Arab masses began looking at the leaders of the party and the Revolution as trailblazing national leaders.

The leaders called for a national congress to be convened in Baghdad to discuss the declaration in a national and democratic manner. Communist circles and the Libyan regime boycotted this congress. A delegation representing the Algerian regime did not attend. Despite this organized boycott and the allegations that were made against that congress and despite the vile propaganda campaigns that were launched against the congress and against the principles of the declaration, the congress was attended by national, respectable parties, movements, forces and figures from most countries of the Arab homeland and countries to which Arabs had

emigrated. It was a national congress in which the principles of Arab nationalism and independence were affirmed. The discussions that took place at that congress were highly democratic. This congress made the major difference quite clear between the original and national positions and practices of the leaders in Iraq and the positions and practices of the other regimes which are considered to be progressive. These other regimes had organized congresses that turned out to be nothing more than chaotic rallies that lacked seriousness and democracy and were incompatible with the basic principles of the Arab Revolutionary Movement.

Our observation and our profound analysis of the essential initiatives and the central policies that were followed by the leaders, particularly since the call to the Baghdad Summit Conference was issued and in the subsequent period, enables us to say that Iraq, under the leadership of the party, has taken a good measure of the initiative in the Arab situation. The masses, national figures and even some regimes are now looking at Iraq and at [our] leader, Saddam Husayn as the leader for national action at this stage in the life of the Arab nation.

Iraq's qualifications lie in its natural characteristics as one of the large and significant Arab countries. It is a major economic power that has educational and cultural capabilities and energies. Iraq's qualifications also lie in the strong and stable conditions that were established by the party's revolution; these were infused with a national, revolutionary and socialist character. Iraq's qualifications also lie in the latent capabilities and the stored energies that were developed and unleashed in the country by the Revolution. They lie in the extraordinary ability [Iraq has shown] it has to oppose aggression, as was the case in the holy war against the Iranian aggression. Iraq's qualifications lie in all the components of military, political and economic power that were uncovered by this war.

It is these qualifications under the energetic and creative leadership of [our] compatriot Saddam Husayn that placed Iraq in this position of taking the initiative and exercising influence on the Arab situation. Iraq's influence and role were manifested in the success of the special style it used in managing relations with Arab regimes in many of the successful initiatives that were realized in the previous period. After the Baghdad Summit Iraq was able to foil the Zionist scheme to annex Jerusalem and to have it considered the eternal capital of the Zionist entity.

The president visited Saudi Arabia in Ramadan--on 5 August 1980--and presented to Saudi officials the text of a declaration warning countries that recognize this decision and keep their embassies in Jerusalem of a total political and economic boycott by Iraq and Saudi Arabia. This declaration achieved immediate results: none of the countries recognized the Zionist decision, and the countries that had embassies in Jerusalem withdrew their embassies from that city. At the Amman Summit conference it was Iraq that proposed the Arab development plan. The conference adopted that plan even though the resolutions it made in that regard left much to be desired. Nevertheless, the plan remains an outstanding indication of joint Arab action. It was also with Iraq's initiative that the Amman Conference turned out to be a conference of Arab economic cooperation that could produce results whose nature in the future could be significant to Arab solidarity.

It is this position in the Arab situation which Iraq has acquired under the leadership of the party and of [our] compatriot Saddam Husayn that was and will

continue to be one of the principal reasons for the conspiracy against the party, the Revolution and the leadership in particular. Zionists, superpowers and the Arab forces of dissolution and decadence do not want to see progress in the Arab situation. They do not want the Arabs to have a national leader who would look out for the Arab nation, close the gaps that exist in it, confront the dangers that befall it and work patiently, steadily and courageously to bring about progress in the Arab condition and put [the Arab world] on the road to independence, power, solidarity and progress. The Khomeyni conspiracy against Iraq, which is supported by Zionists and by numerous international and Arab agencies, ended in war. At the present time that war is the basic part of the conspiracy whose aim is to confine the Pan-Arab role of Iraq and eventually put an end to it.

However, as we play this leadership role on the Arab scene, we have to realize that the new conditions in the Arab homeland are sensitive. We are not to confuse these conditions with those that existed during the fifties and part of the sixties.

The new conditions in the Arab homeland require a new style of leadership. They require new ways of dealing with popular and official Arab conditions so these can be revamped to serve basic national goals.

One of the most important ingredients that is required [in this new style of leadership] is action with long-term political, economic and cultural objectives. We are to concentrate on what the Eighth Regional Congress and the Eleventh National Congress called for: the need to concentrate on and to strengthen the economic and educational infrastructures in the Arab homeland as the firm foundation upon which the Arab unity that is being hoped for can be built. We are to set a radiant national example in our conduct on national questions, and we are to be prepared always to give of ourselves and to make sacrifices for these questions. It is this style of leadership and these methods that the Arab nation and the Arab Revolutionary Movement need at this stage of their development.

During the coming period this will require difficult and complex activities. It will require intense efforts and major sacrifices from the party and the various institutions of the state. It will also require continued close supervision by the command to maintain constant control, on the one hand, on the balance between principles and the exigencies of strengthening the capabilities of revolutionary forces and [expanding] the horizons of the Arab Revolutionary Movement. On the other hand, [close supervision by the command will be required to control the balance between] existing objective conditions and the methods of action they prescribe.

5. Conditions in Iran and Their Effects on Arab Conditions

Iran is one of the important countries neighboring the Arab homeland. It is located near those regions in the Arab homeland that are most sensitive and most important at this historical period. It is natural that conditions in Iran and the nature of the policies pursued by the existing authority in that country would directly or indirectly affect conditions in the Arab homeland and in this part of the Arab homeland in particular.

Iran exercised significant influence on these conditions during the Shah's

administration, since the Shah's regime was an important part of the general western imperialist scheme that was being led by the United States. Iran was a member of the Baghdad Pact, [later renamed] the Central Treaty [Organization], from the time it was formed and until the fall of the Shah. The Iranian regime had very close relations with the Zionist entity, particularly in the areas of intelligence and the economy.

U.S. imperialism had given the Iranian regime a special and distinguished role in the region since the early seventies. On the one hand, most Arab right-wing regimes in the region were either small or weak. On the other hand, the Arab-Zionist struggle was complex and Zionist schemes were influential in the United States. Iran was [chosen for that special and distinguished role] because of its proximity to the Soviet Union, because of its vast geographical terrain, because it overlooked the Arabian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, because it was a populous country and because it is one of the primary producers of oil. Thus, U.S. imperialism gave Iran the role of policing the Gulf region to contain Soviet influence on the one hand and to strike progressive regimes and tendencies in the region on the other. The coffers of the United States' military arsenals were laid open to the Shah's regime, which was furnished with large quantities of the most modern weapons. The Shah was also receiving the most modern weapons that were being produced by the countries of western Europe, and he had extensive arms dealings with the Zionist entity.

This course in U.S. policy coincided with the outbreak of the Revolution in Iraq and the emergence of its libertarian, nationalist and socialist identity. It also coincided with the Arab Revolutionary Movement at that time and the escalation of the Arab-Zionist struggle. This U.S. course coincided completely with the racist, expansionist tendencies of the Iranian regime and with the Shah's deranged dreams of building a large Persian empire. One of the first steps that the Shah took to realize his expansionist dreams of an empire and to carry out the U.S.-Zionist scheme was to abrogate the 1937 treaty with Iraq. He did that in June 1969. The Shah then began to threaten the sovereignty and independence of Iraq on a large scale. He conspired against the independent revolutionary regime in Iraq, and he pulled it away from its national missions in the struggle against the Zionist enemy, as we previously explained when we dealt with the Kurdish problem in other chapters. The Shah took advantage of the relatively large numbers of Iranians living in the countries of the Arabian Gulf. He used their presence with the full support of imperialist forces to strengthen his influence in these countries and to exercise that influence.

The Shah adopted a very clever policy in managing his relations with Arabs. He established very close relations with some Arab regimes, and he developed his relations with other regimes that did not impede his expansionist policy. The Shah tried to improve relations with the Syrian regime, which had received large loans from his regime in 1974. At the same time Iraq was engaged in a political and an open semi-military struggle against the Shah's regime. At the same time also the Shah was intensifying his extreme hostility to Iraq and to genuine national and revolutionary tendencies in the Arab homeland. In the Gulf area and in Saudi Arabia the Shah pursued simultaneously a policy of domination and a carrot and stick approach.

We are not engaged here in making a comprehensive analysis of conditions in Iran, looking at all the ingredients of these conditions both in the Shah's

administration and in Khomeyni's. [Our] inquiry will be confined to factors that are directly or indirectly related to Arab conditions and national questions.

The Shah's experience failed, and the effects of that failure were tumultuous and dramatic because of the breadth of the popular uprising against the Shah which lasted for almost 1 year and [eventually] led to the erosion and fall of that regime.

What is certain, however, is that this failure was not strange to the influences and involvements of imperialist forces. It is true that the Shah's regime was a principal supporter of U.S. imperialism and the West and their policies in the region. But the United States and its agencies are always looking for better alternatives to serve their ambitious designs and their schemes. The United States does not insist on any regime that is allied to it no matter how many services it had provided it in the past. [The United States will abandon any regime] if it finds that regime unable to continue rendering its services and accordingly serving its schemes and its interests.

In the last years of the Shah's administration it became clear that this regime was having numerous difficulties. The absolute dictatorship that was practiced by the Shah and the fact that very limited political and social circles were monopolizing power in Iran created vast opposition against the regime. That opposition encompassed clergymen, the bourgeoisie, the liberal right wing and the ultra left.

The Shah's economic policies failed, and there was a sharp economic crisis in Iran that hurt not only toilers but also the petty and middle bourgeoisie. Various sharp conflicts were churning in Iran under the severely repressive practices of the government against all political forces in the opposition and against Iranian ethnic groups that were hoping to get some of their national rights.

The Shah developed dangerous visions of grandeur because he had been in power for a long time; because he had had absolute power; because of the position that Iran came to occupy in the American scheme in the region; because of the growth of Iran's military capabilities; and because billions were accumulating in the Shah's hands.

Although the Shah did not depart basically from the general framework of the scheme and policies of U.S. imperialism, [domestic] conditions in Iran became disturbing and unsettling for the United States, particularly during the Carter administration when the so-called human rights policy was being employed. In the last years of his rule the Shah, prodded by the interests of his country which he saw were growing and becoming more effective than they had been in the past, tried to regulate and normalize his relations with the Soviet Union. He made arms deals with the Soviet Union, and he set up projects with the Soviet Union of a strategic nature. There was in particular the gas project which would allow gas [to be transported] from Iran to the Soviet Union where it would be used for local consumption. This would enable the Soviet Union to implement a strategic project of its own: the gas pipeline to western Europe. That project would become a factor linking the Soviet Union with Europe closely forever. The United States very strongly resisted this project.

It was all these factors that brought about and brought out the United States' involvements and influences [in the region]. The extent and hidden secrets of these involvements and influences are still not fully known, even though many of them were revealed by the Shah and his supporters themselves in [the process of] facilitating the task of changing the regime in Iran and replacing it with another in which clergymen and the religious movement would play a principal part.

The United States believed that using religion could realize for it a strategic objective. It thought, particularly after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, that the religious movement could form a strong wall against the spread of communism and against the possibilities that Soviet influence in Iran and in the Islamic countries of the region would grow.

Zionism, which has its own schemes and plays direct or indirect roles in adapting U.S. policies and encouraging some tendencies in these policies, played a very effective part in the process of using religion. Zionism, however, was careful to play its role behind the scenes. Zionists are well aware of the fact that stirring up the religious question in this manner with the divisive, sectarian complexities and complications involved therein could create imbalances and disturbances in Arab society, particularly in the countries that are in the eastern part of the Arab World and in the Arabian Peninsula. This is quite consistent with the constant Zionist scheme to weaken the countries of this region by stirring up sectarian, religious and racial divisions in them. With their clever means Zionists also try to show the United States that such conditions could bring about improved possibilities for the United States to take from the countries of the region their oil resources and impose on them U.S. protection under the pretext of protecting them from communism and from the Soviet threat.

One of the main characteristics of the Zionist Movement is the fact that it makes long-term plans. It establishes realistic alliances with countries, powers and movements that may be opposed to it in some aspects but that serve it [in other areas] and help it bring about its tendencies and its basic objectives. This is what Zionism cares about; it is an opportunist and an immoral doctrine that relies totally on the notion that the end justifies the means.

Zionists know that their entity in occupied Palestine is a strange entity to the countries of the region which have rejected it. The Zionist entity is the only entity that is founded on a racial and religious basis. All existing entities in the region, before the Iranian Revolution, were founded on a national or an ethnic basis. On the other hand, the Arab entities that were established on the basis of the Sykes-Picot Agreement and which were politically, economically, culturally and militarily weak before the Zionist entity came into being have now been developed and they now have growing political, economic, cultural and military capabilities. Despite all the negative conditions that exist in these entities or within the general Arab framework, this development is scaring Zionists because it means that the expected course of history does not lie in its favor. Consequently, the Zionist entity could lose its strategic political, military and cultural superiority in the face of surrounding Arab entities. In practical terms this means that the expansion of the Zionist entity would be contained and weakened. Such a development would put Zionists in a position of being forced to look for alliances and to try and create new conditions to ensure their strategic superiority. Zionists know that the prevalence of the religious

phenomenon in the region will inevitably and ultimately break up existing entities in the region and will cause [other] entities to be established on a sectarian basis. In practical terms such a development would mean that the Zionist entity with its strategic superiority in the region would last forever. The Zionist entity would no longer be a strange entity that is founded on a racial and religious basis, since all the entities in the region would be like that. Because existing entities will be broken up and because it is inevitable that the new sectarian entities will fight among each other, the Zionist entity will forever impose its strategic superiority on all of them. This is what lies behind the Zionists' encouragement of the Khomeyni phenomenon, which is a divisive phenomenon in Islamic society. This is the basis for the existing alliance between Zionism, the Khomeyni phenomenon and the Khomeyni regime in Iran.

This analysis does not at all mean that the revolution of the Iranian masses against the Shah's regime was the creation of imperialist, American and Zionist circles. The party rejects the very foundation of such superficial analyses. With its intellectual, social, revolutionary and socialist bases the party knows quite well that in every society where tyranny and injustice prevail, where corruption and exploitation are widespread and where foreign economics and politics dominate, factors for a revolution or a popular uprising have to develop. This is what the case was in Iran.

Because of its political, social, economic and cultural conditions the Shah's regime was likely to come to an end. But the involvements of imperialism, Zionism and other international powers were also an actual fact among the many variables that occurred in the region or in the Third World. The power and effectiveness of these involvements and influences were determined by numerous subjective and objective factors.

These involvements and influences assumed a special significance in the Iranian situation because Iran had been deeply penetrated by American and Zionist networks and their presence in the country and because there was no organized and clearly defined political, intellectual and organizational power in Iran to bring about change in that country. The process of change was quite extensive, and disparate and conflicting personalities that were intellectually and politically incompatible took part in it. Many foreign countries had direct or indirect influence over what was happening in Iran in 1978. U.S. officials interfered directly in dealing with all parts of the Shah's authority which had become scattered, and they dealt with opposition parties which had historical and close relations with many U.S. powers and prominent personalities. Also numerous western regimes, agencies and personalities interfered in Iranian conditions, both in the government and the opposition. By providing Khomeyni with the means for engaging in activity, France played an important role in Iranian events, and Iranians who had become French citizens also played a role in the operation [that changed conditions in Iran].

It is quite certain that in the final stage of the disturbances in Iran Americans and Zionists chose to encourage Khomeyni's movement to take over political power in Iran beside the powers and personalities that had relations with American and western circles. However, historical facts always affirm that the schemes of major countries, and particularly western countries, often end up with situations that produce fortuitous results which lead to a series of complications and outbreaks that do not show the results of the scheme, particularly in its early

stages, in accordance with the plans that had been made by these countries. In some cases the original scheme may be damaged and conflicts may develop, but historical facts also affirm that it is the final outcome of such events that matters. And this is what imperialism and Zionism are counting on.

The change that took place in Iran in 1979 created a strange and a very dangerous and confusing situation in the region. It clearly affected the balance of powers in the region. The behavior of most Arab regimes, organizations and parties toward the Iranian regime was somewhere between fear, anxiety, opportunism or collusion.

We stated at an early time, and experience has proven this, that all the Arab regimes and circles which supported Khomeyni's regime, cheered for it and claimed to be associated with it, did in fact have opportunist motives. By supporting that regime they wanted to ward off some of its dangers and damages.

The party and its revolution in Iraq were the only Arab party--yes, the only one--whose conduct toward the revolution in Iran was based on principle. Their conduct was congruous with their nature and was characterized by earnestness and far-sightedness.

Weak, right-wing Arab regimes in the region that were dazzled by the surface splendor and power of the Shah's regime were alarmed by the tragic downfall of that regime. They were alarmed further by the personal fate of the Shah who became an outcast unable to find refuge for himself despite his enormous fortune, until al-Sadat took him in out of openly self-serving motives.

Because of what was revealed and learned at that time about the United States' involvement in the fall of the Shah, or at least--and there was agreement about this--its inability to protect him from falling, faith in the United States and in its ability to protect its allies and its followers was weakened. In the period following the change in Iran these regimes did not know how to behave in the face of the new tense conditions. One time they would try to appease and flatter the new regime; another time they would look for ways to protect themselves from the United States and the West; and a third time they would talk about an independent course even while they were unable to ensure the requirements of such independence.

The attitude of Palestinian organizations toward conditions in Iran was determined by the political tendencies and the Arab and international associations of these organizations. The Fatah Organization, whose positions are based on a tactical policy and not on a sound analysis of events, behaved quite recklessly with the Iranian Revolution. Leaders of this organization began making "pilgrimages" to Tehran where they made silly demagogic speeches about "the alliance" between the Palestinian Revolution and the Iranian "Revolution." They talked about the role that "revolution" would play in liberating Palestine and Jerusalem and all the rest of these well-known statements. All the fraternal advice and warnings that we gave them about the fact that such hasty conduct would backfire proved futile. We told them that their conduct would encourage harmful and suspect tendencies in Iran to persist in their actions and accordingly to persist in declaring their hostility to Arab nationalism, to Iraq and even to the Palestinian Resistance at a subsequent time. They imagined that what we were saying stemmed from fear from the Iranian Revolution and that it was an attempt to win them over at the expense of the Iranian Revolution.

Communist or Marxist circles in the Palestinian Resistance, which in time had become tools for Soviet strategy, supported the revolution in Iran and cheered for it so they can stay in step with Soviet strategy in the region.

The Algerian regime set out to flatter Khomeyni's regime, and the good old relations between the Algerian regime and the Shah's regime emerged in a new context: that of support for the Islamic Revolution or an alliance between the Algerian and the Iranian revolutions for which there is no objective basis.

The Libyan regime adopted the Iranian Revolution and considered it an extension of Libya's Revolution which became an Islamic Revolution too. It was evident from the outset that the Libyan regime was flattering the Iranian regime to avoid the trouble the Iranian regime could create by stirring up the question of liquidating [Imam] Musa al-Sadr. As time went by the relationship between the Libyan and the Iranian regimes grew stronger as the two regimes mutually exchanged opportunist interests. It was evident that the primary objective of that relationship was to conspire against the party and the Revolution in Iraq because of the deranged hatreds that al-Qadhdhafi harbors for them and because of the suspect motives that characterize his policies and his positions. Al-Qadhdhafi was encouraged to pursue this course by the Syrian regime, by communist parties and by communist or Marxist Palestinian organizations.

But the role that the Syrian regime played [in this regard] was the most malicious and the most conniving of all.

As we indicated when we discussed the relationship with this regime after the Joint National Action Pact was concluded, this regime tried secretly and openly to strengthen its relations with the Iranian regime despite the fact that the Iranian regime was not hiding its hostility to Iraq and its conspiracy against it.

The suspect Syrian regime which is deeply involved in the game of sectarian conflicts in the region--most prominently its suspect role in Lebanon--thought that new conditions in Iran would weaken the patriotic and national revolutionary regime in Iraq. The Syrian regime thought that the new conditions in Iran would make it easier for it to realize its ambitious designs in the manner that we presented: it conspired with some traitors, former members of the command, and it considered the Iranian regime its ally and supporter in this scheme. The Syrian regime took advantage of its relations with the Iranian regime to get money out of Saudi Arabia and the weak regimes in the Gulf. Functionaries of the Syrian regime received bribes and grants on the basis of the fact that they can solve problems between those regimes in the Gulf and Iran. So did some people in Palestinian organizations.

The change that occurred in Iran, the developments that occurred in conditions in that country and these anti-national, unpatriotic and unprincipled positions that Iran assumed toward all Arab parties--positions we have already referred to--constitute a very grave situation.

Opportunities for foreign involvement in the region have now become available on a broad scale. U.S. imperialism, whose Camp David policy suffered a major setback when the Baghdad Summit was convened and when a good measure of Arab solidarity was realized after independent tendencies had become relatively prevalent as better opportunities became available to them, returned months after the Iranian

explosion and after [the crisis] of the U.S. hostages and exploited the tense situation. It exploited the feelings of anxiety and fear that reactionary Arab regimes had; it intensified its military presence in the region; and it promoted once again the old schemes about military bases and facilities in the countries of the region. The United States did in fact get facilities in Oman, and it got bases and facilities in Egypt, Sudan and Somalia.

The upshot of Iranian events at the present time is that U.S. influence in the region is now in a better position than it was after the Baghdad Summit. At the present time the United States is acting with greater ease than it did at that time. This became evident in the role that was played by U.S. envoy to Lebanon, Philip Habib, and it also became evident in the attitude that Arab regimes assumed toward the Reagan plan.

Although U.S. influence in the region grew, Soviet influence did not diminish, even though that would appear to be logical. The total unpatriotic and anti-nationalist policies that were followed by the Arab regimes and organizations that we referred to and the suspect positions of the Iranian regime increased the superpowers' lust [for power] and created for them better opportunities to penetrate and influence the region.

Elements supporting the Soviet Union in Iran, the Tudeh Party in particular, continued for a long time to support the most reactionary religious forces in Iran. They did so in a completely illogical manner that had nothing to do with any ideological standard or any rational, social or political analysis.

The only explanation for this "alliance" cannot be an ordinary one based on principle or politics. This alliance is a kind of opportunist "collusion" practiced by two conflicting parties who have ambitious designs about subsequent developments and conditions. Soviet Union supporters in Iran realize that the domination of the most reactionary and most extreme religious forces in that country will not lead to the establishment of a solid reactionary-religious "regime" in Iran. It is their judgment that this domination will first lead to the liquidation of all the forces of the Iranian opposition: those that are independent as well as those with relations to western circles. Soviet Union supporters also know that the domination of clergymen in Iran will lead to the further dissolution and weakness of the Iranian economy and the Iranian state. This would expose the conflicts that exist in Iranian conditions, and that would make it easier for them at the right moment to seize power in a "professional" operation, as was the case in Afghanistan and in other countries where communists seized control under similar conditions.

The Zionist entity realized some of its objectives as a result of conditions in Iran, just as it had planned to do from the beginning. It took advantage of Iran's aggression against Iraq and Iraq's preoccupation with opposing that aggression to organize an operation to bomb the nuclear reactor, to intensify its aggression against Lebanon and the Palestinian Resistance and to pursue a policy of threats and lawlessness without expecting a firm Arab response.

But at the same time the Zionist scheme suffered a setback because Iraq's decisive success in opposing the Iranian aggression foiled Zionist hopes for exploiting Iranian conditions to create an explosion in the region, stir up sectarian strife and divide the region into weak mini-states that strive against each

other. Such a situation would have made the Zionist state the strongest state in the region and given it in that context permanent legitimacy.

The common failure of the Zionist entity and the Iranian regime forced both to reveal the "actual" alliance that existed between them, particularly in the period during which Iran was preparing for its aggression against Iraq and after the outbreak of the war. So far a significant part of that actual alliance has been uncovered in the scandal about Zionist weapons to Iran. The uncovering of other parts of this "alliance" in the future is inevitable.

It may now be said that the final score of the effects conditions in Iran have had on the area is [as follows]:

1. Iran is continuing its aggression against our country. It has persisted in its conspiracy against the country, against the party and against the Revolution. Iran continues to entertain ambitious designs for expansion as we've explained in previous chapters.

2. As the days go by there is a growing awareness and a certainty in countries of the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf that the Iranian regime is entertaining real ambitious designs to expand against them and that its threat to them is a serious one.

3. This awareness of the Iranian threat has become clearer than it was in the past on the Arab scene and in general. The Iranian regime's determination to continue the war, its rejection of any peaceful settlement and also the development that is occurring in the countries of the Gulf and in Saudi Arabia have helped [develop] this awareness.

4. The alliance between the Syrian and the Libyan regime and the Iranian regime was uncovered; both these regimes revealed their positions clearly. They declared their willingness to engage Iraq in direct hostilities and to do so with the maximum means available. They also declared that they were prepared to face the Arab situation on that basis.

5. The relationship between Iran and Fatah was eroded. This relationship has not been broken completely, but it is no longer as close as it was in the past. Fatah is counting on the Iranian opposition and particularly the Mojahedin-e Khalq.

The situation in Iran still presents and will continue to present as long as this regime lasts, the greatest danger to the region. It will continue to be the biggest factor, after and beside Zionism, stirring up disturbances and instability in the region and increasing the influence and the involvement of the superpowers.

The main foundations and directions of this situation will not change, but like any political situation, this one is subject to existing conditions and balances. Therefore, the command has to continue observing and analyzing the situation; it has to deal with the new factors that come into the situation; and it has to assume appropriate positions accordingly.

Chapter Eight: Conditions and International Relations

The principal ingredients of the international conditions that were defined by

the political report which was issued by the Eleventh National Congress did not undergo a substantial change. However, events on the international scene have been following each other in a sequence; they contain changes and surprises that require proper analysis continuously and the assumption of proper positions accordingly.

As the forementioned report indicated, the previous period was characterized by the good understanding the party and the Revolution had for international conditions and for the changes that were occurring in those conditions. The party and the Revolution conducted themselves appropriately in the face of these conditions. The previous period was also characterized by Iraq's increased activity on the international scene, by its increased clout in international relations and by the fact that it occupied a prominent and effective position in the Third World and in the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

What are the main changes that came over international conditions in the period between the Eleventh National Congress and this congress? What is the relationship of these changes to our questions and our national conditions? What are the most prominent activities that were carried out by the party and its revolution in Iraq on this scene?

1. International Forces and the Palestinian Question

In our investigation of Arab conditions we said that al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and the Camp David Accords brought about a significant change in the political map of the Arab homeland and a new lineup on both the Arab and international scenes with regard to the settlement problem.

What is the change that occurred in the positions of international powers on this problem?

A. The United States

The United States of America has always maintained a position of supporting the Zionist enemy. It has been trying to do as much as possible, particularly after the October War, to attach its policies toward the region and toward the Arab-Zionist struggle to any possible measure of agreement between it and a number of regimes, particularly Saudi Arabia, the countries of the Arabian Gulf and some other regimes. The United States is concerned about its relations with these regimes, and it is also concerned about its relations with those regimes that are directly concerned with the settlement: the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian regimes.

However, a significant development did later take place in the U.S. position in this regard, particularly during Carter's administration. This was when the United States was attaching considerable importance to its relationship with the Egyptian regime in order [to ensure] the success of the direct negotiations between the Egyptian regime and the Zionist enemy and the application of the Camp David Accords and the peace agreements. [At that time] the Carter administration was not giving adequate attention to the positions of the other forementioned parties. Sometimes the Carter administration was even unconcerned about their protests and their anger; on the other hand, it was unconcerned about the damages and dangers this U.S. policy may create for these parties to threaten their destiny.

Despite the evil intentions it harbored for the Arab nation, this change in U.S. policy did actually have positive results from our national point of view, which advocates liberation from any form of association with and subordination to the superpowers. Not only did this change bring about a deeper awareness among the masses and national forces, but it also created a greater awareness of the dangers of relying on the superpowers, even among the regimes. This is because these powers do not in fact place any value on anything but their own private interests. They do not care about their allies and their followers when their interests so require.

The fall of the Shah's regime in Iran a short time after the Camp David Accords strengthened this tendency also. Events in Iran showed that the United States does not abide by [its] moral obligations to those who had served its policies for a long time. Events in Iran showed that in order to preserve its interests the United States would quickly and easily abandon those who had served its policies in the past.

Although this change is an important one, it does not mean that Arab regimes which had close relations with the United States abandoned these relations and began pursuing a national independent course. However, this change did at the time strengthen the national position calling for liberation from subordination and from reliance on the superpowers.

The substance of that U.S. position still exists. However, we have to take an important fact into account: despite the fact that constant factors in U.S. policy have continued to exist, the manifestations of that policy can be changed. It is also not impossible that relative changes would occur even in the constant factors of this policy. Because the new U.S. administration fears for its vital interests in the region, a tendency has developed in that administration which calls for not making overt and tactical associations between U.S. positions and the positions of the Zionist entity. This does not mean at all that there is a substantial change in the alliance between the United States and the Zionist entity. This alliance is a strategic fact that is not likely to change in the foreseeable future. However, this tendency does have significant implications and consequences on the course of the Arab-Zionist struggle. As we indicated, the U.S. administration, through the Zionist invasion of Lebanon which was carried out with U.S. approval, tried to show its displeasure with some of the particulars of the Zionist position. Also the plan which Reagan announced indicates there are differences between the United States and the Zionist entity regarding the view of how the so-called Middle East problem is to be dealt with.

It is essential to say that it would be a mistake to count on radical changes in the U.S. position taking place. However, that attitude must not be discounted. It would not hurt Arab interests if efforts were to be made to change the U.S. position, provided that those efforts are not made at the expense of the essential interests the Arab nation has in [achieving] full independence and regaining the rights of the nation and the Palestinian people.

We also have to observe the relationship and the mutual influence between the positions of countries in western Europe and the U.S. position on the so-called Middle East crisis. There are two basic facts [in this regard]:

First, the developments in the positions of countries in western Europe toward

the questions of the Middle East--and we will deal with those specifically later--express the relatively independent position of western Europe. However, they are not altogether unrelated to the U.S. position, and they are not completely detached from the positions held by some U.S. circles.

Second, just as the countries of western Europe are affected in one degree or another by U.S. positions on this and other international issues, the United States of America cannot altogether ignore the positions of the countries of western Europe. There are circles in the United States that are significantly influenced by these positions.

B. Western Europe

The positions of the countries of western Europe on the Arab-Zionist struggle underwent significant change during the years that followed the aggression of June 1967. Although this change has been slow, it continued to escalate from one period to the other until it reached the current position, which can change too.

The main ingredients behind this change are the growth of the economic and political standing of the Arab nation and the growth of western Europe's need to do business with the countries of the Arab homeland. This requires that appropriate adjustments be made in the political positions of these countries toward Arab countries and toward the questions of the Arab-Zionist struggle which occupy a central position with regard to the questions of the Arab nation. These positions of western Europe also demonstrate a growing measure of independence from the U.S. position.

This change in the positions held by countries of western Europe is a positive phenomenon that we must continue to encourage. Iraq's relations with most of the countries of this group, and with France in particular, and the activities it undertook to change these positions played a significant role in bringing about this change. The results of the Baghdad Summit Conference also played an important role in holding down support for the Camp David plan from the countries of western Europe. At the outset these countries had rushed to support this plan, but then they became critical of this plan and [eventually] assumed new positions on it.

However, we must not build irrelevant hopes on the positions held by West Europe on the Arab-Zionist struggle. The positions of this group of countries do not go beyond the framework of the peaceful settlement which was proposed after the October 1973 War. These positions were analyzed and specified by the political report that was issued by the Eleventh National Congress. Also although the positions of this group of countries regarding the Arab-Zionist struggle differ from those of the United States, these positions will not clash with those of the United States. Relations between the two parties are very close and would not allow for such a possibility. We must also not minimize the importance of the continued Zionist influence on decision making centers and centers that influence public opinion in western Europe. Zionist influence is still a concrete fact in western Europe even though it is gradually and very slowly being eroded.

Western Europe will continue its efforts to perform an increasingly important role in this matter. We have to keep track of this role through analysis and deduction. We have to benefit from the positive results of that role, and we have to criticize its negative consequences whenever that is called for.

The steadfastness of joint Arab action set by the Baghdad Summit is one of the main factors helping to consolidate the positions of western Europe and to bring about continuous change in those positions. Another is the fact that a joint Arab position--albeit a minimum--has continued to exist in the face of questions of the Arab-Zionist struggle. Any weakness or dissolution in this regard will be reflected on the positions of western Europe, and it will strengthen the U.S. course of dealing unilaterally with the region and with the Arab-Zionist struggle.

C. The Soviet Union and the Communist Bloc

The Soviet Union has continued its support for the Arab position against Zionist aggression. The Soviet Union's basic positions on the question of settling the dispute have not changed, but the political manifestations of these positions have differed from what they were in the past. After the defeat of June 1967 the Soviet Union pursued what may be called a policy of relative moderation in dealing with the Arab-Zionist struggle. However, with the continued bias of the Egyptian regime for the United States under al-Sadat's administration and the Soviet Union's loss of the significant positions it formerly had in Egypt--in fact Egypt turned into a center of hostility against the Soviet Union--the Soviet Union became more inclined to engage in political expressions that would create difficulties for the other party (the United States, Egypt and Israel). The Soviet Union began using indirect methods to prod regimes and elements subject to its influence or its tactical allies to follow this course.

Nevertheless, these expressions do not alter the Soviet Union's basic positions on this important matter. Besides, for the Soviet Union the Middle East is one of many international scenes where a multi-faceted struggle between it and the United States is taking place. Therefore, one cannot rely on the permanence of such expressions in Soviet policy toward the region. This is because [these expressions] depend on relations between the two superpowers in other regions of the world. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union will continue to support the Arab position in the context of a settlement plan, and it will continue to want to play an effective role in that settlement.

D. Non-Aligned and Third World Countries

Non-aligned countries have always sided with the Arabs against Zionist aggression. However, the position of this group of countries was determined in the context of the peaceful settlement that the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian regimes as well as the PLO accepted, particularly after the October War. Resolutions issued by the organizations of the group of non-aligned countries were prepared by the Arab countries in question and then easily approved by this group of non-aligned countries.

But the Camp David Accords created a new situation among the non-aligned countries, African countries and Islamic countries. In the past Egypt used to play an active role in formulating the positions of these groups of countries on the so-called Middle East crisis. Therefore, after the Baghdad Summit Conference Arab countries had to make extraordinary efforts among the countries that belong to these groups to make them support the course of the Baghdad Summit and condemn the Camp David Accords and the Egyptian position. In the African group because of the isolation of the Libyan regime and the Algerians' exclusive interest in the question of the Western Sahara, the African Conference that was convened in

Monrovia in 1979 issued a statement that can be considered favorable to al-Sadat's regime. Therefore, Iraq had to wage a sensitive and a difficult battle at the conference for non-aligned countries in Havana in September 1979 in order to get a significant resolution condemning Camp David and the policy of al-Sadat's regime. The resolution even called for the ouster of that regime from the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

At first, the group of African countries adhered to the Monrovia resolutions. These countries had negative attitudes toward Arab countries because of the irresponsible behavior of the Libyan regime toward them on the one hand and because of the effects that the energy problem had had on them on the other. This attitude was also shared by a number of Asian countries.

[Our] compatriot Saddam Husayn who headed the Iraqi delegation to Havana spent tireless efforts with the African leaders and with [the leaders of] some Asian and other countries so that the conference would come out with a position condemning the Camp David Accords and suspending the membership of al-Sadat's regime in the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

This resolution was considered a remarkable success, and Iraq had played a prominent part in bringing it about.

It may be said that the positions of the group of non-aligned countries were the best positions on the Palestinian question compared with the positions of other parties. However, follow-up efforts are required so that the positions of the countries of this group can be consolidated. Some countries of this group are subject to various kinds of pressures and influences that affect their positions.

2. Relations between International Forces and Basic Arab Questions

In the period that preceded the Eleventh National Congress, which analyzed Arab and international conditions, right-wing imperialism was expanding in the Arab region. It appeared as though the Soviet Union had been driven out of the region and that U.S. influence was strengthened considerably. This followed the Egyptian regime's aligning itself with the United States and the growth of Saudi Arabia's influence on Arab political conditions. Regarding relations between international powers it seemed as though detente had been strengthened considerably and that an agreement between the two superpowers over the prevailing situation in the Arab region was one of the prospects for detente.

In the report issued by the Eleventh National Congress the party called attention to a significant fact with two aspects.

The first aspect of that fact is that we must not take detente to be a total and a comprehensive agreement between the two superpowers. The report stated [the following] on page 204: "These relations, that is, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, regardless of the level they reach, have not yet and will not in the future cancel the struggle between these two countries and the countries that are in their camp. These relations have rather regulated that struggle, in a manner of speaking, giving it new forms and formulas that to a certain extent avoid tension, violence and direct methods.

"There is still a great deal that is in dispute in the context of these relations

between the United States and the Soviet Union, politically, militarily and economically. The military struggle between the two countries has taken on the character of war by proxy. Both parties make careful efforts not to cross the dangerous lines that would lead to a direct clash between them."

The second aspect of that fact which was affirmed by the report is that this region is one that is full of changes and surprises because political, economic, social, cultural and military factors and ingredients in it have not been established and stabilized.

Subsequent events confirmed the accuracy of this analysis and this conclusion.

The Soviet Union which has suffered successive losses in the Arab region became noticeably active in Africa. It provided extraordinary support to the communist side in Angola, and it then supported the Ethiopian regime in its battle for survival and in its military battle with Somalia. In the Arab homeland the Soviet Union strengthened its influence in southern Yemen. Then this was followed by events in Afghanistan which constituted a serious development in this regard.

The Soviet Union's policies have created a state of tension in the other camp. The U.S. and the western camp, which had begun to feel comfortable because Soviet influence in the region had been shrinking for years, began feeling worried and apprehensive about the policies of the Soviet Union and about the fact that it was getting strategically closer to the oil region.

It may be said that the present international situation is a tense one. The United States and some of its western allies have become very apprehensive about any change in the balances of power in the region that is not in their favor because of these positions that the Soviet Union took. After the record breaking swift collapse of the Shah's regime, U.S. and west European positions on the questions of the region constituted attempts to restore the balance in their favor. But in the Soviet Union it seems that a relatively intransigent trend is prevailing at the present time.

How did these relations affect conditions in the Arab region? How did they affect basic national questions?

It is an established fact confirmed by experience that peoples and small nations are harmed by detente between the superpowers just as they are harmed by a struggle between them. Therefore, one cannot say definitely that this situation or the other will be more beneficial or more harmful for peoples and small nations. The Arab nation and the countries of the Middle East are among these nations.

It is the conduct of these peoples and small nations toward the superpowers and toward the detente or the tension between them that plays an important role in determining the outcome.

The struggle to affirm the independence of the Arab nation, to keep it away from international blocs and to maintain its adherence to a course of real non-alignment is not at all easy. It requires long work and arduous efforts in various

1. Before the death of Brezhnev.

political, economic and cultural fields. It also requires, as we mentioned, new techniques and methods that are suitable to new conditions, challenges and dangers.

3. Iraq's International Relations and Its Activities on the International Scene

The main principles of international relations that Iraq has followed under the revolution of the party were determined several years ago. They were confirmed by the political report that was issued by the Eighth Regional Congress and by the political report that was issued by the Eleventh National Congress. These principles were also confirmed by the speeches of [our] compatriot Saddam Husayn.

But the previous period, particularly in recent years, was characterized by the growing importance of Iraq on the international scene. Iraq's international, political, economic and other relations were developed, and Iraq's activities on the international scene were also developed.

It is the stability of the revolutionary regime in Iraq, the steadfastness of its principles in international relations, the clarity of these principles to many countries of the world, the growth of Iraq's economic power, the progress of its development plan and the energetic initiatives of its leaders on the international scene that enabled Iraq to attain this standing for the first time in its modern history. Iraq is now considered one of the few countries in the world that is active on the international scene. It is also considered one of the leading countries in this field among countries of the Third World and the group of non-aligned countries.

Despite the conditions of the war with Iran and attempts by numerous international and Arab agencies to undermine Iraq's international position, Iraq's international position was not weakened. Iraq continued to grow and to develop in a normal manner. We preserved our bilateral relations with the countries of the world, and we continued to work to develop these relations in accordance with our wishes. All efforts aimed at preventing Iraq from playing a prominent role on the international scene failed.

What is the present score on Iraq's international relations? What are the basic points in this regard?

A. Relations with Countries of Western Europe and Japan

In recent years Iraq's relations with most countries of western Europe changed. Good relations with France and also with Spain continued. Relations with these two countries involved political, economic, military and cultural areas. Relations with Italy also changed. Relations with the other countries of western Europe were mostly economic in nature, and political relations with them did not rise to the standard of economic relations.

As mentioned in the political report that was issued by the Eighth Regional Congress and in the political report that was issued by the Eleventh National Congress, changing relations with western Europe on the bases of full independence is quite consistent with Iraq's national interests and with supreme national interests. Therefore, what is required is that this course be continued during the next stage.

The economic aspect of relations with Japan continued to develop, and there was some growth in the political aspect [of these relations] as well. [Our] leaders had identified Japan several years ago as one of the important countries in the areas of industry and technology and as a country that was likely to play a more important role as time went by. Therefore, [our] leaders have maintained the course of developing relations with that country.

B. Relations with the Soviet Union and with Socialist Countries

[Our] leaders explained the nature of relations with the Soviet Union and with the socialist countries in the political report that was issued by the Eighth Regional Congress. These relations were also analyzed by the political report that was issued by the Eleventh National Congress.

It may be said that the experience we had in our relations with the Soviet Union during the previous period has developed the leaders' view and their experience regarding this matter.

Current fundamental facts in our relations with the Soviet Union still lie in the framework of the view we defined from the beginning. It is a view that coincides with our national interests and with the supreme national interest. It is essential that friendly and cooperative relations with the Soviet Union and with countries of the socialist bloc continue in those areas where cooperation presently exists.

C. Relations with China

[Our] leaders have tried to develop relations with China in the context of an all-inclusive view of international relations and along the course that has been set at party congresses to establish balanced relations with international powers. Significant progress has actually been made in that direction recently, and China has been quite responsive about developing cooperation with Iraq.

D. Relations with Non-Aligned Countries and with Third World Countries

Despite the party's affirmation that it was essential to develop the Revolution's activities in the Movement of Non-aligned countries and to develop its relations with Third World countries, the activities of the Revolution in most years of the past period were less than ambitious. Participation in past conferences for non-aligned countries was not at a high level. Also there were few high level visits between Iraq and the countries of this movement, with the exception of Yugoslavia, India and Cuba. Saddam Husayn had been interested in relations with these countries when he was vice president of the Revolutionary Command Council.

This situation was not consistent with the growth of Iraq's role in the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and with the growth of its international prestige.

[Our] leaders realized the importance of being active in this movement and the necessity of expanding the scope of relations with the countries of that movement on the basis of the appreciation felt by the party and the Revolution for the importance of the non-alignment policy. Being active in that movement and expanding relations with non-aligned countries would enable Iraq to play its leadership role in that movement before, during and after the seventh conference.

On the basis of that assessment it was decided that the president would participate personally in the sixth conference despite the special conditions that the country was going through at that time. That conference was held in Havana.

The president's participation and the active and effective role he played at the conference had a major effect on developing Iraq's position and its role in this movement. Iraq has emerged in a position of having a primary Arab role in this movement. Iraq was also one of the foremost active and effective countries in that movement.

After the conference adjourned, an intense program was organized to receive in Baghdad leaders of non-aligned countries, particularly African leaders, and to exchange visits with them.

Baghdad became an active center among the group of non-aligned countries ever since [our] compatriot Saddam Husayn became president. Between July 1979 and until the war with Iran broke out, a large number of heads of state, prime ministers and senior officials in non-aligned countries visited Iraq. These meetings continued despite the conditions of war.

As this activity continues, Iraq's leadership position in this movement will be strengthened.

Iraq has assumed the responsibility of playing an active leadership role in the Third World and in the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. Iraq has also assumed the responsibility of offering significant economic assistance to these countries.

It is essential that this matter be looked into.

Playing an active role in the group of non-aligned countries, strengthening that movement and offering economic assistance to these countries are actions that in the judgment of the party stem from two premises: the first has to do with principles, and the second is strategic and scientific.

From the standpoint of principle, the revolution in Iraq, which constitutes a main base of support in the Arab Revolutionary Movement, is part of the general human struggle for freedom, independence, progress and peace that is based on justice. It is natural for the revolution in Iraq to contribute all its capabilities to strengthen people's struggle for these noble objectives. The Arab revolution does not confine itself to its regional or national environment. It is rather a revolution with a humanitarian message. The strategic and practical aspect of this policy lies in its adherence to national and pan-Arab independence and its safeguarding of the free, national and pan-Arab will from the influences of international powers. This cannot be realized by spontaneous regional and national factors alone, although these provide the basis [for this policy]. National and pan-Arab independence and free will must also be protected in an international framework. Therefore, the power of the non-alignment movement is power for our future course and our free will. If the movement is weak, we would then have to confront our battles alone in the face of attempts by major countries to infringe upon our national and pan-Arab independence. There is a major, strategic difference between the two cases.

During the fifties and the sixties the nature of the struggle and the activity

that took place between the peoples of the Third World and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries was political. That period was one in which the peoples of Africa and Asia got their independence. It was a period of struggle against military alliances. But in the present period, with the continued importance of the political factor and of political activity, the economic problem is assuming critical proportions in the Third World. The people of the Third World are suffering new and debilitating difficulties because of the global economic crisis that has been produced by inflation and by increases in energy prices. Therefore, and particularly since Iraq is known to have large economic capabilities, it is actually no longer possible for Iraq to play a leadership role among the countries of the Third World and the non-aligned countries without concentrating on the economic factor and offering concrete assistance to these countries.

From this accurate analysis of the nature of the period Third World nations and the movement of non-aligned countries are going through, Iraq carried out its well-known initiative with regard to Third World nations to deal with economic conditions on a global scale. Hence came the plan that [our] compatriot Saddam Husayn presented at the Havana conference. That plan was received with appreciation and with interest by most conference participants. From this premise also Iraq proceeded to offer sizable economic assistance to friendly countries which found in it a splendid example of a position based on principle, a position that is humane and that has nothing to do with selfish interests and an exploitative outlook.

The course Iraq has pursued in dealing with countries of the Third World and with non-aligned countries has not only strengthened its standing on the international scene, but it has also helped people of the world gain a better understanding of the substance of the Arab Revolutionary Movement, which was distorted by parties claiming to represent it in the past. This course has also stabilized the positions of these countries in favor of pan-Arab causes, chiefly the Palestinian cause.

E. Relations with Progressive Parties and Liberation Movements in the World

The political report that was issued by the Eleventh National Congress stated the following: "The party and its revolution in Iraq have offered many forms of material and moral support to international liberation movements fighting against colonialism and racial discrimination. That is a good accomplishment. During the next period, however, the party and its revolution in Iraq must emerge as a center of active support for these forces who share our common objectives. This is considered one of the main conditions for strengthening the standing of the party among the ranks of the Arab Revolutionary Movement and of the progressive forces in the world.

"The revival of the human struggle for freedom, independence and progress strengthens capabilities for reviving the Arab Revolutionary Movement. It strengthens the movement's role and the leadership role of our party in it. These two sides influence each other."

The activity of the party and the revolution has gone in this direction during the past period.

Although the party is not part of any organized international group that facilitates international relations for it with remaining parties and liberation movements, its standing was strengthened among libertarian and progressive circles worldwide even though the communist party and its international and Arab allies have been engaged in attempts to distort the party and conspire against it. Other Arab parties, such as the Libyan and Syrian regimes, were also engaged in attempts and conspiracies against the party.

Today the party has broad relations with most socialist and progressive parties and liberation movements in Africa, Latin America, Asia and Europe. The party has become a well-known power, and its principles and political positions are now known better than they were in the past. The party's positions are now receiving more appreciation and respect.

The party offers material and moral assistance to many liberation movements in Africa. All the movements that gained independence [with the party's assistance] recognize the supporting role that the party and the revolution have played. The party offers fraternal assistance to socialist and progressive parties and movements everywhere in the world. The party offers that assistance to fulfill its obligations of principle toward the question of freedom and progress in the world.

The coming stage requires that this course continue. It requires that more intellectual, political and organizational efforts be made in accordance with the program that was approved by the Eleventh National Congress.

Now that the party has achieved broad, horizontal relations with most progressive parties and forces and international liberation movements, it is essential in this regard that it devote special efforts to strengthen its relations with socialist parties, movements and forces that follow an independent course in international relations and believe in the principles of non-alignment. It is not essential that this course be one of confrontation with other parties. But it is essential that good relations continue to be established with communist parties in countries that are ruled by communist parties and in other countries as well whenever possible. It is [also] essential that parties and movements which believe in full independence, just as they believe in the principles of freedom, justice and progress, become engaged in distinguished activities on the global scene. That would coincide and be consistent with official activities that are carried out in the context of the Movement of Non-Aligned countries; it would even complement such activities.

The coming period also requires that the party expand the circle of its political relations with all political parties in the world with whom we find that we have common issues. These issues need not be identical, and these parties need not be socialist. We must expand the circle of these political relations particularly in western Europe where these parties and some organizations play significant roles in shaping public opinion in their countries. It is essential that we strengthen our relations with these countries to counter Zionist propaganda.

Relations between the party and the Revolution and political movements in the world became quite evident at the conference that was held in Baghdad in July 1981 to show solidarity with Iraq against the Zionist aggression. Despite the war

with Iran and the determination of numerous agencies to boycott the party and the conference in particular, this conference was attended by 149 parties, organizations and Arab and foreign figures. Speeches were made at that conference that reflected the prestige that the party and the Revolution in Iraq enjoy in that area.

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